JUDGMENT Rajiv Sharma, J. This petition is directed against the judgment, dated 7.9.2010 passed by learned Appellate Authority (II), Shimla in Rent Appeal No.62-S/14 of 93. 2. “Key facts” necessary for the adjudication of this petition are that in the year 1985, the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents, Ram Lubhaya Shegal, (hereinafter referred to as the “landlord” for the sake of convenience) filed an eviction petition under Section 14 of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 against the petitioner (hereinafter referred to as the “tenant” for the sake of convenience) for vacation of rented premises, i.e. one set in ground floor of Sehgal Cottage, Jakhu, Shimla, on the following three grounds:- 1) That there was change of user by the tenant on the ground that she used the rented premises for the purpose other than for which it was let out. 2) That the tenant had committed acts which have impaired materially the value and utility of the residential premises. 3) That the tenant was guilty of causing private nuisance and the acts committed by her had materially affected health comfort and convenience of landlord as well as neighbourers residing in the building in question. 3. According to the landlord, the premises in question were let out to the tenant for residential purpose. She converted the same into non-residential by commercializing a part thereof. She did not take any consent of the landlord. One of the rooms was converted into a temple and she was receiving donations from the devotees. She started using part of the premises as a source of permanent income. She committed acts, which materially impaired value and utility of the premises in question and damaged permanently water pipes, fittings and fixtures. The tenant was guilty of causing nuisance. A number of devotees used to visit the temple daily and despite repeated requests, she did not stop nuisance. She was creating sounds by chanting Bhajans and Kirtans and by using loud speakers. 4. The petition was resisted by the tenant. According to her, the petition was filed in order to pressurize her to increase rent of the premises in question. She was using the premises in question only for residential purpose and she had not converted any portion of the premises in question into a temple. She had not committed any act which created nuisance to the occupiers of the building or adjoining building. She was using the premises in question only for residential purpose and she had not converted any portion of the premises in question into a temple. She had not committed any act which created nuisance to the occupiers of the building or adjoining building. She had not caused materially impairment to the value and utility of the premises in question. 5. Learned Rent Controller vide order dated 30.6.1993 held that the landlord could not establish allegations of change of user and impairment to the value and utility of the premises in question. However, he held that nuisance to the occupiers of the building and neighbourhood was established and allowed the eviction petition on this ground. Against the order dated 30.6.1993, the landlord as well as tenant both filed appeals before the learned Appellate Authority. The appeal filed by the landlord was dismissed and the appeal filed by the tenant was allowed vide judgment dated 21.3.1996. The landlord preferred revision petition against the judgment dated 21.3.1996 and vide judgment dated 10.11.2000, this Court partly allowed the revision petition and the findings of the Rent Controller on change of user and impairment of value and utility of the premises in question were affirmed while findings of the Appellate Authority on the ground of nuisance were set aside and the case was remanded back to the Appellate Authority, who vide judgment dated 29.10.2001 again accepted the appeal filed by the tenant. The landlord preferred revision petition against the judgment of the Appellate Authority dated 29.10.2001, which was accepted by the Court vide judgment dated 8.3.2010 and the case was again remanded back to the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority vide judgment dated 7.9.2010 dismissed the appeal filed by the tenant. Hence, the present petition. 6. Mr. Jeevesh Sharma, learned Advocate, has vehemently argued that all the three grounds taken by the landlord for eviction of the tenant were interlinked. He then argued that the learned authorities below have not correctly appreciated oral as well as documentary evidence. He lastly contended that the landlord has not produced any witness from the immediate neighbourhood. 7. Mr. Y.P. Sood, learned Advocate, has supported the impugned judgment dated 7.9.2010. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the impugned judgment and record carefully. 9. He lastly contended that the landlord has not produced any witness from the immediate neighbourhood. 7. Mr. Y.P. Sood, learned Advocate, has supported the impugned judgment dated 7.9.2010. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the impugned judgment and record carefully. 9. The landlord in the application filed under Section 14 of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 has taken following specific ground, on which eviction was sought:- That the tenant was guilty of causing private nuisance and the acts committed by her had materially affected health comfort and convenience of landlord as well as neighbourers residing in the building in question. 10. The tenant filed the following reply to the same:- “Para 18(i)(ii) of the petition is also wrong and hence denied. The respondent has not committed any act, which may be nuisance to the occupiers of the building or the adjoining building. The allegations have been concocted by the petitioner.” 11. The tenant has not specifically denied the averments contained in the eviction petition. The reply filed the tenant was evasive without controverting the specific ground of nuisance, as reproduced hereinabove, taken in the petition by the land lord. 12. PW1, Kamal Sharma, deposed that he knew the landlord. He remained his tenant w.e.f. 1976 to 1981. Malti Negi, tenant, in the year 1980 started using one of the rooms as temple and the devotees started visiting the same. According to him, kirtan was used to be performed throughout night and the frequency of the same used to increase on every Tuesday and Sunday. According to him, one of the reasons for vacating the premises by him was use of premises as temple by the tenant. In cross-examination, he deposed that one brass idol was placed in the room and one photograph of the idol was placed on the ply board. These idols were placed on a trunk. 13. PW2, Om Parkash Sharma, deposed that he took photographs vide Ext.PW3/A, negative whereof were Ext. PW2/C. 14. PW3, Ashok Sharma, deposed that he was also a tenant in Sehgal Cottage owned by the landlord from August 1981 to September 1982. He was residing in ground floor, Set No.2. Malti Negi was also residing there at that time. She was in possession of two rooms, one kitchen and having joint amenities of bath room and latrine. PW2/C. 14. PW3, Ashok Sharma, deposed that he was also a tenant in Sehgal Cottage owned by the landlord from August 1981 to September 1982. He was residing in ground floor, Set No.2. Malti Negi was also residing there at that time. She was in possession of two rooms, one kitchen and having joint amenities of bath room and latrine. Out of two rooms, one room was being used for residential purposes and other was being used for temple. Near about 25-30 devotees used to visit the temple. She was creating noise by using loud speaker in the temple. She was using the room as temple even at night hours. He left the premises only because of disturbance and nuisance created by her. In cross-examination, he admitted that only Bhajans were chanted on the loudspeakers by her. 15. PW4, Raj Lal, deposed that tenant, Malti Negi, had two rooms in the ground floor. One of the rooms was being used for residential purpose and the other room was being used as temple. He had seen about 15-20 devotees visiting the temple. In cross-examination, he deposed that he went inside the premises of tenant Malti Negi in the year 1982-83 and at that time about 18-20 ladies were sitting inside her room. Kirtan was being performed in the premises. 16. PW5, A.K. Verma, deposed that he remained tenant in Sehgal Cottage in the year 1981. Malti Negi was residing there as tenant. She was using one room as Temple. He also visited the temple for about 2-3 times. At that time, about 20-30 devotees were sitting in the temple. The temple used to remain open till 10-11 P.M. 17. PW6, Narender Kumar, deposed that he knew tenant Malti Devi since 1980. He visited the disputed premises. He had seen a brass idol placed in the room. At that time about 20-30 devotees were sitting and Kirtan was being performed by using loudspeaker, which was creating noise. 18. RW1 Malti Negi, deposed that she was not using one of the rooms as temple in the disputed premises. She was using the rooms for residential purposes. She had placed the bed in both the rooms. She had not placed any idol in the room. She never performed Kirtan in the dispute premises. She never caused any discomfort to the neighbours. According to her, she never used loudspeaker. 19. She was using the rooms for residential purposes. She had placed the bed in both the rooms. She had not placed any idol in the room. She never performed Kirtan in the dispute premises. She never caused any discomfort to the neighbours. According to her, she never used loudspeaker. 19. RW2, Gurmeet Singh, deposed that Malti Devi was using the premises in question for residential purpose only. The disputed premises were not being used as temple by Malti Devi. There was only one photograph, which is generally found in every house. 20. RW3, Devender Kumar, deposed that the disputed premises were being used for residential purposes only. He never saw any temple in the disputed premises. 21. What emerges from the evidence discussed, hereinabove, is that Malti Devi, tenant, was using one room in the disputed premises as temple. She had placed one brass idol in the room. She had been using loudspeaker. It has come on record that a lot of devotees used to visit the temple. According to PW1, Kamal Sharma, though he was tenant of the landlord, but he left the premises due to nuisance created by the devotees of the temple. PW3, Ashok Sharma, specifically stated that near about 25-30 devotees used to visit the temple. The tenant had been using the loud speaker in the temple. She was using the room as temple even at night hours. He had to leave the premises only because of disturbance and nuisance created by her. PW4,Raj Lal, had also seen about 18-20 ladies sitting inside the temple and Kirtan was being performed in the disputed premises. PW5, A.K. Verma, also stated that the tenant was using one room as Temple. He had also visited the temple for about 2-3 times and found about 20-30 devotees sitting in the temple. The temple used to remain open till 10-11 P.M.. PW6, Narender Kumar, deposed that he had seen a brass idol placed in the room by the tenant. About 20-30 devotees were sitting the temple and Kirtan was being performed by using loudspeaker, which was creating noise. Statements of the witnesses produced by the tenant are only of simplicter denial. As noticed above, the tenant has not controverted the specific ground of nuisance taken by the landlord in her reply filed to the eviction petition. About 20-30 devotees were sitting the temple and Kirtan was being performed by using loudspeaker, which was creating noise. Statements of the witnesses produced by the tenant are only of simplicter denial. As noticed above, the tenant has not controverted the specific ground of nuisance taken by the landlord in her reply filed to the eviction petition. The landlord has established that the tenant had been creating nuisance by converting one room into a temple. The temple was being visited frequently by a number of devotees. Even the tenant had been using the loud speaker at odd hours. The nuisance caused by the tenant to the occupiers of the building and neighbourhood was substantial and significant and it cannot be termed as only inconvenience. Since the landlord has examined few witnesses, who were occupying the same building as his tenants, to substantiate ground of nuisance, it was not necessary for the landlord to produce the witnesses from the neighbourhood also. The witnesses produced by the tenant were not residing in the close proximity to the premises in question. 22 In Jayanti Prasad and others vs. Trilok Chand Jain and others, 1977 (9) RCR 16, learned Division Bench of Allahabad High Court has that the word “nuisance” is a word of wide import. It will include all which in any way prejudices the right of an owner of a property or a thing to enjoy the benefit thereof. A nuisance also will be one which prejudicially affects the physical health, or hurts the legitimate emotion of a person. Learned Division Bench has held as under:- 5. We need not for the purpose of disposing of this appeal consider the wider question involved in the second argument raised on behalf of the defendant-appellants. Mere so now when U.P. Act No. III of 1947 has been repealed and the new Act, being U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 has been enforced, which does not contain any provision in respect of the creation of nuisance, being a ground for eviction of a tenant without the permission of the District Magistrate, the question will not arise in future. We, therefore, prefer to confine ourselves to the first argument based on the contention that on the facts established in the instant case the ratio of decision in the case of Ganga Prasad v. Chaube Jagdish Prasad (supra) will not apply. We, therefore, prefer to confine ourselves to the first argument based on the contention that on the facts established in the instant case the ratio of decision in the case of Ganga Prasad v. Chaube Jagdish Prasad (supra) will not apply. We find much force and tenability in the contention raised on behalf of the defendant-tenants that they having asserted bona fide a claim tenancy to other portion of the building which claim was adjudicated upon and litigation in regard to which was fought upto to the High court would not by itself be an act of nuisance on the part of the defendants. We think when a party in assertion of a bona fide title to the property or a bona fide claim to some interest therein goes before a court of law or is compelled to go before a court of law, it will not involve any element of nuisance centering into his conduct. The work ‘nuisance’ is a word of wide import. It will include all which in any way prejudices the right of an owner of a property or a thing to enjoy the benefit thereof. A nuisance also will be one which prejudicially affects the physical health or hurts the legitimate emotion of a person. Of course, the word ‘nuisance’ used in sub-section (1((d) of Section 3 of U.P. Act No. III of 1947 has not been used in the sense of physical injury or emotional injury but it has been used in the first sense., i.e. preventing the owner from using for his own benefit and enjoyment the property or thing owned by him. It is only when some mala fide or wanton act is done by a party which is high handed and the manner of doing it would be of a nature which causes pain to the owner of a property it may amount to creating a nuisance but to bring in a bona fide assertion and claim and doing of something by a party in assertion of that claim which he considers rightful, though it may hurt the feelings of the true owner of that property and may entail some amount of pain to him, would not be a nuisance in our way of thinking. If that were the meaning given to the word ‘nuisance’ occurring in Section 3 (1)(d) of U.P. Act No. III of 1947 then no tenant would be safe where the asserts some bona fide right in regard to any accommodation and the parties have to litigate about it. The facts in the case of Ganga Prasad v. Chaube Jagdish Prasad (Supra) established on the part of the defendant-tenant high-handed and wanton action and a complete absence of any bona fide assertion as to a rightful claim. It was in those circumstances that the learned Judge found for the plaintiff-landlord. Here in the instant case as pointed out above the facts do not warrant such a conclusion. It is well established in this Court that a finding whether a set of circumstances and the facts established on the record amount to a nuisance within the meaning of law is not a finding of fact but a mixed finding of fact and law and can be interfered with in second appeal. 23 In Gopal Vaman vs. Krishnaji Tatyarao, 1979 (2) R.C.R., learned Single Judge of Karnataka High Court has held that what is nuisance or annoyance is essentially a question of fact depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Anything done which unwarrantably affects the rights of others, endangers life or health, gives offence to the senses, violates the laws of decency or obstructs the comfortable and reasonable use of property may amount to nuisance. Learned Single Judge has held as under:- 9. The expressions ‘nuisance, and ‘annoyance’ have nowhere been defined in the Act. According to shorter Oxford Dictionary ‘Nuisance’ means anything injurious or the community to or the individual as a member of it, for which some legal remedy may be found. Literally, it means anything that causes annoyance or that works hurt or injury, harm or prejudice to an individual or the public or anything wrongfully done or permitted which injures or annoys another in the legitimate enjoyment of his legal rights. It may be an interference in the enjoyment of the property or an interference with one’s personal comfort. To put it in short, anything done which unwarrantably affects the rights of others, endangers life or health, gives offence to the senses violates the laws of decency or obstructs the comfortable and reasonable use of property may amount to nuisance. It may be an interference in the enjoyment of the property or an interference with one’s personal comfort. To put it in short, anything done which unwarrantably affects the rights of others, endangers life or health, gives offence to the senses violates the laws of decency or obstructs the comfortable and reasonable use of property may amount to nuisance. However, no precise rule can be laid down as to the degree of inconvenience or discomfort that would be a nuisance, but to constitute nuisance the injury caused that would be a nuisance, but to constitute nuisance the injury cased must be real and not fanciful or imaginary. Ti must not be such as results only in trifling inconvenience, (Vide Noider Mal. V. Ugar Sain Jain(1). 10. Annoyance also more or less means the same thing as nuisance, A systematic discourtesy shown by one to his neighbours may be a nuisance. Similarly, constant abusing or using vulgar language or persisting in creating loud noise by a neighbour may constitute a nuisance or annoyance. Therefore, what is a nuisance or annoyance is essentially a question of fact depending upon the facts and circumstance of each case. Each case therefore to be judged on the facts and circumstance of that case. 24 In S.U.S. Davey and sons vs. Liberty Dry Cleaners, 1980(1) RLR, learned Single Judge of Madras High Court has held that it is not necessary that the tenants must have been either instrument or must abet the commission of the offence. Merely because there had not been a police complaint or any enquiry it does not cease to be nuisance. 20. The frequent quarrels and use of abusive language have been persistent. I do not think, I need elaborate on this. It also requires to be noted that eh Rent Controller is right when he says that if the evidence of PW 1 was not true nothing prevented the tenants from examining anyone of the servants to contradict the same. I also find that Exhibit P-6 has not been replied to. Therefore, a against these evidence, there is no contra evidence. These evidence if accepted clearly make out a case of nuisance to the occupier. The appellate authority is not right when he states that the tenants must have been either instrumental or must abet the commission of the offence. Law does not lay down such a qualification. Therefore, a against these evidence, there is no contra evidence. These evidence if accepted clearly make out a case of nuisance to the occupier. The appellate authority is not right when he states that the tenants must have been either instrumental or must abet the commission of the offence. Law does not lay down such a qualification. Then again merely because there had not been a police complaint or was there any enquiry, it does not cease to be a nuisance. This decision in Janakiraman v. Nagammal (6), relied on by the appellate authority has no bearing. Then again, the appellate authority erred in holding “We do not know whether the servants used indecent language or whether they retaliated when the son and daughters of P.W. 1 obstructed them from using the F.O.L or well.” The appellate authority had merely indulged in surmises instead of rendering positive evidence. The only evidence is, as I held earlier of PW 1 and also Exhibit P-6, which have not been controverted in any manner. 21. Therefore, reversing the findings of eth appellate authority under this head. I hold the tenants are guilty of such acts and conduct which constitute a nuisance, and thereby, they are liable to be evicted under section 10(2)(v) of the Act. I am in entire agreement with the findings of the Rent Controller on this score. Accordingly, the revision will stand allowed. There will be no order as to costs. The tenant will be given time till 31st January, 1980, to hand over vacant possession. The Executing Court, if and when the landlords file such a petition, shall not grant any further time than 31st January, 1980. 25 In A.V.R. Seshagiri Rao vs. Garlapati Jagannadha Murthy, 1987 (1) RCR 67, learned Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court has explained the term “nuisance” as under:- 9. “Nuisance” is an uncertain and indeterminate word and it is not capable of definite meaning. In ‘Law Lexicon’ by Justice T.P. Mukherjee Vol. II(1982 Edition) it is stated that eh term ‘nuisance is incapable of exact and exhaustive definition. The word ‘nuisance’ is derived from French word ‘nuire’ which means ‘to injurious, hurt or harm.’ According to Shorter Oxford Dictionary, it means ‘anything injurious or obnoxious legal remedy may be found. ‘Literally anything that causes annoyance or that works hurt or injury harm or prejudice to individual or the public—“ 10. The word ‘nuisance’ is derived from French word ‘nuire’ which means ‘to injurious, hurt or harm.’ According to Shorter Oxford Dictionary, it means ‘anything injurious or obnoxious legal remedy may be found. ‘Literally anything that causes annoyance or that works hurt or injury harm or prejudice to individual or the public—“ 10. InWebster encyclopedic dictionary ‘nuisance’ defined as some thing or some one annoying or that which is obnoxious or offensive or irritating. As I have already stated no evidence has been produced to establish that the acts of studying and sleeping in the western hall of the central hall committed by the children of the petitioner tenant cause any annoyance or irritation to any one of the occupiers of other portions in the same building. Such acts of sleeping and study normally cannot be said to have the effect of causing annoyance or irritation to others unless it was proved that the other occupiers were in any way annoyed or hurt or injured or put to such inconvenience as to cause a nuisance. When no such evidence was forth coming eviction could not be ordered having regard to the facts of this case under clause (iv) of sub-section (2) of Section 10. In those circumstances the Judgment under revision set aside and the judgment of the Rent Controller is confirmed. The Civil Revision Petition is accordingly allowed. but in the circumstances there shall be no order as to costs. 26. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Narpatchand A. Bhandari vs. Shantilal Moolshankar Jani and another, 1993(2) RCR 133 have held that radio aerials and T.V. antennas of adjoining neighbouring tenements removed by the tenant amounts to acts of nuisance and annoyance as it affected normal living of neighbouring occupants. 10. The second contention of the learned counsel for the appellant-defendant relates to correctness of the findings of the appellate court recorded respecting acts of nuisance and annoyance constituting the ground for recovery of possession of premises by the plaintiffs from the defendants. According to the learned counsel, those findings not having been based on the evidence on record, become unsustainable. We are unable to find any merit in this contention. According to the learned counsel, those findings not having been based on the evidence on record, become unsustainable. We are unable to find any merit in this contention. The findings as to the acts of nuisance and annoyance attributable to the defendant and the person who were residing in the premises are (i) that the defendant who was a tenant in a premises (tenement) in the storeyed building, erected a Rangeen Mill (Textile Printing Mill) on the terrace of the storeyed building and ran it during nights so as to make the occupiers of the adjoining and neighbouring tenements in the storeyed residential building suffer the vibrations and noise in the building arising on account of the running of the Mill and loose their quit and sleep during nights: (ii) that the defendant unauthorizedly utilized the water stored in the common over-head tanks on the terrace meant for domestic use of all the occupiers of tenements in the building, for running his of rangeen Mill – a non-domestic purpose; (iii) that the defendant and the persons residing with him in the premises had adjoining and neighbouring tenements which had been fixed above the common terrace the building (iv) that the defendant and the persons residing in the premises of were wrongly preventing the plaintiffs and their workers in reaching the common terrace for repairs of radio aerials, T.V. antennas, telephone lines and the likes of the occupiers of the neighbouring tenements in the building by blocking its staircase. 13. There are no statutory definitions of ‘nuisance’ or ‘annoyance’ which under section 13 (1)(c) of the Act constitute a ground for recovery possession by landlord of a premises in the occupation of a tenant. In the case with which we are concerned, the acts of nuisance or annoyance complained of are committed by tenant and persons residing with him in the premises which is a tenement (flat) lying amidst other tenements (flats) of the one and same storeyed building. The acts of the defendant or persons residing with him in the tenanted premises which are found as acts causing nuisance or annoyance to adjoining or neighbouring occupiers, cannot fall short of being acts of nuisance or annoyance if regard is had to their nature, intensity and duration and the consequential ill-effects which might have been produced by them on the normal living of suchoccupiers. Further, when the particular acts of the defendant or persons residing with him in the premises (flat) of a storeyed building said to have caused nuisance or annoyance to the occupiers of adjoining or neighbouring occupiers of tenements (flats) in the very same storeyed building are seen, they cannot make us thin k that they were not clear acts of nuisance or annoyance envisaged under section 13 (1)(c) of the Acts because of the intolerable inconveniences, sufferings, humiliations which must have been caused to the adjoining or neighbouring occupiers, due regard being given to the locality of the storeyed building, the class of the people living in the tenements of the storeyed building and the nature of living to which they were accustomed. Even otherwise the acts, said to have been committed by the defendant and persons residing with him in the premises when are, as stated, found by the fact finding courts, to have amounted to acts of nuisance or annoyance entitling the plaintiff of the premises from the defendant and when the High ‘Court, has refused to interfere with such finding in exercise of its Writ jurisdiction there could be no justification whatever for use to interfere with the same in this appeal under article 136 of the Constitution. 27. In P.D. Trivedi vs.Chandanben M. Shah, 1999(1) RCR 45, learned Single Judge of Gujarat High Court has held that following points must exist to hold the action of tenant as causing nuisance or annoyance as under:- “11. What amounts to nuisance of annoyance has been considered in three cases decided by this Court, in Gaurishanker V. Bhikhalal, 1977 (18) Guj LR 805: 1977 (2) RCR 512 (Guj) while dealing with the ambit of Section 13(1)(c) of the Act, it was observed that following points must exist to hold the action of the tenant as causing annoyance or nuisance:- (1) It must be of a gross character. (2) It must be of an unusual character (3) It must be frequent and persistent. (4) It must be such that one cannot ordinarily expect in a household. (2) It must be of an unusual character (3) It must be frequent and persistent. (4) It must be such that one cannot ordinarily expect in a household. (5) It must be such that it would not be possible for the neighbours to lead a normal life which one can hope to live in a busy town or city.” 28 In Seshadri Iyengar and others vs. P.V. Ramadas, 2004(1) RCR 551, learned Single Judge of Karnataka High Court has explained the word “nuisance” as under:- “9. The contention of the learned counsel for the tenant is wholly untenable and cannot be accepted for the reasons mentioned hereunder: (a) In paragraphs 8 and 9 of the order under revision the trial Court has elaborately dealt with the nuisance alleged against the tenant. It is alleged that the tenant has removed the pump-set and shifted it to a different place. The tenant denied the same in the cross-examination he has admitted shifting of the motor. It has to be held that it was too much on the part of the tenant to do so. When a motor is installed at a particular place by the landlord, the tenant cannot shift the same to the place of his choice. The act of the tenant amounts to behaving as if he is the landlord of the property. From the order of the trial Court it is seen that the tenant has to pay 40% of water charges. That being his liability, shifting of motor was not within the domain of the tenant and he has no right to do so. It is pertinent to note that the shifting of motor was made when there was difference of opinion regarding quantum of rent in the year 1996, during which period the tenant filed HRC No. 416/96 for depositing the rents under Section 19 of the Act and another suit in O.S. No. 3194/96 seeking permanent injunction. (b) The other nuisance alleged against the tenant is that the tenant and his family members are parking their vehicles in the common passage causing obstruction to other tenants. The landlord has produced photograph Ex. P-9 showing parking of vehicle by the tenant. In fact, the tenant has admitted this in the cross-examination. No further proof is necessary in this regard. The landlord pleaded that he has to pass through in this place to his house and the lavatory. The landlord has produced photograph Ex. P-9 showing parking of vehicle by the tenant. In fact, the tenant has admitted this in the cross-examination. No further proof is necessary in this regard. The landlord pleaded that he has to pass through in this place to his house and the lavatory. Definitely it is a nuisance caused by the tenant. (c) The trial Court referred to the law laid down in the decision reported in Borannna v. M.A. Chandra Raju, AIR 1990 Kant 121: I.L.R. Karnataka 2095, wherein it is held that dumping fuel wood or wastage in the common passage by the tenant amounts to nuisance or annoyance. (d) Another nuisance alleged against the tenant is that the tenant and his family members are playing music and use the T.C. day-in and day-out with high volume by closing the doors and windows, which cause lot of vibration. Evidence has been adduced in this regard and the trial Court upon appreciation of the documentary and oral evidence held that nuisance alleged against the tenant is proved. (e) From what has been observed above, it is clear that the tenant is not in cordial terms with the landlord. He has failed to keep a harmonious relationship with the landlord. The acts of the tenant shifting the motor to other place, the parking of vehicles in the common passage and the playing music and keeping the T.V. with high volume are all nuisance. Added to that, the filing of the suit for injunction against the true owner/landlord and also petition under Section 19 of the Act for depositing rents in Court are all proved beyond doubt that the tenant has been causing unnecessary harassment to the landlord. Such an harassment is definitely a nuisance to the landlord. Therefore, the trial Court has rightly ordered eviction of the tenant on the ground of causing nuisance.” 29 Accordingly, in view of the discussion and analysis made hereinabove, there is no merit in the petition and the same is dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. No order as to costs.