Judgment 1. The Petitioners/A1 and A2 have preferred the instant Criminal Revision Petition as against the order dated 25.03.2014 in Crl.M.P.No.678 of 2012 in C.C.No.32 of 2012 passed by the Learned IX Additional Special Judge for CBI cases, Chennai. 2. While passing the impugned orders dated 25.03.2014 in Crl.M.P.No.678 of 2012 in C.C.No.32 of 2012 (filed by the Petitioners /A1 and A2, seeking discharge from the case), the trial Court in paragraph No.12 had inter alia observed that “... since the prosecution has projected prima facie materials sufficient for proceeding further against the accused and since this Court finds that prior sanction order approval of State of Madhya Pradesh is not required as A1 was in the service of Central Government during the period of offence of criminal misconduct under the P.C. Act in the disproportionate assets case, this Court is not inclined to grant the request of the petitioners, to discharge them from the case...” and resultantly dismissed the petition. Submissions of the Petitioners/A1: 3. According to the Learned Senior Counsel for the Revision Petitioners/A1&A2, the trial Court had committed an error in dismissing the discharge petition and as such, the said order is contrary to Law, materially irregular and an unjust one. 4. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioners urges before this Court that the trial Court should have appreciated that the 1st petitioner/A1 is an I.A.S officer of the 1982 Batch from Madhya Pradesh Cadre. 5. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioners projects an argument that the check period in the present case was from 01.01.2003 to 04.08.2009 and during the period from 22.08.2003 to 03.09.2004, the 1st Petitioner/A1 was on deputation from Madhya Pradesh Cadre and joined as Zonal Manager in Food Corporation of India, Chennai, attached to the Ministry of Food and Civil Supplies of Government of India. Added further, it is represented on behalf of the Petitioners that the 1st Petitioner/A1 was transferred as Chairman of Chennai Port Trust in the Ministry of Shipping under the Government of India from 03.09.2004 till he completed his tenure on 30.06.2009. 6. Added further, it is represented on behalf of the Petitioners that the 1st Petitioner/A1 was transferred as Chairman of Chennai Port Trust in the Ministry of Shipping under the Government of India from 03.09.2004 till he completed his tenure on 30.06.2009. 6. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioners brings it to the notice of this Court that on 20.03.2009, the Director, Department of Personnel and Training, New Delhi, the Cadre controlling Authority, (who determine the tenure of deputation) passed an order stating that the tenure of the 1st Petitioner/A1 would come to an end on 30.06.2009 and in the same year, it was specifically mentioned that the officer would be reverted on that date. 7. That apart, in continuation of the aforesaid order, through Office Order No.7/09, of the Ministry of Shipping, Ports Wing, dated 26.09.2009, Capt.Subash Kumar was given charge of Chairman, Chennai Port Trust with effect from 30.06.2009 (A.N.) on relinquishing the charge by the 1st Petitioner/A1. In fact, the copy of the said order was marked among others to the Chief Secretary, Government of Madhya Pradesh, Bhopal. Moreover, on 30.06.2009, itself the said Capt.Subash Kumar, took charge from the 1st Petitioner/A1 and also the compliance letter was marked to the Secretary to the Government of Madhya Pradesh. 8. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioners/A1 & A2, contends that from the afternoon of 30.06.2009 or to be more specific from 01.07.2009, the 1st Petitioner/A1, had ceased to function as Chairman of Chennai Port Trust. In effect the Learned Counsel for the Petitioners proceeds to submit that the 1st Petitioner/A1, ceased to be on Central deputation from 30.06.2009 (AN) and stood reverted to Madhya Pradesh and while the 1st Petitioner/A1 joined duty in the State of Madhya Pradesh on 24.08.2009, the First Information Report was registered on 12.10.2009 at 1900 hours. 9. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioners contends that the 1st Petitioner/A1 joined duty in the State of Madhya Pradesh on 24.08.2009 as stated in the FIR and as such, he ceased to be an Officer of an Authority controlled by the Central Government. 10. The prime submission of the Learned Counsel for the Petitioners is that in view of Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment (DSPE) Act, the consent of State Government should be obtained by the Respondent for investigating the case against the 1st Petitioner/A1. 10. The prime submission of the Learned Counsel for the Petitioners is that in view of Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment (DSPE) Act, the consent of State Government should be obtained by the Respondent for investigating the case against the 1st Petitioner/A1. To put it differently, the stand taken on behalf of the Petitioners is that the First Information Report cannot be registered as against the 1st Petitioner/A1 on 12.10.2009, without the consent of Madhya Pradesh State Government. 11. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioners submits that the Respondent was aware of Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act and they sought consent through a letter dated 28.08.2009 addressed to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madhya Pradesh with a copy being marked to the Additional Director of CBI further. In the said letter seeking for consent they had clearly admitted that since the 1st Petitioner/A1 had joined the parent cadre he was no longer in the control of Central Government i.e. Ministry of Shipping. Therefore, the Ministry of Shipping was not in a position to grant permission under Section 6-A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, for registration of the regular case. That apart till date no sanction was obtained. 12. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioners strenuously takes a plea that the consent of the State Government in the instant case should have been obtained prior to the registration of the First Information Report dated 12.10.2009 and inasmuch as the consent is yet to be obtained, the registration of FIR in the present case is without jurisdiction. Furthermore, the subsequent investigation in pursuance of the FIR and laying of charge sheet by the Respondent is contrary to Law. 13. Yet another stand of the Petitioners/A1&A2, is that the sanction order dated 26.03.2012 accorded by the Ministry of Personnel Public Grievance and Pension, Department of Personnel and Training, is invalid in Law, since it is not the 'Competent Authority' in granting sanction to an IAS Cadre of Madhya Pradesh Government. 14. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioners submits that the impugned order of the trial Court is silent in regard to the letter dated 28.08.2009 addressed to the Chief Secretary of Government of Madhya Pradesh by Joint Secretary and Vigilance Officer of Government of India, Ministry of Shipping, a copy of which was marked to the CBI. 14. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioners submits that the impugned order of the trial Court is silent in regard to the letter dated 28.08.2009 addressed to the Chief Secretary of Government of Madhya Pradesh by Joint Secretary and Vigilance Officer of Government of India, Ministry of Shipping, a copy of which was marked to the CBI. Further, it is the plea of the Petitioners that the trial Court should not have ignored the letter dated 28.08.2009 and in effect the continuation of the proceedings will only nullify the ingredients of Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act 1946, which is contrary to Law. Case Law cited on the side of the Petitioners: 15. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioners relies on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ms. Mayawati Vs. Union of India and Others, reported in (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 801, at Special Page 809 to 811, whereby and whereunder in Paragraph Nos.27 to 30, it is observed as follows: 27. A perusal of the orders prior to the order dated 18.09.2003 and several directions in the order dated 18.09.2003 clearly show that this Court was concerned with illegality/irregularity committed by the officers/persons in carrying out the Taj Heritage Corridor Project. The main allegation relates to an amount of Rs. 17 crores which was released by the State Government without proper sanction. It is also clear that in order to find out who cleared the project and for what purpose it was cleared without obtaining necessary sanction from the Department concerned and whether there was any illegality/irregularity committed by the officers/persons, this Court thought an inquiry by CBI was considered necessary. In such a situation, the CBI was directed to interrogate and verify their assets. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Harish Salve, there was no occasion for this Court to consider the alleged disproportionate assets of the petitioner separately that too from 1995 to 2003 when admittedly Rs. 17 crores were released in September, 2002. 28. A thorough scrutiny of all the orders including the specific directions dated 18.09.2003 clearly show that the same was confined only in respect to the case relating to Taj Corridor Project which was the subject matter of reference before the Special Bench. 17 crores were released in September, 2002. 28. A thorough scrutiny of all the orders including the specific directions dated 18.09.2003 clearly show that the same was confined only in respect to the case relating to Taj Corridor Project which was the subject matter of reference before the Special Bench. It is relevant to point out para 13(f) of the order dated 18.09.2003 which makes it clear that the CBI could have lodged only one FIR No. R.C. 0062003A0018 dated 05.10.2003. In other words, inasmuch as there being no consideration of alleged disproportionate assets at any stage of the proceedings while dealing with the Taj Corridor matter, there could not have been and in fact there was no such direction to lodge another FIR being No. R.C. 0062003A0019 dated 05.10.2003 exclusively against the petitioner under the P.C. Act. 29. In this regard, learned senior counsel for the petitioner pressed into service a Constitution Bench decision rendered in the case of State of West Bengal & Ors. vs. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal & Ors., (2010) 3 SCC 571 . After considering various constitutional provisions relating to the State and the Union as well as Section 6 of the DSPE Act, the Bench has concluded thus: “69. In the final analysis, our answer to the question referred is that a direction by the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, to CBI to investigate a cognizable offence alleged to have been committed within the territory of a State without the consent of that State will neither impinge upon the federal structure of the Constitution nor violate the doctrine of separation of power and shall be valid in law. Being the protectors of civil liberties of the citizens, this Court and the High Courts have not only the power and jurisdiction but also an obligation to protect the fundamental rights, guaranteed by Part III in general and under Article 21 of the Constitution in particular, zealously and vigilantly. 70. Before parting with the case, we deem it necessary to emphasise that despite wide powers conferred by Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, while passing any order, the Courts must bear in mind certain self-imposed limitations on the exercise of these constitutional powers. The very plenitude of the power under the said articles requires great caution in its exercise. Before parting with the case, we deem it necessary to emphasise that despite wide powers conferred by Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, while passing any order, the Courts must bear in mind certain self-imposed limitations on the exercise of these constitutional powers. The very plenitude of the power under the said articles requires great caution in its exercise. Insofar as the question of issuing a direction to CBI to conduct investigation in a case is concerned, although no inflexible guidelines can be laid down to decide whether or not such power should be exercised but time and again it has been reiterated that such an order is not to be passed as a matter of routine or merely because a party has levelled some allegations against the local police. This extraordinary power must be exercised sparingly, cautiously and in exceptional situations where it becomes necessary to provide credibility and instil confidence in investigations or where the incident may have national and international ramifications or where such an order may be necessary for doing complete justice and enforcing the fundamental rights. Otherwise CBI would be flooded with a large number of cases and with limited resources, may find it difficult to properly investigate even serious cases and in the process lose its credibility and purpose with unsatisfactory investigations. 71. In Minor Irrigation & Rural Engg. Services, U.P. v. Sahngoo Ram Arya this Court had said that an order directing an enquiry by CBI should be passed only when the High Court, after considering the material on record, comes to a conclusion that such material does disclose a prima facie case calling for an investigation by CBI or any other similar agency. We respectfully concur with these observations.” 30. As rightly pointed out that in the absence of any direction by this Court to lodge an FIR into the matter of alleged disproportionate assets against the petitioner, the Investigating Officer could not take resort to Section 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short “the Code”) wherein the Officer-in-charge of a Police Station is empowered under Section 156 of the Code to investigate on information received or otherwise. Section 6 of the DSPE Act prohibits the CBI from exercising its powers and jurisdiction without the consent of the Government of the State. Section 6 of the DSPE Act prohibits the CBI from exercising its powers and jurisdiction without the consent of the Government of the State. It is pointed out on the side of the petitioner that, in the present case, no such consent was obtained by the CBI and submitted that the second FIR against the petitioner is contrary to Section 157 of the Code and Section 6 of the DSPE Act. It is not in dispute that the consent was declined by the Governor of the State and in such circumstance also the second FIR No. R.C. 0062003A0019 dated 05.10.2003 is not sustainable.” The Respondent's/Complainant's contentions: 16. The Learned Special Public Prosecutor (CBI Cases) for the Respondent/Complainant, contends that in the instant case, on completion of investigation, a charge sheet was filed against the Petitioners and other accused before the trial Court for CBI cases on 04.07.2012 under Section 109 and Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Further, the trial Court dismissed the discharge petition as per order dated 25.03.2014. At this stage, the Learned Counsel for the Respondent brings it to the notice of this Court that the 1st Petitioner/A1, before joining duty in Madhya Pradesh on 24.08.2009, had availed Leave and was on the pay of the Central Government. 17. Expatiating his submission, the Learned Counsel for the Respondent, projects an argument that the 1st Petitioner/A1, is an officer of All India Services belonging to Madhya Pradesh Cadre of 1982 Batch and in respect of the period from 22.08.2003 to 30.09.2014, he was on deputation from Madhya Pradesh Cadre as Zonal Manager in the Food Corporation of India, Chennai (attached to the Ministry of Food & Civil Supplies, Government of India) and later on he was posted as Chairman of Chennai Port Trust (under the Ministry of Shipping) for the period from 03.09.2004 till the completion of his tenure on 30.06.2009. 18. The Learned Counsel for the Respondent proceeds to contend that on completion of his tenure, the 1st Petitioner/A1 was on leave from 01.07.2009 till 24.08.2009, during which period, the CBI conducted search of his residential premises on 04.08.2009, which date was taken as the end of the check period and he was a Central Government employee during the period from 22.08.2003 to 04.08.2009. 19. 19. The Learned Counsel for the Respondent brings it to the notice of this Court that All India Services have been constituted under the Article 312 of the Constitution of India, which provides that the Parliament, may, by Law, regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to the All India Services common to the Union and the States and the Parliament enacted the All India Services Act, 1951. Also that, Section 3 of the Act provides that the Central Government may after consultation with the Government of the State concerned make rules for the regulation of recruitment and conditions of services of persons appointed to the All India Service. In exercise of the said power, the Central Government after consultation with Governments of the State made rules like All India Service (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1969, All India Service (Confidential) Rules, 1970, etc. 20. The Learned Counsel for the Respondent submits that the State employees under the scheme of Constitution hold office at the pleasure of His Excellency of the State while the Central Government employees hold office at the pleasure of the President of India. 21. Moreover, it is represented on behalf of the Respondent that as per Rule 6 of the Indian Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules, the Cadre Officer may with the concurrence of the State Government concerned and the Central Government, be deputed for service under the Central Government or another State Government or under company, association of body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, which is wholly or substantially owned or controlled by the Central Government or by another State Government. 22. That apart, as per Rule 6(2), a cadre officer may also be deputed for service under (i) a company, association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, which is wholly or substantially owned or controlled by a State Government, a Municipal Corporation or a Local Body, by the State Government on whose cadre he is borne, and (ii) an international organisation, an autonomous body not controlled by the Government or a private body, by the Central Government in consultation with the State Government on whose cadre he is borne. 23. The prime contention advanced by the Learned Counsel for the Respondent is that the 1st Petitioner/A1 belonging to Madhya Pradesh State Cadre was on deputation for service under the Central Government. 23. The prime contention advanced by the Learned Counsel for the Respondent is that the 1st Petitioner/A1 belonging to Madhya Pradesh State Cadre was on deputation for service under the Central Government. In the present case, according to the Respondent/Complainant, he was undisputedly an officer posted, functioned and discharged his duties in Food Corporation of India, Ministry of Food and Civil Supplies and the Chennai Port Trust under the Ministry of Shipping of the Central Government. 24. The Learned Counsel for the Respondent refers to Indian Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules, wherein the term 'Government' is defined as follows: “Government means:- (i) in the case of member of service serving in connection with the affairs of the union, the Central Government, or (ii) in the case of a member of the service under a foreign government or outside India, the Central Government, or (iii) in the case of a member of the service serving in connection with the affairs of State, the Government of that State.” 25. Apart from the above, as per Rule 2(c) of All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, the term 'Government' means: “in the case of a member of the service serving in connection with the affairs of a State, or who is deputed for service in any company, association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not, which is wholly or substantially owned or controlled by the Government of a State, or in a local authority set up by an Act of the Legislature of a State, the Government of that State; (ii) in any other case, the Central Government”. 26. As such it is the plea of the Respondent that the definition of the 'Government' would show that the 1st Petitioner/A1 is the member of the All India Services serving the Central Government at the relevant point of time. 27. 26. As such it is the plea of the Respondent that the definition of the 'Government' would show that the 1st Petitioner/A1 is the member of the All India Services serving the Central Government at the relevant point of time. 27. The primordial submission of the Learned Counsel for the Respondent is that as per the Guidelines for Deputation of Members of the All India Services, under Rule 6(2)(iii) of the respective cadre Rules, while on deputation, the service condition of the officer shall continue to be regulated under the relevant All India Service Rules and other terms and conditions may be in accordance with standard terms devised from time to time and added further, the terms and conditions of deputation shall be finalised by the concerned State Government if the officer is in the cadre. 28. However, if the officer is in the Government of India, the Ministry concerned viz., Ministry of Home Affairs in the case of Indian Police Service, Ministry of Environment & Forest in the case of Indian Forest Service and Department of Personnel & Training in the case of Indian Administrative Service shall finalise the same and this may be done in accordance with the standard terms and conditions prescribed by the Department of Personnel & Training. 29. The Learned Counsel for the Respondent contends that the 1st Petitioner/A1, relinquished the charge of Chairman of Chennai Port Trust on 30.06.2009. But, he had not joined the Madhya Pradesh Government till 24.08.2009 and he was availing leave. In fact, during the entire period from 22.08.2003 till he reported back to his parent cadre on 24.08.2009, the 1st Petitioner/A1 was on Central deputation and during the intervening period from 01.07.2009 to 23.08.2009, he was on leave and drew pay from the Central Government. As such, it is the plea of the Respondent that even though, the 1st Petitioner/A1 ceased to function as Chairman of Chennai Port Trust, his service, therefore, was still with the Central Government. 30. As such, it is the plea of the Respondent that even though, the 1st Petitioner/A1 ceased to function as Chairman of Chennai Port Trust, his service, therefore, was still with the Central Government. 30. The Learned Counsel for the Respondent submits that although, the 1st Petitioner/A1 had ceased to function as Chairman, Chennai Port Trust, Chennai on the date of First Information Report, the offences committed by him were not related to the State of Madhya Pradesh, but, while in the service of Government of India, being on deputation to the Food Corporation of India and Chennai Port Trust and therefore, the consent of the State of Madhya Pradesh as specified under Section 6 of Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, was not required. 31. The Learned Counsel for the Respondent, strenuously submits that the investigation was carried out in respect of the period of the 1st Petitioner/A1 while in the service of Food Corporation of India and Chennai Port Trust and that the allegation of amassment of wealth by him took place while in the service of the Central Government and not during his service in the State of Madhya Pradesh and as such there is no requirement of the State Government of Madhya Pradesh to grant consent under Section 6 of Delhi Special Police Establishment Act. 32. The Learned Counsel for the Respondent contends that as per Section 6-A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, an approval is to be obtained from the Central Government to conduct inquiry or investigation where the allegation for commission of offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act relate to the employees of the Central Government of the level of the Joint Secretary and above. Inasmuch as the 1st Petitioner/A1 had joined the State of Madhya Pradesh, his home cadre, he no longer came under the purview of Section 6-A of the aforesaid Act, as by then, he was no longer of the level of a Joint Secretary of the Central Government. 33. The Learned Counsel for the Respondent adverts to Section 6-A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, which reads as follows: “6A. Approval of Central Government to conduct inquiry or investigation. 33. The Learned Counsel for the Respondent adverts to Section 6-A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, which reads as follows: “6A. Approval of Central Government to conduct inquiry or investigation. (1) The Delhi Special Police Establishment shall not conduct any enquiry or investigation into any offence alleged to have been committed under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988) except with the previous approval of the Central Government where such allegation relates to (a) The employees of the Central Government of the Level of Joint Secretary and above; and (b) such officers as are appointed by the Central Government in corporations established by or under any Central Act, Government Companies, Societies and local authorities owned or controlled by that Government.” 34. The Learned Counsel for the Respondent submits that the CBI vide letter dated 20.08.2009, sought permission from the Ministry of Shipping under Section 6-A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act for registration of a case of disproportionate assets in RC 53(A)/2009 against the 1st Petitioner/A1. But the Ministry of Shipping wrote to the Government of Madhya Pradesh through its letter dated 28.08.2009 (with a copy marked to CBI) stating that on an earlier request from the CBI, it had granted permission to register a case against the 1st Petitioner/A1. 35. It is represented on behalf of the Respondent that on the request made by the CBI for permission to register a case in respect of possession of disproportionate assets, it was stated that the 1st Petitioner/A1, was granted Earned Leave for months from 01.07.2009 to 31.08.2009 and on completion of his tenure joined his parent cadre, viz., Madhya Pradesh on 24.08.2009 and that he was no longer under the administrative control of the Central Government i.e., Ministry of Shipping, which, therefore, was not in a position to grant permission under Section 6-A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act. In fact, the Government of Madhya Pradesh was requested to take a view on the request of CBI and take further necessary action. However, by the time, the Ministry replied, the 1st Petitioner/A1 had joined back the Madhya Pradesh Government and hence, the aforesaid reply. 36. In fact, the Government of Madhya Pradesh was requested to take a view on the request of CBI and take further necessary action. However, by the time, the Ministry replied, the 1st Petitioner/A1 had joined back the Madhya Pradesh Government and hence, the aforesaid reply. 36. The Learned Counsel for the Respondent contends that on completion of investigation, the prosecution had filed charge sheet against the 1st Petitioner/A1 after obtaining sanction under Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 dated 26.03.2012 for his prosecution and RC 53(A)/2009 pertains to offences committed during the period of Central Government and therefore, the prosecution under Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, was not required from the Madhya Pradesh Government. 37. The Learned Counsel for the Respondent brings it to the notice of this Court that when the sanction for prosecution of the 1st Petitioner/A1 under Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 in the case, RC 42(A)/2009 was sought for from the Government of Madhya Pradesh, it was categorically replied through letter dated 10.05.2011 by the State Government to the effect that “The alleged irregularities committed by Shri K. Suresh are not related to the State of Madhya Pradesh, during the period he was on deputation to Government of India. The competent authority for the sanction for prosecution of IAS officer under Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, is the Government of India”. 38. That apart, the sanction for prosecution in respect of the 1st Petitioner/A1 was granted by the Government of India and the same reasoning is applicable to the present case as well since the 1st Petitioner/A1 was on deputation to the Government of India. 39. In so far as the question of obtaining approval under Section 6-A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act is concerned, it is to be pointed out that, the said issue is no longer relevant because of the simple reason that the said Section was struck down as invalid by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 06.05.2014 in W.P (Civil) No.38 of 1997 between Dr. Subramanian Swamy Vs. Director, Central Bureau of Investigation and another with W.P. (Civil) No.21 of 2004 between Centre for Public Interest Litigation Vs. Union of India. 40. Subramanian Swamy Vs. Director, Central Bureau of Investigation and another with W.P. (Civil) No.21 of 2004 between Centre for Public Interest Litigation Vs. Union of India. 40. The Learned Counsel for the Respondent relies on the Division Bench Judgment of this Court dated 29.04.2013 in W.A.No.12 of 2013 between Pramod Kumar Vs. Union of India, rep. By its Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Grih Mantralaya, New Delhi and four others, wherein in Paragraph No.97, it is observed as follows: Judgment/Order relied on by the Respondent: “97. We summarise our conclusions as under:- (i) The appellant, having been allotted to the State of Tamil Nadu, while serving in connection with the affairs of the State, the appellant is an employee of the State Government and the service conditions are governed under various rules as elaborated supra. Since the appellant is only an employee of the State Government, obtaining of prior approval of the Central Government under Section 6A of DSPE Act was not necessary and hence there is no violation of any statutory provision. (ii) Mere empanelment of the appellant for holding the post of Inspector General vide proceedings not I-21023/14/2010-IPS-IV of Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, dated 13.7.2010 does not confer any right of appointment on the appellant and the appellant, having not been appointed to the said post at the Centre, cannot claim that he is an Officer in the status of Joint Secretary level at the Centre. (iii) Even assuming that appellant is a Central Government employee at Joint Secretary level, the prior approval contemplated under Section 6A of DSPE Act can at the best be only directory and not mandatory and consequently, non-compliance of the same would not vitiate the proceedings. (iv) The inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 are of wide amplitude. The power to order transfer of investigation to CBI is not restricted to only Constitutional Court under Article 226 of Constitution of India. As held in the decision of (2008) 3 SCC 54.[Divine Retreat Centre v. State of Kerala and others], the nomenclature of the petition is not decisive. The High Court can exercise powers either under Article 226 of Constitution of India or under Section 482 of Crl.P.C. or under both. As held in the decision of (2008) 3 SCC 54.[Divine Retreat Centre v. State of Kerala and others], the nomenclature of the petition is not decisive. The High Court can exercise powers either under Article 226 of Constitution of India or under Section 482 of Crl.P.C. or under both. (v) Direction in the Order made in Crl.O.P.Nos.2691 and 5356 of 2011 dated 19.4.2011 to transfer investigation to CBI cannot be said to be in deviation of any statutory provisions. More so, when the said order dated 19.4.2011 transferring investigation to CBI remains unchallenged.” 41. In the Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 06.05.2014 in W.P (Civil) No.38 of 1997 between Dr. Subramanian Swamy Vs. Director, Central Bureau of Investigation and another with W.P.(Civil) No.21 of 2004 between Centre for Public Interest Litigation Vs. Union of India, in Paragraph No.98, it is held as under: “....In view of our foregoing discussion, we hold that Section 6- A(1), which requires approval of the Central Government to conduct any inquiry or investigation into any offence alleged to have been committed under the PC Act, 1988 where such allegation relates to (a) the employees of the Central Government of the level of Joint Secretary and above and (b) such officers as are appointed by the Central Government in corporations established by or under any Central Act, government companies, societies and local authorities owned or controlled by the Government, is invalid and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. As a necessary corollary, the provision contained in Section 26 (c) of the Act 45 of 2003 to that extent is also declared invalid.” Discussions: 42. At the outset, it is to be pointed out that in Crl.M.P.No.678 of 2012 (filed by the Petitioners/A1 & A2 on the file of the trial Court under Section 239 of Cr.P.C., seeking discharge from the case), it is inter alia averred in Paragraph No.7 that “... After the successful completion of his tenure on 30th June 2009, and as per orders of the Dept. of Personnel and Training the accused relinquished the charge and handed over the charge on 30th June 2009 A.N., to Capt. Subash Kumar, Deputy Chairman, Chennai Port Trust. The accused ceased to be on Central Deputation from 30th June 2009 A.N. and stood reverted to Madhya Pradesh Cadre”. 43. of Personnel and Training the accused relinquished the charge and handed over the charge on 30th June 2009 A.N., to Capt. Subash Kumar, Deputy Chairman, Chennai Port Trust. The accused ceased to be on Central Deputation from 30th June 2009 A.N. and stood reverted to Madhya Pradesh Cadre”. 43. Further, in Crl.M.P.No.678 of 2012, the Petitioners/A1& A2 have averred in Paragraph No.8, that the Respondent/Complainant deliberately chose to enquire and conduct investigation against the accused, who had ceased to function/act as Chairman, Chennai Port Trust as he handed over charge on 30.06.2009, etc. 44. The main bone of contention of the Petitioners is that the 1st Petitioner/A1, was a senior I.A.S., officer of the Joint Secretary rank and as such the Respondent/Complainant should have obtained prior approval of the competent authority and in the present case, prior approval of Madhya Pradesh Government ought to have been sought. That apart, it is the stand of the Petitioners that the State Government's prior approval ought to have been obtained by the Respondent/Complainant before proceeding with the enquiry and investigation and that before initiating the proceedings, the sanction of the State Government under Section 6-A of Delhi Special Police Establishment Act is required. 45. However, the plea taken on behalf of the Respondent/Complainant in the counter to Crl.M.P.No.678 of 2012 on the file of the trial Court is that for the registration of a regular case against the 1st Petitioner/A1 and others, Ministry of Shipping conveyed its permission for the same vide letter No.C-13019/42/2009 dated 29.07.2009 (LD-2) and then only, a case was registered in RC 42(A)/2009 against the Petitioners and others under Sections 120-B r/w 420, 420 IPC and 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. On 05.07.2012, after completion of investigation a charge sheet was filed against the Petitioners and other accused, of course, after obtaining sanction for prosecution from the Government of India. 46. Before the trial Court, in the Additional Grounds for Discharge Petition filed under Section 239 of Cr.P.C., in Crl.M.P.No.678 of 2012, the Petitioners have stated that in First Information Report, it was clearly mentioned that Petitioner/A1 joined duty in Madhya Pradesh State on 24.08.2009 and ceased to be an officer of an authority controlled by the Central Government and therefore, on the date of registration of FIR, the Petitioner/A1 was a public servant employed in the services of Madhya Pradesh State. As such, in view of the prohibition under Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, the CBI should not have investigated the case without the sanction of the State of Madhya Pradesh. 47. In the additional counter filed by the Respondent/Complainant to Crl.M.P.No.678 of 2012 before the trial Court, the Respondent had inter alia stated that though the 1st Petitioner ceased to function as the Chairman of the Chennai Port Trust, Chennai. On the date of FIR, the offences committed by him were not related to the State of Madhya Pradesh, but while working in the service of the Government of India, being on deputation to the Food Corporation of India and Chennai Port Trust and therefore, the consent of the State of Madhya Pradesh was not required. Also that, as on the date of registration of the FIR, in the present case, the 1st Petitioners/A1 had joined duty in Madhya Pradesh State on 24.08.2009 and ceased to be an officer of an authority controlled by the Central Government and the sanction order dated 26.03.2012 was accorded by the Ministry of the Personnel, Public Grievances and Pension, is valid. 48. It is also brought to the notice of this Court that in Crl.M.P.No.1700 of 2011 on 07.06.2011, the Learned XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai, passed an order under Section 306(1) Cr.P.C., granting 'Tender of pardon' to the accused S. Jaganath, S/o. Late T.S. Ragavan, based on the petition filed by the Inspector of Police, SPE/CBI/EOW, Shastri Bhavan, Chennai. 49. Likewise in Crl.M.P.No.1137 of 2011, the Learnned II Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai, on 06.06.2011, (based on the petition filed by the Additional Superintendent of Police, CBI, ACB, Chennai, under Section 306 Cr.P.C.), granted 'Tender of pardon' to the accused Ramraj @ Kuwait Raja @ K.P. Ramaraj, S/o. Pillaiyar Raja. 50. It is to be noted that valid sanction is a pre-requisite to the taking of cognizance of the offences. Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, is a safeguard for the innocent and is not a shield for the guilty. After all, the order of sanction is only an administrative act and not a quasi-judicial nor lis is involved. 51. Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, is a safeguard for the innocent and is not a shield for the guilty. After all, the order of sanction is only an administrative act and not a quasi-judicial nor lis is involved. 51. Furthermore, the onus of proof that the sanctioning authority had applied his mind to the question before him and had all the relevant papers in that connection before it, while according the same, lies on the Respondent/Complainant/Prosecution and it must discharge the burden. In fact, the Rules/Provisions in regard to sanction ought to be observed with complete strictness. The validity of sanction which goes to the root of the main case may be permitted to be raised by a Court of Law during the trial of the case. In reality, a sanction allowing prosecution is a public document as specified under Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, as per the decision in Sagarmal V. S, reported in AIR 1951 All 816 . Also that, a public document is one made by a public officer for the purpose of the public making use of it and being able to refer it, as per decision in Sturla V. Ferrica, reported in (1885) 5 App Cas 623 HL at page 643, per Lord Blackburn. Furthermore, it is not enough that the document is available for public inspection, it must have been brought into existence for that purpose, as per the decision in Thrasy Voulos Ioannou V. Papa Christofers Demetrious, reported in 1952 AC 84 PC. 52. At this stage, this Court aptly points out the decision in Laljibhai Shivshankar Trivedi Vs. State of Gujarat, reported in 2001 Cri. L.J.833 at Special Page 835, wherein in paragraph No.12, it is observed as follows: “12. 52. At this stage, this Court aptly points out the decision in Laljibhai Shivshankar Trivedi Vs. State of Gujarat, reported in 2001 Cri. L.J.833 at Special Page 835, wherein in paragraph No.12, it is observed as follows: “12. Section 19(3) of the Act, on the other hand, provides that, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure; (a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a Special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a Court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of absence of or any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction required under subsection (1), unless in the opinion of the Court failure of justice has been occasioned thereby; (b) No Court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on the ground of absence of or any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction granted by the Authority, unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice.” 53. It cannot be gainsaid that the preamble of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 mentions that it is an Act to make provision for the Constitution of a Special Police Force in Delhi for the investigation of certain offences in the Union Territories and for the extension to other areas of the powers and jurisdiction of the members of the said force in regard to the investigation of the said offences. In fact, Section 1 of the said Act, says that it extends to the whole of India. Section 2 provides for Constitution and powers of Special Police Establishment. Section 3 of the Act enables the Central Government to investigate offences by Special Police Establishment. Section 4 deals with superintendence and administration of Special Police Establishment. Section 5 enjoins the Central Government to extend the powers and jurisdiction of Special Police Establishment to States. Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act is an important one because of the reason that it requires consent of State Government for exercising powers and jurisdiction under the Act by Special Police Establishment to any area in a State not being Union Territory or Railway. The said section is extracted as under: “6. Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act is an important one because of the reason that it requires consent of State Government for exercising powers and jurisdiction under the Act by Special Police Establishment to any area in a State not being Union Territory or Railway. The said section is extracted as under: “6. Consent of the State Government to exercise powers and jurisdiction:- Nothing contained in Sec. 5 shall be deemed to enable any member of the Delhi Special Police Establishment to exercise powers and jurisdiction in any area in a State, not being a Union Territory or railway area without the consent of the Government of that State.” 54. One cannot brush aside an important fact that the 1st Petitioner/A1 joined his parent cadre on 24.08.2009 and he was on 'Earned Leave' from 01.07.2009 till 23.08.2009. It is to be noted that on 12.10.2009, First Information Report in RC.53(A)/2009 was registered. On 29.07.2009, when permission was granted to register a regular case, against the Petitioner/A1 by the Government of India to the Ministry of Shipping, the FIR in RC 42(A)/2009 dated 03.08.2009 was registered. There is no dispute in regard to the fact that the Petitioner/A1 was on 'Earned Leave' and the check period pertains to 01.09.2003 to 04.08.2009. During that period, the Petitioner/A1 was said to have acquired assets and was in possession pecuniary resources and properties to his known source of income. The 1st Petitioner/A1, served as Zonal Manager, Food Corporation of India from 22.08.2003 to 03.09.2004 and as Chairman, Chennai Port Trust from September 2004 till 30.06.2009 and was on earned leave from 01.07.2009 till 04.08.2009, the date of search of his residence or till 24.08.2009, the date on which his he joined his parent cadre. 55. In this connection, this Court at the risk of repetition, points out that on 29.07.2009, the permission was granted by the Government of India to register a regular case against the 1st Petitioner/A1 and since, he was considered to be in service of Central Government, although he had relinquished the charge as Chairman, Chennai Port Trust on 30.06.2009, (notwithstanding the fact that in the extension of tenure letter dated 20.03.2009 by the Government of India, it was stated that the 1st Petitioner/A1, shall stand reverted after 30.06.2009). As such, the very same permission is valid for the registration of FIR in RC 53(A)/2009 in view of the fact that the period of offence was from 01.09.2003 to 04.08.2009 and the designation and the work place of offence of disproportionate assets fall within the jurisdiction of Central Government viz., Zonal Manager, Food Corporation of India and Chairman, Chennai Port Trust. 56. It can safely be concluded that the registration of First Information Report of disproportionate assets case on 12.10.2009 cannot displace the position of 1st Petitioner/A1 till 24.08.2009 as he was in the service of the Central Government till 23.08.2009. In fact, he can be said to be in the Madhya Pradesh State Government service only from 24.08.2009, as opined by this Court. 57. Apart from the above, it is seen from the D.O. Letter No.D2/39/2009/6/One dated 10.05.2011 of the Secretary, Government of Madhya Pradesh, General Administration Department, addressed to Su. Arunachalam, IPS, DIG & Head of Branch, CBI, Government of India, Madras6, where it was inter alia stated that “.... The alleged irregularities committed by Shri. K. Suresh, are not related to the State of Madhya Pradesh, during the said period, he was on deputation to Government of India. The Competent Authority under Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, is Government of India. We have referred the matter vide our letter to of even number dated 8.12.2010 to DoPT.” 58. As far as the present case is concerned, the Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions Department of Personnel & Training, in letter No.107/16/2011-AVD.I dated 26.03.2012, had accorded sanction under Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act for prosecuting the 1st Petitioner/A1 in the subject matter in issue. 59. In the instant case, it cannot be said that there is no sanction order. But the crux of the matter, which revolves in a narrow compass is whether prior approval of State Government of Madhya Pradesh is essential for registration of disproportionate assets cases as against 1st Petitioner/A1, inasmuch as he joined his parent cadre on 24.08.2009 because of the reason that FIR in disproportionate assets cases was registered on 12.10.2009. But the crux of the matter, which revolves in a narrow compass is whether prior approval of State Government of Madhya Pradesh is essential for registration of disproportionate assets cases as against 1st Petitioner/A1, inasmuch as he joined his parent cadre on 24.08.2009 because of the reason that FIR in disproportionate assets cases was registered on 12.10.2009. At this juncture, this Court pertinently points out that the words employed in Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act cannot imply that the powers and jurisdiction of CBI can be exercised in a State in which the offences may not have taken place, only with the prior sanction of that State Government. What is to be seen is that the relevant period during which the offences take place and that is a pivotal factor to be taken into consideration as opined by this Court. Also that, in the present case, the offences investigated by the CBI were not committed within the State of Madhya Pradesh. As such, the prima facie opinion/view of this Court is that in the present case, there is no need for the CBI to obtain prior permission from the State of Madhya Pradesh for prosecuting the 1st Petitioner/A1. In any event, whether there exists a valid sanction order in the eye of Law, its validity, etc., these are all matters, which can be canvassed/agitated on behalf of the Petitioners during the trial of the main case before the trial Court, as opined by this Court. 60. It cannot be forgotten that a Court of Law at the time of framing charges is only to take into account the prima facie/Ex facie materials available on record for the purpose of proceeding further against the accused. In fact, it is not for the Hon'ble High Court to enter into the arena of an enquiry as to whether the evidence relied on by the Respondent/Prosecution is reliable or not, since, in the considered opinion of this Court that would be purely within the domain of the trial Court. 61. Also that, at the time of framing charges it is not for this Court to embark upon an elaborate enquiry whether the materials collected by the Respondent/Prosecution are sufficient for convicting the accused. It is enough that the materials collected by the prosecution shows prima facie case for a Court of Law to proceed further against the concerned accused. 62. Also that, at the time of framing charges it is not for this Court to embark upon an elaborate enquiry whether the materials collected by the Respondent/Prosecution are sufficient for convicting the accused. It is enough that the materials collected by the prosecution shows prima facie case for a Court of Law to proceed further against the concerned accused. 62. Further, the prohibition is incorporated in sub Section 3 of Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Indeed, the sub Section 3 consists of three clauses. To put it more precisely, it is in Clause (c) of sub Section that the prohibition is couched in unexceptional terms. Disposition: 63. In the light of an overall assessment of the entire facts and circumstances of the present case in a cumulative fashion, this Court comes to a prima facie irresistible conclusion that the investigation was carried out in respect of the period while the 1st Petitioner/A1 was in service of Food Corporation of India and Chennai Port Trust. Also that, When the allegation of amassment of wealth by him took place while in the service of the Central Government and not during Petitioner's service in the State of Madhya Pradesh, there is no requirement of the State Government of Madhya Pradesh to grant consent under Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, as opined by this Court. Looking at from any angle, the Criminal Revision Petition fails. 64. In the result, the Criminal Revision Petition is dismissed. It is made clear that the dismissal of the Criminal Revision Petition would not preclude the Petitioners/A1&A2 to raise all factual and legal pleas before the trial Court in C.C.No.32 of 2012 on the file of the Learned IX Additional Special Judge for CBI Cases, Chennai and to seek appropriate remedy, if they so desire/advised, in the manner known to Law and in accordance with Law. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.