Judgment : 1. The Petitioner has preferred the instant Criminal Revision Petition praying for passing of an order by this Court to set aside the order dated 20.12.2005 in S.C.No.148 of 2002 passed by the Learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Vellore and to enhance the sentence. 2. According to the Petitioner, the ingredients of Section 307 I.P.C. speaks of 'Attempt to Murder' and in the instant case on hand, the trial Court had failed to appreciate the gravity of offences corroborated by P.W.1 to P.W.4 and P.W.7 at full length. Further, the trial Court had failed to appreciate the entire evidence on record in proper perspective and the scope of Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner, in support of the contention that the victim in given crime has a right to prefer an Appeal against an inadequacy of sentence awarded by the trial Court, relies on the Division Bench Judgment of this Court reported in [ (2012) 1 LW Crl. 700], (S.Balasubramanian V/ The State of Tamil Nadu rep. By the Labour Welfare Officer, III Circle Chennai “ 600 035), wherein, in paragraph 74, it is, inter alia, observed as follows : “74.... Therefore, the victim is also given a right to prefer an appeal against acquittal or inadequacy of sentence.” 4. Also, in the aforesaid decision, the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner seeks in aid of the observations made, in paragraph 56, which runs as follows : “56. According to sub section (10 of Section 401 of the Code, the High Court, while dealing with a revision can exercise any of the powers conferred on appellate Court by Section 386 of the Code. According to clause (c) of Section 386 of the Code, the Appellate Court can in an appeal for enhancement of sentence, alter the nature or the extent of the sentence so as to enhance or reduce the same. In view of this provisions contained in section 386 of the Code, it should be held that the High Court while dealing with a revision can enhance the sentence. As the powers of the Sessions Judge, while dealing with a revision are the same as that of the High Court, since the High Court can enhance the sentence the Sessions Judge can also do so. As the powers of the Sessions Judge, while dealing with a revision are the same as that of the High Court, since the High Court can enhance the sentence the Sessions Judge can also do so. What has not been granted under section 377 of the Code, has been conferred under section 386 of the Code.” 5. That apart, the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner, in the aforesaid decision, refers to paragraph 43, the relevant portion of the same which runs as under : “43. The point of difference by S.Nagamuthu J. has been expressed in paragraph 12 of the order, which reads as follows : In Janani Advertising Case cited supra, the learned Judge has held that in view of the provision contained in Section 399 of Cr.P.C., the Court of Sessions can exercise all the powers of the High Court as revisional Court. I regret that I am unable to agree with the said view. As I have already stated, Section 386 of Cr.P.C. contains three kinds of appellate powers viz., (i) appeal against conviction (ii) appeal against acquittal; and (iii) appeal for enhancement of sentence.” 6. Moreover, the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner invites the attention of this Court to paragraph 39 of the aforesaid decision, which runs as follows : “39. In answering the above said question, the learned single Judge M.Karpagavinayagam J, in the Janani Advertising case has considered Secs. 377, 386, 399, 401 Cr.P.C. and has observed thus : 36. The reading of these Sections would reveal that the Sessions Court under Section 399(2) Cr.P.C. could invoke the power of the High Court under sub-section (1) of Section 401 Cr.P.C. 37. It is true that the word “Sessions Court” is not included in Section 377 Cr.P.C. But, Section 401 Cr.P.C. would refer to the powers of the Court of Appeal under Section 386 Cr.P.C. in which the reference about Section 377 Cr.P.C. is made. The only difference between the powers of revision before the Sessions Court and the High Court, as could be seen from Sections 399 and 401 Cr.P.C. is this. 38. Section 399 Cr.P.C. would provide “in the case of any proceeding, the record of which has been called for by himself the Sessions Judge may exercise. The only difference between the powers of revision before the Sessions Court and the High Court, as could be seen from Sections 399 and 401 Cr.P.C. is this. 38. Section 399 Cr.P.C. would provide “in the case of any proceeding, the record of which has been called for by himself the Sessions Judge may exercise. In Section 401 Cr.P.C. the Section begins with the words “in the case of any proceeding the record of which has been called for by itself or which otherwise comes to its knowledge, the High Court may exercise. Thus, it is clear that the word “otherwise comes to its knowledge” is absent in Section 399 Cr.P.C.” Also, he refers to paragraph 37 of the aforesaid decision, which refers to 'Section 397 of Cr.P.C. in regard to the Calling for records to exercise powers of revision'. 7. Per contra, it is the submission of the Learned Counsel for the 2nd Respondent/Accused had filed the Criminal Appeal No. 126 of 2006 on the file of this Court and he was granted bail by this Court on 30.05.2006 as per order in Crl.M.P.No.3346 of 2006. Since the earlier Counsel for the 2nd Respondent had not appeared for the case, the 2nd Respondent/Appellant had engaged the present Counsel and that the Change of Memo of Appearance in Crl.A.No.126 of 2006 was filed before this Court on 22.11.2013 and Written Submissions on behalf of the 2nd Respondent in Crl.A.No.126 of 2006 filed before the Court on 27.01.2014 and the arguments were made on behalf of the 2nd Respondent. 8. The Learned Counsel for the 2nd Respondent brings it to the notice of this Court that on 27.10.2014, the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner appeared before this Court and stated that the Revision Petition was filed before this Court and for that the Learned Counsel for the 2nd Respondent submitted to the Court for no notice was served on the 2nd Respondent in the Revision Petition and further arguments were made in Crl.A.No.126 of 2006 and the case was adjourned for hearing the argument of the Learned Public Prosecutor. Later, on behalf of the Petitioner, M.P.No.1 of 2014 in Crl.A.No.126 of 2006 was filed and also, written arguments were submitted on behalf of the Petitioner and the Appeal was adjourned for hearing the arguments of the Learned Public Prosecutor. 9. Later, on behalf of the Petitioner, M.P.No.1 of 2014 in Crl.A.No.126 of 2006 was filed and also, written arguments were submitted on behalf of the Petitioner and the Appeal was adjourned for hearing the arguments of the Learned Public Prosecutor. 9. Added further, the Learned Counsel for the 2nd Respondent submits that to the utter shock and surprise of the 2nd Respondent, he was called to the Vellore Taluk Police Station on 24.02.2014 by one Police Constable and accordingly, the 2nd Respondent went to the Police Station at about 7.30 p.m. and the notice in Crl.R.C.No.175 of 2014 was served without serving him any other document. On 05.03.2014, Crl.A.No.126 of 2006 was posted before this Court and the Counsel for the 2nd Respondent submitted that without serving of any notice, in any condone delay petition, to the 2nd Respondent and without hearing him, he was served with a notice only in Crl.R.C.No.175 of 2014 and prayed for copies of the petitions and documents may be served to him. Subsequently, the copies of petition in Crl.R.C.No.175 of 2014, the Dispense with Petition in M.P.No.1 of 2014 and the Condonation Delay Petition and Affidavit in M.P.No.2 of 2014 were served. 10. The Learned Counsel for the 2nd Respondent contends that a bare perusal of the Condone Delay Petition in M.P.No.2 of 2014 and the affidavit filed in support of the Petition and the Dispense with Petition in M.P.No.1 of 2014 and also the Criminal Revision Petition in Crl.R.C.No.175 of 2014 squarely reveal that by gross abuse of process of Court and Law and without any application of mind, erroneously and illegally in an unjust manner, M.P.No.1 of 2014 and M.P.No.2 of 2014 were numbered and allowed and thereafter, Crl.R.C.No.175 of 2014 was also numbered and admitted. Further, in M.P.No.1 of 2014 and M.P.No.2 of 2014, the cause title was the same as in Crl.R.C.No.175 of 2014 indicating that the Dispense with Petition and the Condone Delay Petition were filed against the Revision preferred against Crl.A.No.126 of 2006, which was prima faice erroneous, illegal and unjust. 11. That apart, the Learned Counsel for the 2nd Respondent contends that the judicial administration of this Court was grossly abused by numbering and admitting the said Petitions as well as the Criminal Revision Petition and if such serious commissions and omissions happen in High Court Administration, it would result in miscarriage of Justice etc. 12. 11. That apart, the Learned Counsel for the 2nd Respondent contends that the judicial administration of this Court was grossly abused by numbering and admitting the said Petitions as well as the Criminal Revision Petition and if such serious commissions and omissions happen in High Court Administration, it would result in miscarriage of Justice etc. 12. In short, the plea taken on behalf of the 2nd Respondent is that Crl.R.C.No.175 of 2014 in Crl.A.No.126 of 2006 and also M.P.No.1 of 2014 and M.P.No.2 of 2014 were filed after eight years of filing of the Appeal in Crl.A.No.126 of 2006 with mala fide intentions and ulterior motives of deflecting the opinion of the Court and derail the hearing of the Appeal in Crl.A.No.126 of 2006, violating all procedures and in a manner unknown to law. 13. The Learned Counsel for the 2nd Respondent places heavy reliance on the decision reported in Jasman Rai V. Smt. Sonamaya Rai and another, 1980 CRI. L. J. 500 (1), wherein, in paragraph 5 & 7, it is, inter alia, observed and held as follows : “5. In all the three Patna decisions, it was accepted that though there was no statutory period of limitation for a criminal revisional application yet such an application was, according to the practice of the High Court, settled by judicial decisions, to be filed within sixty days. It was also accepted, as will appear from Bipat Gope's case, that the Court could "condone the delay in proper cases". Now if it is accepted that a criminal revision has to be initiated within a certain period, and cannot be entertained if initiated beyond such period unless the delay is condoned by the Court, then it is obvious that the principle of natural justice would require that the other party to the proceeding is to be heard as to whether such delay is to be condoned or not, or if already condoned without notice to him and in his absence, whether it has been properly condoned. For otherwise, it would, as observed by the Privy Council in Krishnasami Panikondar v. Ramasami Chettiar AIR 1917 PC 179 at p. 180, "deprive him of a valuable right, for it put in peril the finality of the decision in his favour, so that to preclude him from questioning its propriety would amount to a denial of justice". For otherwise, it would, as observed by the Privy Council in Krishnasami Panikondar v. Ramasami Chettiar AIR 1917 PC 179 at p. 180, "deprive him of a valuable right, for it put in peril the finality of the decision in his favour, so that to preclude him from questioning its propriety would amount to a denial of justice". In that Krishnasami's case, a time-barred appeal was admitted by an express order condoning the delay when it was presented for admission and when, after receiving notice of the appeal, the respondent appeared and urged that the appeal was time-barred, it was argued that the "admission of the appeal was final" and the Court had "no jurisdiction at the hearing of the appeal to reconsider the question whether the delay was excusable". This contention was repelled by the Privy Council which took notice of the fact that such admission and condonation were made in the absence of the respondent and without notice to him and observed that "it must, therefore, in common fairness be regarded as a tacit term of an order like the present that though unqualified in expression, it should be open to reconsideration at the instance of the party prejudicially affected and this view is sanctioned by the practice of the Courts in India". The dictum of the Privy Council, therefore, is that even though a time-barred action has been admitted and even though the delay in initiating the action has been condoned by an order to that effect, if such admission and condonation have been made ex parte and without notice to the other party to the action, such other party has the right to have such admission and condonation reconsidered and to urge that the action was barred by time and the condonation was unjustified. 7..... 7..... As already pointed out and as also held by the Supreme Court, the principle of natural justice must always be allowed to operate on and supplement our procedural laws unless there is anything in such laws to prohibit their application and as I find nothing in the law relating to Criminal Procedure in general and criminal revisions, in particular, to prohibit the application of the abovenoted principle of natural justice, I am inclined to hold that even if a time-barred criminal revisional application is admitted, whether inadvertently or after condoning the delay and such admission or condonation are made in the absence of and without notice to the respondent, the respondent, on receipt of the notice of revision, must be allowed to urge that the revision should not have been admitted and the delay should not have been condoned. These considerations will not obviously apply where the High Court proceeds to exercise its revisional jurisdiction suo motu for which no period has been prescribed either by statute or by the practice of Courts and I should not be taken to have meant that if a I time-barred revisional application has been admitted but it is found that there is no sufficient ground for condoning the delay, the High Court cannot in an exceptional case treat it as a revision initiated suo motu even if there appears to be a flagrant failure of justice. But except in such exceptional cases, which may justify the High Court's invoking its revisional jurisdiction on its own even in the midst of a case initiated on application, a revisional application filed after the expiry of the due period should be dismissed unless the delay is condoned in the manner as stated above after hearing the other party to the proceeding.” 14. At this stage, this Court pertinently points out that in M.P.No.2 of 2014 [Condone Delay Petition], in the cause title, it is mentioned as 'Crl.R.C.SR.No.3659 of 2014 Against C.A.No.126 of 2006 [ON THE FILE OF HON'BLE HIGH COURT] Against S.C.No.148 of 2002'. But the Petition prayer seeks for Condonation of Delay of 2870 days in filing the Appeal before this Court against the order passed in S.C.No.148 of 2002 on the file of the Learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Vellore, Vellore District. But the Petition prayer seeks for Condonation of Delay of 2870 days in filing the Appeal before this Court against the order passed in S.C.No.148 of 2002 on the file of the Learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Vellore, Vellore District. It appears that in M.P.No.2 of 2014, no notice was ordered to the Respondents and in fact, this Court, on 07.02.2014 allowed the Petition after having satisfied with the reasons stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition and condoned the delay. 15. Also, a perusal of M.P.No.1 of 2014 in Crl.RC.SR.No.3659 of 2014 (filed by the Revision Petitioner seeking to Dispense with the production of Certified Copy of the Judgment copy in S.C.No.148 of 2002 dated 20.12.2005 on the file of the trial Court], no notice was ordered to the Respondents, but the said Miscellaneous Petition was ordered by this Court on 04.02.2014. 16. It is to be noted that even the preamble portion to the cause title of Crl.R.C.No.175 of 2014 shows that the Criminal Revision is preferred against C.A.No.126 of 2006 on the file of this Court against S.C.No.148 of 2002 on the file of the Learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Vellore. At this stage, the Learned Counsel for the Revision Petitioner submits that the preamble portion of the cause title in Crl.R.C.No.175 of 2014 shows that the Revision is filed against the C.A.No.126 of 2006 on the file of this Court etc. which is only a curable defect and in fact, the present Revision Case is filed seeking an Enhancement of Sentence in regard to the Judgment dated 20.12.2005 in S.C.No.148 of 2002 passed by the trial Court. Also, in Crl.R.C.No.175 of 2014, the Learned Government Advocate took notice on behalf of the R1 and notice was ordered to the 2nd Respondent returnable in two weeks and also permitted the private notice. 17. It cannot be gainsaid that it is the sacred and solemn duty of the Registry to scrutinise the Applications/Petitions filed by the Litigants espousing their cause for the purpose of seeking necessary reliefs. As such, the Registry is to scrutinise the said Applications/ Petitions with great Care, Caution and also by exercising utmost circumspection so as to not give room for any cause/complaint from any quarters in the near future. 18. As such, the Registry is to scrutinise the said Applications/ Petitions with great Care, Caution and also by exercising utmost circumspection so as to not give room for any cause/complaint from any quarters in the near future. 18. It is to be borne in mind that the power of the Hon'ble High Court to enhance the sentence awarded by the trial Court ought to be exercised sparingly and with great restraint, as opined by this Court. A Rule for Enhancement should not be issued ordinarily inasmuch as the issuance of said Rule itself, would have a telling effect on the convict on whose head the Damocles Sword was hanging over. If a trial Court, without applying its mind, mechanically sentences the Accused, then, a Court of Law can interfere. However, if the trial Court had applied its mind in regard to the question of sentence and while deciding the same should look into the relevant considerations and to pass appropriate sentence as it deems fit and proper. In a case for Enhancement, the High Court should see whether the reasons assigned by the trial Court for not awarding the Life Imprisonment are not convincing and cogent. But, in the instant case, the trial Court had awarded 10 years of Rigorous Imprisonment and imposed a fine amount of Rs.5,000/- etc. to the Appellant/Accused, based on the facts and circumstances of the case. 19. However, this Court, in Crl.A.No.126 of 2006, while upholding the Judgment of Conviction passed by the trial Court in S.C.No.148 of 2002, had awarded a Sentence of Rigorous Imprisonment of 8 years to the Appellant/Accused and further directed the balance fine amount of Rs.1,000/- also to be paid to the Injured/Victim (P.W.11) as compensation in addition to the compensation of Rs.4,000/- already directed to be paid to the injured. 20. Ordinarily, the High Court under Section 401 Cr.P.C. will interfere with the Judgment of the trial Court in an exceptional cases to prevent flagrant miscarriage of Justice. At this stage, it cannot be lost sight of that the Revisional Jurisdiction before the High Court cannot be utilised by any one with a view to substitute the view of the High Court with that of the trial Court on a question of fact. 21. At this stage, it cannot be lost sight of that the Revisional Jurisdiction before the High Court cannot be utilised by any one with a view to substitute the view of the High Court with that of the trial Court on a question of fact. 21. As a matter of fact, the High Court will interfere under Revision if there is a material error or defect in law or procedure, misconception or misreading of evidence, failure to exercise or wrong exercise of jurisdiction or where the facts admitted or proved do not disclose any offence. To put it precisely, the cases for interference, under Revisional Jurisdiction by the High Court, must be of an exceptional nature, as opined by this Court. In fact, the Revisional jurisdiction is discretionary as is the jurisdiction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India under Article 136 of the Constitution of India as per decision Rabindra Nath Chaubey V. Charai Chamar, 1984 CrLJ 1590 (Patna). Unless the finding of the trial Court is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is based on irrelevant evidence or ignoring relevant evidence, it is not permissible to interfere with the Order/Judgment of the trial Court in revisional jurisdiction. If there is capriciousness on the part of the trial Court in the assessment of evidence, then, the Hon'ble High Court may interfere under Revisional Jurisdiction. Further, if the trial Court Judgment verges on the perverse, the Appellate Court has a duty to set the evaluation right and pass appropriate Judgment in accordance with law. 22. At this stage, this Court pertinently, points out the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sahab Singh and others V. State of Haryana, AIR 1990 Supreme Court 1188, wherein it is observed as follows : “A conjoint reading of Ss.377, 386, 397 and 401 would indicate that if the State Government is aggrieved about the inadequacy of the sentence it can prefer an appeal under S.377(1) of the Code. The failure on the part of the State Government to prefer an appeal, does not however, precludes the High Court from exercising suo motu power of revision under S.397 read with S.401 of the Code since the High Court itself is empowered to call for the record of the proceeding of any court subordinate to it. The failure on the part of the State Government to prefer an appeal, does not however, precludes the High Court from exercising suo motu power of revision under S.397 read with S.401 of the Code since the High Court itself is empowered to call for the record of the proceeding of any court subordinate to it. Sub-section (4) of S.401 operates as a bar to the party which has a right to prefer an appeal but has failed to do so but that sub-section cannot stand in the way of the High Court exercising revisional jurisdiction suo motu. But before the High Court exercises its suo motu revisional jurisdiction to enhance the sentence, it is imperative that the convict is put on notice and is given an opportunity of being heard on the question of sentence either in person or through his advocate. The revisional jurisdiction cannot be exercised to the prejudice of the convict without putting him on guard that it is proposed to enhance the sentence imposed by the Trial Court.” 23. In the upshot of qualitative and quantitative detailed discussions and on a careful consideration of entire facts and circumstances of the present case, in a cumulative fashion, although the Revision Petitioner has wrongly mentioned the preamble portion of the cause title in M.P.Nos.1 and 2 of 2014 in Crl.R.C.SR.No.3659 of 2014 and notwithstanding the fact that no notice was issued/given to the 2nd Respondent/Appellant/Accused in M.P.Nos.1 and 2 of 2014 in Crl.R.C.SR.No.3659 of 2014 and in view of the fact that as per decision in Jasman Rai V. Smt. Sonamaya Rai, 1980 CRI. L.J. 500 (1), this Court is not bound to decide the Criminal Revision Petition on merits and can dismiss it as time barred, but it is not dismissing the Criminal Revision Petition on that count at this distance point of time, because of the fact that this Court, on merits of the matter, had partly allowed Crl.A.No.126 of 2006 [for the reasons ascribed in the Judgment therein], this Court, prima facie, is subjectively convinced that the present case does not require any Enhancement of Sentence and also, the present case is not one where this Court can exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. Consequently, the Criminal Revision Petition fails. 24. In the result, the Criminal Revision Petition is dismissed.