Judgment The fifth respondent is a minority aided school. In the said school, on the retirement of one Mrs. Pushpa Lilly, a vacancy arose for the post of Secondary Grade Teacher with effect from 30.04.1997. The fifth respondent appointed the petitioner as Secondary Grade Teacher as against the said vacancy on 11.06.1997. But the fact remains that the petitioner did not have the requisite qualification to be appointed as a Secondary Grade Teacher. Instead, she had qualification to be appointed as a B.T. Assistant. In other words, the petitioner has got B.Sc. Degree in Chemistry and B.Ed. Degree. Her appointment was not at all approved by the respondents, since the petitioner was not qualified for being appointed as Secondary Grade Teacher. 2. At this juncture, it needs to be looked into a few Government Orders in this regard. The Government, as early as on 11.07.1995, issued an order in G.O.Ms.No.559, Education, Science and Technology Department, directing the Education Department not to approve the appointment of B.T./Tamil Pandits in the Secondary Grade Teacher vacancies in future, in all kinds of schools, including the minority schools. Since the petitioner was appointed against the said Government Order, her appointment was not approved. 3. There were number of writ petitions filed by similarly placed persons challenging the said orders declining to approve the appointment of B.T./Tamil Pandits as Secondary Grade Teachers as per the above G.O., and the said writ petitions were all dismissed. As against the same, writ appeals were filed and in those writ appeals, a Division Bench of this Court directed that in respect of those teachers who were appointed as against the Secondary Grade Teacher posts, the Government may direct them to undergo Child Psychology Training and on completion of the same, they shall be regularised as Secondary Grade Teachers. That was accepted by the Government and accordingly the Government issued G.O.Ms.No.155, School Education Department, dated 03.10.2002 directing to approve appointment of B.T./Tamil Pandit qualified persons appointed in the sanctioned regular post of Secondary Grade Teachers between 11.07.1995 and 19.05.1998 after sending them to undergo one month training in Child Psychology in the District Institute of Education and Training. 4. Accordingly, as per the said Government Order, the petitioner was sent for one month training in Child Psychology. 4. Accordingly, as per the said Government Order, the petitioner was sent for one month training in Child Psychology. On her completing the said training, as directed by the Division Bench of this Court, the petitioner's appointment as Secondary Grade Teacher was approved with effect from 02.06.2003. Thus, from 02.06.2003, the petitioner was drawing the pay scale of the Secondary Grade Teacher. 5. While so, the Government issued yet another order in G.O.Ms. No. 79, School Education Department, dated 14.06.2002 wherein the Government directed that as against the vacancies in the post of Secondary Grade Teachers, the said vacancies shall be converted as Middle Grade Graduate Teachers and accordingly, teachers with B.Ed. qualification shall be appointed, but only as Secondary Grade Teachers in the pay scale of Secondary Grade Teacher, however with one additional increment. According to this Government Order, several vacancies in the post of Secondary Grade Teacher which had occurred after 14.06.2002 were all converted as Middle Grade Graduate Teacher posts and accordingly, teachers with B.T. qualification were all appointed. Still, the said appointees were drawing salary of only a Secondary Grade Teacher. This Government Order has got no much relevance to the case of the petitioner. 6. Thereafter, the Government took a policy decision that the classes between VI to VIII shall be hereafter taught only by teachers with B.Ed. qualification. This was because, the Government felt that the Secondary Grade Teachers were not capable of handling the tough subjects meant for Classes VI to VIII in the schools. As per this policy decision, the Government issued a Government Order in G.O.Ms.No.100, School Education (Budget) Department, dated 27.06.2003 wherein the Government directed that the vacancies which had occurred after 27.06.2003 in the post of Secondary Grade Teachers shall be converted as Graduate Teachers (Junior Grade) on a consolidated pay of Rs.4,000/-for a period of five years and thereafter they shall be absorbed with regular time scale of pay. However, this Government Order had only a short life. The Government did not allow this consolidated pay for these teachers for a full term of 5 years from the date of appointment. However, this Government Order had only a short life. The Government did not allow this consolidated pay for these teachers for a full term of 5 years from the date of appointment. Instead, the Government issued G.O.Ms.No.99, School Education Department, dated 27.06.2006, directing that the Junior Grade teachers working in the Government/Government aided schools in consolidated pay from 2003-2004 shall be paid regular time scale of pay applicable to graduate teachers with effect from 01.06.2006 and that in future to fill up the teacher vacancies in Government/Government aided schools in the regular time scale of pay. After the issuance of the said Government Order, the teachers who were appointed as Junior Grade B.Ed. teachers in consolidated pay from 2003-2004 were posted in the regular vacancies of graduate teachers and were paid salary and allowances admissible to the post of graduate teachers from 01.06.2006. The Government issued yet another Government Order in G.O.Ms.No.174, School Education Department, dated 15.09.2006 by which the Government directed the Director of Elementary Education to fill up the post of B.T. Assistant in Government Panchayat Union Schools only under the Tamil Nadu Elementary Subordinate Service Rules by promotion. This Government Order is applicable only to the Panchayat Union School teachers coming under the above said rules. 7. According to the petitioner, as per the above Government Orders, from 01.06.2006 onwards the petitioner should have been brought in the regular time scale of pay for the post of B.T. Assistant, but the petitioner is kept only as Secondary Grade Teacher though she is fully qualified in all respects for the post of B.T. Assistant. 8. It is the contention of the petitioner that as per the above Government Orders, the vacancies for the post of Secondary Grade Teachers which fell subsequent to 14.06.2002 were all filled up only from the teachers who are qualified to be appointed as B.T. Assistants. Now, as per the subsequent Government Orders referred to above, they have been brought under the time scale of pay for the post of B.T. Assistant, but the petitioner, for the simple reason that she was appointed as Secondary Grade Teacher, though she did not have the qualification for being appointed as Secondary Grade Teacher, is penalised by not bringing her into the time scale of pay for the post of B.T. Assistant. It is further contended that in all respects, the petitioner is equal to those teachers who are all appointed subsequent to 14.06.2002. It is also pointed out that the petitioner is imparting education to the students studying in Classes VI to VIII like any other teacher appointed subsequent to G.O.Ms.No.79. It is further contended that the syllabus and the nature of the job, etc. are all equal, but in the case of pay scale, there is dispute as indicated above. Thus, the petitioner has been discriminated. When the policy of the Government itself is to have only B.T. Assistants to teach the students between Classes VI to X, there is no reason as to why the teachers like the petitioner alone to be deprived of equal treatment. Thus, according to the petitioner, she is entitled for the time scale of pay for the post of B.T. Assistant with effect from 01.06.2006. 9. A detailed counter has been filed by the first respondent on behalf of all the respondents. In the counter, it is stated inter alia that the petitioner cannot claim parity with the other teachers who are appointed after 14.06.2002. It is stated that the petitioner was initially appointed as Secondary Grade Teacher though she was not qualified to be appointed so. Thus, her initial entry was not in accordance with law. However, the Division Bench of this Court, while taking a decision in respect of similarly placed persons, directed the Government to show some compassion making such persons to undergo Child Psychology Training for one year and then to regularise them. However, it was made clear that though their appointments would be legalised, such teachers would be entitled for only the pay scale of Secondary Grade Teachers and they cannot claim the pay scale on par with the B.T. Assistants. It is further contended in the counter that considering the said directions of the Division Bench of this Court, the Government issued G.O.Ms.No.155, by which the petitioner was allowed to undergo Child Psychology Training and on completion, her appointment has been regularised. According to the respondents, it is not open to her now to claim parity with those teachers who are appointed subsequently as against the B.T. Assistant Junior Grade who were subsequently absorbed as regular B.T. Assistants with effect from 01.06.2006. According to the respondents, it is not open to her now to claim parity with those teachers who are appointed subsequently as against the B.T. Assistant Junior Grade who were subsequently absorbed as regular B.T. Assistants with effect from 01.06.2006. It is further contended that from 2006 to 2010, the petitioner had kept silent and after a long delay of 5 years the petitioner is illegally seeking seniority and Graduate Teacher scale of pay now. It is also apprehended that if the request of the petitioner is accepted, it will create a bad precedent and pave way for many number of litigations to arise. This, according to the respondents, is a time barred claim of the petitioner. Thus, according to the respondents, the writ petition deserves only to be dismissed. 10. I have considered the above submissions. 11. On facts, as I have narrated above, absolutely there is no controversy between the parties before this Court. Admittedly the initial appointment of the petitioner was not in accordance with law. As already pointed out, though the petitioner was not qualified for being appointed as Secondary Grade Teacher, she was appointed by the Management as Secondary Grade Teacher with B.Ed. qualification. However, as per the direction issued by the Division Bench and as per G.O.Ms.No.155, she was directed to undergo Child Psychology Training and accordingly on completion of the same, from 02.06.2003, her appointment has been approved as Secondary Grade Teacher with secondary grade scale of pay. Regarding this position, there is no dispute. 12. The present litigation is on account of the subsequent developments. As I have already pointed out, there has been obvious change in the policy of the Government in respect of teachers taking classes between VI and VIII. Previously, classes IX and X were taught by regular B.T. Assistants with B.Ed. qualification and Secondary Grade Teachers were handling classes between VI and VIII in all schools including aided schools. Due to change in syllabus, the Government noticed that the Secondary Grade Teachers cannot handle the classes between VI and VIII. This is the reason why the Government issued G.O.Ms.No.79, School Education Department, dated 14.06.2002 wherein the Government directed that if any vacancy arise in the post of Secondary Grade Teacher for classes between VI and VIII, the same shall be converted as Middle Grade Graduate Teacher and accordingly the teachers with B.Ed. qualification would be appointed. This is the reason why the Government issued G.O.Ms.No.79, School Education Department, dated 14.06.2002 wherein the Government directed that if any vacancy arise in the post of Secondary Grade Teacher for classes between VI and VIII, the same shall be converted as Middle Grade Graduate Teacher and accordingly the teachers with B.Ed. qualification would be appointed. The Government thereafter took yet another policy decision and issued G.O.Ms.No.100, School Education (Budget) Department, dated 27.06.2003, by which the Government directed that only the vacancies which may arise after the said date shall be filled up by teachers with B.Ed. qualification as B.T. Assistants but with consolidated pay for a period of five years and thereafter to be brought in the regular time scale of pay for the post of B.T. Assistant. But even before five years, the Government took another policy decision by which the Government issued G.O.Ms.No.99 dated 27.06.2006 by which the Government directed that all such teachers who were working in the schools for classes between VI and VIII with consolidated pay as B.T. Assistants shall be brought in the regular time scale of pay from 01.06.2006. However, while issuing the above three Government orders, the Government was conscious of the teachers who are already working as Secondary Grade Teachers. Probably, the Government did not want to have any disturbance to those teachers who are already working as Secondary Grade Teachers in the classes between VI and VIII. In order to protect their interest, the Government directed that they shall continue to work as Secondary Grade Teachers and only on their retirement, in the vacancies which will so arise, B.T. Assistants will be appointed. The petitioner has been working as Secondary Grade Teacher all along from 02.06.2003 though she is qualified for the post of B.T. Assistant. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, according to the policy of the Government, she is eligible to handle the classes between VI and VIII. Those teachers who are appointed after 14.06.2002 as Secondary Grade Teachers with B.Ed. qualification have been now brought in the time scale of pay with effect from 01.06.2006. Simply because the petitioner was appointed prior to 14.06.2002 as Secondary Grade Teacher with B.Ed. qualification and simply because her appointment was initially illegal and then it was subsequently regularised, the petitioner cannot be discriminated. qualification have been now brought in the time scale of pay with effect from 01.06.2006. Simply because the petitioner was appointed prior to 14.06.2002 as Secondary Grade Teacher with B.Ed. qualification and simply because her appointment was initially illegal and then it was subsequently regularised, the petitioner cannot be discriminated. She is doing the same job, handling the same class and performing the functions like that of the teachers appointed as Secondary Grade Teachers after 14.06.2002. 13. In my considered opinion, denying the benefits of the time scale of pay from 01.06.2006 to the petitioner on par with the other teachers, is discriminatory and it grossly violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In this regard, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Randhir Singh v. Union of India and others, reported in (1982) 1 SCC 618 , wherein in paragraphs 7 and 8, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: “7. Our attention was drawn to Binoy Kumar Mukerjee v. Union of India (ILR (1973) 1 Del 427), and Makhan Singh v. Union of India (ILR (1975) 1 Del 227), where reference was made to the observations of this Court in Kishori Mohanlal Bakshi v. Union of India ( AIR 1962 SC 1139 ), describing the principle of “equal pay for equal work” as an abstract doctrine which had nothing to do with Article 14. We shall presently point out how the principle, “equal pay for equal work”, is not an abstract doctrine but one of substance. Kishori Mohanlal Bakshi v. Union of India is not itself of any real assistance to us since what was decided there was that there could be different scales of pay for different grades of a service. It is well known that there can be and there are different grades in a service, with varying qualifications for entry into a particular grade, the higher grade often being a promotional avenue for officers of the lower grade. The higher qualifications for the higher grade, which may be either academic qualifications or experience based on length of service, reasonably sustain the classification of the officers into two grades with different scales of pay. The principle of “equal pay for equal work” would be an abstract doctrine not attracting Article 14 if sought to be applied to them. 8. The higher qualifications for the higher grade, which may be either academic qualifications or experience based on length of service, reasonably sustain the classification of the officers into two grades with different scales of pay. The principle of “equal pay for equal work” would be an abstract doctrine not attracting Article 14 if sought to be applied to them. 8. It is true that the principle of “equal pay for equal work” is not expressly declared by our Constitution to be a fundamental right. But it certainly is a constitutional goal. Article 39(d) of the Constitution proclaims “equal pay for equal work for both men and women” as a directive principle of State Policy. “Equal pay for equal work for both men and women” means equal pay for equal work for everyone and as between the sexes directive principles, as has been pointed out in some of the judgments of this Court have to be read into the fundamental rights as a matter of interpretation. Article 14 of the Constitution enjoins the State not to deny any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws and Article 16 declares that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. These equality clauses of the Constitution must mean something to everyone. To the vast majority of the people the equality clauses of the Constitution would mean nothing if they are unconcerned with the work they do and the pay they get. To them the equality clauses will have some substance if equal work means equal pay. Whether the special procedure prescribed by astatute for trying alleged robber-barons and smuggler kings or for dealing with tax evaders is discriminatory, whether a particular governmental policy in the matter of grant of licences or permits confers unfettered discretion on the Executive, whether the take-over of the empires of industrial tycoons is arbitrary and unconstitutional and other questions of like nature, leave the millions of people of this country untouched. Questions concerning wages and the like, mundane they may be, are yet matters of vital concern to them and it is there, if at all that the equality clauses of the Constitution have any significance to them. Questions concerning wages and the like, mundane they may be, are yet matters of vital concern to them and it is there, if at all that the equality clauses of the Constitution have any significance to them. The Preamble to the Constitution declares the solemn resolution of the people of India to constitute India into a Sovereign Socialist Democratic Republic. Again the word “socialist” must mean something. Even if it does not mean ‘to each according to his need’, it must at least mean “equal pay for equal work”. “The principle of “equal pay for equal work” is expressly recognized by all socialist systems of law, e.g., Section 59 of the Hungarian Labour Code, para 2 of Section 111 of the Czechoslovak Code, Section 67 of the Bulgarian Code, Section 40 of the Code of the German Democratic Republic, para 2 of Section 33 of the Rumanian Code. Indeed this principle has been incorporated in several western Labour Codes too. Under provisions in Section 31 (g. No. 2d) of Book I of the French Code du Travail, and according to Argentinian law, this principle must be applied to female workers in all collective bargaining agreements. In accordance with Section 3 of the Grundgesetz of the German Federal Republic, and Clause 7, Section 123 of the Mexican Constitution, the principle is given universal significance” (vide International Labour Law by Istvan Szaszy, p. 265). The Preamble to the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation recognises the principle of ‘equal remuneration for work of equal value’ as constituting one of the means of achieving the improvement of conditions “involving such injustice, hardship and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperilled”. Construing Articles 14 and 16 in the light of the Preamble and Article 39 (d), we are of the view that the principle “equal pay for equal work” is deducible from those Articles and may be properly applied to cases of unequal scales of pay based on no classification or irrational classification though those drawing the different scales of pay do identical work under the same employer.” A cursory reading of the above judgment would go to show that equal pay for equal work falls within the ambit of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 14. 14. The learned counsel for the petitioner relies on yet another judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in T. Venkateswarulu v. Executive Officer, Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanams and others, reported in (2009) 1 SCC 546 , wherein in paragraph-20, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows: “20. Since the plea of parity of Draughtsman Grade I with the Supervisors had to be examined on the touchstone of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, the burden was upon the appellant to establish discrimination by placing on record cogent materials. For this purpose, the crucial factor to be established is not only the functional parity of the two cadres, but also the mode of recruitment, qualification and the responsibilities attached to the two offices. All this information is necessary to analyse the rationale behind the State action in giving different treatment to two classes of its employees and then determine whether or not an invidious discrimination has been practised. In this judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has explained that for the purpose of Articles 14 and 16, the crucial factor to be established is not only the functional parity of the two cadres, but also the mode of recruitment, qualification and the responsibilities attached to the two offices. As per this judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, both such cadres shall fall equal in terms of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In the case on hand, as has been rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the petitioner and those teachers who were appointed after 14.06.2002 are equal in all respects as indicated above. Therefore, in my considered opinion, the doctrine of equal pay for equal work, if complied, then, the petitioner is entitled for time scale of pay as it is paid to the other teachers who were appointed on or after 14.06.2002. 15. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on yet another judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of West Bengal and another vs. West Bengal Minimum Wages Inspectors Association an others, reported in (2010) 5 SCC 225 . It is a case concerned with the doctrine of equal pay for equal work. Paragraph-25 of the said judgment reads as under: “25. It is a case concerned with the doctrine of equal pay for equal work. Paragraph-25 of the said judgment reads as under: “25. As noticed above, one post which is considered as having a lesser pay scale may be assigned a higher pay scale and another post which is considered to have a proper pay scale may merely be assigned the corresponding revised pay scale but not any higher pay scale. Therefore, the benefit of higher pay scale can only be claimed by establishing that holders of the subject post and holders of reference category posts, discharge duties and functions identical with, or similar to, each other and that the continuation of disparity is irrational and unjust.” 16. In yet another judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers' Union v. Union of India and others, reported in (1991) 1 SCC 619 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court had to consider as to whether the doctrine of equal pay for equal work will fall within the ambit of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India in service jurisprudence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that though equal pay for equal work is not expressly declared by the Constitution as a Fundamental Right, in view of the Directive Principles of State Policy as contained in Article 39(d) of the Constitution, equal pay for equal work has assumed the status of Fundamental Rights in service jurisprudence having regard to the constitutional mandate of equality in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. It is also held that “this Court has zealously enforced the fundamental right of equal pay for equal work in effectuating the constitutional goal of equality and social justice in a number of decisions”. 17. Similar view has been taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K.T. Veerappa and others v. State of Karnataka and others, reported in (2006) 9 SCC 406, Union of India v. Dineshan K.K., reported in (2008) 1 SCC 586 and State of Kerala v. B. Renjith Kumar and others, reported in (2008) 12 SCC 219 . 18. 17. Similar view has been taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K.T. Veerappa and others v. State of Karnataka and others, reported in (2006) 9 SCC 406, Union of India v. Dineshan K.K., reported in (2008) 1 SCC 586 and State of Kerala v. B. Renjith Kumar and others, reported in (2008) 12 SCC 219 . 18. From the above judgments, it is crystal clear that the law on this subject has been well settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that though equal pay for equal work is not expressly stated in any of the provisions of the Fundamental Rights, it falls within the ambit of Article 14 of the Constitution of India in view of Article 39(d) of the Constitution of India and the same is enforceable by the Courts. In the case on hand, those teachers who were appointed after 14.06.2002 and the petitioner are equal in all respects. Therefore, the doctrine of equal pay for equal work should be applied. I do not find any reason as to why the petitioner alone should be deprived of the benefit of G.O.Ms.No.99 when her service was regularised even on 02.06.2003 itself. When the petitioner and the other teachers who were appointed on or after 14.06.2002 are equal in all respects, I have to necessarily hold that the petitioner is also entitled for the basic scale of pay for the post of B.T. Assistant with effect from 01.06.2006. The apprehension of the Government that this decision would open the floodgate cannot prevent the petitioner from enforcing her rights under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 19. It may be true that this judgment will lead to many more litigations of this nature. It is needless to point out that any man who claims that his fundamental right has been violated in an arbitrary manner by denying equal pay for equal work, he can get his grievance redressed only by means of litigation before this Court. Such litigations could be prevented by the Government by implementing this order in respect of similarly placed persons, or else let there be litigants before this Court with the plea to establish their right to have equal pay for equal work. Such litigations could be prevented by the Government by implementing this order in respect of similarly placed persons, or else let there be litigants before this Court with the plea to establish their right to have equal pay for equal work. Therefore, the apprehension of the spate of litigations is no answer to the fundamental right which is sought to be enforced by the petitioner in this writ petition. 20. In view of all the above, I find that this writ petition deserves to be allowed. In the result, the writ petition is allowed with a direction to the respondents to bring the petitioner into regular time scale of pay of B.T. Assistant with effect from 01.06.2006, pay her arrears and all the other service benefits. It is directed that such consequential order shall be passed by the respondents, within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed. No costs.