Judgment 1. The present Second Appeal has been directed against the impugned judgment and decree passed in A.S. No.85 of 2003 dated 21.03.2012, whereby the learned Appellate Court, reversing the judgment of the trial court, dismissed the suit. 2. Mr. G. Justin, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff/ appellant would submit that the plaintiff M. Lakshmi Ammal filed the suit in O.S. No.2163/90 on the file of the VI Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai for declaration of title with reference to the suit property namely the house, ground and premises at Door No.1-A, Abirami Avenue 1st Street, Kodungaiyur, Chennai – 51, covered in Survey no.175/3A (part) and measuring 2340 sq.ft. and for permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their men, servants and subordinates or anybody claiming under or through them from in any way interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property, along with the costs of the suit, on the basis that the defendants have no right to evict the plaintiff from the suit property since the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the suit property, armed with patta and other revenue records. At the time of filing the suit, an application in I.A. No.4396/1990 was moved to dispense with the notice under Section 138 of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board Act, 1961. Learned Trial Court, while over-ruling the objections raised by the defendants/ respondents that the suit filed by the petitioner was not maintainable for want of notice under Section 138 of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board Act, 1961 and that the suit property has been acquired by the Government, accepted the case of the plaintiff by holding that the plea raised by the defendants was not established before the Trial Court. 3. As against the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court the defendants/ Housing Board went on appeal in A.S. No.85 of 2003 before II Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court-II) Chennai-5. But the learned Appellate Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Housing Board as devoid of any merits, confirming the judgment of the Trial Court. As against that, S.A. No. 1328 of 2003 was preferred. But the learned Appellate Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Housing Board as devoid of any merits, confirming the judgment of the Trial Court. As against that, S.A. No. 1328 of 2003 was preferred. This Court, by taking a view that the land acquisition proceedings are juridical acts in remand hence the judgments of both courts below had no legs to stand, held that both the courts below have failed to see that the issues relating to the plea of the land acquisition proceedings were not framed and remitted the matter back to the lower Appellate Court, by framing two additional substantial questions of law, viz., i. whether the land in Survey No.175/3A2 measuring 0.22 acres in Kondungaiyur Village (including the suit property) was acquired by the Government under the Land Acquisition proceedings concerned; and ii. whether the prayer of the plaintiff for permanent injunction is tenable. Adding further, learned counsel for the appellant contended that the learned First Appellate Court, without answering the said issues, wrongly came to a conclusion that on the date of acquisition, 12 years period relating to adverse possession has not been completed. Therefore, the finding given by the learned First Appellate Court, he pleaded, is perverse. 4. Arguing further, he would state that when the 4th defendant in S.A. No.1328/2008 Mr. V.A. Joy has already filed S.A. No.1242/2005, the dismissal of the Second Appeal in respect of the suit will operate as res-judicata since the parties in S.A. No.1242/2005 and S.A. No.1328/2008 are one and the same. However, this vital aspect also has not been properly answered by the learned First Appellate Court. 5. Learned counsel further contended that the plaintiff, filed the suit for declaration of the property covered in Survey No.175/3A (part) measuring 2340 sq.ft. and for permanent injunction restraining the defendants, clearly mentioning the description that it was bound on south by Survey No.175/3A/2 (R-36) and also by marking substantive entrance to show that the suit property belonging to the plaintiff was never covered by the land acquisition proceedings. and for permanent injunction restraining the defendants, clearly mentioning the description that it was bound on south by Survey No.175/3A/2 (R-36) and also by marking substantive entrance to show that the suit property belonging to the plaintiff was never covered by the land acquisition proceedings. Whereas, learned First Appellate court merely accepting the deposition of PW-2 the Tahsildar that Survey No.175/3A has been divided into 175/3A-1 to 175/3A-7, wrongly fastened the burden upon the plaintiff/ appellant to prove that the suit property is not covered under the land acquisition proceedings and erroneously held that the plaintiff miserably failed to establish the same, when it is the duty of the defendants to prove and establish beyond reasonable doubt that the suit land was the subject matter of land acquisition proceedings. While concluding his arguments, he also stated that when the plaintiff amply proved the factum about his possession of the suit land by producing the chitta and adangal extracts, the learned Appellate Court ought not to have held that the plaintiff/ appellant had failed to establish her case. When the plaintiff has been all along pleading even before the defendants/ Housing Board that the suit property was never acquired by the Government, the learned Appellate Court has wrongly held that the plaintiff/ appellant has failed to distinguish the property covered under the suit schedule and the property under the land acquisition proceedings. Accordingly, he prayed for allowing this Appeal. 6. In reply, Mr. S. Gomathi Nayagam, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for respondents 1 and 2, would submit that the suit filed by the plaintiff/ appellant against the Housing Board was not even legally maintainable. According to him, the provisions contemplated under Section 138 of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board Act are different from the provisions contained under Section 80(2) of CPC. When Section 80(2) of CPC confers sufficient powers upon the trial court to dispense with the issuance of the pre-suit notice 60 days before filing of the suit, there is no such power conferred under Section 138 of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board Act. When Section 80(2) of CPC confers sufficient powers upon the trial court to dispense with the issuance of the pre-suit notice 60 days before filing of the suit, there is no such power conferred under Section 138 of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board Act. Therefore, the suit filed by the plaintiff without complying the mandatory provisions contained in Section 138 of the said Act which says, no suit shall be instituted against the Board, or any member, or any officer or servant of the Board, or any person acting under the direction of the Board, or of the Chairman or Managing Director of any officer or servant of the Board, in respect of any act done or intended to be done under this Act or any rule or regulation made there under until the expiration of sixty days next after written notice has been delivered stating the causes of action, was not maintainable. Hence, the Second Appeal, he pleaded, is liable to be dismissed. 7. Adding further, it was submitted that when the suit land was already acquired under Section 4 (1) notification followed by Declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act way back in the year 1970 by paying suitable compensation to the original landlord Mr. Janarthanam in respect of the land covered in Survey No.175/3A-2, the plaintiff/ appellant, without establishing his title with regard to the suit property, had wrongly set up his title by raising the plea of adverse possession. Therefore, learned Appellate Court, in the impugned judgment, has rightly come to the conclusion that when the disputed property, as claimed by the defendants/ respondents, was the subject matter of Land Acquisition proceedings, the entire burden is cast upon the plaintiff/ appellant to prove that the suit property is not covered under the land acquisition proceedings, but she has failed to establish the same. Learned Appellate Court, after the matter was remanded by this Court, vide judgment passed in S.A. No.85 of 2003 has rightly come to the conclusion that the land acquisition proceedings was in respect of Survey No.175/3A-2 etc. Therefore, as evidenced by B-6 the plan issued by Tahsildar, the entire Survey No.175/3A was sub divided into 175/3A-1 to 175/3A-7 and no property was left out without proper sub division. Therefore, as evidenced by B-6 the plan issued by Tahsildar, the entire Survey No.175/3A was sub divided into 175/3A-1 to 175/3A-7 and no property was left out without proper sub division. On that basis, disbelieving the case of the plaintiff/ appellant that the suit property was not acquired, the court below rightly allowed the appeal, reversing the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court. Therefore, when the specific issue raised by this Court in Second Appeal, as to whether the land in survey No.175/3A-2 measuring 0.22 acres in Kodungaiyur Village was acquired by the Government under the land acquisition proceedings, has been rightly answered holding against the plaintiff/ appellant herein that no document was produced to prove continuous possession over the statutory period to claim adverse possession also and that, in order to prove that the disputed property is not the property acquired by the Government, the plaintiff/ appellant has failed to distinguish the suit property and the property covered under the land acquisition proceedings, the said findings on facts and the ultimate conclusions do not call for interference by this Court; hence, the Second Appeal may not be entertained, he ultimately pleaded. 8. Heard the parties on both sides. 9. When the suit filed by the plaintiff/ appellant seeking for declaration of the suit property measuring 2340 sq.ft. covered in Survey No.175/3A (part) and for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from in any way interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property, was decreed by the learned trial court, on appeal, the learned First Appellate Court initially concurred with the said findings and conclusions of the trial court and that led to the filing of Second Appeal No.1328/2008. As already mentioned above, while disposing the said Second Appeal, this Court by framing two additional issues, remanded the case back to the learned First Appellate Court. As already mentioned above, while disposing the said Second Appeal, this Court by framing two additional issues, remanded the case back to the learned First Appellate Court. The learned First Appellate Court while proceeding to answer the issue as to whether the suit land was acquired by the Government under the Land Acquisition Proceedings or not fixed the burden upon the plaintiff/ appellant to prove that the suit property is not covered under the land acquisition proceedings and found that the plaintiff miserably failed to establish the same and answered ultimately against the plaintiff/ appellant herein by holding that the description of the suit property as Survey No. 175/3A (part) was not proper as there was further sub division of the same into 175/3A-2 etc. Learned First Appellate Court also found that when the plaintiff/ appellant was all along claiming that the suit property should not be interfered with by the Housing Board on the ground that the same was acquired under the land acquisition proceedings, she should have differentiated the suit property and the property covered under the land acquisition proceedings. 10. In fact, PW-2 one Mr. Sukumaran, the Tahsildar, during his cross examination, clearly deposed that the entire lands under Survey No.173/3A has been sub-divided into Survey Nos.175/3A-1 to 175/3A-7. No doubt, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, by pointing out, to the description relating to the schedule of property, would state that the plaintiff has claimed declaration with regard to the suit property covered under Survey No.175/3A (part) measuring an extent of 2340 sq.ft alone. When the plaintiff/ appellant is concerned with the suit property covered under Survey No.175/3A (part) alone, having a limited extent of 2340 sq.ft., although the defendants/ respondents have claimed that after the Survey No. 175/3A was sub divided into Survey Nos. 175/3A-1 to 175/3A-7 in the map/ sketch, nowhere, the survey number 175/3A-2 or 3 or 4 after sub division, has been shown. Further, when the Tahsildar from the Revenue Department entered into the witness box and deposed to prove that the entire lands in Survey No. 175/3A were sub divided into Survey Nos.175/3A-1 to 175/3A-7, the plaintiff/ appellant, to disprove the said deposition made by PW-2, Mr. Sukumara the Tahsildar, did not adduce any evidence, oral or documentary. Further, when the Tahsildar from the Revenue Department entered into the witness box and deposed to prove that the entire lands in Survey No. 175/3A were sub divided into Survey Nos.175/3A-1 to 175/3A-7, the plaintiff/ appellant, to disprove the said deposition made by PW-2, Mr. Sukumara the Tahsildar, did not adduce any evidence, oral or documentary. Under this background, learned Appellate Court, by answering the issue framed by this Court in the Second Appeal, arrived at a factual finding that the suit property is covered under the land acquisition proceedings that had taken place in the year 1970. 11. Therefore, such findings on facts reached by the learned First Appellate Court with regard to the questions framed by this Court in the Second Appeal No.85/2003 whether the suit property has been acquired or not, cannot be slightly doubted by this Court. 12. Therefore, the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court, in my considered opinion, do not call for any interference. Accordingly, the Second Appeal fails and the same is dismissed. Consequently, the connected M.Ps are closed. There is no order as to costs.