JUDGMENT : Anjani Kumar Mishra, J. Heard Shri Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal, learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 24062 of 2014, who is also counsel for the applicants in recall application filed in Writ Petition No. 1286 of 1968, Shri C.K. Mishra, who has filed another recall application in Writ Petition No. 1286 of 1968 and Shri B.D. Madhayan, who was counsel for the petitioner in the aforesaid Writ Petition No. 1286 of 1968. 2. The writ petition of 2014 is directed against the order dated 21.03.2014 passed in proceedings under Rule 109-A of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, initiated to implement the final order dated 02.04.2004 passed in Writ Petition No. 1286 of 1968. By the impugned order, the Consolidation Officer has rejected the application filed by the petitioners for stay of these proceedings under Rule 109-A. This stay was prayed for on the ground that the applicants, who are transferees pendenti lite from the respondents in Writ Petition No. 1286 of 1986, had no knowledge or information about the pendency of the aforesaid writ petition. Since they have purchased the land in question during the pendency of the writ petition without any information or intimation of the litigation, and had been duly mutated over the land in question, they were necessary parties to Writ Petition No. 1286 of 1968 and, have therefore, filed an application for recall of the final judgment passed in Writ Petition on 02.04.2004. It was also alleged in this application for stay that the petitioners came to know about the Writ Petition No. 1286 of 1986 only on receipt of notice of the proceedings under Rule 109-A. 3. The order impugned refusing to stay the proceedings under Rule 109-A had been passed on the reasoning that no order has been passed on the recall application said to have been preferred by the petitioners for recall of the order dated 02.04.2004 and, therefore, there is no justification not to proceed with its implementation. 4. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, when this writ petition came up for admission, this Court summoned the record of Writ Petition No. 1286 of 1968 wherein the petitioners have filed a recall application. Thereafter with the consent of the parties both the matters were heard together and are being decided by this common judgment. 5. 4. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, when this writ petition came up for admission, this Court summoned the record of Writ Petition No. 1286 of 1968 wherein the petitioners have filed a recall application. Thereafter with the consent of the parties both the matters were heard together and are being decided by this common judgment. 5. In so far as the recall application filed in Writ Petition No. 1286 of 1968 is concerned, perusal of the record reveals that this writ petition was directed against the order dated 20.03.1968 passed in Revision Nos. 283 and 288 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Meerut. 6. This writ petition was decided finally on 02.04.2004. By this judgment and order, the orders passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation were set aside and the judgments passed by the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer, Consolidation were restored. The writ petition was thus decided against the respondents therein, who are also the vendors of the petitioners in the writ petition of 2014. 7. Learned counsel for the applicants, who have filed the recall application submitted that the final judgment in writ petition was ex parte against their vendors. This fact is mentioned in the order itself. The applicants purchased the land in question through various sale deeds executed during the period from 1990 to 2010. The recall application mentions four sale deeds dated 31.03.1990, 27.01.2000, 28.12.2007 and 20.09.2012. These sale deeds were executed by the respondent no. 5, Muneeza; respondent no. 10 Zubeda or their heirs. 8. In so far as the sale deed dated 20.09.2010 is concerned the same is said to have been executed in favour of the applicants by persons, who had earlier purchased the land from the respondent no. 10. 9. In this connection, I have carefully examined the record of Writ Petition No. 1286 of 1968. Perusal of the order-sheet of this writ petition indicates that notice of this writ petition had been served and service had been held to be sufficient upon respondent no. 5, Muneeza and respondent no. 10, Zubeda. These respondents were duly represented by the counsel. This writ petition had been earlier dismissed but was later remanded back by the apex court for a fresh decision. Even after remand, the fresh notices issued were served upon the respondents on 25.10.1999. The respondent no. 5 was thereafter represented by Shri M.S. Zaidi, Advocate. 10. 10, Zubeda. These respondents were duly represented by the counsel. This writ petition had been earlier dismissed but was later remanded back by the apex court for a fresh decision. Even after remand, the fresh notices issued were served upon the respondents on 25.10.1999. The respondent no. 5 was thereafter represented by Shri M.S. Zaidi, Advocate. 10. The order-sheet further reveals that before this writ petition was heard finally, learned counsel for the petitioner was directed by the Court to inform the counsel for the respondents in writing. This notice was refused by Shri M.A. Zaidi saying that the file of the writ petition was not available to him. This has been categorically noted in the order-sheet. It is only thereafter that the matter was heard and decided finally. 11. From the above facts, it is abundantly clear that the vendors of the recall applicants were served with notice of the writ petition and had engaged a counsel. There is nothing on record of this writ petition to indicate that the vakalatnama executed by such respondents in favour of Shri M.A. Zaidi was ever cancelled. Thus the vendors were aware of the proceedings and in case they did not appear before the Court to convas their claim, the final judgments against them cannot be said to be ex parte inasmuch as the Court had afforded them every opportunity of hearing. A party who has been afforded full opportunity of hearing and despite such opportunity fails to appear, the order passed thereafter cannot be faulted with by such person. 12. It would also be relevant to note that initially Writ Petition No. 24062 of 2014 came up before this Court on 28.04.2014. On that date, it was ordered to be put up along with record of Writ Petition No. 1268 of 1968 as observed earlier. On 30.04.2014, it was directed that copies of the recall and impleadment applications be served upon Shri B.D. Madhayan, learned counsel for the petitioners in writ petition of 1968 and he was granted time to obtain instructions. The matter was thereafter fixed for 09.05.2014. Again on 09.05.2014, the matter was ordered to be put up on 12.05.2014. The matter was ultimately heard on 13.05.2014 on which date a mention was made by Shri C.K. Mishra that he had filed an application in the registry. The matter was thereafter fixed for 09.05.2014. Again on 09.05.2014, the matter was ordered to be put up on 12.05.2014. The matter was ultimately heard on 13.05.2014 on which date a mention was made by Shri C.K. Mishra that he had filed an application in the registry. This application was an application for recall along with an application for condonation of delay and had been filed on behalf of respondents 8 and 9 in the writ petition of 1968. On this mention the application was summoned from the registry and parties were heard on this application also. 13. The case of the applicants, namely, Javed and Mustafiz, respondent nos. 6 and 8 in the writ petition is that they were minors when the writ petition was instituted and had no knowledge of the same and, therefore, were unable to do pairvi in the case. It has further been alleged in paragraph 3 of the affidavit filed in support of the recall application that they had sold some land in their possession through sale deeds and the purchasers had been mutated and were in possession over the land purchased by them. On an enquiry being made by their vendees they came to know about the order dated 03.04.2004 as also the proceedings under Rule 109. It is thereafter that they have filed the instant recall application. 14. It has lastly been urged that since the order dated 02.04.2004 mentions that it has been passed without hearing the respondents as nobody had appeared on their behalf, the order was ex parte against these applicants and was, therefore, liable to be set aside. 15. From the facts noticed above, it is clear that the applicants, namely, Javed and Mustafiz have filed the recall application to support the applicants in the other recall application and a plea is sought to be raised that the applicants were minors when the writ petition itself was instituted in 1968. It would be relevant to notice that this recall application is supported by an affidavit by Javed, respondent no. 6. The age of Javed mentioned in this affidavit is 49 years. It can be stated with certainty that this applicant attained majority at least in 1984. It would be relevant to notice that this recall application is supported by an affidavit by Javed, respondent no. 6. The age of Javed mentioned in this affidavit is 49 years. It can be stated with certainty that this applicant attained majority at least in 1984. It would also be relevant to notice that in the other recall application, preferred by the vendees, the various sale deeds executed in their favour have been enumerated in the affidavit filed in support of the recall and impleadment applications. There is no averment that any sale deed was executed by Mustafiz. There is a reference to a sale deed dated 21.12.2007 which has been executed by Javed (applicant) respondent no. 6. Javed is the son of respondent no. 5, Smt. Muniza, who as already noticed herein above, had been served with a notice and had also engaged a counsel. Under the circumstances, the allegation that the applicants, Javed and Mustafiz were not aware of the pendency of the writ petition cannot be believed. It would also be relevant to notice that the sale deed in favour of the applicants have been executed also by the husband of the respondent no. 5, who was also the guardian of his minor son Javed, respondent no. 6 as indicated from the array of the parties of the writ petition of 1968. 16. It, therefore, emerges that the second recall application has been filed merely to support the applicants of the first recall application and since applicants in the second recall application were duly served, the recall application filed merely on the ground that they had no knowledge of the pendency of the writ petition cannot be accepted. For the same reason, the recall application also is not bona fide. 17. Learned counsel for the applicants, in the first recall application, Shri Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal has relied upon the following decisions in support of his contentions: 1.2012 (10) SCR Vidur Implex an Traders Pvt. Ltd. & Others v. Tosh Apartments Pvt. Ltd. & Other 2.2005 (1) SCC 403 Amit Kumar Shaw and Another v. Farida Khatoon and Another 3.AIR 2013 (Karnataka) 149 (Para 7) 18. The authorities relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner are that a transferee pendente lite is liable to be impleaded as a party in a pending suit. The authorities relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner are that a transferee pendente lite is liable to be impleaded as a party in a pending suit. The situation in the instant case is that as on date no proceedings are pending. The applicants are seeking impleadment in a writ petition which has been decided finally in the year 2004. The case law relied upon is, therefore, clearly distinguishable as the applicants are not seeking impleadment in any pending proceedings but are seeking to reopen proceedings which has become final almost a decade ago. In this connection, it would be relevant to refer to the provisions in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. This section embodies the principle that a transferee pendente lite is bound by a judgment and decree passed against his vendor in case, the transfer is made pendente lite. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated 03.04.2004 passed in Writ Petition No. 1286 of 1968 had been passed against the vendors of the applicants who had full intimation of the pendency of the said case and had even engaged a counsel. The vakalatnama of the counsel was never cancelled and, therefore, if the counsel did not appear despite notice, on the ground that the file of the case was not available with him. There appears no justification for recalling the final judgment passed in the year 2004. 19. Since for the reasons given above, I find no justification to recall the order dated 02.04.2004, both the recall applications are not found to be bona fide and are liable to be rejected. 20. The apex court in the case reported in 2008 (7) SCC 144 Usha Sinha vs. Deena Ram & Others as laid down that there a presumption of knowledge in so far as a transferee pendente lite is concerned. 21. The applicants in the recall application have not been able to refute this presumption and since in view of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, a transfer of pendente lite remain sub serve to the pending litigation, the applicants are not entitled to any relief. 22. In this connection, it would also relevant to notice that the applicants claim on the basis of, among others, two sale deeds said to have been executed in their favour on 28.12.2007 and 20.09.2010. 22. In this connection, it would also relevant to notice that the applicants claim on the basis of, among others, two sale deeds said to have been executed in their favour on 28.12.2007 and 20.09.2010. Both these sale deeds are subsequent to the final decision in Writ Petition No. 1286 of 2008 which was passed on 02.04.2004. The vendors of these two sale deeds, therefore, had no entitle rest in the property sold by them and no rights can accrue in favour of the applicants on the basis of these proceedings. 23. Accordingly, and for this reasons given above, I see no reason to recall the order dated 02.04.2004. Both the recall applications have not been found to be bona fide. They are, accordingly, rejected. 24. In so far as the Writ Petition No.24062 of 2014 is concerned the order impugned has merely refused to stay the proceedings under Rule 109-A of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. No final order, passed in such proceedings is under challenge. 25. Since the order impugned has refused to stay the execution proceedings under Rule 109, which stay had been sought only on account of pendency of the recall application in the writ petition of 1968, and the said recall application is being dismissed by this order itself, the order impugned in the Writ Petition No. 24062 of 2014 suffers from no illegality and even this writ petition deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed. 26. Accordingly, the Writ Petition No. 24062 of 2014 is dismissed and the recall applications filed in Writ Petition No. 1286 of 1968 for recalling the final judgment and order dated 02.04.2004 are also dismissed. Petition dismissed