JUDGMENT 1. The petitioners are the computer operators working in the 3rd respondent Devasthanam, having been appointed on 06.10.2003 by the 2nd respondent-Commissioner of Endowments on a consolidated pay of Rs.5000/- per month. Citing instances of similarly placed persons working in different temples getting appointed in substantive posts with time scales, the petitioners too have made representations to the 3rd respondent Devasthanam. In turn, based on the recommendations of the 3rd respondent, the 2nd respondent, the competent authority, instead of extending the time scale to the petitioners, enhanced their monthly consolidated pay from Rs.5,000/- to Rs. 7,000/-. Aggrieved by the refusal of the 2nd respondent to extend the time scale to the petitioners in substantive posts, the petitioners made further representations to the first respondent, which in turn issued Memo dated 28.01.2008, directing the 2nd respondent to extend the time scale to the petitioners, subject to their suitability. 2. When the directions of the first respondent as contained in the Memo dated 28.01.2008 were not implemented, the petitioners filed the present Writ Petition assailing the inaction of the 2nd and 3rd respondents in not implementing the binding directives of the first respondent. The 3rd respondent Temple, the immediate employer of the petitioners, filed its Counter Affidavit contending that in terms of the existing statutory scheme, there cannot be any conversion of the posts of computer operators - a non-existing cadre - into those of junior assistants. Citing various reasons for not implementing the order of the 1st respondent, the 3rd respondent has pleaded that the implementation could only be in violation of the rules of reservation, roster points and also G.O. Rt. No. 1997, Revenue (Endowments-1) Department, dated 18.10.2005, apart from G.O. Ms. No. 1422, Revenue (Endowment-1) Department, dated 25.07.2005. It is further pleaded that G.O. Ms. No. 2501, Finance Department-2006 provides for separate provisions to pay salary to the computer operators on contract basis and that the cases of the petitioners would be considered only in terms of the said G.O. Accordingly, the 3rd respondent prays for dismissal of the Writ Petition. 3. It is further pleaded that G.O. Ms. No. 2501, Finance Department-2006 provides for separate provisions to pay salary to the computer operators on contract basis and that the cases of the petitioners would be considered only in terms of the said G.O. Accordingly, the 3rd respondent prays for dismissal of the Writ Petition. 3. The 2nd respondent has also filed its Counter Affidavit contending that the petitioners were not appointed by following the selection process and that there are about 10,000 similarly situated employees in several temples in the State of Andhra Pradesh and any deviation in the recruitment process would open flood gates putting enormous financial burden on the temples and in turn the State exchequer. Even in terms of G.O. Ms. No. 888, Revenue-1, dated 18.12.2000, the 3rd respondent temple is governed by the recruitment procedure laid therein. As such, there cannot be any violation of those mandatory provisions in considering the case of the petitioners. Accordingly, the 2nd respondent too prays for the dismissal of the Writ Petition. 4. Brining to the notice of this Court the subsequent developments that have taken place after filing of the Writ Petition, the 2nd respondent filed an Additional Counter Affidavit stating that the orders issued by the 1st respondent through Memo No. 3638/ENDTS-I(1), dated 28.01.2008 were subsequently cancelled through another Memo dated 13.08.2009. Accordingly, it is contended that the very Writ Petition has become infructuous and is required to be dismissed. 5. As a matter of subsequent developments, after filing of the Writ Petition, having issued rule nisi, this Court, through an Order dated 24.03.2008 in W.P. M.P. No. 6810 of 2008, issued directions to extend the benefit of time scale to the petitioners evidently in the cadre of Junior Assistants. Soon thereafter, complaining of non-implementation of the interim direction, the petitioners invoked the contempt jurisdiction of this Court and filed Contempt Case No. 1579 of 2008. In the wake of the said Contempt Case, the 2nd respondent filed W.P.M.P. No. 148 of 2009 seeking vacation of the interim orders. 6. Pending consideration of Vacate Petition and also the Contempt Case, the first respondent, having persuaded by the 2nd respondent, issued Memo dated 31.08.2009 canceling the Orders issued earlier through Government Memo, dated 28.01.2008. In the wake of the said Contempt Case, the 2nd respondent filed W.P.M.P. No. 148 of 2009 seeking vacation of the interim orders. 6. Pending consideration of Vacate Petition and also the Contempt Case, the first respondent, having persuaded by the 2nd respondent, issued Memo dated 31.08.2009 canceling the Orders issued earlier through Government Memo, dated 28.01.2008. Aggrieved by the cancellation of the Memo, the implementation of which was sought by the petitioners through the present Writ Petition, the petitioners filed miscellaneous petition in W.P.M.P. No.22610 of 2009 seeking amendment of the prayer in the Writ Petition, thus laying challenge against the latest Memo. 7. This Court, cutting through this labyrinth of litigation by consolidating all the miscellaneous petitions, including the Vacate Petition, eventually disposed them of through a Common Order. By the time these miscellaneous petitions were taken up, the interim direction given by this Court earlier however had been implemented by the respondents, on pain of contempt. 8. In any event, through an Order dated 26.08.2009, this Court closed the contempt petition. Insofar as the miscellaneous petitions are concerned, this Court has allowed W.P.M.P. No. 22610 of 2009 permitting the petitioners to amend their pleadings, apart from holding that the Writ Petition has not become infructuous. Since the interim directions of this Court with regard to implementation of time scale had already been implemented, this Court did not choose to disturb the same. Accordingly, the W.V.M.P. No. 148 of 2009 was dismissed. Further, as the final Memo dated 31.08.2009 was issued pending Writ Petition, more particularly without an opportunity given to the petitioners before issuing it, the operation of the said Memo was suspended by this Court through the Common Order. 9. Aggrieved by the Common Order dated 24.08.2009 passed in W.P.M.P. No. 22610 of 2009 and W.V.M.P. No. 148 of 2009, the respondents filed an intra-court appeal in W.A. No. 964 of 2013. The said Writ Appeal was eventually disposed of by a learned Division Bench through a Judgment dated 03.07.2013, with a direction to have the Writ Petition listed for final hearing within six months. The Division Bench, while disposing of the said Writ Appeal, has in fact observed that the interim orders which were made absolute on 24.08.2009 stood implemented by 26.08.2009. 10. In the above factual backdrop, the respective counsel have made their submissions. 11. The Division Bench, while disposing of the said Writ Appeal, has in fact observed that the interim orders which were made absolute on 24.08.2009 stood implemented by 26.08.2009. 10. In the above factual backdrop, the respective counsel have made their submissions. 11. Sri P. Gangaiah Naidu, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Sri N. Bharat Babu, learned counsel for the petitioners, has submitted that the authorities have unfortunately displayed obstinacy and have vindictively refused to implement the first respondent’s orders, which are unquestionably binding on respondents Nos.2 and 3. The learned Senior Counsel has stated that, as has been demonstrated by the petitioner in the pleadings and also by filing the relevant orders of absorption passed by the first respondent in favour of other similarly placed person, numerous employees working in different temples on consolidated pay across the State had their services regularised. The learned Senior Counsel has contended that there is no substance in the averment of the respondents that ‘the computer operator’ is not a substantive post and that there cannot be any conversion from that cadre to that of Junior Assistants. The learned Senior Counsel has submitted that even before the appointment of the petitioners, the 2nd respondent being the competent authority, created those posts and only against those existing vacancies, the petitioners were appointed. 12. The learned Senior Counsel has contended that it is only a matter of implementation. Elaborating further, he has stated that, in tune with the policy the Government adopted with regard to temporary employees working on the basis of consolidated pay, the 1st respondent has issued directions to the 2nd and 3rd respondents to extend the benefit of timescale to the petitioners as well. It is further contended that there is no denial on the part of the respondent authorities that there has been numerous instances of regularisation even by way of conversion from one post to another, provided the employees possessed the necessary qualifications. Having regularised the services of scores of employees and having extended the benefit of timescale to them, inexplicably the respondents chose to discriminate against the petitioners. The action of the respondents, contended the learned Senior Counsel, is not only invidiously discriminatory, but also vindictive. Having regularised the services of scores of employees and having extended the benefit of timescale to them, inexplicably the respondents chose to discriminate against the petitioners. The action of the respondents, contended the learned Senior Counsel, is not only invidiously discriminatory, but also vindictive. The learned Senior Counsel has reminded the Court that, pending the disposal of the Writ Petition, the respondents have tried everything at their disposal to stultify the order of the first respondent, and later implemented it only on pain of contempt. 13. The learned Senior Counsel has strenuously contended that the respondent authorities have displayed their mala fide attitude in getting the Memo dated 28.01.2008, issued by the first respondent, cancelled through another Memo, dated 13.08.2009. According to him, the first respondent is deemed to have exercised his powers of Revision under section 93 of the Act 30 of 1987 while issuing the impugned Memo, dated 13.08.2009. Further elaborating on the said aspect, the learned Senior Counsel has stated that the power of review can be exercised by the 1st respondent only within 90 days from the date of the order to be reviewed. In this case, the 1st respondent, the learned Senior Counsel asserts, took up the issue beyond 90 days, and as such, the very impugned Memo is without any jurisdiction. According to the learned Senior Counsel, while issuing the impugned Memo canceling the earlier Memo, the petitioners, being the affected persons, have not been put on notice, and as such the order passed in violation of the principles of natural justice is void ab initio and a nullity, so to speak. Finally, the learned Senior Counsel has urged the Court to allow the Writ Petition as prayed for. 14. Per contra, the learned Government Pleader, appearing for the 2nd respondent, has strenuously contended that the very entry of the petitioners into service is in violation of the rules governing the recruitment into endowment services. He has reminded the Court that on numerous occasions the Courts have consistently held that if an employee has not been brought into cadre in accordance with the recruitment regulations, the said employee cannot stake any claim to any substantive post, whatever be the length of his service. He has reminded the Court that on numerous occasions the Courts have consistently held that if an employee has not been brought into cadre in accordance with the recruitment regulations, the said employee cannot stake any claim to any substantive post, whatever be the length of his service. The learned Government Pleader has asserted that the first respondent has, in terms of Section 94 of the Act, power of review, which is plenary, and as such, no limitation can be read into it. He has also submitted that no authority can be bound by any order passed even by himself, once it has come to light that the said order is ex facie illegal and does not have statutory support. 15. On his part, the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent has contended that there are many other senior employees working on contract basis, and the petitioners are the junior most. He has further submitted that the posts of computer operators are not to be found in the approved cadre of the Devasthanam. The learned Standing Counsel has further contended that at no point of time had the petitioners filed any application of Review before the 1st respondent, and as such, the Memo issued by the 1st respondent cannot be treated as an order passed by the said authority exercising his power of review. As it is not a judicial order or even a quasi-judicial order, the question of issuing any notice to the petitioners does not arise. The learned Standing Counsel has also referred to various GOs and Departmental Instructions to underline the aspect that the services of the petitioners cannot be regularised, and a fortiori the benefit of timescale is not available to them. In support of his submissions, the learned Standing Counsel has placed reliance on the following judgments Ashwani Kumar and others V. State of Bihar and others ( AIR 1997 SC 1628 ); Secretary, State of Karnataka and others (2006) 4 SCC 1 ); State of U. P and others Vs. Desh Raj (2007) 1 SCC 257 ); and K. Ganesh Vs. Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthnam (2006 (6) ALD 506). Accordingly, the learned standing counsel has urged this court to dismiss the Writ Petition. 16. Desh Raj (2007) 1 SCC 257 ); and K. Ganesh Vs. Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthnam (2006 (6) ALD 506). Accordingly, the learned standing counsel has urged this court to dismiss the Writ Petition. 16. Heard the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, the learned Government Pleader for the 2nd respondent, and the learned Standing Counsel for the 3rd respondent, apart from perusing the record. 17. To put the issue in its proper perspective, it is required to be appreciated that initially the petitioners filed the Writ Petition seeking implementation of the Memo, dated 28-01-2008 issued by the 1st respondent. Pending the Writ Petition, the 2nd respondent addressed a series of departmental letters to the 1st respondent stressing the need and necessity of canceling the said Memo. In view of the eventual cancellation of the Memo, dated 28-01-2008, through another Memo, dated 13-08-2009, said to have been issued in supercession of the previous Memo, the petitioners have been compelled to lay challenge against the said subsequent Memo. 18. Chronologically speaking, through an Order, dated 16-10-2003, the second respondent created two posts of Computer Operator and permitted the third respondent Devasthanam to fill the said posts. Resultantly, on the same day both the petitioners were appointed on a consolidated pay of Rs.5,000/- per month. Later, based on the representation, dated 26-11-2005, made by the petitioners, the Executive Officer of the third respondent sent his recommendation on 8-12-2005 to the second respondent to convert the posts of Computer Operator into those of Junior Assistant and to have the services of the petitioners absorbed as junior assistants with a timescale of pay attached to the said posts. In fact, the said recommendation was followed by a reminder dated 11-04-2006 from the third respondent. The second respondent, however, in response to the recommendations made by the third respondent issued Proceedings enhancing the monthly consolidated pay of the petitioners from Rs.5000/- to Rs.7000/-, thus, thereby rejecting the recommendations of the third respondent by implication. 19. The record further reveals that aggrieved by the refusal of the second respondent to convert their posts and to extend the benefit of timescale, the petitioners submitted a representation to the first respondent. Ostensibly, treating the said petition or application of the petitioners as an application for a review, in exercise of his powers under Section 94 of the Act, the first respondent issued Memo No. 3638 Endowments. Ostensibly, treating the said petition or application of the petitioners as an application for a review, in exercise of his powers under Section 94 of the Act, the first respondent issued Memo No. 3638 Endowments. 1(1)/2008.1, dated 28-01-2008, the operative portion of which reads as follows: “4. The Commissioner, Endowments Department, Hyderabad is therefore requested to take necessary action to extend the timescale in the Carter of Junior Assistant to Sri Y. Divakar Reddy and M. Srinivasa Rao, Computer Operators, Sri Bhramaramba Mallikarjuna Swamy Varla Devasthanam, Srisailam, if they are fully eligible, and qualified for the post of Computer Operator and if they have already completed the said service for 4 to 5 years so far.” (Emphasis added) 20. It may have to be appreciated that the petitioners have brought to the notice of this Court certain instances, where the services of the similarly situated persons in other Devasthanams were converted into substantive posts of Junior Assistants by extending the benefit of timescale as well. In fact, the petitioners have cited four such examples with requisite material proof. In that backdrop, we may have to examine two issues on this score: Whether denial of the same benefit to the petitioners amounts to invidious discrimination? And whether the action of the respondent authorities is hit by the principles of either the legitimate expectation or the promissory estoppel? 21. These two issues may not detain us long. Firstly, there can be no negative equity. In other words, if any benefit in violation of a statutory scheme is extended to a particular person, it does not enjoin the respondent authorities to extend the same benefit to other persons, thus perpetuating the manifest illegality. Succinctly put, there is no estoppel against the statute. Admittedly, when numerous employees have been working in different temples on consolidated pay, the question of legitimate expectation does not arise in favour of a handful of employees, unless the practice of converting the posts, regularising the services or extending the timescale has been practised by the authorities regularly, predictably, and invariably, in the absence of any statutory interdiction. Admittedly, when numerous employees have been working in different temples on consolidated pay, the question of legitimate expectation does not arise in favour of a handful of employees, unless the practice of converting the posts, regularising the services or extending the timescale has been practised by the authorities regularly, predictably, and invariably, in the absence of any statutory interdiction. On the same count even the promissory estoppel has to be discounted inasmuch as mere recommendation on the part of the third respondent, the enhanced consolidated pay on the part of the second respondent, or a Memo by the first respondent providing a certain benefit, more particularly when it is in the face of certain regulatory regime, cannot be treated as a promise that has been held out by the respondent authorities, acting on which, the petitioners put themselves in a prejudicial position. 22. In this regard the definitive pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 , has the salutary effect, when their Lordships have stated: “47. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognised by the relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of the consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or contractual in nature. Such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in cases concerned, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced by temporary, contractual or casual employees. It cannot also be held that the State has held out any promise while engaging these persons either to continue them where they are or to make them permanent. The State cannot constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious that the theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of being made permanent in the post.” 23. Before undertaking any further discussion of the issues, it is apposite to examine the decisions the respondents have placed reliance on in support of their submissions. In Ashwani Kumar v. State of Bihar (1 supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held: “13. Before undertaking any further discussion of the issues, it is apposite to examine the decisions the respondents have placed reliance on in support of their submissions. In Ashwani Kumar v. State of Bihar (1 supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held: “13. So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry itself was illegal and void, is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularisation of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on ad hoc basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But if the initial entry itself is unauthorised and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given it would be an exercise in futility. It would amount to decorating a still-born baby. Under these circumstances there was no occasion to regularise them or to give them valid confirmation. The so-called exercise of confirming these employees, therefore, remained a nullity.” 24. Amplifying the said proposition of law, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the celebrated case of Umadevi-3 has begun its ratiocination with the following prefatory observations: “4. But, sometimes this process is not adhered to and the constitutional scheme of public employment is bypassed. The Union, the States, their departments and instrumentalities have resorted to irregular appointments, especially in the lower rungs of the service, without reference to the duty to ensure a proper appointment procedure through the Public Service Commissions or otherwise as per the rules adopted and to permit these irregular appointees or those appointed on contract or on daily wages, to continue year after year, thus, keeping out those who are qualified to apply for the post concerned and depriving them of an opportunity to compete for the post. It has also led to persons who get employed, without the following of a regular procedure or even through the backdoor or on daily wages, approaching the courts, seeking directions to make them permanent in their posts and to prevent regular recruitment to the posts concerned. It has also led to persons who get employed, without the following of a regular procedure or even through the backdoor or on daily wages, approaching the courts, seeking directions to make them permanent in their posts and to prevent regular recruitment to the posts concerned. The courts have not always kept the legal aspects in mind and have occasionally even stayed the regular process of employment being set in motion and in some cases, even directed that these illegal, irregular or improper entrants be absorbed into service. A class of employment which can only be called “litigious employment”, has risen like a phoenix seriously impairing the constitutional scheme. Such orders are passed apparently in exercise of the wide powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. Whether the wide powers under Article 226 of the Constitution are intended to be used for a purpose certain to defeat the concept of social justice and equal opportunity for all, subject to affirmative action in the matter of public employment as recognised by our Constitution, has to be seriously pondered over... It has to be emphasised that this is not the role envisaged for the High Courts in the scheme of things and their wide powers under Article 226 of the Constitution are not intended to be used for the purpose of perpetuating illegalities, irregularities or improprieties or for scuttling the whole scheme of public employment. Its role as the sentinel and as the guardian of equal rights protection should not be forgotten.” In deed, the Constitutional Bench has further gone on to observe: “43. Thus, it is clear that adherence to the rule of equality in public employment is a basic feature of our Constitution and since the rule of law is the core of our Constitution, a court would certainly be disabled from passing an order upholding a violation of Article 14 or in ordering the overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution. Therefore, consistent with the scheme for public employment, this Court while laying down the law, has necessarily to hold that unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. Therefore, consistent with the scheme for public employment, this Court while laying down the law, has necessarily to hold that unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. If it is a contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment. It has also to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules. It is not open to the court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right.” 25. The other judgment the learned Government Pleader has placed reliance on is K. Ganesh v. The Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanam rep. by its Executive Officer (4 supra), in which a learned Single Judge of this Court has held: “It is not in dispute that the petitioner, hitherto engaged as a volunteer on daily wages of Rs. 10/- was neither appointed pursuant to a regular process of selection nor in accordance with the rules governing appoint to posts in the Tirumala-Tirupati Devastanams. The order of the Government, in G.O. Rt. No. 172 dated 07.02.1997, in directing the T.T.D. to re-induct the petitioner and absorb him into T.T.D. service on humanitarian grounds is ex facie illegal and contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court.” And, eventually, his Lordship has held: “11. The order of the Government, in G.O. Rt. No. 172 dated 07.02.1997, in directing the T.T.D. to re-induct the petitioner and absorb him into T.T.D. service on humanitarian grounds is ex facie illegal and contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court.” And, eventually, his Lordship has held: “11. Upholding the rule of law may justify this Court's intervention where a legal and valid order, passed in exercise of a statutory power, is transgressed by an authority subordinate to the authority which passed the order, and not those which are ex facie illegal and are contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court.” 26. If we relate the above ratio to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen that the learned counsel for the respondents have placed reliance on GO. Rt. No. 1997, dated 18-10-2005. The said GO, referring to Act 2 of 1994, states that there is a bar against all types of appointments on contract basis/daily wages or on consolidated pay in any public service, to any post, any class, category or grade, without prior permission of the competent authority and without the name of the candidate concerned sponsored by the Employment Exchange. Accordingly, the Government prohibited the recruitment of all administrative staff in Hindu Religious and Endowments Institutions until further orders. In the first place, as the said directive was issued on 18-10-2005, it was only prospective; whereas the petitioners got their appointments in 2003. On the other hand, the bar imposed through Act No. 2 of 1994 does not operate once the requisite permission is obtained from a competent authority. Indisputably, in the present instance, the second respondent, who is the competent authority, issued permission to third respondent to appoint the petitioners. Ipso facto, it cannot be said that the appointment of the petitioners is without proper sanction. Concerning the requirement of getting sponsored by Employment Exchange, it is by now well settled that no appointment can be vitiated on the ground of non-sponsoring by the Employment Exchange. Accordingly the plea of the respondents that the very entry of the petitioners is without legal sanction cannot be sustained. 27. Concerning the requirement of getting sponsored by Employment Exchange, it is by now well settled that no appointment can be vitiated on the ground of non-sponsoring by the Employment Exchange. Accordingly the plea of the respondents that the very entry of the petitioners is without legal sanction cannot be sustained. 27. The learned Government Pleader, assailing the entry of the petitioners into third respondent Devasthanam, has sought to canvass that their initial appointment was against the provisions of the AP Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Officeholders and Servants Service Rules, 2000 (GO. MS No. 888, Revenue (Endowments I), dated 18-12-2000.) Undeniably, the 3rd respondent temple is covered by Rule 36 of the said rules. Further, Rule 46 lays down the procedure for direct recruitment, stating that any vacancy to be filled up by direct recruitment shall be notified by the Executive Officer through sponsoring of candidates by the Employment Exchange having jurisdiction over the institution. It also states that from among those sponsored candidates, the selection must be made by the committee to be constituted by the Commissioner from time to time and the said committee shall conduct a written examination followed by oral test. In any event, it being a piece of subordinate legislation, since nothing contradictory can be observed, those rules are only prospective in nature. Needless to say that the appointment of the petitioners took place in 1993 and the said rules came into force in 2000. 28. Now we may examine the power of review said to have been exercised by the first respondent in issuing Memo, dated 28-01-2008. There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioners only submitted a representation to the first respondent ventilating their grievance against the second respondent in not considering their case for extending the benefit of timescale, as has been done in the case of similarly placed other persons. At the same time, it is required to be underlined that unless a format is prescribed in the statute or the rules made thereunder for filing an appeal or revision or a review, it cannot be contended that unless the petition or representation of the petitioner is in a conventional format of revision or review, the authority, who has the necessary power, cannot consider it. What matters is the content of the petition, rather than its form or format. What matters is the content of the petition, rather than its form or format. Since no provision of law imposes a bar on an authority in treating a representation as an application for revision or review of an order affecting the said person, the action of the first respondent cannot be found fault with for issuing Memo, dated 28-01-2008. This court does not have any hesitation to treat the said Memo as being in order, having been passed by the first respondent exercising his powers of revision. 29. On treating the Memo, dated 28-01-2008 as a quasi-judicial order under Section 93 of the Act, the consequential question that is required to be answered is whether the first respondent can exercise his powers of review under section 94 of the Act vis-à-vis the order he passed under section 93 of the Act. If he can, is there any time limit to exercise the said suo moto power? 30. It is apposite to examine the statutory scheme under Act 30 of 1987 regarding the powers of revision and also review. Chapter XIII of the Act deals with Appeals, Revisions, Review, etc. Section 92 deals with the revision power of the Commissioner, the second respondent. Sections 93 and 94 of the Act deal with the powers of revision and review to be exercised by the first respondent, the Government. Chapter XIII of the Act deals with Appeals, Revisions, Review, etc. Section 92 deals with the revision power of the Commissioner, the second respondent. Sections 93 and 94 of the Act deal with the powers of revision and review to be exercised by the first respondent, the Government. It is profitable to extract those provisions: “Section 93 – Power of Government to call for records and pass orders - The Government may either suo motu or an application and examine the record of the Commissioner or any Deputy Commissioner or any Assistant Commissioner or any other Officer subordinate to them, or of any Executive Officer or any trusty of a charitable or religious institution or endowment, other than a math or specific endowment attached to a math in respect of any administrative or quasi judicial decision taken or order passed under this act, but not being a proceeding in respect of which a suite or an appeal or application, or a reference to court is provided by this act, to satisfy themselves as to the correctness, legality or propriety of such decision or order taken or passed, and if in any case, it appears to the government that such decision or order should be modified, annulled, reversed or remitted for consideration, they may pass orders accordingly: Provided that the Government shall not pass any order prejudicial to any party unless he has had an opportunity of making his representation. (2) The Government may stay the execution of any such decision or order pending the exercise of their powers under Sub-section (1) in respect thereof. (3) No application to the Government for the exercise of their power under this section shall be made in respect of any matter unless an application had already been made in respect of the same matter to the Commissioner under Section 92 and had been disposed of by him. (4) Every application to the Government for the exercise of their powers under this section shall be made within ninety days from the date on which the decision or order to which the application relates was received by the applicant”. 31. (4) Every application to the Government for the exercise of their powers under this section shall be made within ninety days from the date on which the decision or order to which the application relates was received by the applicant”. 31. Section 94 of the Act deals with the power of review to be exercised by the first respondent and the same is as follows: “Review: The Government may either suo motu, or on application from any person interested made within ninety days of the passing of an order under Section 93, review any such order if it was passed by them under any mistake, whether of fact or of law, or in ignorance of any material fact. The provisions in the proviso to sub section (1) and sub section (2) of Section 93, shall also apply to any proceeding under this Section.” 32. The learned Senior Counsel, referring to section 94 of the Act, has contended that it is to be exercised within 90 days. Dilating further, the learned Senior Counsel has stated that the first Memo was issued on 28-01-2008, whereas the subsequent Memo canceling the previous one was issued on 13-08-2009 - clearly beyond 90 days. Not to put too fine a point on the submission, it is, I am afraid, required to be rejected without further consideration. The provision clearly indicates that the time limit of 90 days will apply to the application to be made by an affected person, but not to a suo motu review. A close scrutiny of the initial portion of Section 94 makes it manifestly clear. The expression suo motu is separated from the expression ‘the application to be made’ not only by a disjunctive, but also by a coma; whereas the expression ‘within Ninety days’ is attached to the expression ‘the application to be made’. Had there been no coma between the expression suo motu and the rest of the sentence, it could have been a case of attaching the prepositional phrase as a compliment to both the expressions. In any event, there is no gainsaying the fact that even in the absence of any time limit, any power to be exercised suo motu is required to be exercised within a reasonable time. Axiomatically the said reasonable time depends on facts and circumstances of each case, and it cannot be put in a straitjacket. In any event, there is no gainsaying the fact that even in the absence of any time limit, any power to be exercised suo motu is required to be exercised within a reasonable time. Axiomatically the said reasonable time depends on facts and circumstances of each case, and it cannot be put in a straitjacket. In this case, it cannot be held that exercising the power of review in about 19 months is inordinately delayed. Accordingly, this Court does not find anything illegal insofar as the so-called time limit sought to be applied to the power of review exercised by the first respondent. 33. Having accepted that the power of review was exercised within a reasonable time, as a natural corollary, the next question to be examined is whether the said exercise of power of review was after due compliance with the procedural safeguards? Incontrovertibly, the orders passed exercising the said suo motu power of review are quasi-judicial in nature. A fortiori, the observance of the principles of natural justice is imperative whenever an authority exercises quasi-judicial powers, especially when the orders to be passed have the potential of affecting the accrued civil rights of a person or persons. It is a truism to state that no person shall be condemned unheard and no order affecting a person shall be passed without hearing the said affected person. In this case, the second respondent addressed a series of letters to the first respondent stressing the need of having the earlier Memo cancelled, even when the issue had been under the active consideration of this Court, more particularly after having certain judicial directives issued in that regard. Be that as it may, it is well established that all the developments that take place lis pendence shall be subject to or bound by the outcome of the said judicial Proceedings. 34. Now, we may examine whether the first respondent is justified in issuing Memo, dated 10-08-2009 without hearing the petitioners, at whose instance the authority passed the initial Memo, for the implementation of which the Writ Petition was filed in the first place. The answer to the issue is an emphatic ‘No’. 35. The judicial precedents are a legion to state that the principles of natural justice have attained the status of fundamental rights and have to be invariably read into every statute, unless there is a specific exclusion of their application. The answer to the issue is an emphatic ‘No’. 35. The judicial precedents are a legion to state that the principles of natural justice have attained the status of fundamental rights and have to be invariably read into every statute, unless there is a specific exclusion of their application. Though the exercise of the power on the part of the first respondent cannot be interdicted, yet the manner of its exercise can certainly be called into question. The respondents have not controverted the claim of the petitioners that they had not been put on notice prior to issuing of the Memo, dated 13-08-2009. Viewed from any angle, the Memo in question shall not survive, and accordingly it is required to be set aside. 36. In any event, having undertaken the tumultuous and tantalising litigious journey, what should be the fate of the petitioners? This issue can be signed off with what else, but the exhortation of the Constitutional Bench in Uma Devi-3, which is to the effect: “53.One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained in S.V. Narayanappa [ (1967) 1 SCR 128 : AIR 1967 SC 1071 ] , R.N. Nanjundappa [ (1972) 1 SCC 409 : (1972) 2 SCR 799 ] and B.N. Nagarajan [ (1979) 4 SCC 507 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 4 : (1979) 3 SCR 937 ] and referred to in para 15 above, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of the courts or of tribunals. The question of regularisation of the services of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court in the cases abovereferred to and in the light of this judgment. In that context, the Union of India, the State Governments and their instrumentalities should take steps to regularise as a one-time measure, the services of such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of the courts or of tribunals and should further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases where temporary employees or daily wagers are being now employed. The process must be set in motion within six months from this date. We also clarify that regularisation, if any already made, but not sub judice, need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there should be no further bypassing of the constitutional requirement and regularising or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme.” 37. In fact, it is for the 1st Respondent, acting as the quasi-judicial authority, while exercising its powers of review, to decide whether the petitioners have been regularly appointed into a substantive vacancy and whether their services are required to be regularised by extending the benefit of time scale to them, as has been held in Umadevi-3 and K. Ganesh (4 supra) – keeping in mind the generosity of the State in extending the benefit to other similarly placed persons, as has been emphatically demonstrated by the petitioners. Without disturbing the principle that the authorities cannot be compelled to perpetuate an illegality in the name of parity of treatment, I hasten to add that unless the previous anomalies of appointments or regularisations by way of conversion of posts and extension of time-scale benefits have already been rectified, the respondent authorities cannot insouciantly claim that what they earlier did was illegal and that they would not be tied down to their past aberration. If it is a persistent phenomenon, it binds the authorities, since they bargained for it; lest it should amount to permitting the authorities to be selectively discriminatory, which is an anathema in the regime of rule of law. 38. Accordingly, for the aforesaid reasons, Memo dated 13.08.2009 issued by the first respondent is hereby set aside. Consequently, the respondent authorities are further directed to continue the petitioners in service by extending the benefit of time scale in terms of Memo, dated 28.01.2008. 39. The first respondent, however, is not precluded from exercising its powers under Section 94 of the Act, if it chooses to, thereby subjecting Memo, dated 28.01.2008 to review, suo moto or otherwise, subject to its statutory sustainability. In the event of the first respondent exercising its powers of review, the petitioners shall be put on prior notice and shall be provided every opportunity of being heard before a decision is arrived at. Needless to observe that any such adjudication shall be uninfluenced by the observations of this Court in the present disposition. 40. In the event of the first respondent exercising its powers of review, the petitioners shall be put on prior notice and shall be provided every opportunity of being heard before a decision is arrived at. Needless to observe that any such adjudication shall be uninfluenced by the observations of this Court in the present disposition. 40. With the above observations, the Writ Petition stands disposed of. No orders as to dress to costs. The miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall stand closed.