JUDGMENT Sudhir Agarwal,J. 1. Heard Sri Rajeev Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record. 2. The petitioner has filed application for getting his plaint amended, which has been rejected by Trial Court i.e. Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Court No. 2, Muzaffar Nagar vide order dated 02.4.2013 and thereagainst revision has also been filed, which has been dismissed by Additional District Judge, Court No.1, Muzaffar Nagar vide order dated 06.9.2014. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that amendment is the statutory unfettered right of plaintiff to seek at any stage and it cannot be denied. He further submitted that amendment can be denied by applying proviso to Order VI, Rule 17 C.P.C. at the stage when evidence commence and not before that. 4. From the pleadings of the writ petition, it is evident that after exchange of pleadings, issues have been framed and dates for recording evidence of parties have also been fixed. The Trial Court's order shows that on 08.8.2008 issues were framed and thereafter the Court fixed date for recording evidence. In fact evidence also commenced and partial evidence of plaintiff has been recorded. This is evident from Revisional Court's order dated 6.9.2013, wherein it has said as under: ^^ekeys esa ijh{k.k vkjEHk gks pqdk gS rFkk oknh dh vksj ls vkaf'kd lk{; izLrqr fd;k tk pqdk gSA^^ English Translation by the Court. "Trial has commenced in the matter and partial evidence has been adduced on behalf of the plaintiff." 5. It is no doubt true that initially, amendment applications, used to be allowed with due indulgence granted liberally except of a few exceptions like introduction of a new cause of action, brining a time barred cause, change of nature of the suit etc. This is evident from a recent decision. Construing a matter prior to 2002, in Lakha Ram Sharma Vs. Balar Marketing Private Limited, (2008) 17 SCC 671 , the Court held that amendment of pleadings at any stage is permissible and should be allowed liberally subject to certain inbuilt restriction like where it changes the nature of proceedings or may revive a time barred relief or result in an irreparable loss or prejudice to other side. 6. Time and again, Apex court had given a very wide scope to amendment of pleadings. However, there is an intervention of Legislature with an object for preventing dilatory tactics to delay disposal of cases. 6. Time and again, Apex court had given a very wide scope to amendment of pleadings. However, there is an intervention of Legislature with an object for preventing dilatory tactics to delay disposal of cases. In that view of the matter, first intervention came by virtue of C.P.C. Amendment Act, 1999 whereby, in Order 6, Rules 17 and 18 were omitted. However, this complete omission of Rules 17 and 18 did not found favour with litigating people and realizing their hardship, Legislature again intervened vide Amendment Act, 2002 whereby Rule 17 Order 6, C.P.C. was incorporated but with a restricted scope. A proviso was added therein. Order 6 Rule 17 came to be inserted by Amendment Act, 2002 reads as under: "17. Amendment of pleadings.--The Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties: Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial" (emphasis added) 7. A bare perusal of above Rule 17 would show that an amendment is permissible by Court at any stage of proceedings, of course, in such manner and in such terms as the Court may find just, but, such an amendment is required to be necessary for the purpose of determining real question in controversy between the parties. It gives very wide power to Court for allowing amendment but the proviso added therein restricts such wide power of the Court, simultaneously, by observing that no application for amendment shall be allowed after Trial has commenced unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, party could not have raised the matter before commencement of Trial. 8. Now there is an embargo on an application for amendment to be allowed once the Trial has commenced. The embargo is complete. The only scope, thereafter is that the Court must come to the conclusion that despite due diligence, such matter could not have been raised by the party (ies) concerned before commencement of Trial. 8. Now there is an embargo on an application for amendment to be allowed once the Trial has commenced. The embargo is complete. The only scope, thereafter is that the Court must come to the conclusion that despite due diligence, such matter could not have been raised by the party (ies) concerned before commencement of Trial. Therefore the party seeking amendment, after commencement of Trial, is bound to first plead and then prove that amendment it has sought, could not have been pleaded by it, before commencement of Trial, despite its due diligence. After the Trial has commenced, an amendment cannot be sought and allowed as a matter of course unless conditions of due diligence is found to have existed therein, since it is prohibited by proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. 9. Now, coming to the second question that amendment can be denied when trial has commenced i.e. evidence is being recorded by applying proviso to Order VI, Rule 17 and not otherwise, I find, that situation, as a matter of fact, exist in the case in hand, as already discussed above. After framing issues on 08.8.2008, recording of evidence has started and partial evidence of plaintiff has also been recorded. It, thus, cannot be doubted that trial has commenced and it is at the stage of recording evidence. 10. The Apex Court in Kailash Vs. Nanhku AIR 2005 SC 2441 had held that a Trial is deemed to have commenced when the issue are settled and the case is set down for recording of evidence. This view has been followed in Baldev Singh and others Vs. Manohar Singh and another (2006) 9 SCC 498 and Ajendraprasadji N. Pande Vs. Swami Keshavprakeshdasji N., AIR 2007 SC 806 . 11. The Apex Court has held in Ajendraprasadji N. Pande (supra) that Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C. as amended by Amendment Act, 2002 does not permit an amendment once the Trial has commenced unless despite due diligence, matter could not be raised before the commencement of Trial. The Court held that provision is "mandatory" and precludes a party to seek amendment of his pleadings once the Trial has commenced unless requirement of proviso itself is satisfied. In taking this view, the Apex Court also referred to and relied on its earlier decision in Salem Advocate Bar Association Vs. Union of India AIR 2005 SC 3353 . 12. The Court held that provision is "mandatory" and precludes a party to seek amendment of his pleadings once the Trial has commenced unless requirement of proviso itself is satisfied. In taking this view, the Apex Court also referred to and relied on its earlier decision in Salem Advocate Bar Association Vs. Union of India AIR 2005 SC 3353 . 12. To the same extent, is the view taken by this Court in Rajkumar Gurawara Vs. M/s. S. K. Sarwagi and Co. Pvt. Ltd. AIR 2008 SC 2303 and Revajeetu Builders and Developers Vs. Narayanaswamy and sons and others 2009 (1) SCC 84. This Court has also followed the above exposition of law by referring to Revajeetu Builders (supra) in Sri Krishan Mittal Vs. Upper District Judge C.N. 10 Bijnor and others (Writ A No. 46709 of 2012) decided on 13.9.2012. 13. In J. Samuel and others Vs. Gattu Mahesh and others: (2012) 2 SCC 300 , the Court observed that, on a proper interpretation of proviso to Rule 17, Order VI CPC, the party has to satisfy the Court that he could not discover that ground which was pleaded by proposed amendment of the plaint, despite due diligence. No doubt, Rule 17 confers power on the Court to amend pleading at any stage of the proceedings. However, the proviso restricts that power, once the trial has commenced. Unless the Court is satisfied that there is a reasonable cause for allowing amendment, normally the Court has to reject such requests. Due diligence is the idea behind such restriction, that is, a reasonable investigation is necessary before certain kinds of relief are requested. Undoubtedly, diligent efforts are a requirement for a party seeking to use adjudicatory mechanism to attain an undisputed relief. An advocate representing someone has to engage himself in due diligence to determine that the representations made by him are factually correct and sufficient. The term due diligence is specifically used in the Court so as to provide a test for determining whether to exercise a distinction in a situation of requested amendment after the commencement of trial. A party requesting a relief stemming out of a claim is required to exercise due diligence. It is a requirement which cannot be dispensed with. The term 'due diligence' determines the scope of parties' constructive knowledge, and is critical to the outcome of the suit. A party requesting a relief stemming out of a claim is required to exercise due diligence. It is a requirement which cannot be dispensed with. The term 'due diligence' determines the scope of parties' constructive knowledge, and is critical to the outcome of the suit. The Court also observed that decisions given before insertion of proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC may not help the parties to decide cases after such amendment has been inserted in CPC. The entire object of amendment to order VI Rule 17, as introduced in the year 2002, is to stifle filing of application for amendment of a pleading, subsequent to the commencement of trial court, to avoid surprises and that the parties had sufficient knowledge of other's case. It also helps checking delays in filing applications. The Court in making the aforesaid observation relied on its earlier decisions in Aniglase Yohannan Vs. Ramlatha and others: (2005) 7 SCC 534 ; Chander Kanta Bansal Vs. Rajinder Singh Anand: (2008) 5 SCC 117 ; Rajkumar Gurawara (Dead) through LRs Vs. S.K. Sarwagi and Company Private Limited and another: (2008) 14 SCC 364 ; Vidyabai and others Vs. Padmalatha and another: (2009) 2 SCC 409 ; and Man Kaur (Dead) by LRs Vs. Hartar Singh Sangha, (2010) 10 SCC 512 . 14. The view, I have taken above, has also been reiterated by this Court in Suraj Prakash Vs. Waqf Khudaband Tala Mausooma, 2012(11) ADJ 524 and Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.61790 of 2012 (Shanti Swaroop Vs. Smt. Rama Sharma) decided on 29.11.2012. 15. In the present case, the amendment has been sought after the trial has commenced, without satisfying the Court as to why assertion of such facts could not be made with due diligence before commencement of trial when initial pleadings were filed before trial court. On this aspect virtually there is no averment. It cannot be said that there is a proper justification stated to do away the rider imposed by proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC. Therefore, I have no hesitation in holding that the courts below have rightly rejected amendment sought by the petitioner. No legal or otherwise error can be said to have been committed by Court below so as to justify interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 16. Therefore, I have no hesitation in holding that the courts below have rightly rejected amendment sought by the petitioner. No legal or otherwise error can be said to have been committed by Court below so as to justify interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 16. Even otherwise, in supervisory jurisdiction of this Court over subordinate Courts, the scope of judicial review is very limited and narrow. It is not to correct the errors in the orders of the court below but to remove manifest and patent errors of law and jurisdiction without acting as an appellate authority. 17. This power involves a duty on the High Court to keep the inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner. But this power does not vest the High Court with any unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the Court or Tribunal. It must be restricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principle of law or justice, where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes. 18. In D. N. Banerji Vs. P. R. Mukherjee 1953 SC 58 the Court said: "Unless there was any grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law calling for intervention, it is not for the High Court under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to interfere." 19. A Constitution Bench of Apex Court examined the scope of Article 227 of the Constitution in Waryam Singh and another Vs. Amarnath and another AIR 1954 SC 215 and made following observations at p. 571 : "This power of superintendence conferred by article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J. in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. Vs. Sukumar Mukherjee AIR 1951 Cal. 193 , to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors". 20. In Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim and Ors. Sukumar Mukherjee AIR 1951 Cal. 193 , to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors". 20. In Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim and Ors. AIR 1984 SC 38 the Court held that this Court has very limited scope under Article 227 of the Constitution and even the errors of law cannot be corrected in exercise of power of judicial review under Article 227 of the Constitution. The power can be used sparingly when it comes to the conclusion that the Authority/Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or proceeded under erroneous presumption of jurisdiction. The High Court cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decision. For interference, there must be a case of flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or where order of the Tribunal, etc. has resulted in grave injustice. 21. For interference under Article 227 , the finding of facts recorded by the Authority should be found to be perverse or patently erroneous and de hors the factual and legal position on record. (See: Nibaran Chandra Bag Vs. Mahendra Nath Ghughu, AIR 1963 SC 1895 ; Rukmanand Bairoliya Vs. the State of Bihar & ors., AIR 1971 SC 746 ; Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. Vs. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha & ors., AIR 1980 SC 1896 ; Laxmikant R. Bhojwani Vs. Pratapsing Mohansingh Singh Pardeshi, (1995) 6 SCC 576 ; Reliance Industries Ltd. Vs. Pravinbhai Jasbhai Patel & ors., (1997) 7 SCC 300 ; M/s. Pepsi Food Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Sub-Judicial Magistrate & ors., (1998) 5 SCC 749 ; and Virendra Kashinath Ravat & ors. Vs. Vinayak N. Joshi & ors. (1999) 1 SCC 47 ). 22. It is well settled that power under Article 227 is of the judicial superintendence which cannot be used to up-set conclusions of facts, howsoever erroneous those may be, unless such conclusions are so perverse or so unreasonable that no Court could ever have reached them. (See: Rena Drego Vs. Lalchand Soni & ors., (1998) 3 SCC 341 ; Chandra Bhushan Vs. Beni Prasad & ors., (1999) 1 SCC 70 ; Savitrabai Bhausaheb Kevate & ors. Vs. Raichand Dhanraj Lunja, (1999) 2 SCC 171 ; and Savita Chemical (P) Ltd. Vs. Dyes & Chemical Workers' Union & Anr., (1999) 2 SCC 143 ). 23. (See: Rena Drego Vs. Lalchand Soni & ors., (1998) 3 SCC 341 ; Chandra Bhushan Vs. Beni Prasad & ors., (1999) 1 SCC 70 ; Savitrabai Bhausaheb Kevate & ors. Vs. Raichand Dhanraj Lunja, (1999) 2 SCC 171 ; and Savita Chemical (P) Ltd. Vs. Dyes & Chemical Workers' Union & Anr., (1999) 2 SCC 143 ). 23. Power under Article 227 of the Constitution is not in the nature of power of appellate authority enabling re-appreciation of evidence. It should not alter the conclusion reached by the Competent Statutory Authority merely on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. (See: Union of India & ors. Vs. Himmat Singh Chahar, (1999) 4 SCC 521 ). 24. In Ajaib Singh Vs. Sirhind Co-opeative Marketing cum Processing Service Society Ltd., (1999) 6 SCC 82 , the Court has held that there is no justification for the High Court to substitute its view for the opinion of the Authorities/ Courts below as the same is not permissible in proceedings under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution. 25. In Mohan Amba Prasad Agnihotri Vs. Bhaskar Balwant Aheer, AIR 2000 SC 931 , the Court said that jurisdiction of High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is not appealable but supervisory. Therefore, it cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by Courts below unless there is no evidence to support findings or the findings are totally perverse. 26. In Indian Overseas Bank Vs. Indian Overseas Bank Staff Canteen Workers' Union (2000) 4 SCC 245 , the Court observed that it is impermissible for the Writ Court to reappreciate evidence liberally and drawing conclusions on its own on pure questions of fact for the reason that it is not exercising appellate jurisdiction over the awards passed by Tribunal. The findings of fact recorded by the fact finding authority duly constituted for the purpose ordinarily should be considered to have become final. The same cannot be disturbed for the mere reason of having based on materials or evidence not sufficient or credible in the opinion of Writ Court to warrant those findings. At any rate, as long as they are based upon some material which are relevant for the purpose no interference is called for. Even on the ground that there is yet another view which can reasonably and possibly be taken the High Court can not interfere. 27. In Union of India Vs. At any rate, as long as they are based upon some material which are relevant for the purpose no interference is called for. Even on the ground that there is yet another view which can reasonably and possibly be taken the High Court can not interfere. 27. In Union of India Vs. Rajendra Prabhu, (2001) 4 SCC 472 , the Court observed that the High Court, in exercise of its extraordinary powers under Article 227 of the Constitution, cannot re-appreciate the evidence nor it can substitute its subjective opinion in place of the findings of Authorities below. 28. Similar view has been reiterated in State of Maharashtra Vs. Milind & ors., (2001) 1 SCC 4 ; Extrella Rubber Vs. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 97 ; and Omeph Mathai & ors. Vs. M. Abdul Khader, (2002) 1 SCC 319 . 29. In Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander Rai and others (2003) 6 SCC 675 , it was held that in exercise of supervisory power under Article 227 , High Court can correct errors of jurisdiction committed by subordinate Courts. It also held that when subordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or jurisdiction though available is being exercised in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned, the Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. However, it also said that be it a writ of certiorari or exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or law unless error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law; or, a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. 30. In Jasbir Singh Vs. State of Punjab (2006 ) 8 SCC 294, the Court said: "...while invoking the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution, it is provided that the High Court would exercise such powers most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority. The power of superintendence exercised over the subordinate courts and tribunals does not imply that the High Court can intervene in the judicial functions of the lower judiciary. The power of superintendence exercised over the subordinate courts and tribunals does not imply that the High Court can intervene in the judicial functions of the lower judiciary. The independence of the subordinate courts in the discharge of their judicial functions is of paramount importance, just as the independence of the superior courts in the discharge of their judicial functions." 31. In Shalini Shyam Shetty and another Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil (2010) 8 SCC 329 , the Court said that power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. The above authority has been cited and followed in Kokkanda B. Poondacha and others Vs. K.D. Ganapathi and another AIR 2011 SC 1353 and Bandaru Satyanarayana Vs. Imandi Anasuya (2011) 12 SCC 650. 32. In Abdul Razak (D) through Lrs. & others Vs. Mangesh Rajaram Wagle and others (2010) 2 SCC 432 , Court reminded that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227, High Courts should not act as if they are exercising an appellate jurisdiction. 33. In T.G.N. Kumar Vs. State of Kerala and others (2011) 2 SCC 772 , the Court said that power of superintendence conferred on the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is both administrative and judicial, but such power is to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority. 34. In Commandant, 22nd Battalion, CRPF and others Vs. Surinder Kumar (2011) 10 SCC 244 , Apex Court referring to its earlier decision in Union of India Vs. R.K. Sharma (2001) 9 SCC 592 observed that only in an extreme case, where on the face of it there is perversity or irrationality, there can be judicial review under Articles 226 or 227. 35. In view thereof, I find no justification warranting interference with the orders impugned in this writ petition. 36. Dismissed.