JUDGMENT S. Talapatra, J.:- 1. This writ petition has got a chequered history. Previously a batch of teaching and non-teaching staff of the New Hindi Secondary School, a privately managed Educational Institution, approached this court by filing a writ petition, being W.P. (C) No. 360/2008, for releasing their pay and allowances and other pecuniary benefits w.e.f. 01.04.2007 at the rate as applicable for the teaching and non-teaching employees of Grant-in-aid educational institutions. Indisputably, the New Hindi Secondary School was brought under the grant-in-aid scheme by the Govt. of Tripura, by the notification dated 16.04.2007, Annexure 4 to this writ petition. During pendency of the said writ petition, the grant-in-aid status of the New Hindi Secondary School was withdrawn by the Govt. of Tripura w.e.f. 01.04.2007 by the notification dated 17.12.2008, Annexure-21 to this petition. It would be appropriate to note that before 17.12.2008, no benefit under the grant-in-aid scheme was released in favour of the said school. Challenging the said notification dated 17.12.2008, the Managing Committee of the New Hindi Secondary School filed another writ petition, being W.P. (C) No. 235/2009. 2. From the notification dated 17.12.2008, it can be gathered without any pain that since the school failed to comply with the conditions stipulated in the said notification and in the Tripura Grant-in-Aid (Government aided Schools) Rules, 2005 (for short, "Grant-in-Aid Rules"), the Government decided to withdraw the grant-in-aid status which was conferred w.e.f. 01.04.2007. Gauhati High Court as it had jurisdiction over the territory of the state as the common High Court, has observed by the common judgment and order dated 05.03.2010 that : "But in the given case it is not so inasmuch as there is no admitted and indisputable fact leading to only one conclusion that the New Hindi Secondary School has not fulfilled the conditions mentioned in the said Notification dated 16.04.2007. This Court is constrained to observe that what is given by one hand cannot be taken by another hand. Ref. This Court is constrained to observe that what is given by one hand cannot be taken by another hand. Ref. Bhavnagar University case (supra), wherein the Apex Court held that it is not and cannot be the intention of the legislature that what is given by one hand should be taken away by other." But, finally, the writ petitions were partly allowed in terms of the paragraph 32 of the said common judgment and order dated 05.03.2010, which is reproduced for reference : "For the foregoing reasons, the impugned Notification dated 17.12.2008 is hereby quashed. The State respondents are directed to give reasonable opportunity in compliance of Rule 10 of the Grant-in-Aid Rules, 2005 to the New Hindi Secondary School, Khejurbagan through the Principal or/School Managing Committee or/authorized representative by allowing them to file the documents and their pleadings, if necessary by hearing them in person before passing any orders for withdrawal/cancellation of the said Notification dated 16.04.2007 and the New Hindi Secondary School, Khejurbagan at present shall be under Grant-in-aid scheme. However, it is left to the wisdom of the State respondents to decide the quantum of the arrear of pay and allowances of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the school and also the date of implementation of the Mid-Day-Meal Scheme in the Primary Section of the School within three months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this judgment and order. It is also made clear that the State respondents shall keep in view of the observations and findings of this Court in the present judgment and order in passing order regarding the matters relating to the Grant-in-aid to the New Hindi Secondary School and that the State respondents shall make the funds available for payment of the salaries of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the School at the rate fixed for the teaching and non-teaching staff of the Government aided Schools in the State of Tripura." 3. If those directions are segmented in different parts, what can be had is reproduced hereunder : (i) The notification dated 17.12.2008 withdrawing the status of the Grant-in-aid is quashed; (ii) The respondents are directed to give reasonable opportunity in compliance of Rule 10 of the Grant-in-Aid Rules, 2005, which provides that "if in the opinion of the Director of School Education, it is so found that any school is not fulfilling any terms and conditions of the grant or violating valid instructions of the Director of School Education or the State Government or taking contrary action which is violative of the various instructions and rules, the Director of School Education with the approval of the Education (School) Department either withdraw the grant-in-aid status or stop payment of grant by issuing a speaking order after allowing a reasonable opportunity. The Director of School Education may also proceed to suspend temporarily payment of grant subject to the inquiry on a grave complaint. In case of temporary suspension, the Director of School Education may arrange to draw in part or in full, the grant-in-aid of the school through a Departmental Officer for making payment. The amount so drawn and paid shall be deemed to have been given to the school concerned as grant-in-aid for that period. Separate accounts in respect of such grants and expenditure shall be maintained by the officer concerned" (iii) The Principal or the Managing Committee or their authorized representative shall be allowed to file the documents and their pleadings, if necessary by hearing them in person before passing any order for withdrawal/cancellation of the said Notification dated 16.04.2007; (iv) The School at present shall be under Grant-in-aid scheme. However, that has been left to the wisdom of the State respondents to decide the quantum of the arrear of pay and allowances of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the school and also the date of implementation of the Mid-Day-Meal Scheme in the Primary Section of the School within three months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of the judgment and order; (v) It has been made clear that the State respondents shall keep in view of the observations and findings in passing the order regarding the matters relating to the Grant-in-aid to the New Hindi Secondary School and the State respondents shall make the funds available for payment of the salaries of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the school at the rate fixed for the teaching and non-teaching staff of the Government aided Schools in the State of Tripura. 4. By a representation dated 22.03.2010, Annexure-30 to this petition, the Secretary of the Managing Committee of that school requested the Director of School Education, Govt. of Tripura, to release a sum of ` 95,90,769 for disbursement of the pay and allowances of the teaching and non-teaching staff of that school in terms of the direction passed in W.P. (C) No. 360/2008 and W.P. (C) No. 235/2009. With that representation dated 22.03.2010, a Due Drawn Statement showing the fund required for the period from 01.04.2007 to 28.02.2010 was appended, but the State-respondents did not take any steps. In the meanwhile, the State-respondents filed two intra-court appeals, being W.A. No. 18/2010 and W.A. No. 19/2010. By the order dated 04.05.2010, both the appeals were dismissed with the following observations : "In our considered opinion, this aspect of the matter will have to be considered by the appellant-State. We piously hope that the State Government shall look after the policy of the mid-day meal and would look into the laudable object behind that scheme. It is expected of the appellant that they would comply with the direction issued by the learned Single Judge especially in relation to the issue of notice to show cause in completion of the enquiry preferably within three months from today." 5. After the order dated 04.05.2010 passed in W.A. No. 18/2010 and W.A. No. 19/2010, Annexure-31 to this petition, the Director of School Education, Govt. After the order dated 04.05.2010 passed in W.A. No. 18/2010 and W.A. No. 19/2010, Annexure-31 to this petition, the Director of School Education, Govt. of Tripura, issued a show cause notice dated 12.05.2010, Annexure-32 to this petition, clarifying that despite the instructions vide memorandum No. F.15(2-41)SE/GIA/05, dated 04.08.2007, the Managing Committee of the New Hindi Secondary School did not furnish (i) a clear land status of the school free from all disputes in respect of ownership, (ii) identification of a separate plot of land for the school including one standard playground, (iii) why the strength of existing teachers was beyond the approved norms of students teachers ratio of 40:1 and the list of teachers as per norms; and (iv) constitution of a new School Managing Committee according to the approved rules of the School (Education) Department. It has been further alleged that the Managing Committee of that school did not submit an audit report in respect of the accounts of the school from a registered Chartered Accountant as per the provisions of sub-rule (2) of Rule 11 of the Tripura Grant-in-Aid (Government aided Schools) Rules, 2005. In the said show cause it has been categorically stated that the Managing Committee of that school failed to fulfil the terms and conditions as per provisions of Rule 3 and clauses (a),(b),(c),(d),(e),(f),(g),(h),(i-xi) for having the Grant-in-Aid status as laid down in the Grant-in-Aid Rules. It has been observed that no additional land is available for further expansion of the school in the existing location. Existing infrastructure is neither conducive for proper development of children education nor is there any scope for shifting to a separate plot of land. Thereafter, the Managing Committee was asked to show cause within 15 days from the date of issuance of that notice as to why the Grant-in-Aid status conferred vide Notification No. No. F.15(2-41)SE/GIA/2006, dated 16.04.2007 shall not be withdrawn. 6. The Managing Committee of the New Hindi Secondary School has furnished their reply, clarification and comments as regards the deficiencies located in the said show cause notice dated 12.05.2010 by their reply dated 07.06.2010, Annexure-33 to this petition. The highlights of their reply are that after due consideration of the land status and particulars of the teaching and non-teaching staff and all other amenities, the school was brought under the Grant-in-Aid Scheme by the notification dated 16.04.2007 and, the said notification is quite exhaustive. The highlights of their reply are that after due consideration of the land status and particulars of the teaching and non-teaching staff and all other amenities, the school was brought under the Grant-in-Aid Scheme by the notification dated 16.04.2007 and, the said notification is quite exhaustive. It has been also noted in the said reply that the Govt. of Tripura undertook to provide a separate plot of land for the school including the standard playground for the purpose of future expansion of the school and the school authority had been given the responsibility to identify the separate plot of land for the purpose of future expansion. Nowhere has it been provided that the obligation to find out the land or to provide the land is the obligation of the Managing Committee of that school. It has been also stated that the allegation of not having an elected Managing Committee is absolutely untrue, inasmuch as, the newly elected Managing Committee, approved by the competent authority, Tripura Board of Secondary Education (TBSE) has been in place and the school authority has duly identified the land in response to the letter dated 11.09.2008. In the para 5 of their reply, it has been stated that in response to the letter dated 04.08.2007, the school authority submitted the reply on furnishing details and explanations as comprehensively as possible. So far as the land status is concerned, there is no dispute at all. As regards the identification of a separate plot of land is concerned it would appear from the letter dated 03.08.2008 issued by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sadar, Agartala and the letter dated 13.08.2008 issued by the Additional District Magistrate & Collector, West Tripura that 2 acres of land has been identified by the Government as per the decision of the Cabinet held on 31.07.2008 for upgradation and relocation of the school. Based thereon, it has been contended that there had been no lapse on the part of the Managing Committee of the school in respect of identification of a separate land. It has been further contended that the student-teachers ratio, 40:1 has been maintained and the new Managing Committee has been constituted by election before expiry of the term of the existing committee and the said committee has been duly approved by the Tripura Board of Secondary Education as per law, by the communication dated 04.07.2008. It has been further contended that the student-teachers ratio, 40:1 has been maintained and the new Managing Committee has been constituted by election before expiry of the term of the existing committee and the said committee has been duly approved by the Tripura Board of Secondary Education as per law, by the communication dated 04.07.2008. Thus, the allegation that the Managing Committee failed to fulfil the terms and conditions as laid down in the instructions vide letter dated 04.08.2007, is not the correct reflection of the state of affairs. In the reply, it has been further stated that even though no grant has been received from the Government, an audit report for the period from 01.04.2007 to 31.03.2010 has been submitted alongwith the reply. Further, the petitioner has contended in the reply that all the terms and conditions as per the provision of Rule 3 and clauses (a),(b),(c),(d),(e),(f),(g),(h),(i-xi) for having the Grant-in-Aid status as laid down in the Grant-in-Aid Rules have been complied with. Having said so, the Managing Committee has also stated that "the terms and conditions laid down in Rule 3 as a whole are not mandatory for extending Grant-in-Aid status to a school and the condition in Rule 2 are directory/optional in nature and subject to consideration of the State Government". In the reply it has been stated that the school is having more than 1000 students and also 8 trained post-Graduate and Graduate teachers. It has been further contended in the reply that, "so far the fulfilment of clause h(i-xi) is concerned the school has complied with all the conditions as practicable and the requirements mentioned in the said provision may be ideal one but do not appear to be mandatory and mostly are subject to subjective satisfaction, which was presumably found in favour of the school authority by the Government at the time of grant-in-aid status in 2007. It is stated that the respondents have not pointed out any particular lapse in respect of any requirement except regarding land. So far as the provision of land is concerned, the Government was kind enough to select 2 acres of Govt. land for relocation of the school which has been duly identified". It is stated that the respondents have not pointed out any particular lapse in respect of any requirement except regarding land. So far as the provision of land is concerned, the Government was kind enough to select 2 acres of Govt. land for relocation of the school which has been duly identified". In the reply, the Managing Committee of the school, the petitioner herein, has given some examples regarding the nature of occupation over the land and the size of the land where some privately managed schools are situated nonetheless those are managed under the Grant-in-Aid scheme. The Managing Committee of the school has repeatedly stated that 2 acres of land identified would be sufficient for relocation, expansion and upgradation of the school and the school authority would start construction of building and make other provisions as required under the Rules as soon as the possession of the land is handed over to the school. It has been further asserted that, "if for any reason the handing over of the identified land is delayed the school authority is trying to get adequate land at some distance for relocation of the school and after finally knowing the probability of allotment of the identified land the school authority, if necessary, will proceed for acquiring further land for the purpose". A categorical statement has been made in their reply stating that, "it is humbly submitted that in case Govt. refuses to allot the identified land, the school authority shall provide additional fund for relocation and expansion of the school within a period of 6 months". Finally, it has been urged to comply with the directions contained in the said judgment and orders passed by the Gauhati High Court. 7. Alongwith the reply filed by the petitioner, one copy of the Khatian No. 2124/19 of Mouza Barjala, has been submitted to exemplify the nature of occupation. One plot No. 6094 is shown in column 24 of the said khatian as under possession of the Junior Basic School situated at Goalabasti and the said plot admeasures.34 acre. From the said land record, it clearly appears that the school authority is simply under the possession, whereas the owner of that land is one Smt. Priti Debi. One plot No. 6094 is shown in column 24 of the said khatian as under possession of the Junior Basic School situated at Goalabasti and the said plot admeasures.34 acre. From the said land record, it clearly appears that the school authority is simply under the possession, whereas the owner of that land is one Smt. Priti Debi. It appears from the order dated 30.07.2010, Annexure-34 to this petition, that the Secretary of the Managing Committee of the New Hindi Secondary School as well as the teaching and non-teaching staff have been afforded opportunity of hearing before taking the final decision of withdrawal of the Grant-in-Aid status, which was conferred by the notification dated 16.04.2007. For purpose of appreciation, the relevant part of the said order dated 30.07.2010 is extracted hereunder : "WHEREAS vide Memo No. F.15(2-41)SE/GIA/05/2030 dated 02.07.2010 the Director of School Education has given the opportunity of personal hearing on 07.07.2010 at 11 A.M. in the office chamber of the Director of School Education and accordingly the Secretary, School Managing Committee of New Hindi Secondary School appeared in the office chamber of the Director of School Education and in course of personal hearing the Secretary of School Managing Committee reiterated the ground stated in the show cause reply and further on query of the Director of School Education verbally submitted that the school has no land of its own and that the school was set up in the land belong to one Smt. Priti Debi and that the ownership of the land lies with Priti Debi and that there is no scope to have any land for future expansion of the school and for extension of School building etc. AND WHEREAS, the Secretary, School Managing Committee also submitted that the school committee had/have being collected fees from the students @Rs. 60/- per head from the students of Class-I to V and @Rs. 100/- per head from the students of class VI to X per month without any approval from the Director of School Education. AND WHEREAS, the School Managing Committee also submitted that at the relevant point of time no audit report in respect of the accounts of the School could be submitted before the authority as required under the rules. 100/- per head from the students of class VI to X per month without any approval from the Director of School Education. AND WHEREAS, the School Managing Committee also submitted that at the relevant point of time no audit report in respect of the accounts of the School could be submitted before the authority as required under the rules. AND WHEREAS, I have meticulously applied mind to the representation made by the Secretary of the school and to show cause reply given by the Secretary and whereas the undersigned after consideration of all aspects satisfied that the New Hindi Secondary school has failed to comply and fulfill the terms and conditions incorporated in the notification dated 16.04.2007 and the condition incorporated in the rules and also failed to fulfill the specific terms as was asked by the Director vide Memo No. F.15(2-41)-SE/GIA/05 dated 4.8.2007. AND WHEREAS, the undersigned on application of the judicious mind found that the Grant-in-Aid Status was simply conferred in the Nee Hindi Secondary school on some specific terms and conditions and was not actually acted upon since the Managing Committee of the school could not fulfil those conditions after the notification was issued. AND WHEREAS, the undersigned after due consideration found the ground stated by the School Managing Committee in the show cause reply are flimsy and having no merit at all AND WHEREAS, the Education (School) Department has approved that the Grant-in-Aid status of New Hindi Secondary school is withdrawn w.e.f. 01.04.2007. AND THEREFORE, in exercise of power conferred under Rule-10 of "The Tripura Grant-in-Aid (Government Aided Schools) Rules, 2005", I hereby withdraw the Grant-in-Aid status of New Hindi Secondary (Hindi & English Medium) School, Gowala Basti, Khejur Bagan, Agartala w.e.f. the 1st April, 2007." 8. Being aggrieved by the decision, as embodied in the order dated 30.07.2010 passed by the Director of School Education, Govt. of Tripura, this petition has been filed by the Managing Committee, New Hindi Secondary School as sequel to the common judgment and order dated 05.03.2010. 9. Mr. A.K. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, New Hindi Secondary School, has mainly contended that the said order dated 30.07.2010, hereinafter referred to as the impugned order, has been passed arbitrarily, unfairly and in colourable exercise of power. 9. Mr. A.K. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, New Hindi Secondary School, has mainly contended that the said order dated 30.07.2010, hereinafter referred to as the impugned order, has been passed arbitrarily, unfairly and in colourable exercise of power. He has submitted that whether the school has charged any fees or not, during the period when no financial benefit under the Grand-in-aid school was extended, that cannot be made any ground for cancelling the grant-in-aid status of the school. This would have been a valid ground if, after extending the grant-in-aid to a school, the Managing Committee or the authority of the school charged fees in addition to that grant-in-aid. Then that would have been a serious irregularity, even that might invite cancellation of the grant-in-aid status. The fact which is not in dispute is that not a pie has come to the coffer of the Managing Committee of the said school from the grant-in-aid fund. Thus the allegations in that regard are entirely extraneous in the context. Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel, having referred to the record of the decisions of the meeting of the Council of Ministers held on 24.01.2007, Annexure-36 to the affidavit-in-rejoinder filed by the petitioner, has drawn attention of this court to the following agenda and decisions : "Item No. 12: Proposal to bring the privately managed Hindi Secondary School, Khejur Bagan, Gorkha Basti, Agartala, West Tripura under Grant-in-aid Scheme under Education (School) Department, (Education (School) Deptt. File No. f.15(2-41)-SE/GIA/2006 dated 24.01.07). Approved (to be effective from 1st April, 2007). Keeping future expansion in view, a separate plot of land for the school including standard play ground may be identified." Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel has submitted that while the said decision was taken by the Cabinet, it has to be understood that the Council of Ministers was adequately informed as regards the status of the land where the school is situated and thus a conscious decision had been taken for future expansion in a separate plot of land. He has also referred to a communication addressed by the District Magistrate and Collector, West Tripura, Agartala, on 23.07.2010 to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sadar, West Tripura, Annexure-37 to the affidavit-in-rejoinder filed by the petitioner, where it is found that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was asked for locating a land for that purpose and to submit a detailed report for allotment of the land. Mr. Mr. Bhowmik has further submitted that there is no provision to withdraw the grant-in-aid status with retrospective effect. As such, the Managing Committee is entitled to have all the pecuniary benefit from 01.04.2007 till 17.12.2008, irrespective of the validity of the impugned order. For that period, the petitioner is entitled to have the fund for pay and allowances for the teaching and non-teaching staff of the school and on account of the mid-day-meal. Mr. Bhowmik has stated that, by the order dated 05.03.2010 passed in W.P. (C) No. 360/2008 and W.P. (C) No. 235/2009, it has been observed that it is left to the wisdom of the State-respondents to decide the arrear of pay and allowances of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the school and also the date of implementation of the mid-day-meal in the Primary Section of the school within three months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of the judgment and order. But no such decision has been taken. According to Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel, from the impugned order it cannot be held that any such decision has been taken by the respondents. He has further submitted that in the counter-affidavit filed by the state, the reason, as resorted to, as regards the identification of the land is incredulous for existence of records to reflect that a conscious decision had been taken to grant 2 acres of land for future expansion of the school, managed by the petitioner. However, he has submitted further that if the land becomes the bone of contention for denying the grant-in-aid status to the school managed by the petitioner, they would identify an appropriate plot of land for purpose of allotting the same for the school managed by the petitioner and the petitioner is ready to acquire the required land. Even in the reply it has been unambiguously undertaken that in case the Government refuses to allot the identified land, the school authority shall provide additional land for relocation and expansion of the school within a period of six months. However, Mr. Bhowmik did not advance any submission on the finding as returned by the impugned order that the school is set up in the land belonging to one Smt. Priti Debi and that the ownership of the land lies with her and there is no scope for future expansion of the school building etc. 10. However, Mr. Bhowmik did not advance any submission on the finding as returned by the impugned order that the school is set up in the land belonging to one Smt. Priti Debi and that the ownership of the land lies with her and there is no scope for future expansion of the school building etc. 10. The crux of the submission of Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner is that before conferring the status as stated above, the respondents were well informed regarding the status of the land on which the school is situated. Mr. Bhowmik has submitted that if the decision of the Cabinet dated 24.01.2007 in pursuance of which the notification dated 16.04.2007 was issued, be read with the terms and conditions laid down in the notification dated 16.04.2007, the only condition that was provided to be obliged by the petitioner is that, "keeping future expansion in view, a separate plot of land for the school including standard play ground may be identified". Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel, has further submitted that there was no time frame for identifying the land for future expansion. The question of future expansion is always subject to the assessment of the availability of the resources etc. Thereafter, by the memorandum dated 04.08.2007, the Secretary, New Hindi Secondary School had been instructed to furnish a clear land status of the school and to get the dispute regarding land ownership be settled. It had been further asked to intimate the undisputed possession of land to the authority. By the said memorandum dated 04.08.2007 as stated, election of the Managing Committee was asked to be conducted by the Election Officer to be deputed by the Department on receipt of the proposal from the school. Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that it has been categorically apprised that there is no dispute as regards the ownership of the land, as would be evident from the statement made in the reply dated 20.08.2007 by the Secretary of the Managing Committee of the New Hindi Secondary School in response to the memorandum dated 04.08.2007. It has been communicated in the said reply that the District Education Officer was present in the meeting for operationalising the grant. It has been communicated in the said reply that the District Education Officer was present in the meeting for operationalising the grant. But, whether the said District Education Officer was the representative of the Directorate of School Education or not, is not clear from the said reply. Mr. Bhowmik has further submitted that from the communication dated 08.09.2007, it would be apparent that the Director of School Education was satisfied with the reply and that is the reason why the mid-day-meal scheme had been sought to be introduced in the school managed by the petitioner. 11. It is surprising that even though the Managing Committee of the New Hindi Secondary School was constituted on 03.06.2008, Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, has shown this court an administrative approval of the Managing Committee which was issued on 04.07.2008, for claiming that the election was duly conducted. Again, for purpose of identification of the land, a letter of the Addl. District Magistrate and Collector, West Tripura, Agartala, dated 13.08.2008 was addressed to the Director of School Education, Govt. of Tripura and the said letter shows that the relocation of the school was being considered. The communication dated 13.08.2008, part of Annexure-15 to this petition and, the communication dated 15.09.2008, Annexure 16 to this petition, are also pressed for that purpose. Despite the letter for introduction of the mid-day-meal scheme, no fund was placed with the school and, as a result, some communications were made by the petitioner to the Director of School Education, Govt. of Tripura, but without any yield. 12. There is no doubt that the New Hindi Secondary School is a recognized school and its management are supposed to be carried out in terms of the Rules called 'Management of recognized Non-Government Institutions (Aided and non-Aided) Rules, 1969' of West Bengal, as adopted by the Tripura Board of Secondary Education. By the Grant-in-Aid Rules, 2005, the said Rules have been adopted for the State of Tripura and the Managing Committees are directed to follow all such provisions strictly. So, the Managing Committee as elected and approved by the Tripura Board of Secondary Education are to be considered as duly constituted Managing Committee. On query from this Court, Mr. Bhowmik, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner could not produce any contemporaneous approval of the Managing Committee, particularly of that Managing Committee which was constituted on 03.06.2008. So, the Managing Committee as elected and approved by the Tripura Board of Secondary Education are to be considered as duly constituted Managing Committee. On query from this Court, Mr. Bhowmik, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner could not produce any contemporaneous approval of the Managing Committee, particularly of that Managing Committee which was constituted on 03.06.2008. In absence of such record it is really difficult to accept the status of the Managing Committee. 13. Mr. A.K. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the school managed by the petitioner has been treated unfairly and arbitrarily. He contends further that absence of arbitrariness is the essence of the rule of law and where the rule of law fails it is the duty of the court to intervene in the affairs, relating to the executive governance. 14. Mr. A.K. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel has referred a decision of the apex court in State of Maharashtra Vs. Manubhai Pragaji Vashi & Ors., reported in AIR 1996 SC 1 , where it has been held that : "It is in that direction the grant-in-aid by the State will facilitate and ensure that recognised private law colleges to function effectively and in a meaningful manner and turn out sufficient number of well trained or properly equipped law graduates in all branches year after year. That will in turn enable the state and other authorities to provide free legal aid and ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen on account of any disability. These aspects necessarily flowing from Articles 21 and 39A of the Constitution were totally lost sight of by the Government when it denied the grant-in-aid to the recognised private law colleges as was afforded to other faculties. We would add that the State has abdicated the duty enjoined on it by the relevant provisions of the Constitution aforesaid. In this perspective, we hold that Article 21read with Article 39A of the Constitution mandates or casts a duty on the State to afford grant-in-aid to recognised private law colleges, similar to other faculties, which qualify for the receipt of the grant. The aforesaid duty cast on the State cannot be whittled down in any manner, either by pleading paucity of funds or otherwise. The aforesaid duty cast on the State cannot be whittled down in any manner, either by pleading paucity of funds or otherwise. We make this position clear." In the para 13 of Manubhai Pragaji Vashi the apex court has further observed that the Court can in a fit case direct the executive to carry out the directive principles of the Constitution, and when there is inaction or slow action by the executive the judiciary must intervene under its jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 15. Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel has also referred Avinash Mehrotra Vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in (2009) 6 SCC 398 , to contend that the education occupies an important and sacred place in our Constitution and culture. There has been emphasis on free and compulsory education for children in this country for a long time. There is a very strong historical perspective. The Hunter Commission in 1882-83, almost 125 years ago, recommended universal education in India. It proposed to make education compulsory for the children. That observation of the apex court has been referred to by Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel as emanated from Article 45 of the Constitution, which lays down the directive principles of the State policy for provision for free and compulsory education for children. That Article postulates that "the State shall endeavour to provide, within a period of ten years from the commencement of this Constitution, for free and compulsory education for all children until they complete the age of fourteen years." 16. It is not intelligible how those two decisions can help the case of the petitioner, inasmuch as in Manubhai Pragaji Vashi the foundation of the decision was Article 39A of the Constitution and in Avinash Mehrotra the foundation is Article 45 of the Constitution. Both those Articles cannot have any manner of application in respect of conferring the grant-in-aid status to a school in terms of the framed rules. 17. Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, while closing his submission has contended that in view of the State policy to grant the school managed by the petitioner, grand-in-aid status, the State must show a fair amount of latitude so far the conditionality for grant of such status are concerned. In this regard, Mr. 17. Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, while closing his submission has contended that in view of the State policy to grant the school managed by the petitioner, grand-in-aid status, the State must show a fair amount of latitude so far the conditionality for grant of such status are concerned. In this regard, Mr. Bhowmik has submitted that if permitted, within six months, the school managed by the petitioner would be able to arrange an alternative land for future expansion and the standard playground for the school. 18. Appearing from the other side, Mr. S. Deb, learned senior counsel has raised a good number of jurisprudential objections. According to him, the present writ petition is hit by the principles of res judicata, inasmuch as the issues involved in this writ petition were raised in the previous writ petition filed by the petitioner and except the plea of non-compliance of the provisions of Rule 10 of the Grant-in-Aid Rules, no other plea was entertained by the petitioner. Therefore, it has to be deemed that all those pleas were rejected by the court by the said common judgment and order dated 05.03.2010 passed in W.P. (C) No. 360/2008 and, more particularly in W.P. (C) No. 235/2009. He has further raised the question of locus standi in respect of the petitioner. Whether the petitioner as the Managing Committee, has got any locus standi to file this petition? Further it has been questioned by Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel that whether the petitioner is a juristic person, being an unregistered society or body by the name of the Managing Committee, to approach this court for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He has also canvassed the reservation as regards the judicial review of the impugned order when he has submitted that it is the decision making process, not the decision passed by the executive can be judicially reviewed by this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India unless it is an infringement of fundamental right. Furthermore, he has submitted that there is material suppression of facts which itself would definitely engage this court to reject the writ petition for the attempt of polluting purity of the stream of justice. Furthermore, he has submitted that there is material suppression of facts which itself would definitely engage this court to reject the writ petition for the attempt of polluting purity of the stream of justice. Finally, he has submitted that the petitioner has no cause of action whatsoever as unless the Rules are statutory in nature those cannot be enforced. Therefore, no interference seeking enforcement of the Rules can be entertained by this court. 19. Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel, while making his submission on the aspect of res judicata has placed reliance on Section 11, Explanation IV of the CPC, which provides that any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit and such issue shall not be tried in any suit or issue in the latter suit between the same parties. Mr. Deb has relied on a decision of the Court of appeal in Greenhalgh Vs. Mallard, reported in (1947) 2 ALL ER 255, where Lord Somervell J. spoke as under : "That, I think, would be enough to dispose of this case, but counsel for the defendants put his case in two ways, and I will deal with them. He relied, first, on res judicata, and then said that, if there was any doubt about that, he was entitled to succeed on the ground that it would be vexatious and an abuse of the process of the court to allow this transaction to be brought before the court again on the basis of the present statement of claim. I think that on the authorities to which I will refer it would be accurate to say that res judicata for this purpose is not conflict to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but that it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject-matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them. I believe I state the rule of the court correctly, when I say, that where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time." [Emphasis supplied] 20. Similarly, the apex court in Forward Construction Co. & Ors. Vs. Prabhat Mandal (Regd.), Andheri & Ors. etc., reported in : (1986) 1 SCC 100, has held as under : 19. The second question for consideration is whether the present writ petition is barred by res judicata. This plea has been negatived by the High Court for two reasons: (1) that in the earlier writ petition the validity of the permission granted under Rule 4(a)(i) of the Development Control Rules was not in issue; and (2) that the earlier writ petition filed by Shri Thakkar was not a bona fide one in as much as he was put up by some disgruntled builder, namely, M/s. Western Builders. 20. So far as the first reason is concerned, the High Court in our opinion was not right in holding that the earlier judgment would not operate as res judicata as one of the grounds taken in the present petition was conspicuous by its absence in the G earlier petition. Explanation IV to Section 11 C.P.C. provides that any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit. Explanation IV to Section 11 C.P.C. provides that any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit. An adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have had it decided as incidental to or essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation and every matter coming with the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect of the matters of claim or defence. The principle underlying Explanation IV is that where the parties have had an opportunity of controverting a matter that should be taken to be the same thing as if the matter G had been actually controverted and decided. It is true that where a matter has been constructively in issue it cannot be said to have been actually heard and decided. It could only be deemed to have been heard and decided. The first reason, therefore, has absolutely no force. [Emphasis supplied] 21. In a subsequent decision in Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Association Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors., reported in (1990) 2 SCC 715 , the apex court has held that : "The objection appears to be well founded. It is well established that the principles of res judicata are applicable to writ petitions. The relief prayed for on behalf of the petitioner in the present case is the same as he would have, in the event of his success, obtained in the earlier writ petition before the High Court." Further in Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Association, the apex court has with approval referred to Daryao Vs. State of U.P., reported in (1962) 1 SCR 574 , where it has been held as under : "Where the High Court dismisses a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution after hearing the matter on the merits, a subsequent petition in the Supreme Court under Article 32 on the same facts and for the same reliefs filed by the same parties will be barred by the general principle of res judicata. The binding character of judgments of courts of competent jurisdiction is in essence a part of the rule of law on which the administration of justice, so much emphasised by the Constitution, is founded and a judgment of the High Court under Article 226 passed after a hearing on the merits must bind the parties till set aside in appeal as provided by the Constitution and cannot be permitted to be circumvented by a petition under Article 32." It has been further held in Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Association as under : "The decision in Forward Construction Co. Vs. Prabhat Mandal (Regd.), Andheri: (1986) 1 SCC 100, further clarified the position by holding that an adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have had decided as incidental to or essentially connected with subject matter of the litigation and every matter coming into the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect of the matters of claim and defence. Thus, the principle of constructive res judicata underlying Explanation IV of Section 11 of the CPC was applied to writ case. We, accordingly hold that the writ case is fit to be dismissed on the ground of res judicata." 22. In State of Karnataka & Anr. Vs. All India Manufacturers Organisation & Ors., reported in (2006) 4 SCC 683 , the principles of res judicata has again fallen for consideration of the apex court vis-a-vis the provision of Section 11, Explanation IV of the CPC, where it has been held as under : 32. Res judicata is a doctrine based on the larger public interest and is founded on two grounds: one being themaxim nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa (no one ought to be twice vexed for one and the same cause) and second, public policy that there ought to be an end to the same litigation. It is well settled that Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (hereinafter " CPC") is not the foundation of the principle of res judicata, but merely statutory recognition thereof and hence, the Section is not to be considered exhaustive of the general principle of law. It is well settled that Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (hereinafter " CPC") is not the foundation of the principle of res judicata, but merely statutory recognition thereof and hence, the Section is not to be considered exhaustive of the general principle of law. The main purpose of the doctrine is that once a matter has been determined in a former proceeding, it should not be open to parties to re-agitate the matter again and again. Section 11 CPC recognises this principle and forbids a court from trying any suit or issue, which is res judicata, recognising both "cause of action estoppels" and "issue estoppels". There are two issues that we need to consider, one, whether the doctrine of res judicata, as a matter of principle, can be applied to Public Interest Litigations and second, whether the issues and findings in Somashekar Reddy Vs. Govt. of Karnataka: : (1999) 1 KLD 500 constitute res judicata for the present litigation. 33. Explanation VI to Section 11 states: "Explanation VI.-Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating." 34. Explanation VI came up for consideration before this Court in Forward Construction Co. v. Prabhat Mandal (Regd): : (1986) 1 SCC 100 (hereinafter "Forward Construction Co."). This Court held that in view of Explanation VI, it could not be disputed that Section 11 applies to Public Interest Litigation, as long as it is shown that the previous litigation was in public interest and not by way of private grievance. Further, the previous litigation has to be a bona fide litigation in respect of a right which is common and is agitated in common with others. 35. As a matter of fact, in a Public Interest Litigation, the petitioner is not agitating his individual rights but represents the public at large. As long as the litigation is bona fide, a judgment in a previous Public Interest Litigation would be a judgment in rem. 35. As a matter of fact, in a Public Interest Litigation, the petitioner is not agitating his individual rights but represents the public at large. As long as the litigation is bona fide, a judgment in a previous Public Interest Litigation would be a judgment in rem. It binds the public at large and bars any member of the public from coming forward before the court and raising any connected issue or an issue, which had been raised should have been raised on an earlier occasion by way of a Public Interest Litigation. It cannot be doubted that the petitioner in Somashekar Reddy: : (1999) 1 KLD 500 was acting bona fide. Further, we may note that, as a retired Chief Engineer, Somashekar Reddy had the special technical expertise to impugn the Project on the grounds that he did and so, he cannot be dismissed as a busybody. Thus, we are satisfied in principle that Somashekar Reddy, as a public interest litigation, could bar the present litigation. 36. We will presently consider whether the issues and findings in Somashekar Reddy: : (1999) 1 KLD 500 actually constitute res judicata for the present litigation. Section 11 of the CPC undoubtedly provides that only those matters that were "directly and substantially in issue" in the previous proceeding will constitute res judicata in the subsequent proceeding. Explanation III to Section 11 provides that for an issue to be res judicata it should have been raised by one party and expressly denied by the other: "Explanation III.-The matter above referred to must in the former suit have been alleged by one party and either denied or admitted, expressly or impliedly, by the other." 37. Further, Explanation IV to Section 11, states: "Explanation IV.-Any matter which might and ought to have been made ground defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit." 38. The spirit behind Explanation IV is brought out in the pithy words of Wigram, V.C. in Henderson v. Henderson: (1843-60) All ER Rep. The spirit behind Explanation IV is brought out in the pithy words of Wigram, V.C. in Henderson v. Henderson: (1843-60) All ER Rep. 378 as follows: "The plea of res judicata applies, except in special case (sic), not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time." [Emphasis supplied] 23. In All India Manufacturers Organisation case, Greenhalgh Vs. Mallard has been referred to and, on consideration of the principles so laid down by Lord Somervell J. as reproduced hereinbefore, has held as under : "The judgment in Greenhalgh: (1947) 2 ALL ER 255 (CA) was approvingly referred to by this Court in State of U.P. v. Nawab Hussain: : (1977) 2 SCC 806 . Combining all these principles, a Constitution Bench of this Court in Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers' Association v. State of Maharashtra: : (1990) 2 SCC 715 expounded on the principle laid down in Forward Construction Co. by holding that : "[A]n adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have had (sic) decided as incidental to or essentially connected with (sic) subject matter of the litigation and every matter coming into the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect of the matters of claim and defence. Thus, the principle of constructive res judicata underlying Explanation IV of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure was applied to writ case. We, accordingly hold that the writ case is fit to be dismissed on the ground of res judicata." 24. Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents, thereafter has continued his submission and focussed on the question of locus standi of the petitioner as the Secretary of the Managing Committee of the New Hindi Secondary School. We, accordingly hold that the writ case is fit to be dismissed on the ground of res judicata." 24. Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents, thereafter has continued his submission and focussed on the question of locus standi of the petitioner as the Secretary of the Managing Committee of the New Hindi Secondary School. At the outset, he has pointed out that there is no pleading whether the teaching and non-teaching staff of the school or the students who are studying in the school or for that matter their guardians have authorised them to represent those classes or persons whose interest may be affected in the event of withdrawal of the grant-in-aid status. Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel has submitted further that unless a person is directly affected by any executive action he does not have any right to approach the court for any other person unless he has been engaged the recognised agent to carry on the litigation. He has grabbed the occasion by referring to a decision of the apex court in Charanjit Lal Chowdhury Vs. The Union of India & Ors., reported in : AIR 1951 SC 41 , where it has been held that : "No one except those whose rights are directly affected by a law can raise the question of the constitutionality of that law. This principle has been very clearly stated by Hughes J. in McCabe v. Atchison, (1914) 235 U.S. 151 in these words: "It is an elementary principle that in order to justify the granting of this extraordinary relief, the complainant's need of it and the absence of an adequate remedy at law must clearly appear. The complainant cannot succeed because someone else may be hurt. Nor does it make any difference that other persons who may be injured are person of the same race or occupation. It is the fact, clearly established, of injury to the complainant-not to others-which justifies judicial interference." [Emphasis added] 25. The complainant cannot succeed because someone else may be hurt. Nor does it make any difference that other persons who may be injured are person of the same race or occupation. It is the fact, clearly established, of injury to the complainant-not to others-which justifies judicial interference." [Emphasis added] 25. In Charanjit Lal Chowdhury, it has been further observed that : "The company and the shareholders are in law separate entities, and if the allegation is made that any property belonging to the company has been taken possession of without compensation or the right enjoyed by the company under article19(1)(f) has been infringed, it would be for the company to come forward to assert or vindicate its own rights and not for any individual shareholder to do so. In this view, the only question which has to be answered is whether the petition has succeeded in showing that there has been an infringement of his rights as a shareholder under Arts. 31 and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. This question has been so elaborately dealt with by Mukherjea J. that I do not wish to add anything to what he has said in his judgment, and all that is necessary for me to say is that I adopt his conclusions, without committing myself to the acceptance of all his reasonings." 26. In Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. Vs. State of West Bengal & Ors., reported in AIR 1962 SC 1044 , it has been held that : "The first question that falls to be considered is whether the appellant has locus standi to file the petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The argument of learned counsel for the respondents is that the appellant was only managing the industry and it had no proprietary right therein and, therefore, it could not maintain, the application. Article 226 confers a very wide power on the High Court to issue directions and writs of the nature mentioned therein for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose. It is, therefore, clear that persons other than those claiming fundamental right can also approach the court seeking a relief thereunder. Article 226 confers a very wide power on the High Court to issue directions and writs of the nature mentioned therein for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose. It is, therefore, clear that persons other than those claiming fundamental right can also approach the court seeking a relief thereunder. The Article in terms does not describe the classes of persons entitled to apply thereunder; but it is implicit in the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction that the relief asked for must be one to enforce a legal right. In State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal: : (1952) SCR 28 : ( AIR 1952 SC 12 ) this Court has ruled that the existence of the right is the foundation of the exercise of jurisdiction of the court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. In Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India: : 1950 SCR 869 : ( : AIR 1951 SC 41 ), it has been held by this Court that the legal right that can be enforced under Art. 32 must ordinarily be the right of the petitioner himself who complains of infraction of such right and approaches the court for relief. We do not see any reason why a different principle should apply in the case of a petitioner under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The right that can be enforced under Art. 226 also shall ordinarily be the personal or individual right of the petitioner himself, though in the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto this rule may have to be relaxed or modified. The question, therefore, is whether in the present case the petitioner has a legal right, and whether it has been infringed by the contesting respondents." [Emphasis added] 27. In Inland Revenue Comrs Vs. National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Business Ltd., reported in (1981) 2 ALL ER 93, it has been held that : "Whether an applicant for mandamus had a sufficient interest in the matter to which the application related, for the purposes of Ord 53, r 3(5) depends on whether the definition (statutory or otherwise) of the duly alleged to have been breached or not performed expressly or impliedly gave the applicant the right to complain of the breach or non-performance. Since the tax legislation, far from expressly or impliedly conferring on a taxpayer the right to make proposals about another's tax or to inquire about such tax, in fact indicated the reverse by reason of the total confidentiality of assessments and negotiations between individuals and the Revenue, and since on the evidence the Revenue in making the impugned arrangement were genuinely acting in the care and management of taxes under the powers entrusted to them, the application made by the applicant would be dismissed because the applicant did not have a sufficient interest for the purposes of r 3(5), or (per Lord Diplock) because it had not been shown that the Revenue had acted ultra vires or unlawfully in making the arrangement." 28. Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents has made reference to the comments in Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 1, where it has been observed that : "The applicant for an order of mandamus must show that there resides in him a legal right to the performance of a legal duty by the party against whom the mandamus is sought, or alternatively that he has a substantial personal interest in its performance. In order that a mandamus may issue to compel something to be done under a statute, it must be shown that the statute imposes a legal duty; the duty may be to exercise a genuine discretion, or to exercise a discretionary power according to law. It has been said that the court will not enforce an equitable, as distinct from a legal, right by this remedy; but it would seem that an applicant may have a right enforceable by mandamus to secure compliance with a public duty to give effect to his equitable interests." 29. Similarly, in Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 1, discussing the locus standi, it has been observed that : "The general principle is that a person whose fundamental right has been infringed has locus standi to move the Supreme Court for the enforcement of his right. The legal right to be enforced through the writ jurisdiction of the apex court must ordinarily be the right of the petitioner himself. As rights are different and inhere in different legal entities, it is not competent for a person to seek to enforce the rights of another, except when the law permits him to do so. The legal right to be enforced through the writ jurisdiction of the apex court must ordinarily be the right of the petitioner himself. As rights are different and inhere in different legal entities, it is not competent for a person to seek to enforce the rights of another, except when the law permits him to do so. This principle is based on the theory that remedies and rights are correlative and therefore, only a person whose own right is in jeopardy is entitled to seek a remedy. Since a corporation has a distinct legal personality, with rights and duties separate from those of its individual members, a shareholder cannot complain against a law which affects the fundamental right of the corporation, except to the extent to which it infringes his own fundamental right as well. However, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus may be made not only by the person who is imprisoned or detained but by any person, provided he is not a complete stranger, for liberating a person from an illegal imprisonment. The rule of standing is also relaxed in case of a petition for quo warranto." 30. Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel has unleashed his objections as to the status of the petitioner as juristic person to maintain this litigation. The admitted position is that the Managing Committee of the School is not a registered society and, hence, according to Mr. Deb their petition cannot be maintained. At the outset, he has referred a decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Parents Teachers Association & Ors. Vs. Chairman, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan & Ors., reported in : AIR 2001 RAJASTHAN 35, where it has been held that : 12. The appellant-petitioners have not placed before this Court any document to show that the Parents-Teachers Association is a registered and recognised association. The writ petition has been allegedly filed in public interest and the alleged large interest of the students. It is evident that the so-called Parents-Teachers Association is an unregistered and unrecognised association and, therefore, in our view, has no fundamental right to approach this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The writ petition has been allegedly filed in public interest and the alleged large interest of the students. It is evident that the so-called Parents-Teachers Association is an unregistered and unrecognised association and, therefore, in our view, has no fundamental right to approach this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. This point has been concluded by the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mahinder Kumar Gupta, ( : 1994 AIR SCW 5139) (supra) and by the decision of Full Bench of this Court in the case of RSEB Accountant's Association (: 1995 (3) WLC 1) (supra). A reply to the preliminary objection raised by the respondents was also made by the appellants. It is stated that the Parents-Teachers Association has been recognised by the KVS and that the Principal is the Vice Chairman of the said Association and hence, the Association is competent to file the writ petition on behalf of the students. In our view, the above reason cannot be considered as a valid reason for maintaining the writ petition. It is not in dispute that the Association is not a registered body and recognised Association. Thus, after examining this point of law in detail and placing reliance on various judgments delivered by the Apex Court from time to time, the Full Bench of this Court in the case of RSEB Accountant's Association (supra) held as under : "It may also be observed that an unregistered association has no fundamental right to approach this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution and this point is concluded by the decision in the case of Shri Maninder Kumar Gupta vs. Union of India, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, (: 1995 1 JT (SC) 11 : (1994 AIR SCW 5139). A decision in the case of Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh v. Union of India,: : AIR 1981 SC 298 was relied where the non-registered Association was held to apply under Art. 32 of the Constitution. We may observe that there had been number of the instances of public interest litigation where large body of persons is having the grievance against inaction of the State. Even letters have been considered to be a writ petition but all these are the matters where large section of public is affected and the personal interest of any person or a smaller section as in the present case, is not involved. Even letters have been considered to be a writ petition but all these are the matters where large section of public is affected and the personal interest of any person or a smaller section as in the present case, is not involved. Even in the case of People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, : AIR 1982 SC 1473 when the question of locus standi was considered, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had taken into consideration the poverty, illiteracy and the ignorance obstructing and impeding accessibility of the judicial process and on that ground it was considered that the writ petition can be filed. In D.S. Nakara & Others v. Union of India, : AIR 1983 SC 130 the old pensioners individually were unable to undertake journey through labyrinths of costly and protracted legal judicial process for allowing to espouse their cause. In case of S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, : AIR 1982 SC 149 poverty, helplessness and disability or social or economic disadvantaged, position was considered a sufficient ground for maintaining the writ petition. There had been other decisions of the Apex Court as well and principles which emerge from all of them are as under :- (a) That the members of the said association should have sufficient strength so as to come in the category of a large sect of public. (b) That the members should be identifiable. (c) That the members must be of the category of poor/illiterate/helpless or disabled. (d) That the individual member must not be capable of filing a writ petition. (e) That the entire body of the members must authorise the association to protect their legal rights. (f) That such an association must have its own Constitution, and (g) That there must be authority to file a writ petition on behalf of all the members." 31. Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents has further referred to a decision of the apex court in B. Srinivasa Reddy Vs. Karnataka Urban Water Supply & Drainage Board Employees' Assn. & Ors., reported in : (2006) 11 SCC 731 (II), where the apex court was confronted with the similar question of maintainability of a writ petition. Can that be maintained at the instance of an unregistered trade union or an Employees' Association? Karnataka Urban Water Supply & Drainage Board Employees' Assn. & Ors., reported in : (2006) 11 SCC 731 (II), where the apex court was confronted with the similar question of maintainability of a writ petition. Can that be maintained at the instance of an unregistered trade union or an Employees' Association? While responding to that question of maintainability, the apex court, relying on Parents Teachers Association case, has observed that none of the grounds mentioned in (a) to (g) have been satisfied by the appellants to maintain the writ petition. Since the above conditions are not fulfilled, such an unregistered association cannot file writ petition in respect of the legal rights of the said association for the alleged breach of fundamental rights as the association itself has no fundamental right of its own. 32. In People's Union for Democratic Rights & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in : (1982) 3 SCC 235 , it has been held that : "A writ petition under Article 32 cannot be maintained unless it complains of a breach of some fundamental right or the other and since what were alleged in the present writ petition were merely violations of the labour laws enacted for the benefit of the workmen and not breaches of any fundamental rights, the present writ petition was not maintainable and was liable to be dismissed. Now it is true that the present writ petition cannot be maintained by the petitioners unless they can show some violation of a fundamental right, for it is only for enforcement of a fundamental right that a writ petition can be maintained in this Court under Article 32." 33. Even though law posits generally, as pointed out by Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel, but so far the question of locus standi is concerned, it is subject to the various interpretations having contextualised in the nature of representation vis-a-vis the disputes and for the persons whom are being represented by that means. It is now well recognised that when the marginalised, oppressed, illiterate persons, incapable of taking their right to the court of law for their justice, in that case their grievance can be taken to the court of law by any public spirited organisation or person. These social action litigations stand out altogether in the different class. 34. Mr. It is now well recognised that when the marginalised, oppressed, illiterate persons, incapable of taking their right to the court of law for their justice, in that case their grievance can be taken to the court of law by any public spirited organisation or person. These social action litigations stand out altogether in the different class. 34. Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents, in reply to the submission advanced by Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner as regards collecting of fees from the students, has submitted that if it is held that the objection cannot be considered as violation of the conditions that part can be severed and the other part may be maintained. In this regard, Mr. Deb has relied on a decision of the apex court in R. Jeevaratnam Vs. State of Madras, reported in : AIR 1966 SC 951 , where the apex court has held that : "An order of dismissal with retrospective effect is, in substance, an order of dismissal as from the date of the order with the superadded direction that the order should operate retrospectively as from an anterior date. The two parts of the order are clearly severable. Assuming that the second part of the order is invalid, there is no reason why the first part of the order should not be given the fullest effect. The Court cannot pass a new order of dismissal, but surely it can give effect to the valid and severable part of the order." 35. In Union of India & Anr. Vs. G. Ganayutham, reported in (1997) 7 SCC 463 , the apex court has held that : 12. This case is treated as laying down various basic principles relating to judicial review of administrative or statutory discretion. Before summarising the substance of the principles laid down there we shall refer to the passage from the judgment of Lord Greene in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn.: (1948) 1 KB 223. It reads as follows: ".... It is true that discretion must be exercised reasonably. Now what does that mean? Lawyers familiar with the phraseology used in relation to exercise of statutory discretions often use the-words 'unreasonable' in a rather comprehensive sense. It has frequently been used and is frequently used as a general description of the things that must not be done. It is true that discretion must be exercised reasonably. Now what does that mean? Lawyers familiar with the phraseology used in relation to exercise of statutory discretions often use the-words 'unreasonable' in a rather comprehensive sense. It has frequently been used and is frequently used as a general description of the things that must not be done. For instance, a person entrusted with a discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting 'unreasonably'. Similarly, there may be something so absurd that no sensible person could even dream that it lay within the powers of the authority..... In another, it is taking into consideration extraneous matters. It is unreasonable that it might almost be described as being done in bad faith; and in fact, all these things run into one another." Lord Greene also observed (KB p. 230: ALL ER p. 683): "...it must be proved to be unreasonable in the sense that the Court considers it to be a decision that no reasonable body can come to. It is not what the Court considers unreasonable...... The effect of the legislation is not to set up the Court as an arbiter of the correctness of one view over another. Therefore, to arrive at a decision on 'reasonableness' the Court has to find out if the administrator has left out relevant factors or taken into account irrelevant factors. The decision of the administrator must have been within the four corners of the law, and not one which no sensible person could have reasonably arrived at having regard to the above principles, and must have been a bona fide one. The decision could be one of many choices open to the authority but it was for that authority to decide upon the choice and not for the Court to substitute its view. [Emphasis supplied] 36. Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel has further submitted that unless by any action, substantive in nature, any right is created and vested in someone's favour there cannot be any difficulty in taking away that benefit by a valid order giving retrospective operation. [Emphasis supplied] 36. Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel has further submitted that unless by any action, substantive in nature, any right is created and vested in someone's favour there cannot be any difficulty in taking away that benefit by a valid order giving retrospective operation. In this respect, he has relied on a decision of the apex court in T.R. Kapur & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana & Ors., reported in AIR 1987 SC 415 , where the apex court has held as under : "It is equally well-settled that any rule which affects the right of a person to be considered for promotion is a condition of service although mere chances of promotion may not be. It may further be stated that an authority competent to lay down qualifications for promotion, is also competent to change the qualifications. The rules defining qualifications and suitability for promotion are conditions of service and they can be changed retrospectively. This rule is however subject to a well-recognised principle that the benefits acquired under the existing rules cannot be taken away by an amendment with retrospective effect, that is to say, there is no power to make such a rule under the proviso to Art. 309 which affects or impairs vested rights. Therefore, unless it is specifically provided in the rules, the employees who are already promoted before the amendment of the rules, cannot be reverted and their promotions cannot be recalled. In other words, such rules laying down qualifications for promotion made with retrospective effect must necessary satisfy the tests of Article 14and 16(1) of the Constitution: State of Mysore v. M.N. Krishna Murty, ( : AIR 1973 SC 1146 ) : (1973) 2 SCR 575 , B.S. Yadav v. State of Punjab, ( : AIR 1981 SC 561 ) : (1981) 1 SCR 1024 , State of Gujarat v. Ramanlal Keshavial Soni, ( : AIR 1984 SC 161 ) : (1983) 2 SCR 287 and K.C. Arora v. State of Haryana, : (1984) 3 SCR 623 : (1984 Lab IC 1015)." 37. In B.S. Vadera Vs. In B.S. Vadera Vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in AIR 1969 SC 118 , the apex court has held on any executive action taken retrospectively as under : "The rules, which are embodied in the Schemes, framed by the Board, under Annexures 4 and 7, are within the powers, conferred under Rule 157; and, in the absence of any Act, having been passed by the 'appropriate' Legislature, on the said matter, the rules, framed by the Railway Board, will have full effect and, if so indicated, retrospectively also. Such indication, about retrospective effect, as has already been pointed out by us, is clearly there, in the impugned provisions." 38. Mr. S. Deb, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents, in order to rebut the submission of Mr. A.K. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, has contended that the land referred in the various communications as placed by the petitioner was for the establishment of Hindi School at Lichu Bagan for the benefit of the students of that locality and accordingly the Hindi and English Medium School has been established under the name and style of 'Sahid Bhagat Singh English Medium Primary School'. In this regard, Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel has referred to the averments made in the paragraph 17 of the counter affidavit filed by the respondents. However, his contention, based on the paragraph 19 of the counter-affidavit is that the petitioner has tried to make out a case taking advantage of the name-sake. It is obvious that the land under reference is not for the school, managed by the petitioner. Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel has also contended that since the recognition of the grant-in-aid school has been withdrawn w.e.f. 01.04.2007 by the impugned order dated 17.12.2008, consequence that would follow is that the school managed by the petitioner shall not be entitled to any benefit whatsoever. Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel has urged this court to pierce through the process for purpose of scrutiny and, if on such scrutiny, no illegality is found, the impugned decision may not be interfered in any manner subject to severability as pleaded by him. 39. Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, in rejoinder, has urged again to follow Manubhai Pragaji Vashi case. 39. Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, in rejoinder, has urged again to follow Manubhai Pragaji Vashi case. He has further submitted that in the previous writ petition the respondents did not raise the issue of locus standi and, as such, whether they can now be allowed to raise that issue. According to Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel, whether the writ petition is barred by res judicata or not, the decisions on the issues in the previous writ petition are of pivotal importance. If the issue is not decided, there cannot be any application of the principles of res judicata. Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel has referred a decision of the apex court in Bar Council of Maharashtra Vs. M.V. Dabholkar & Ors., reported in (1975) 2 SCC 702 , wherein the apex court has considered the question of locus standi. It has been held that wherever there is the statutory duty and interest to see that the rules laid down are upheld and not violated even if there is no personal or pecuniary interest and whereas the person in the rights and privileges of a class of persons etc. the said person can be considered an 'aggrieved person'. For further elucidation, the following passage is reproduced hereunder : "The Bar Council is "a person aggrieved" for these reasons. First, the words "person aggrieved" in the Act are of wide import in the context of the purpose and provisions of the statute. In disciplinary proceedings before the disciplinary committee there is no lis and there are no parties. Therefore, the word "person" will embrace the Bar Council which represents the Bar of the State. Second, the Bar Council is "a person aggrieved" because it represents the collective conscience of the standards of professional conduct and etiquette. The Bar Council acts as the protector of the purity and dignity of the profession. Third, the function of the Bar Council in entertaining complaints against advocates is when the Bar Council has reasonable belief that there is a prima facie case of misconduct that a disciplinary committee is entrusted with such inquiry. Once an inquiry starts the Bar Council has no control over its decision. The Bar Council may entrust it to another disciplinary committee or the Bar Council may make a report to the Bar Council of India. Once an inquiry starts the Bar Council has no control over its decision. The Bar Council may entrust it to another disciplinary committee or the Bar Council may make a report to the Bar Council of India. This indicates that the Bar Council is all the time interested in the proceedings for the vindication of discipline, dignity and decorum of the profession. Fourth, a decision of a disciplinary committee can only be corrected by appeals as provided under the Act. When the Bar Council initiates proceedings by referring cases of misconduct to disciplinary committee the Bar Council in the performance of its functions under the Act is interested in the task of seeing that the advocates maintain the proper standards and etiquette of the profession. Fifth, the Bar Council is vitally concerned with the decision in the context of the functions of the Bar Council. The Bar Council will have a grievance if the decision prejudices the maintenance of standards of professional conduct and ethics." 40. While concurring with the said observation of Ray, C.J. (for himself and Khanna, Mathew, Gupta and Fazal Ali, JJ.), Beg, J. has observed that : "The learned Chief Justice has very clearly and succinctly set out the reasons why a State Bar Council is a "person aggrieved" entitled to appeal against orders in disciplinary proceedings against members of the Bar of the State. It represents the Bar of the State. It is the "keeper of the conscience" and the guardian of the interests of members of the Bar. It acts "as the protector of the purity and dignity of the profession." Its function in relation to disciplinary proceedings, is to entertain complaints against Advocates, and, when there is a prima facie case of misconduct, to initiate proceedings by sending the complaint to its Disciplinary Committee. It has an interest in seeing that correct decisions are given upon matters involving allegations of misconduct against members of the Bar of the State. My learned brother Krishna Iyer has indicated the wide range and the social significance and dimensions of this interest." 41. Justice Krishna Iyer, concurring with the above observation has further held as under : 44. The two-day long arguments in this case have been devoted to a construction of two simple words in common use forming the expression 'person aggrieved'. My learned brother Krishna Iyer has indicated the wide range and the social significance and dimensions of this interest." 41. Justice Krishna Iyer, concurring with the above observation has further held as under : 44. The two-day long arguments in this case have been devoted to a construction of two simple words in common use forming the expression 'person aggrieved'. Precedential erudition and traditional approaches notwithstanding, the key to the meaning of the expression in question lies in plain English plus the social feel of the statute and the public commitment of the legal profession, the regulation of which has been achieved by the Advocates Act, 1961 (for short, the Act) wherein the above words occur. Legal scholarship, to be fruitful, must focus on the lifestyle of the law without getting lost in mere logomachy. 45. The short question is as to whether the State Bar Council is a 'person aggrieved' within the meaning of Section 38 so that it has locus standi to appeal to this Court against a decision of the Disciplinary Tribunal of the Bar Council of India which, it claims, is embarrassingly erroneous and if left unchallenged, may frustrate the high obligation of maintaining standards of probity and purity and canons of correct professional conduct among the members of the Bar on its rolls. It has been further supplemented by Krishna Iyer, J. that : "The hackneyed phrase, 'person aggrieved', is not merely of frequent occurrence in statutes and in the writ jurisdiction but has come up for judicial consideration in Anglo-American and Indian courts in a variety of a situations and legislative settings. Notwithstanding the slippery semantics of such legalese, the Indian legislative draftsmen have continued to use them, out of linguistic allegiance to the British art and Indian Judges have frequently sought interpretative light from English authorities of ancient vintage. These 'borrowed' drafting and interpretative exercises are sometimes inept when time and country change and the context and text of the statute vary. I stress this aspect since much of the time of the Courts in India is consumed by massive, and sometimes mechanical reliance on exotic constructions and default in evolving legislative simplicity and avoiding interpretative complexity. At a time when our Courts are on trial for delayed disposals and mystifying processes, this desideratum becomes all the more urgent. I stress this aspect since much of the time of the Courts in India is consumed by massive, and sometimes mechanical reliance on exotic constructions and default in evolving legislative simplicity and avoiding interpretative complexity. At a time when our Courts are on trial for delayed disposals and mystifying processes, this desideratum becomes all the more urgent. Otherwise, why should decoding a single expression/'person aggrieved'-take two days of learned length?" Justice Krishna Iyer, in no uncertain terms has sounded caution as to the peril of being ensnared by the hypertechnical approach at the cost of the substantive justice : "No narrow, pedantic, technical or centenarian construction can be blindly applied. On the other hand, a spacious construction, functionally informed by the social conscience and the salutary purpose of the enactment must illumine the judicial effort. So viewed, the ample import and breadth of meaning of the words 'person aggrieved' will embrace the State Bar Council, for reasons which I shall presently set out." Krishna Iyer, J. has also quoted the well-known case of Attorney General of the Gambia Vs. Pierra Sarr N.' Jie, reported in 1961 ac 617, where Lord Denning observed about the Attorney General's standing thus : "... the words 'person aggrieved' are of wide import and should not be subjected to a restrictive interpretation. They do not include, of course, a mere busybody who is interfering in things which do not concern him; but they do include a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affects his interests. Has the Attorney-General a sufficient interest for this purpose? Their Lordships think that he has. The Attorney General in a colony represents the Crown as the guardian of the public interest. It is his duty to bring before the judge any misconduct of a barrister or solicitor which is of sufficient gravity to war rant disciplinary action." 42. Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, on the issue of locus standi of the petitioner, has placed reliance on another decision of the apex court in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai Vs. It is his duty to bring before the judge any misconduct of a barrister or solicitor which is of sufficient gravity to war rant disciplinary action." 42. Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, on the issue of locus standi of the petitioner, has placed reliance on another decision of the apex court in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai Vs. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed & Ors., reported in (1976) 1 SCC 671 , where it has been observed by a larger bench that in order to have the locus standi to invoke certiorari jurisdiction, according to the most English decisions, the petitioner should be an "aggrieved person" and in a case of defect of jurisdiction, such a petitioner will be entitled to a writ of certiorari as a matter of course, but if he does not fulfil that character and is a "stranger", the Court will, in its discretion, deny him this extraordinary remedy, save in very special circumstances. In Jasbhai Motibhai Desai, it has been further observed that : 13. This takes us to the further question: Who is an "aggrieved person"? And what are the qualifications requisite for such a status? The expression "aggrieved person" denotes an elastic, and, to an extent, an elusive concept. It cannot be confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. At best, its feature can be described a broad tentative manner. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of the petitioner's interest and the nature and extent of the prejudice or injury suffered by him. English Courts have sometimes put a restricted and sometimes a wide construction on the expression "aggrieved person". However, some general tests have been devised to ascertain whether an applicant is eligible for this category so as to have the necessary locus standi or 'standing' to invoke certiorari jurisdiction. 14. We will first take up that line of cases in which an "aggrieved person" has been held to be one who has a more particular or peculiar interest of his own beyond that of the general public, in seeing that the law is properly administered. The leading case in this line is Queen v. Justices of Surrey: (1870) 5 QB 466, decided as far back as 1870. The leading case in this line is Queen v. Justices of Surrey: (1870) 5 QB 466, decided as far back as 1870. There, on the application by the highway board the Justices made certificates that certain portion of three road were unnecessary. As a result, it was ordered that the roads should cease to be repaired by the parishes. 43. In Jasbhai Motibhai Desai, the larger bench of the apex court, after deliberating quite at length has observed as under: 30. Typical of the cases in which a strict construction was put on the expression "person aggrieved", is Buxton v. Minister of Housing and Local Govt. (1961) 1 QB 278. There, an appeal by a Company against the refusal of the Local Planning Authority of permission to develop land owned by the Company by digging chalk, was allowed by the Minister. Owners of adjacent property applied to the High Court under Section 31(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1959 to quash the decision of the Minister on the ground that the proposed operations by the company would injure their land and that they were 'persons aggrieved' by the action of the Minister. It was held that the expression 'person aggrieved' in a statute meant a person who had suffered a legal grievance; anyone given the right under Section 37 of the Act of 1959 to have his representation considered by the Minister was a person aggrieved, thus Section 31 applied, If those rights were infringed; but the applicants had no right under the statute and no legal rights had been infringed and therefore they were not entitled to challenge the Minister's decision, Salmon J. quoted with approval these observations of James LJ in Re Sidebothem (1880) 14 Ch D. 458. The words 'person aggrieved' do not really mean a man who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some other order had been made. A 'person aggrieved' must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something. 31. Ex Parte Stott (1916) 1 KB 7 is another illustration of a person who had no legal grievance, nor had he sufficient interest in the matter. 31. Ex Parte Stott (1916) 1 KB 7 is another illustration of a person who had no legal grievance, nor had he sufficient interest in the matter. A licensing authority under the Cinematograph Act, 1901, granted to a theatre proprietor a licence for the exhibition of cinematograph films at his theatre. The license was subject to the condition that the licensee should not exhibit any film if he had notice that the licensing authority objected to it. A firm who had acquired the sole right of exhibition of a certain film in the district in which the theatre was situated entered into an agreement with the licensee for the exhibition of the film at his theatre. The licensing authority having given notice to the licensee that it is objected to the exhibition of the film, the firm applied for a writ of certiorari to bring up the notice to be quashed on the ground that the condition attached to the licence was unreasonable and void and that they were aggrieved by the notice as being destructive of their property. It was held that whether the condition was unreasonable or not, the applicants were not persons who were aggrieved by the notice and had no locus standi to maintain the application. 32. Similarly, in King v. Middlesex Justices" (1832) 37 RR 594 : 3 B & Ad 938 it was held that the words "person who shall think himself aggrieved" appearing in the statute governing the grant of licenses to innkeepers mean a person immediately aggrieved as by refusal of a licence to himself and not one who is consequently aggrieved and that though the Justices had granted a licence to a party to open a public house not before licensed, within a very short distance of a licensed public house, the occupier of the latter house could not appeal against such grant. 33. Other instances of a restricted interpretation of the expression "person aggrieved" are furnished by R. v. Bradford-on-Avon Urban District Council; Ex Parte Boulton (1964) 2 All ER 492: Gregory v. Cam-den London Borough Council (1966) 1 WLR 899; R v. London O.S.; Ex parte Westminster Corporation (1951) 2 KB 508; Regina v. Cardiff Justices; Ex parte Cardiff Corporation (1962) 2 QB 436. 34. 34. This Court has laid down in a number of decisions that in order to have the locus standi to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. an applicant should ordinarily be one who has & personal or individual right in the subject-matter of the application, though in the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto this rule is relaxed or modified. In other words, as a general rule, infringement of some legal right or prejudice to some legal interest inhering in the petitioner is necessary to give him a locus standi in the matter-(See State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Gungta: : 1952 1 SCR 28; Calcutta Gas Co. v. State of W.B.: : AIR 1962 SC 1044 ; Ram Umeshwari Suthoo v. Member, Board of Revenue, Orissa: (1967) 1 SCA 413; Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Government of A.P.: AIR 1966 SC 828 ; State of Orissa v. Rajasaheb Chandanmall: : (1973) 3 SCC 739 ; Dr. Satyanarayana Sinha v. M/s. S. Lal & Co.: : (1973) 2 SCC 696 . 35. The expression "ordinarily" indicates that this is not a cast-iron rule. It is flexible enough to take in those cases where the applicant has been prejudicially affected by an act or omission of an authority, even though he has no proprietary or even a fiduciary interest in the subject-matter. That apart, in exceptional cases even a stranger or a person who was not a party to the proceedings before the authority, but has a substantial and genuine interest in the subject-matter of the proceedings will be covered by this rule. The principles enunciated in the English cases noticed above, are not inconsistent with it. 36. In the United States of America, also, the law on the point is substantially the same. "No matter how seriously infringement of the Constitution may be called into question," said Justice Frankfurter in Coleman v. Miller : (1939) 307 US 433 this is not the tribunal for its challenge except by those who have some specialized interest of their own to vindicate apart from a political concern which belongs to all". To have a "standing to sue", which means locus standi to ask for relief in a court independently of a statutory remedy, the plaintiff must show that he is injured, that is, subjected to or threatened with a legal wrong. To have a "standing to sue", which means locus standi to ask for relief in a court independently of a statutory remedy, the plaintiff must show that he is injured, that is, subjected to or threatened with a legal wrong. Courts can intervene only where legal rights are invaded Chapman v. Sheridan Wyoming Coal Co. (1949) 338 US 621. "Legal wrong" requires a judicially enforceable right " and the touchstone to justiciability is injury to a legally protected right. A nominal or a highly speculative adverse effect American Jurisprudence Vol. 2d Ss. 575. p. 334 Joint Anti Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGarth (1950) 341 US 123; on the interest or right of a person has been held to be insufficient to give him the "standing to sue'' for judicial review of administrative action. United States Cane Sugar Refiners' Assocn. v. McNutt 138 F 2d 116-158 ALR 849; Again the "adverse effect"' requisite for "standing to sue" must be an "illegal effect" United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co.(1955) 351 US 192 Thus. in the undermentioned cases, it was held that injury resulting from lawful competition not being a legal wrong, cannot furnish a "standing to sue" for judicial relief, Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay (1955) 350 US 884. 37. It will be seen that in the context of locus standi to apply for a writ of certiorari, an applicant may ordinarily fall in any of these categories: (i) 'person aggrieved'; (ii) 'stranger'; (iii) busybody of meddlesome interloper. Persons in the last category are easily distinguishable from those coming under the first two categories. Such persons interfere' in things which do not concern them. They masquerade as crusaders for justice. They pretend to act in the name of Pro Bono Publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect. They indulge in the past time of meddling with the judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives. Often, they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity; while the ulterior intent of some applicants in this category, may be no more than spoking the wheels of administration. The High Court should do well to reject the applications of such busybodies at the threshold. 38. The distinction between the first and second categories of applicants, though real, is not always well-demarcated. The High Court should do well to reject the applications of such busybodies at the threshold. 38. The distinction between the first and second categories of applicants, though real, is not always well-demarcated. The first category has, as it were, two concentric zones; a solid central zone of certainty, and, a grey outer circle of lessening certainty in a sliding centrifugal scale, with an outermost nebulous fringe of uncertainty. Applicants falling within the central zone are those whose legal rights have been infringed Such applicants undoubtedly stand in the category of 'persons aggrieved'. In the grey outer-circle the bounds which separate the first category from the second, intermix, interfuse and overlap increasingly in a centrifugal direction. All persons in this outer-zone may not be "persons aggrieved" 39. To distinguish such applicants from 'strangers', among them, some broad tests may be deduced from the conspectus made above. These tests are not absolute and ultimate. Their efficacy varies according to the circumstances of the case, including the statutory context in which the matter falls to be considered. These are: Whether the applicant is a person whose legal right has been infringed? Has he suffered a legal wrong or injury, in the sense, that his interest, recognised by law, has been prejudicially and directly affected by the act or omission of the authority, complained of? Is he a person who has suffered a legal grievance, a person "against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something? Has he a special and substantial grievance of his own beyond some grievance or inconvenience suffered by him in common with the rest of the public? Was he entitled to object and be heard by the authority before it took the impugned action? If so, was he prejudicially affected in the exercise of that right by the act of usurpation of jurisdiction on the part of the authority? Is the statute, in the context of which the scope of the words "person aggrieved" is being considered, a social welfare measure designed to lay down ethical or professional standards of conduct for the community? Or is it a statute dealing with private rights of particular Individuals? 40. Now let us apply these tests to the case in hand. Is the statute, in the context of which the scope of the words "person aggrieved" is being considered, a social welfare measure designed to lay down ethical or professional standards of conduct for the community? Or is it a statute dealing with private rights of particular Individuals? 40. Now let us apply these tests to the case in hand. The Act and the Rules with which we are concerned, are not designed to set norms of moral or professional conduct for the community at large or even a section thereof. They only regulate the exercise of private rights of an Individual to carry on a particular business on his property. In this context, the expression "person aggrieved" must receive a strict construction. [Emphasis supplied] 44. Prior to Jasbhai Motibhai Desai, a larger bench of the apex court in Bar Council of Maharashtra Vs. M.V. Dabholkar & Ors., reported in : (1975) 2 SCC 702 , has enunciated the law on considering the word "person aggrieved" appearing in several statutes. It has been observed in M.V. Dabholkar that the meaning of the words "person aggrieved" will have to be ascertained with reference to the purpose and the provisions of the statute. Sometimes, it is said that the words "person aggrieved" correspond to the requirement of locus standi which arises in relation to judicial remedies. It has been held in M.V. Dabholkar as under : 28. Where a right of appeal to Courts against an administrative or judicial decision is created by statute the right is invariably con fined to a person aggrieved or a per son who claims to be aggrieved. The meaning of the words "a person aggrieved" may vary according to the context of the statute. One of the meanings is that a person will be held to be aggrieved by a decision if that decision is materially adverse to him. Normally, one is required to establish that one has been denied or deprived of something to which one is legally entitled in order to make one "a person aggrieved." Again a person is aggrieved if a legal burden is imposed on him. The meaning of the words "a person aggrieved" is sometimes given a restricted meaning in certain statutes which provide remedies for the protection of private legal rights. The restricted meaning requires denial or deprivation of legal rights. The meaning of the words "a person aggrieved" is sometimes given a restricted meaning in certain statutes which provide remedies for the protection of private legal rights. The restricted meaning requires denial or deprivation of legal rights. A more liberal approach is required in the back ground of statutes which do not deal with property rights but deal with professional conduct and morality. The role of the Bar Council under the Advocates Act is comparable to the role of a guardian in professional ethics. The words "persons aggrieved" in Sections 37 and 38 of the Act are of wide import and should not be subjected to a restricted interpretation of possession or denial of legal rights or burdens or financial interests. The test is whether the words "person aggrieved" include "a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which pre judicially affects his interests." It has, therefore, to be found out whether the Bar Council has a grievance in respect of an order or decision affecting the professional conduct and etiquette. 29. The pre-eminent question is: what are the interests of the Bar Council? The interests of the Bar Council are the maintenance of standards of professional conduct and etiquette. The Bar Council has no personal or pecuniary interest. The Bar Council has the statutory duty and interest to see that the rules laid down by the Bar Council of India in relation to professional conduct and etiquette are upheld and not violated. The Bar Council acts as the sentinel of professional code of conduct and is vitally interested in the rights and privileges of the advocates as well as the purity and dignity of the profession. 30. The interest of the Bar Council is to uphold standards of professional conduct and etiquette in the profession, which is founded upon integrity and mutual trust. The Bar Council acts as the custodian of the high traditions of the noble profession. The grievance of the Bar Council is to be looked at purely from the point of view of standards of professional conduct and etiquette. The Bar Council acts as the custodian of the high traditions of the noble profession. The grievance of the Bar Council is to be looked at purely from the point of view of standards of professional conduct and etiquette. If any decision of the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India is according to the State Bar Council such as will lower the standards and imperil the high traditions and values in the profession, the State Bar Council is an aggrieved person to safeguard the interests of the public, the interests of the profession and the interests of the Bar. 31. The Bar Council is "a person aggrieved" for these reasons. First, the words "person aggrieved" in the Act are of wide import in the context of the purpose and provisions of the statute. In disciplinary proceedings before the disciplinary committee there is no lis and there are no parties. Therefore, the word "person" will embrace the Bar Council which represents the Bar of the State. Second, the Bar Council is "a person aggrieved" because it represents the collective conscience of the standards of professional conduct and etiquette. The Bar Council acts as the protector of the purity and dignity of the profession. Third, the function of the Bar Council in entertaining complaints against advocates is when the Bar Council has reasonable belief that there is a prima facie case of misconduct that a disciplinary committee is entrusted with such inquiry. Once an inquiry starts the Bar Council has no control over its decision. The Bar Council may entrust it to another disciplinary committee or the Bar Council may make a report to the Bar Council of India. This indicates that the Bar Council is all the time interested in the proceedings for the vindication of discipline, dignity and decorum of the profession. Fourth, a decision of a disciplinary committee can only be corrected by appeals as provided under the Act. When the Bar Council initiates proceedings by referring cases of misconduct to disciplinary committee the Bar Council in the performance of its functions under the Act is interested in the task of seeing that the advocates maintain the proper standards and etiquette of the profession. Fifth, the Bar Council is vitally concerned with the decision in the context of the functions of the Bar Council. Fifth, the Bar Council is vitally concerned with the decision in the context of the functions of the Bar Council. The Bar Council will have a grievance if the decision prejudices the maintenance of standards of professional conduct and ethics. 32. For these reasons we hold that the Bar Council is an aggrieved person to maintain an appeal under the Act. [per majority] 45. In Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) Vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in : AIR 1981 SC 298 , it has been observed by the supreme court that : "Whether the petitioners belong to a recognised union or not, the fact remains that a large body of persons with a common grievance exists and they have approached this Court under Article 32. Our current processual jurisprudence is not of individualistic Anglo-Indian mould. It is broad-based and people-oriented, and envisions access to justice through 'class actions', 'public interest litigation', and 'representative proceedings'. Indeed, little Indians in large numbers seeking remedies in courts through collective proceedings, instead of being driven to an expensive plurality of litigations, is an affirmation of participative justice in our democracy. We have no hesitation in holding that the narrow concept of 'cause of action' and 'person aggrieved' and individual litigation is becoming obsolescent in some jurisdictions. It must fairly be stated that the learned Attorney General has taken no objection to a non-recognised association maintaining the writ petitions." [Emphasis added] 46. Thereafter, Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has relied on a decision on the rule of fairness in Government action, as according to Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel, the absence of fairness in the impugned action is apparent on the face of the records and, as such, the action offends the provision of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 47. In Jagdish Prasad Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., reported in : (2011) 7 SCC 789 , it has been observed as under : "It is equally true that the rule of fairness in Government action is an essential feature. However, such fairness has to be founded on reasons. Usually, the providing of Reasons demonstrates the concept of reasonableness but where the statutory rules provide the circumstances and criteria, ambit and methods by which the selection should be governed, they would become the yardstick of fairness. In the case of Manager Government Branch Press and Anr. However, such fairness has to be founded on reasons. Usually, the providing of Reasons demonstrates the concept of reasonableness but where the statutory rules provide the circumstances and criteria, ambit and methods by which the selection should be governed, they would become the yardstick of fairness. In the case of Manager Government Branch Press and Anr. v. D.B. Belliappa: : (1979) 1 SCC 477 , this Court held that the essence of the guarantee under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution is 'fairness founded on reasons'." In Jagdish Prasad, the apex court has held that if the impugned action is not informed with reasons, the said action is to be stated unfair action. 48. Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, at the fag end of his rejoinder, has relied on a decision of the apex court, though entirely on different context, in The Manager, Government Branch Press & Anr. Vs. D.B. Belliappa, reported in : (1979) 1 SCC 477 , where the apex court has observed that : "We have a vague feeling that it was, perhaps, open to the appellant to say in view of the complaint alluded to in the show-cause notice against the integrity and fidelity of the respondent, that the former had lost confidence in the latter and considered him unsuitable to be continued in the post which was one of trust and confidence. But it will be hazardous for us to base our decision on any such speculation, when the appellant, himself, instead of taking any such plea, has, with obdurate persistency stuck to the position that the respondent's service has been terminated without any reason, which comes perilously near to admitting that the power reserved to the employer under the conditions of the employment, has been exercised arbitrarily." 49. Having appreciated the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and also on rigorous scrutiny of the records, those have been placed before this court, this court is constrained to note that the notification dated 16.04.2007 (Annexure-4 to the writ petition) had been issued in complete disregard to the provisions of Rule 3 of the Tripura Grant-in-Aid (Government Aided Schools) Rules, 2005, for short 'Grant-in-Aid Rules', which came into force w.e.f. 31.05.2005. By the provisions of Rule 3 of the Grant-in-Aid Rules, it has been provided that in order to earn the status of Government grant-in-aid, the terms and conditions as laid down therein have to be taken into consideration. The terms and conditions are : (a) A school shall have to be registered by the Director of School Education as per the existing guidelines applicable from time to time; (b) There should be minimum number of students enrolled in various classes which should be as per the following scale :- (c) There should be required teachers including trained teachers as per the guidelines applicable from time to time; (d) There should be Managing Committee duly approved by the Tripura Board of Secondary Education; (e) There is a transparent system of proper maintenance of accounts, audit; (f) There is adequate administrative apparatus, satisfactory discipline & acceptable standard of academic efficiency as per guidelines applicable from time to time; (g) Managing Committee of the concerned School shall have to provide a resolution to the effect that it shall abide by the existing instruction and Rules and regulations of the Education (School) Department; (h) The concerned school should have the following amenities or shall provide for :- (i) Sufficient accommodation (at least 10 sq. ft.) floor area per pupil along with provision for cycle/car stand; (ii) Suitable site for future construction of school building as per need; (iii) The land belongs to the school; (iv) Adequate playing fields and ground for physical culture; (v) Satisfactory drinking water supply and sanitation facilities; (vi) Well-equipped library; (vii) Amenities for out school activities; (viii) Compulsory singing of National Anthem before the class work starts; (ix) No religious compulsions is to be resorted to in the school; (x) No criminal cases are pending against the school; (xi) The High and Higher Secondary schools must be an affiliate to Tripura Board of Secondary Education or the Central Board of Secondary Education, New Delhi or I.C.S.E. Board. 50. This Court is also of the considered opinion, what Mr. 50. This Court is also of the considered opinion, what Mr. S. Deb, learned senior counsel has contended that the land which was earmarked by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sadar, at the initiative of the District Magistrate & Collector, West Tripura, Agartala, was not for the petitioner, but for a separate school, is not borne in the records, rather from a collective reading of all the materials including the decision of the meeting of the Council of Ministers held on 24.01.2007 (Annexure-36 to the affidavit-in-rejoinder filed by the petitioner), it is apparent that the said initiative for identifying a separate plot of land had been initiated in terms of the decision of the Council of Ministers as stated. Thus there cannot be any doubt that the Council of Ministers was conscious of the status of the land where the school of the petitioner is situated. The decision of the Council of Ministers, in uncertain terms says that "proposal to bring the privately managed Hindi Secondary School, Khejur Bagan, Gorkha Basti, Agartala, West Tripura under Grant-in-aid Scheme under Education (School) Department, (Education (School) Deptt. File No. F.15(2-41)-SE/GIA/2006 dated 24.01.07) has been approved. The decision also includes that "keeping future expansion in view, a separate plot of land for the school including standard play ground may be identified." The decision of the Council of Ministers for identification of the land is for purpose of a separate plot of land for future expansion. Without proper estimation of the ground reality, the Council of Ministers had taken a decision and pursuant to that decision, by the notification dated 16.04.2007 the school was brought under the Grant-in-aid scheme. It appears that the decision of the Council of Ministers had not been preceded any assessment whether the petitioner-school did have the required amenities or in a position to provide such amenities, such as sufficient accommodation, at least 10 sq. ft. floor area per pupil alongwith provision for cycle/car stand, suitable site for future construction of school building as per need, whether the land belongs to the school or whether there was adequate playing fields and ground for physical culture etc. From the respondents, no such assessment note has been placed before the court and, as such, this court is persuaded to take an adverse inference in this regard. From the respondents, no such assessment note has been placed before the court and, as such, this court is persuaded to take an adverse inference in this regard. It appears that the respondents intended to alter their decision and at that point of time they recalled their notification dated 16.04.2007, by which the school was brought under the Grant-in-aid school w.e.f. 01.04.2004, by the notification dated 17.12.2008, which was challenged by the petitioner by filing the previous writ petition, being W.P. (C) No. 235/2009. Since the said order was not preceded by any show cause in terms of Rule 10 of the Grant-in-Aid Rules, the said notification has been interfered with and set aside. Rule 10 under Chapter-IV of the Grant-in-Aid Rules entirely deals with the withdrawal of grant and such withdrawal can only be made if in the opinion of the Director of School Education, it is so found that any school is not fulfilling any terms and conditions of the grant or violating valid instructions of the Director of School Education or the State Government or taking contrary action which is violative of the various instructions and rules, the Director of School Education with the approval of the Education (School) Department can either withdraw the grant-in-aid status or stop payment of grant by issuing a speaking order after allowing a reasonable opportunity. The Director of School Education may also proceed to suspend temporarily payment of grant subject to the inquiry on a grave complaint. In case of temporary suspension, the Director of School Education may arrange to draw in part or in full, the grant-in-aid of the school through a Departmental Officer for making payment. The amount so drawn and paid shall be deemed to have been given to the school concerned as grant-in-aid for that period. Separate accounts in respect of such grants and expenditure shall be maintained by the officer concerned. 51. From the notification dated 17.12.2008, by operation of which the grant-in-aid status of the petitioner-school has been withdrawn w.e.f. 01.04.2007, it has been provided that "the private management of the said school has failed to comply with the standard conditions stipulated in the notification and in the Grant-in-Aid Rules". 51. From the notification dated 17.12.2008, by operation of which the grant-in-aid status of the petitioner-school has been withdrawn w.e.f. 01.04.2007, it has been provided that "the private management of the said school has failed to comply with the standard conditions stipulated in the notification and in the Grant-in-Aid Rules". From a bare perusal of the notification dated 16.04.2007, it appears that the only condition was "keeping future expansion in view, a separate plot of land for the School including standard play ground should be identified by the School Managing Committee", but there is no time stipulation for such identification. However, by the memorandum dated 04.08.2007, the Management of the petitioner-school was communicated as under : "It was intimated earlier to the Secretary, School Managing Committee of New Hindi Secondary School, Khejur Bagan that a separate plot of land for the School including standard play ground should be identified by the School management. No information in this regard has yet been received from the school. 2. The Secretary, New Hindi Secondary School is hereby instructed to furnish a clear land status of the School. Dispute regarding land ownership need to be settled and clear un-disputed position is to be intimated to this Department. 3. As per Revised Grant-in-Aid Rules, 2005 teachers student ratio is 40:1. So, the school is eligible for (576-40) 14 nos. teacher. But the School has 23 nos. existing teachers. Present Teachers strength of this School is beyond the norms. So, the Secretary of Managing Committee is hereby requested to furnish a list of teachers as per norms. 4. In the first condition of the Notification dated 16.04.2007 it was stated that an elected School Managing Committee with a permanent Govt. nominee of School Education Deptt. i.e. District Education Officer of West Dist. Zonal Office should be constituted by the School Management which is not yet done. There is a separate Rules for constitution of School Managing Committee by an Election which will be conducted by an Election Officer to be deputed by this Deptt. on receipt of proposal from the school. A copy of the Rules is enclosed herewith. An elected and valid School Managing Committee need to be constituted for New Hindi Secondary School. The Secretary of the School Management is requested to take immediate steps on the matter as stated above. This is for his information and taking necessary action." 52. on receipt of proposal from the school. A copy of the Rules is enclosed herewith. An elected and valid School Managing Committee need to be constituted for New Hindi Secondary School. The Secretary of the School Management is requested to take immediate steps on the matter as stated above. This is for his information and taking necessary action." 52. The clarification sought by the memorandum dated 04.08.2007, no doubt ought to have been sought prior to grant of the grant-in-aid status to the petitioner-school. For non-compliance of the conditions of the grant-in-aid Rules as well as of the instruction given in the memorandum dated 04.08.2007, as it appears, the grant-in-aid status was cancelled by the order dated 17.12.2008. Since there was no opportunity for the school management to clarify their position, the learned Single Judge, while disposing of the previous writ petition, being W.P. (C) No. 235/2009, quashed the said notification dated 17.12.2008, directing the Director of School Education to give an opportunity to file the documents and pleadings to the petitioner-school before passing any order for withdrawal/cancellation. But, as regards the payment of arrear pay and allowances or implementation of the mid-day-meal scheme, that was left to the wisdom of the State-respondent. It has been further directed that keeping in view of the observation made in the judgment and order dated 05.03.2010 passed in W.P. (C) No. 235/2009 the appropriate order be passed by the competent authority, the Director of School Education. There is no controversy that the Director of School Education, in terms of the order dated 05.03.2010 provided adequate opportunity and scope of hearing to the petitioner to lay their pleadings and documents after they were served with a show cause notice dated 12.05.2010, categorically laying how they have failed to observe the direction contained in the memorandum dated 04.08.2007 and the other conditions of the grant-in-aid Rules. The petitioner-school filed the reply on 07.06.2010 alongwith certain documents relating to the land under their possession. On scrutiny of the reply, what has appeared that the petitioner-school could not produce any document to show that the land where the school is situated belongs to the school, rather it has surfaced that the school has been un-authorisedly occupying the land of one Priti Debi, from the records of rights, being khatian No. 2124/19. On scrutiny of the reply, what has appeared that the petitioner-school could not produce any document to show that the land where the school is situated belongs to the school, rather it has surfaced that the school has been un-authorisedly occupying the land of one Priti Debi, from the records of rights, being khatian No. 2124/19. By the decision contained in the order dated 30.07.2007 passed by the Director of School Education, the grant-in-aid status granted w.e.f. 01.04.2007 was withdrawn. The respondents by taking a hasty decision for conferring the grant-in-aid status to the petitioner-school, has failed to observe the requirements of the rules for reasons not disclosed before this court. Even the matter was considered by the Council of Ministers and without any inquiry to that aspect of the matter they approved the proposal of conferring the grant-in-aid status to the petitioner-school. Later on, again for the reasons not disclosed in the writ petition, it appears that when the respondents decided to withdraw the grant-in-aid status then they took the advantage of Rule 10 of the Grant-in-aid Rules. Such action of the State is deplorable and against the fairness principle. While observing thus, this court is oblivious that any action taken without due difference to law is not irrevocable. 53. The Executive is entrusted by the people to uphold the rules not to trample it. If this is the example of upholding the rules then it has to be held that the people of this country has been left to wait for anarchy. But, at the same time, this court observed that the initial non-observance of the grant-in-aid Rules is absolutely against the public policy as the petitioner-school did not have any land of their own or the land on which the school is situated did not belong to them. The petitioner-school does not have any land of their own even now. Unless it is shown that despite the fulfilment of the conditions as laid down in Rule 3 of the Grant-in-aid Rules there cannot be any indefeasible right to ask for mandamus or consequential quashment of any order or decision by way of certiorari. The petitioner-school does not have any land of their own even now. Unless it is shown that despite the fulfilment of the conditions as laid down in Rule 3 of the Grant-in-aid Rules there cannot be any indefeasible right to ask for mandamus or consequential quashment of any order or decision by way of certiorari. Unless it is demonstrated that there resides a legal right to the performance of a legal duty by the party against whom mandamus is sought, mandamus cannot be issued to compel something to be done against the statute or the public policy whose constitutionality is not challenged. It must be shown that there is a legal or a constitutional duty that has to be observed. In view of the codified rules how to confer grant-in-aid status of a school, the executive is not authorised to confer grant-in-aid Rule in the manner it has been so granted in the case of the petitioner-school. Even the Council of Ministers if is so bent to depart from the rules, it is the duty cast upon them, first to modify the rules and, thereafter take the decision, not vice versa. But, keeping the rules unaltered even the Council of Ministers cannot take any decision in contrast to the said rules or public policy. This Court therefore holds, so far this aspect of the matter is concerned, that the petitioner-school has failed to show that it has the eligibility to be conferred with the grant-in-aid status. As such, no mandamus can be issued commanding the respondents to confer the grant-in-aid status to the petitioner-school. Some other aspects so seriously pressed by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, those, according to this court, calls for a brief response. Locus Standi 54. The respondents has raised the question that whether the petitioner-school can be treated as the juristic person or aggrieved person for purpose of maintaining the writ petition. There is no dispute that the petitioner-school is neither a registered society nor a statutory trust. The issue of locus standi has received a liberal consideration in the passage of time having regard to the access to justice, but a stranger cannot be allowed to be on the board. There is no dispute that the petitioner-school is neither a registered society nor a statutory trust. The issue of locus standi has received a liberal consideration in the passage of time having regard to the access to justice, but a stranger cannot be allowed to be on the board. From the decisions of the apex court, as relied, general principles it can be culled out that as rights are different and inhere in different legal entities, it is not competent for a person to seek to enforce the rights of another, except when the law permits him to do so. This principle is based on the theory that remedies and rights are correlative and therefore, only a person whose own right is in jeopardy is entitled to seek remedy. But, this question of locus standi was not urged by the respondents in the previous writ petition, being W.P. (C) No. 235/2009 and, as consequence of that, the learned Single Judge, by the judgment and order dated 05.03.2010 passed in W.P. (C) No. 235/2010, issued mandamus on the respondents to do certain things in a certain way and also recognising the status of the petitioner and allowed it to file a representation in response to the show cause that would be issued by the respondents. In such circumstances, on that issue this court cannot go for a strict construction of the words 'aggrieved person' or the issue of locus standi. A new liberal paradigm has been surfacing, as would be evident from the decision of the apex court in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai, where it has been further culled out that whose legal rights have been infringed they undoubtedly stand in the category of 'persons aggrieved'. But, in the grey outer-circle the bounds which separate the first category from the second, intermix, interfuse and overlap increasingly in a centrifugal direction. All persons in this outer-zone may not be "persons aggrieved". In this case, however, the petitioner having been in the helm of the Management of the School, definitely falls within the broad zone if though grey. On considering the context and on embarking on liberal consideration, the petitioner-school may be termed as "aggrieved person". This is more so held in view of the judgment delivered in the previous writ petition. Res judicata 55. This court does not have any manner of doubt as to what has been contended by Mr. On considering the context and on embarking on liberal consideration, the petitioner-school may be termed as "aggrieved person". This is more so held in view of the judgment delivered in the previous writ petition. Res judicata 55. This court does not have any manner of doubt as to what has been contended by Mr. S. Deb, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents that in the writ proceeding the principles of constructive res judicata as provided under Section 11, Explanation-IV of the CPC applies and thus any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such petition and such issue shall not be tried in any petition or issue in the latter action between the same parties in that event and that would create constructive res judicata. But, in this case, this principle can hardly save the respondents inasmuch as by the judgment and order dated 05.03.2010 passed in the previous writ petition, the respondents were directed to issue show cause to the petitioner-school to have their response by means of pleadings and documents, and thereafter to take a decision informed with reasons. The decisions have been taken by the order dated 30.07.2010, Annexure-34 to the writ petition. Since the said order has been questioned in this writ petition, this Court has been called upon to examine the process of the decision making and also the reasons assigned in the decision, inasmuch as Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the said decision contained in the order dated 30.07.2010 is bereft of reasons, influenced by the extraneous reason and visited by unfairness. This Court has considered the issue liberally and afresh, partly for having the perspective of the controversy and substantially to examine the validity of the questioned action. 56. We are constrained to hold that even though the mesh has been created by the respondents, but for absence of any enforceable right of any nature subsisting in favour of the petitioner-school, this court cannot hold that the petitioner-school is entitled to have the grant-in-aid status in the circumstances as stated and, as consequence thereof, the impugned order cannot be interfered, with mandate to the respondents to release the grant as sought for and to implement the mid-day meal scheme etc. 57. As already stated, the conditions of Rule 3 of the Grant-in-aid Rules have not been conformed to by the petitioner-school. However, the petitioner-school has given an undertaking that they are in a position to acquire the land within a period of six months, if they are so permitted. Having regard to the future of the said school and also to the Constitutional mandate to provide free and compulsory education to the children up to the age of 14 under Article 21A of the Constitution of India, if within 6(six) months, as undertaken by the petitioner-school, the land required for functioning of the school of Secondary level, is acquired and a fresh application is made with all particulars of land and on conforming to the other conditions as provided under Rule 3 of the Grant-in-Aid Rules, 2005, the respondents shall grant them the grant-in-aid status within a period of 1(one) month from the day of compliance as above. 58. Having held so, this writ petition is allowed to the limited extent as indicated above. Before parting, it is made clear that the effect of this order shall only be confined to the petitioner-school in the peculiar fact and circumstances of the case. There shall be no order as to costs.