Judgment : 1. The Civil Revision Petition is filed to set aside the order in I.A.No.1356 of 2013 in M.C.O.P.No.645 of 2013 dated 14.03.2014 on the file of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Special District Court, Trichirapalli. 2. The petitioner is the second respondent, whereas the respondents 1 to 6 are the petitioners, 7th respondent is the first respondent in M.C.O.P.No.645 of 2013 on the file of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Special District Court, Tiruchirapalli. The respondents 1 to 6 filed M.C.O.P.No.645 of 2013 against the petitioner herein and seventh respondent claiming a sum of Rs.75 lakhs as compensation for the death of one P.Sivakumar. The owner / 7th respondent herein was driving the vehicle at the time of accident. According to the F.I.R., he was drunk at the time of accident. The 7th respondent did not file any counter affidavit in time and therefore, he was set ex-parte. He filed an application to set aside the ex-parte order and the learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 6 did not object the same. Now, the 7th respondent is contesting the M.C.O.P.No.645 of 2013. 3. The respondents 1 to 6 and owner / 7th respondent are colluding with each other, so that an award can be passed for huge amount against the petitioner herein. Therefore, the petitioner filed an application in I.A.No.1356 of 2013 under Section 170(1) of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for permission to the petitioner to contest the case on all the grounds that are available to the 7th respondent. The respondents 1 to 6 and 7th respondent filed separate counter affidavit denying the collusion between them. Considering the materials on record and arguments of counsel for parties, the learned Judge dismissed the application in I.A.No.1356 of 2013. Against the said order of dismissal, the present Civil Revision Petition is filed. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondents. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the respondents herein are colluding with each other trying to fastening huge liability on the petitioner. The petitioner contended that once Insurance Company is impleaded as party respondent in the M.C.O.P., it is open to the Insurance Company to contest the said M.C.O.P. on all the grounds available to the owner of the vehicle and driver. The petitioner contended that once Insurance Company is impleaded as party respondent in the M.C.O.P., it is open to the Insurance Company to contest the said M.C.O.P. on all the grounds available to the owner of the vehicle and driver. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on a judgment reported in 2011 (ACJ) 2729 (United India Insurance Company Limited v. Shila Datt), wherein it is stated as follows: "9. The Act does not require the claimants to implead the insurer as a party respondent. But if the claimants choose to implead the insurer as a party, not being a notice under Section 149(2), the insurer can urge all grounds and not necessarily the limited grounds mentioned in Section 149(2) of the Act. If the insurer is already a respondent (having been impleaded as a party respondent), it need not seek the permission of the Tribunal under Section 170 of the Act to raise grounds other than those mentioned in section 149(2) of the Act. The entire scheme and structure of Chapters XI and XII is that the claimant files a claim petition only against the owner and driver and the Tribunal issues notice to the insurer under Section 149(2) so that it can be made liable to pay the amount awarded against the insured and if necessary, deny liability under the policy of insurance, on any of the grounds mentioned in section 149(2). If an insurer is only a notice and not a party respondent, having regard to the decision in Nicolletta Rohtagi, 2002 ACJ 1950 (SC), it can defend the claim only on the grounds mentioned in section 149(2) and not any of the other grounds relating to merits available to the insured respondent. This is the position even where the claim proceedings are initiated suo motu under sections 149(7) [sic 166 (4)] and 158(6) of the Act, without any formal application by the claimants, as the insurer is only a notice under Section 149(2) of the Act." 11. Therefore, where the insurer is a party respondent, either on account of being impleaded as a party by the Tribunal under Section 170 or being impleaded as a party respondent by the claimants in the claim petition voluntarily, it will be entitled to contest the matter by raising all grounds, without being restricted to the grounds available under Section 149(2) of the Act. The claim petition is maintainable against the owner and driver without impleading the insurder as a party. When a statutory notice is issued under section 149 (2) by the Tribunal, it is clear that such notice is issued not to implead the insurer as a party respondent but merely to put it on notice that a claim has been made in regard to a policy issued by it and that it will have to bear the liability as and when an award is made in regard to such claim. Therefore, it cannot, as of right, require that it should be impleaded as a party respondent. But it can, however, be made a party respondent either by the claimants voluntarily in the claim petition or by the direction of the Tribunal under Section 170 of the Act. Whatever be the reason or ground for the insurer being impleaded as a party, once it is a party respondent, it can raise all contentions that are available to resist the claim. 6. The learned counsel for the respondents contended that only on appreciating the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Judge dismissed the above application. 7. I have perused the materials on record, judgments and arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner and respondents. 8. From the materials on record, it is seen that the 7th respondent, the owner of the vehicle, who was driving the vehicle at the time of accident was drunk and therefore, the petitioner apprehends that for that reason respondents will collude with each other and 7th respondent will not contest the M.C.O.P effectively and fastening the huge liability on the petitioner. 9. That apart, as per the judgments of Apex Court reported in 2011 ACJ 2729 , it has been held that once Insurance Company is impleaded as party respondent, the Insurance Company is entitled to raise all the grounds without being restricted to grounds available under Section 149 (2) of Motor Vehicles Act. The Apex Court has held that even without any permission from Tribunal under Section 170(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, the Insurance Company can contest the matter on all the grounds available to the owner and driver of the vehicle. 10. The Apex Court has held that even without any permission from Tribunal under Section 170(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, the Insurance Company can contest the matter on all the grounds available to the owner and driver of the vehicle. 10. In view of the above judgment, the impugned order of the learned Judge is set aside and the petitioner is permitted to contest the M.C.O.P. on all the grounds available to the owner and driver of the vehicle. 11. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed. No costs. Consequently, the connected M.P.No.1 of 2014 is closed.