ORDER : A. Ramalingeswara Rao, J. The 3rd accused in FIR No.421 of 2008 on the file of P.S. Begumpet, Hyderabad is the petitioner in this writ petition. 2. As per the averments in the affidavit filed by the petitioner, the 3rd respondent approached the petitioner for education loan to his son for his 2 years study of Diploma in Hotel Management at Geneva, Switzerland. The petitioner sanctioned a loan of Rs. 4,50,000/- on 02.05.2002 and the same was availed by the 3rd respondent and his son as co-borrowers through loan account No.10161741349. The loan amount was secured by equitable mortgage created by the 3rd respondent over his plot No.69 admeasuring 311 square yards situated at Autonagar, Saroornagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. Since the borrowers failed to repay the loan, steps were initiated under Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for short `SARFAESI Act'). A demand notice under Section 13 (2) of the Act was issued on 02.05.2006 followed by a possession notice on 06.08.2006. Both the notices were published in Hindu and Eenadu on 29.05.2006 and 07.08.2006 respectively. Later on, an auction notice was issued on 22.02.2007 which was published in Indian Express and Prajasakthi on 28.02.2007 fixing the auction on 30.03.2007. Three bidders participated in the auction and the bid of the 2nd accused was found to be highest and sale certificate was issued in his favour on 02.06.2007. After adjusting the amount outstanding to the loan amount, the balance amount was put in fixed deposit at the request of the 3rd respondent on 03.06.2007. Thereafter, at the request of the 3rd respondent, the fixed deposit proceeds were transferred to the account of the 3rd respondent at Bangalore on 17.12.2007. 3. The 3rd respondent initially filed a complaint No.4357/2007-08 before the Banking Ombudsman and the same was rejected on 06.11.2007 on the ground that the complaint requires consideration on elaborate documentary and oral evidence. Thereafter, the 3rd respondent filed CD.No.580/2008 before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum-III, Hyderabad and the same also dismissed on 27.07.2009. 3. The 3rd respondent initially filed a complaint No.4357/2007-08 before the Banking Ombudsman and the same was rejected on 06.11.2007 on the ground that the complaint requires consideration on elaborate documentary and oral evidence. Thereafter, the 3rd respondent filed CD.No.580/2008 before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum-III, Hyderabad and the same also dismissed on 27.07.2009. It appears that when the said complaint was pending, he filed a complaint on 30.06.2008 before the XI Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Secunderabad against the petitioner as accused No.3, the then Chief Manager/Authorized Officer as accused No.1 and the auction purchaser as accused No.2 alleging that they committed offences under Sections 420, 415, 418, 464, 477 (A), 506 and 409 of Indian Penal Code. The learned XI Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate referred the complaint to the 2nd respondent for investigation and the same was registered as FIR No.421 of 2008. 4. The 2nd respondent issued a notice to the Chief Manager of the Bank on 26.02.2009 to attend the police station in person. The Chief Manager attended the police station and explained the case. Thereafter, the 2nd respondent issued a letter on 18.07.2009 to furnish the information on the loan account and the same was furnished to him on 07.08.2009. Another letter was issued on 07.11.2009 calling for various documents and the same was also furnished on 05.01.2010. Again letters dated 25.03.2010 and 27.03.2010 were issued calling for some more documents. At that stage, this writ petition was filed on 06.04.2010. This writ petition was admitted on 07.04.2010 and stay of all further proceedings in FIR No.421 of 2008 was granted. 5. The 2nd respondent filed a counter stating that the complaint received him was registered as Crime No.421 of 2008 on 24.12.2008 and investigation was taken up. During the course of investigation, he examined the 3rd respondent/complainant and his son and recorded their detailed statements. He noticed ambiguity in the statements of the complainant as well as the alleged accused. The bank authorities stated that the loan account of the 3rd respondent became NPA (Non- Performing Account) from February 2005 whereas the then Chief Manager informed the Ombudsman by letter dated 08.09.2007 that the loan account of the 3rd respondent became NPA from June, 2004. The bank authorities have given two different account statements of the 3rd respondent dated 27.09.2007 and 05.01.2010 to him. There were discrepancies in the said statements. The bank authorities have given two different account statements of the 3rd respondent dated 27.09.2007 and 05.01.2010 to him. There were discrepancies in the said statements. The paper publication given by the bank authorities showed that they had given loan to the 3rd respondent for housing loan instead of education loan and description of the property was also wrongly mentioned. The investigation was pending for want of collection of some more evidence. 6. The 3rd respondent also filed a detailed counter affidavit pointing out the discrepancies noticed by him in the procedure adopted by the petitioner for declaring the account as NPA and showing the outstanding amount. The 3rd respondent also challenged the service of notice issued under Section 13 (2) of the SARFAESI Act. It is also alleged that the person who purchased the property is a close friend of the then Chief Manager, SBI, Secunderabad. The auction purchaser was setup by the bank only, as immediately on the date of issuance of the sale certificate, he entered into an agreement of sale-cum-GPA with possession in favour of another person and there were irregularities in conducting the auction also. Though, he got issued a legal notice on 09.07.2007 to cancel the sale deed executed on 06.06.2007, no reply was given by the petitioner bank. Likewise several notices issued to the petitioner also elicited no response. In those circumstances only he filed a complaint before the Ombudsman. The petitioner fabricated the documents in support of its case and there were several irregularities in presenting the cheques issued by him. 7. Heard the learned Senior Counsel, Sri M. Narender Reddy for the petitioner, learned Government Pleader for respondent Nos.1 and 2 and the learned Counsel for the 3rd respondent. 8. It is contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that Section 32 of the Act clearly says that no suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings shall lie against any secured creditor or any of his officers for exercising their powers under the SARFAESI Act. It is also contended by him that the 3rd respondent has a remedy under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. A plain reading of the complaint shows that the acts alleged against the petitioner and the other accused are in performance of their duties under the SARFAESI Act only and no offence has been committed attracting the criminal proceedings. It is also contended by him that the 3rd respondent has a remedy under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. A plain reading of the complaint shows that the acts alleged against the petitioner and the other accused are in performance of their duties under the SARFAESI Act only and no offence has been committed attracting the criminal proceedings. It is submitted that the filing of a petition before the Ombudsman, a complaint before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum-III and the present complaint before the learned Magistrate is a sheer abuse of legal process and hence the complaint is liable to be quashed. 9. The learned counsel for the 3rd respondent submitted that during the process of exercising their powers under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, the petitioner and its officers committed several irregularities warranting investigation by the police and the complaint filed is proper in the circumstances of the case. 10. The 3rd respondent filed a complaint under Section 190 (1) (a) of Cr.P.C. read with Section 200 Cr.P.C. before the XI Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Secunderabad on 30.06.2008. The case was given SR.No.5107 of 2008 and was adjourned from 30.06.2008 to 04.07.2008, 25.07.2008, 22.08.2008, 19.09.2008, 22.10.2008, 14.11.2008 and 21.11.2008 on which the following order was passed: "Complainant present, the case referred to SHO, Begumpet Police Station, for necessary investigation under Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C.". 11. The SHO received the complaint on 24.12.2008 and registered a case in Crime No.421 of 2008 under Sections 420, 415, 464, 468, 477 (A), 506 & 409 IPC read with Section 120-B IPC and took up investigation. 12. A reading of the complaint filed by the 3rd respondent is necessary for better appreciation of the issue raised in the Writ Petition and it reads as follows: "This is a court refer case wherein the complainant Sri Satish Kumar S/o. Sri Omprakash, aged about 54 years, Occ:Business, Flat No.403, 5th Floor, Lakshmi Sree Apartments, Park view, Street No.3, Opp:Library, Ashok Nagar, Hyderabad. In which he stated that he purchased a house in the year 1980 at Mansoorabad village, Saroornagar, Plot No.69 in Sy.No.38, 39 and 40 admeasuring 311 sq.situated at ward No.3, his son Vivek Majitha wanted to peruse his further studies abroad and for which they said his own house. The bank values the property and 6,22,000/- to the said house and sanctioned the educational loan of Rs. The bank values the property and 6,22,000/- to the said house and sanctioned the educational loan of Rs. 4,50,000/- and shall be repayable in sixty (60) months the amount of Rs. 2,60,500/- is paid by him to the Bank through cheques since the date of issuance of loan. The A-1 Smt. P.V. Ratna Kumari W/o. S.J. Kristofar, age 50 years, Occ:Chief Manager, State Bank of India, personal banking branch, SP Road, Secunderabad, R/o. Flat No.303, Manju Mansion, East Merredpally, Secunderabad was issued notice under Section 13 (2) of SARFAESI Act 2002 demanding to pay an amount of Rs. 4,13,138/- within 60 days from the date of receipt of the said notices to the complainant and his son when the address no where the addresses are no concerned to them. They also publishing in Hindu newspaper two times and a auction notice but he did not have any knowledge about the said all above A-2 R.N. Venkata Ramana Rao S/o. R.V. Subba Rao, age 36 years, Occ: Business, R/o. H.No.185, Janapriya West City, Miyapure, Hyderabad who is a close friend of Mr. R.N. Venkata Ramana Rao for a total sum of Rs. 12,92,000/- and certificate of sale issued to him. Hence he requested to take necessary action against the said accused A.1 and A.3 has committed the offence under Sections 420, 415, 464, 468, 477 (A), 506 & 409 IPC read with Section 120-B IPC. Hence FIR." 13. In order to appreciate whether the above allegations constitute any offence under the provisions of IPC and whether the accused can be proceeded against in respect of the said allegations, it is necessary to look into the relevant provisions of SARFAESI Act 2002. 14. The relevant provisions are Sections 17 (1) and 32 of SARFAESI Act 2002 and they read as follows: "17. Right to Appeal:- (1) Any person (including borrower), aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 13 taken by the secured creditor or his authorised officer under this Chapter, may prefer an appeal to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter within 45 days from the date on which such measures had been taken." "32. Protection of action taken in good faith:- No suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings shall lie against any secured creditor or any of his officers or manager exercising any of the rights of the secured creditor or borrower for anything done or omitted to be done in good faith under this Act." 15. A combined reading of the allegations in the complaint and Section 32 makes it very clear that for the acts done by the officers or manager exercising the rights of the secured creditor in good faith under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, no suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings shall lie. In the complaint, no mala fides were alleged nor it was alleged that the acts done by the officers against the 3rd respondent were in excess of the powers conferred under the SARFAESI Act. In that view of the matter, no complaint can be made against the acts of the 1st accused. The 2nd accused is an auction purchaser and the 3rd accused is the Bank. 16. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner drew the attention of this court to the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat and Others, 2008 (5) SCC 668 and M.N. Ojha And Others v. Alok Kumar Srivastav And Another, 2009 (9) SCC 682 in support of his contention that the complaint is not maintainable. He also relied on an unreported judgment dated 30.10.2013 in Civil Appeal No. 9771 of 2013 between Jagdish Singh v. Heeralal and others, 2014 (1) ALD 46 (SC), 2013 AIR SCW 6378 in support of his contention that alternative remedies are available to the 3rd respondent if he was aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in sub-Section 4 of Section 13 of the Act. It is true that the Act provides for appropriate remedies for the aggrieved persons to challenge the measures taken by the secured creditor in pursuance of the provisions of the Act. Though, the Civil Courts jurisdiction is ousted, the Act provides for sufficient safeguards to the aggrieved person. In the instant case, the 3rd respondent has not chosen to avail those remedies but resorted remedies other than those provided under the SARFAESI Act after allowing the sale to become final. 17. Though, the Civil Courts jurisdiction is ousted, the Act provides for sufficient safeguards to the aggrieved person. In the instant case, the 3rd respondent has not chosen to avail those remedies but resorted remedies other than those provided under the SARFAESI Act after allowing the sale to become final. 17. In Maksud Saiyed's case (1 supra) the Supreme Court examined the scope of Sections 156 (3) and 200 Cr.P.C. and held as follows: "13. Where a jurisdiction is exercised on a complaint petition filed in terms of Section 156 (3) or Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate is required to apply his mind. Indian Penal Code does not contain any provision for attaching vicarious liability on the part of the Managing Director or the Directors of the Company when the accused is the Company. The learned Magistrate failed to pose unto himself the correct question viz. as to whether the complaint petition, even if given face value and taken to be correct in its entirety, would lead to the conclusion that the respondents herein were personally liable for any offence. The Bank is a body corporate. Vicarious liability of the Managing Director and Director would arise provided any provision exists in that behalf in the statute. Statutes indisputably must contain provision fixing such vicarious liabilities. Even for the said purpose, it is obligatory on the part of the complainant to make requisite allegations which would attract the provisions constituting vicarious liability." 18. In M.N. Ojha's case (2 supra) the Supreme Court while dealing with the role of Magistrate held as follows: "Had the learned SDJM applied his mind to the facts and circumstances and sequence of events and as well as the documents filed by the complainant himself along with the complaint, surely he would have dismissed the complaint. He would have realised that the complaint was only a counter blast to the FIR lodged by the Bank against the complainant and others with regard to same transaction. This Court in Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors. 1997 (2) ALD (Cri) 840 (SC), (1998)5 SCC 749 held: "28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. This Court in Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors. 1997 (2) ALD (Cri) 840 (SC), (1998)5 SCC 749 held: "28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused." The case on hand is a classic illustration of non-application of mind by the learned Magistrate. The learned Magistrate did not scrutinise even the contents of the complaint, leave aside the material documents available on record. The learned Magistrate truly was a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning the appellants." 19. In the present case the crime was registered under Sections 420, 415, 464, 468, 477 (A), 506 & 409 IPC read with Section 120-B IPC. 20. With regard to the procedure to be followed upon receipt of complaints under the Code of Criminal Procedure, a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Panchabhai Popotbhai Butani & Others v. State Of Maharashtra & Others, 2010 (Cri) LJ 2723, held as follows: "9. 20. With regard to the procedure to be followed upon receipt of complaints under the Code of Criminal Procedure, a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Panchabhai Popotbhai Butani & Others v. State Of Maharashtra & Others, 2010 (Cri) LJ 2723, held as follows: "9. Where a person has approached the police station under Section 154 but the police station does not register FIR as contemplated under law, he has a right to make a complaint to the higher authorities in terms of Section 154 (3) of the Code and such higher authority exercising the powers of an officer-in-charge of a police station would investigate the matter himself or direct the investigation to be conducted by another police officer subordinate to him. In the event the information of any kind received by the police officer-in-charge of a police station relates to commission of a non-cognisable offence, he is obliged to proceed in accordance with the provisions of Section 155 of the Code. The Legislature provides a specific protection in terms of Section 156 (3) of the Code and gives a right to a person to approach the Court of competent jurisdiction for issuance of a direction to a police officer to investigate the matter in accordance with law. Once the investigation is completed by the investigating agency, it is required of the said agency to file appropriate report in terms of Section 173 of the Code, whereupon the Court competent to try such an offence would take cognizance and conduct the trial and punish the offender, if found guilty, in accordance with law. 10. The other branch of the procedural law under the Code is where any one may approach the Court of competent jurisdiction by institution of a complaint in terms of Section 200 of the Code. Once such a complaint is filed and it is shown to the satisfaction of the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence that offence has been committed, he shall follow the procedure prescribed under Chapter XV of the Code. Interestingly, even when a complaint is received by the Magistrate in terms of Section 200 of the Code, he can issue summons, conduct an inquiry himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or such other person as he thinks fit. 11. Interestingly, even when a complaint is received by the Magistrate in terms of Section 200 of the Code, he can issue summons, conduct an inquiry himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or such other person as he thinks fit. 11. The Magistrate exercising powers under Section 159 is also expected to proceed with the matter in accordance with the provisions of the Code upon receipt of the report in terms of Sections 157 and 158 and either direct an inquiry by a Magistrate subordinate to him or may direct investigation. 12. This is the entire gamut of procedure for any one desirous of putting a criminal justice system into motion. In fact, as stated by the Supreme Court in the case of A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak and another, (1984) 2 SCC 500 , ( AIR 1984 SC 718 ), it was clearly stated that scheme underlying the Code of Criminal Procedure clearly reveals that anyone who wants to give information of an offence may either approach the Magistrate or the officer in charge of a police station. It also stated that it was open to the Magistrate but not obligatory upon him to direct investigation by police. Thus, two agencies have been set up for taking offenders to the Court. These observations of the Supreme Court, of course, were made where the Court was not concerned with the ambit, scope and application of the provisions of Section 154 and for that matter Section 156 of the Code." 21. Thereafter, the full bench to which reference was made examined the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure and binding precedents to answer the following questions: (i) whether in absence of a complaint to the police, a complaint can be made directly before a Magistrate? And (ii) whether without filing a complaint within the meaning of Section 2 (d) and praying only for an action under Section 156 (3), a complaint before a Magistrate was maintainable? 22. And (ii) whether without filing a complaint within the meaning of Section 2 (d) and praying only for an action under Section 156 (3), a complaint before a Magistrate was maintainable? 22. After examining the same, the Full Bench, while answering question No.1, held that normally a person should invoke the provisions of section 154 of the code before he takes recourse to the power of the Magistrate competent to take cognizance under Section 190 of the code, under Section 156 (3), At least an intimation to the police of commission of a cognisable offence under Section 154 (1) would be a condition precedent for invocation of powers of the Magistrate under Section 156 (3) of the code. However, it was held that the said recourse is also subject to the exceptions, and the Magistrate is not divested of his jurisdiction under Section 156 (3) even in the absence of non-compliance to the provisions of Section 154 (3). It was held that when there is possibility of the evidence of commission of the offence being destroyed and/or tampered and where the police fail to act immediately, the applicant could approach the Magistrate under Section 156 (3) of the code directly. While answering question No.2, it was held that a petition under Section 156 (3) cannot be strictly construed as a complaint in terms of Section 2 (d) of the code and absence of a specific or improperly worded prayer or lack of complete and definite details would not prove fatal to a petition under Section 156 (3), in so far as it states facts constituting ingredients of a cognisable offence. Such petition would be maintainable before the Magistrate. 23. A learned Judge of the Karnataka High Court in Y.N. Ramachandra Rao & Another v. M/s. Cci Limited & Another, 2011 Crl. LJ 1073, examined the duty of Magistrate while referring the matter for police investigation. The learned single Judge held as follows: "14. In order to indicate that he applied his mind to the facts alleged in the complaint, the Magistrate could have stated in the impugned orders passed under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. as "perused the allegations in the complaint" or "allegations in the complaint disclose cognisable offence" or "the allegations in the complaint make out cognisable offence requiring investigation by the police" etc. If any of such statements is made in an order under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C., one can make out from the order itself that 'the learned Magistrate applied his mind to the facts alleged in the complaint'. If such statement is made by the Magistrate in his order under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C., there would be no scope for the respondent-accused, as in the instant case, to challenge the correctness of such order on the ground that the learned Magistrate passed it mechanically without applying his mind to the facts alleged in the complaint. In order to avoid such a situation, it would be advisable that the Magistrate, while passing an order under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. shall make some observation therein as stated above indicating that he applied his mind to the facts alleged in the complaint and formed his opinion that the said allegations disclose a cognisable offence and hence the complaint requires to be referred to the police for investigation as provided under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C." 24. A learned single Judge of this Court also in D.K. Pattanaik And Another v. Station House Officer And Another, 2008 (1) ALD (Crl.) 692 (AP), 2008 Crl. LJ 2287, after referring to the case law on the subject held that even for ordering investigation by police under Section 156 (3) of Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate cannot act merely as post office and he is bound to apply his mind before so doing. 25. A Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in Sukhwasi v. State Of Uttar Pradesh, 2008 Crl. LJ 472, considered the power of Magistrate under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. and held that the Magistrate is not always bound to pass an order for register of the case and investigation after receipt of the application under Section 156 (3) of the code disclosing a cognisable offence. The Magistrate may use his discretion judiciously and if he is of the opinion that in the circumstances of the case, it will be proper to treat the application as a complaint case then he may proceed according to the procedure provided under Chapter XV of Cr.P.C. It was also observed that the provisions under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. should be used sparingly. They should not be used unless there is something unusual or extraordinary like miscarriage of justice, which warrants a direction to the police to register a case. They should not be used unless there is something unusual or extraordinary like miscarriage of justice, which warrants a direction to the police to register a case. Such applications should not be allowed because the law provides them with an alternative remedy of filing a complaint, therefore, recourse should not normally be permitted for availing the provisions of Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. 26. A Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in Ram Babu Gupta And Another v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others, 2001 Crl. LJ 3363, answered the following two points referred to it for a decision. (1) Should the Magistrate while exercising powers under Section 156 (3), Cr.P.C. be left to write criptic orders "register and investigate," or "register and do the needful" or "he has to investigate," or the like? or the Magistrate's order should prima facie indicate application of mind; (2) Is the observation of the Division Bench in Suraj Mal (1993 (30) All Cri C 81) (supra) correct when it says that when an applicant before the Magistrate prays only for registration and investigation of a case, such an application will not become "complaint" as defined in Section 2 of the Cr.P.C. 27. Here we are concerned with point No.1. After examining the case law on this point, the Full Bench held that on receiving a complaint, the Magistrate has to apply his mind to the allegations in the compliant upon which he may not at once proceed to take cognizance and may order it to go to the police station for being registered and investigated. The Magistrate's order must indicate application of mind. If the Magistrate takes cognizance, he proceeds to follow the procedure provided in Chapter-XV of Cr.P.C. It was also held that the Magistrate has to always apply his mind on the allegations in the complaint where he may use his powers under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. 28. A complaint was filed and the same was referred to the 2nd respondent in a routine manner by the learned Magistrate under Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C without applying his mind as could be seen from the endorsement made on 21-11-2008. The petitioner and other accused would not have been subjected to unnecessary investigation, had the learned Magistrate applied his mind to the allegations in the complaint, provisions of the Act and his powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The petitioner and other accused would not have been subjected to unnecessary investigation, had the learned Magistrate applied his mind to the allegations in the complaint, provisions of the Act and his powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Though, the Supreme Court time and again pointed out the duties of a Magistrate while dealing with criminal complaints, that primary duty has been neglected by the learned Magistrate in the instant case. 29. In the present case, a reading of the complaint clearly discloses that the 1st accused was discharging her official duty under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, the 2nd accused was a bona fide auction purchaser and the 3rd accused is a bank and was merely added as an accused. There is not even an iota of allegation of any criminal act which can be called as an offence under the provisions of IPC that can be attributed to the said accused. It is a clear case of abuse of judicial process. The 3rd respondent may have a grievance against the petitioner with respect to the procedure adopted by it in declaring his account as NPA or in recovering the loan amount. But such grievance has to be ventilated in a proper forum and redressal should be sought. One more fact to be noticed is that the 3rd respondent has not taken any steps before putting the property to sale and after sale also, he requested the bank to keep the balance amount in fixed deposit and later on requested the same to be transferred to his account in Bangalore. He started legal proceedings after a sale certificate was issued in favour of the auction purchaser without availing the remedies provided under the SARFAESI Act. The facts unfold a case of harassment of the officers of the Bank for discharging their lawful duties. There may be procedural lapses or irregularities which can be remedied in the regular channels provided under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act. The invocation of the criminal proceedings is surely not an alternative remedy except for the purpose of harassing the officers. The very complaint is not maintainable and its reference to Police is unwarranted. The learned Magistrate should have looked into the allegations in the complaint and should not have ordered for investigation in a routine manner. The invocation of the criminal proceedings is surely not an alternative remedy except for the purpose of harassing the officers. The very complaint is not maintainable and its reference to Police is unwarranted. The learned Magistrate should have looked into the allegations in the complaint and should not have ordered for investigation in a routine manner. This is a clear case of non-application of mind by the learned Magistrate who ought to have taken the legal provisions and binding precedents into account. 30. In view of the above facts, clear legal provisions and the case law on this aspect, the FIR No. 421 of 2008 is liable to the quashed and accordingly quashed. The Writ Petition is allowed. No order as to costs. As a sequel, Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in this writ petition shall stand closed.