ORDER Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. Respondent No. 1 - Krishna Chandra was tried for commission of offence under Section 135 of the Electricity Act, 2003 by the State of Chhattisgarh through Station House Officer, Sarangarh on the allegation that on 5.9.2005 he committed theft of electricity by hooking. Further case of the prosecution is that the Committee constituted to assess the theft of electricity, made a raid in the residential premises of respondent No. 1 - Krishna Chandra, S/o. Bodh Ram at village Saraipali, and on enquiry it was found that he was stealing electricity by direct hooking from the electric pole, which is punishable offence under Section 135(a) of the Electricity Act, 2003, seizure to this effect was made, Panchnama was prepared and electric instruments were given on Supurdiginama to respondent No. 1-Krishna Chandra; and he was found committing theft of electricity of ` 4,101. First Information Report (Ex. P-7) lodged and charge sheet was filed against the respondent No. 1 before the jurisdictional criminal court. Respondent No. 1 denied the charges and pleaded no guilty. 2. In order to bring home the offence, prosecution examined six witnesses and brought eight documents in support of its case whereas respondent No. 1 neither examined any witness nor brought any document in support of his case. 3. The Special Judge, constituted under the Electricity Act, 2003, Raigarh acquitted the respondent No. 1 for the aforesaid offences finding that prosecution has failed to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt. Against the judgment of acquittal, instant revision has been filed. 4. Shri Amiyakant Tiwari, counsel for the applicant would submit that impugned judgment of acquittal has been passed by the learned Special Judge ignoring the testimony of material witnesses available on record and, as such, the revision deserves to be dismissed. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents would support the judgment of acquittal and submit that prosecution has miserably failed to bring home the offence against respondent No. 1 and, as such, the revision deserves to be dismissed. 6. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and considered the rival submissions made therein and have perused the record of court below with utmost circumspection. 7. 6. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and considered the rival submissions made therein and have perused the record of court below with utmost circumspection. 7. In order to comprehend the challenge to the attack made to the judgment of acquittal, it would be profitable to have a quick look over the legal parameters laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court for interfering with the judgments of acquittal. 8. In Bindeshwari Prasad Singh alias B.P. Singh and others v. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) and another, AIR 2002 SC 2907 , the Supreme Court has clearly held that the High Court should not re-appreciate the evidence on record and come to a different conclusion by interfering in a revision with the order of acquittal except in cases where the interest of public justice requires interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of gross miscarriage of justice. Paragraph 12 of the decision states as under: "12. We have carefully considered the material on record and we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in re-appreciating the evidence on record and coming to a different conclusion in a revision preferred by the information under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Sub-section (3) of Section 401 in terms provides that nothing in Section401 shall be deemed to authorize a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. The aforesaid sub-section, which places a limitation on the powers of the revisional Court, prohibiting it from convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, is itself indicative of the nature and extent of the revisional power conferred by Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the High Court could not convert a finding of acquittal into one of the conviction directly, it could not do so indirectly by the method of ordering a re-trial. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that the High Court will ordinarily not interfere in revision with an order of acquittal except in exceptional cases where the interest of public justice requires interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of gross miscarriage of justice. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that the High Court will ordinarily not interfere in revision with an order of acquittal except in exceptional cases where the interest of public justice requires interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of gross miscarriage of justice. The High Court will not be justified in interfering with an order of acquittal merely because the trial Court has taken a wrong view of the law or has erred in appreciation of evidence. It is neither possible nor advisable to make an exhaustive list of circumstances in which exercise of revisional jurisdiction may be justified, but decisions of this Court have laid down the parameters of exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in an appeal against acquittal by a private party. (See, AIR 1951 SC 196 : D. Stephens v. Nosibolla; AIR 1962 SC 1788 : K.C. Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh; (1973) 2 SCC 583 : Akalu Ahir and other v. Ramdeo Ram, AIR 1975 SC 1854 : Pakalapati Narayana Gajapathi Raju and others v. Bonapalli Peda Appadu and another and, AIR 1968 SC 707 : Mahendra Pratap Singh v. Sarju Singh)." 9. Thereafter, in Venkatesan v. Rani and another, (2013) 14 SCC 207, the Supreme Court, considering its earlier decision in paragraphs 8 and 9, clearly laid down as to cases in which the High Court should interfere with the finding of acquittal. Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the decision state as under: "8. Specifically and for the purpose of a detailed illumination on the subject, the contents of paras 8 and 10 of the judgment in Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram, (1973) 2 SCC 583 , may be usefully extracted below: (SCC pp. Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the decision state as under: "8. Specifically and for the purpose of a detailed illumination on the subject, the contents of paras 8 and 10 of the judgment in Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram, (1973) 2 SCC 583 , may be usefully extracted below: (SCC pp. 587-88) "8.....This Court, however, by way of illustration, indicated the following categories of cases which would justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision: (i) Where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case, but has still acquitted the accused; (ii) where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce; (iii) where the appellate court has wrongly held the evidence which was admitted by the trial court to be inadmissible; (iv) where the material evidence has been overlooked only (either) by the trial court or by the appellate court; and (v) where the acquittal is based on the compounding of the offence which is invalid under the law. These categories were, however, merely illustrative and it was clarified that other cases of similar nature can also be properly held to be of exceptional nature where the High Court can justifiably interfere with the order of acquittal. * * * 10. No doubt, the appraisal of evidence by the trial Judge in the case in hand is not perfect or free from flaw and a court of appeal may well have felt justified in disagreeing with its conclusion, but from this it does not follow that on revision by a private complainant, the High Court is entitled to reappraise the evidence for itself as if it is acting as a court of appeal and then order a retrial. It is unfortunate that a serious offence inspired by rivalry and jealousy in the matter of election to the office of village Mukhia, should go unpunished. But that can scarcely be a valid ground for ignoring or for not strictly following the law as enunciated by this Court. 9. The observations in para 9 in Vimal Singh v. Khuman Singh, (1998) 7 SCC 223 , would also be apt for recapitulation and, therefore, are being extracted below: (SCC pp. 226-27) "9. But that can scarcely be a valid ground for ignoring or for not strictly following the law as enunciated by this Court. 9. The observations in para 9 in Vimal Singh v. Khuman Singh, (1998) 7 SCC 223 , would also be apt for recapitulation and, therefore, are being extracted below: (SCC pp. 226-27) "9. Coming to the ambit of power of the High Court under Section 401 of the Code, the High Court in its revisional power does not ordinarily interfere with judgments of acquittal passed by the trial Court unless there has been manifest error of law or procedure. The interference with the order of acquittal passed by the trial court is limited only to exceptional cases when it is found that the order under revision suffers from glaring illegality or has caused miscarriage of justice or when it is found that the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case or where the trial court has illegally shut out the evidence which otherwise ought to have been considered or where the material evidence which clinches the issue has been overlooked. These are the instances where the High Court would be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal. Sub-section (3) of Section 401 mandates that the High Court shall not convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. Thus, the High Court would not be justified in substituting an order of acquittal into one of conviction even if it is convinced that the accused deserves conviction. No doubt, the High Court in exercise of its revisional power can set aside an order of acquittal if it comes within the ambit of exceptional cases enumerated above, but it cannot convert an order of acquittal into an order of conviction. The only course left to the High Court in such exceptional cases is to order retrial." 10. Thus, after having ascertained the legal position with regard to scope of interference in a revision with the order of acquittal, reverting back to the facts of the present case, it would appear that search and the panchnama prepared by the prosecution has not been supported by the independent witness. Thus, after having ascertained the legal position with regard to scope of interference in a revision with the order of acquittal, reverting back to the facts of the present case, it would appear that search and the panchnama prepared by the prosecution has not been supported by the independent witness. In panchnama, presence of Lakhanlal has been recorded whereas he was not present; copy of panchnama, seizure memo has not been served either to Krishna Chandra Patel or his representative; and it has not been established on record that alleged house, in which the electric meter was installed, is owned by respondent No. 1, thus, prosecution has completely failed to prove the offence under Sections 135(a)of the Electricity Act, 2003 beyond reasonable doubt against the accused/respondent No. 2 and, therefore, this Court is of the opinion that there is no manifest legal error in judgment of the acquittal recorded by the Special Judge and keeping in view the parameters laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases, I do not consider it a fit case where this Court should re-appreciate the entire evidence on record or it is not a case where the view taken by the Special Judge is so arbitrary or bears manifest error requiring interference taking into consideration the parameters laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above referred cases. As a fall out and the consequence of the aforesaid discussion, the revision is held to be devoid of merit and is, therefore, dismissed.