Judgment R. Sudhakar, J. 1. The Revenue has filed this appeal challenging the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal ‘A’ Bench, Chennai, dated 27.10.2006 made in I.T.A. No.1838/Mds/2002 for the assessment year 1997-1998, by raising the following questions of law: (i) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the rectification was on a debatable issue, when the rectification was done only in accordance with a decision of the jurisdictional High Court? (ii) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the issue can be said to be a debatable one, when there is an order of the jurisdictional High Court settling the issue? 2.1. The facts in a nutshell are as under: The assessee company is engaged in merchant banking and allied activities. They filed return of income for the assessment year 1997-1998. The Assessing Officer made prima facie adjustment in the intimation vide order dated 14.3.2000 and he disallowed the provision for non-performing assets from the book profits made under Section 115JA of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for brevity, “the Act”). 2.2. Aggrieved by the said order, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), who, by order dated 22.1.1999, placing reliance on a decision of this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Srivinayaga Pictures, [1986] 161 ITR 65 (Mad.), deleted the addition on account of provision for non-performing assets. 2.3. Thereafter, in the case of Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax v. Beardsell Ltd., [2000] 244 ITR 256 (Mad.), decided on 14.3.2000, this Court decided the issue for not allowing the provision for non-performing assets in favour of the Revenue. On the basis of the said decision, it appears the Assessing Officer filed an application for rectification of the mistake pleading that the provision for doubtful debts could not be excluded from the book profits under Section 115JA of the Act. 2.4. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), by order dated 28.10.2002, allowed the application filed by the Assessing Officer seeking rectification and held that the Assessing Officer was justified in not excluding the provision for non performing assets for the purpose of determination of the book profits under Section 115JA of the Act. The earlier order dated 22.1.1999 passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) was rectified accordingly. 2.5. Aggrieved by the said decision, the assessee appealed to the Tribunal. The earlier order dated 22.1.1999 passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) was rectified accordingly. 2.5. Aggrieved by the said decision, the assessee appealed to the Tribunal. The Tribunal, taking note of the two different views of this Court on the issue, and also the decision in India Pistons Ltd. v. DCIT, [2004] 188 CTR 282 (Mad.), decided on 16.2.2004, came to hold that the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) had no jurisdiction to rectify his earlier decision (though wrongly stated as to restore the decision already taken) under Section 154 of the Act, when the issue involved is a debatable point of law. 2.6. Challenging the said order, the present appeal is filed on the substantial questions of law, referred supra. 3. We have heard Mr.T.Ravikumar, learned Senior Standing Counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr.R.Vijayaraghavan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 4. At the outset, it was pointed out by Mr.R.Vijayaraghavan, learned counsel appearing for the assessee that the issue as to whether the provision for bad and doubtful debts should be added back to book profits under Section 115JA of the Act has been answered in the negative by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. HCL Comnet Systems and Services Ltd., [2008] 305 ITR 409 (SC), wherein it was held as under: “From the above, it is evident that the Assessing Officer has to accept the authenticity of the accounts maintained in accordance with the provisions of Part II and Part III of Schedule VI to the Companies Act, which are certified by the auditors and passed by the company in the general meeting. The Assessing Officer has only the power of examining whether the books of account are duly certified by the authorities under the Companies Act and whether such books have been properly maintained in accordance with the Companies Act. The Assessing Officer does not have the jurisdiction to go beyond the net profit shown in the profit and loss account except to the extent provided in the Explanation. Thereafter, the Assessing Officer has to make adjustment permissible under the Explanation given in section 115JA of the 1961 Act. The Assessing Officer does not have the jurisdiction to go beyond the net profit shown in the profit and loss account except to the extent provided in the Explanation. Thereafter, the Assessing Officer has to make adjustment permissible under the Explanation given in section 115JA of the 1961 Act. It may be noted that the adjustments required to be made to the net profit disclosed in the profit and loss account for the purposes of section 349 of the Companies Act are quite different from the adjustment required to be made under the Explanation to section 115JA of the 1961 Act. For the purposes of section 115JA, the Assessing Officer can increase the net profit determined as per the profit and loss account prepared as per Parts II and III of Schedule VI to the Companies Act only to the extent permissible under the Explanation thereto. As stated above, the said Explanation has provided six items, i.e., item Nos. (a) to (f) which if debited to the profit and loss account can be added back to the net profit for computing the book profit. In this case, we are concerned with item No. (c) which refers to the provision for bad and doubtful debts. The provision for bad and doubtful debts can be added back to the net profit only if item (c) stands attracted. Item (c) deals with amount(s) set aside as provision made for meeting liabilities, other than ascertained liabilities. The assessee’s case would, therefore, fall within the ambit of item (c) only if the amount is set aside as provision; the provision is made for meeting a liability; and the provision should be for other than an ascertained liability, i.e., it should be for an unascertained liability. In other words, all the ingredients should be satisfied to attract item (c) of the Explanation to section 115JA. In our view, item (c) is not attracted. There are two types of “debt”. A debt payable by the assessee is different from a debt receivable by the assessee. A debt is payable by the assessee where the assessee has to pay the amount to others whereas the debt receivable by the assessee is an amount which the assessee has to receive from others. In the present case, the “debt” under consideration is a “debt receivable” by the assessee. A debt is payable by the assessee where the assessee has to pay the amount to others whereas the debt receivable by the assessee is an amount which the assessee has to receive from others. In the present case, the “debt” under consideration is a “debt receivable” by the assessee. The provision for bad and doubtful debt, therefore, is made to cover up the probable diminution in the value of the asset, i.e., debt which is an amount receivable by the assessee. Therefore, such a provision cannot be said to be a provision for a liability, because even if a debt is not recoverable no liability could be fastened upon the assessee. In the present case, the debt is the amount receivable by the assessee and not any liability payable by the assessee and, therefore, any provision made towards irrecoverability of the debt cannot be said to be a provision for liability. Therefore, in our view, item (c) of the Explanation is not attracted to the facts of the present case. In the circumstances, the Assessing Officer was not justified in adding back the provision for doubtful debts of Rs. 92,15,187 under clause (c) of the Explanation to section 115JA of the 1961 Act.” (emphasis supplied) 5. In view of the law enunciated by the Supreme Court in HCL Comnet Systems and Services Ltd. case, referred supra, the primary issue decided by the Assessing Officer that bad and doubtful debts should be added to book profits under Section 115JA of the Act has to fail. The order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) passed on 22.1.1999 deleting the addition on account of provision for non-performing assets is, therefore, in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in HCL Comnet Systems and Services Ltd. case, referred supra. In view of the above, on merits, there is no issue for the revenue to canvass either before this Court or the Tribunal in respect of the assessee's claim that bad and doubtful debts should not be added back to the book profits under Section 115JA of the Act. 6. The further issue raised in the appeal is purely academic. However, since the appeal is admitted, we would like to answer the said substantial questions of law, as it would set right any confusion that has arisen in this case. 7. 6. The further issue raised in the appeal is purely academic. However, since the appeal is admitted, we would like to answer the said substantial questions of law, as it would set right any confusion that has arisen in this case. 7. We find that the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) dated 22.1.1999 was decided on the basis of the decision of this Court in Srivinayaga Pictures case, referred supra, and the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) is bound by the said decision of the jurisdictional High Court. 8. In the case on hand, based on a subsequent decision of the jurisdictional High Court in Beardsell Ltd. case, referred supra, the Assessing Officer filed an application for rectification under Section 154 of the Act before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), who considered the subsequent decision and allowed the rectification application. 9. The core issue to be considered is whether there existed any mistake apparent from the record requiring the revenue to invoke Section 154 of the Act. 10. Section 154 of the Act deals with rectification of mistake apparent from the record and it empowers the authority to amend any order passed by it under the provisions of the Act. In the case on hand, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), by order dated 22.1.1999, relying on the decision of this Court in Srivinayaga Pictures case, referred supra, deleted the addition on account of provision for non-performing assets. Thereafter, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), by order dated 28.10.2002, allowed the application filed by the Assessing Officer seeking rectification under Section 154 of the Act relying on the decision of this Court in Beardsell Ltd. case, referred supra, and held that the Assessing Officer was justified in not excluding the provision for non performing assets for the purpose of determination of the book profits under Section 115JA of the Act. In our considered opinion, the subsequent decision rendered by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) can at the best be stated to be based on change of opinion and not based on any mistake apparent from the record. 11. In our considered opinion, the subsequent decision rendered by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) can at the best be stated to be based on change of opinion and not based on any mistake apparent from the record. 11. This view of the Court is fortified by a decision of the Supreme Court in Mepco Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, [2009] 319 ITR 208 (SC), wherein it is held as under: “The short point involved in these appeals is, whether there existed a 'rectifiable mistake' enabling the Department to invoke section 154 of the Act? If one examines the scheme of the Income-tax Act, as it stood at the material time, one finds a clear dichotomy between section 154 and section 147 of the Act. Section 154 deals with rectification of mistake. Section 154(1), inter alia, states that, with a view to rectify any mistake apparent from the record, an income-tax authority may amend any order passed by it under the provisions of the Act, whereas section 147, inter alia, states that if the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year, he may, subject to the provisions of sections 148 to 153, assess or reassess such income which has escaped assessment and which comes to the notice of the Assessing Officer subsequently in the course of proceedings under the said section. In the present case, the Department did not invoke section 147 of the Act even when the matter was within the time limit prescribed. Be that as it may, in these appeals, we are concerned with the meaning of the words 'rectifiable mistake'. On the facts of the present case, we are of the view that the present case involves change of opinion. In this connection, it must be noted that Government grants different types of subsidies to the entrepreneurs. The subsidy in Sahney Steel and Press Works Ltd. [1997] 228 ITR 253 (SC) was an incentive subsidy linked to production. In fact, in Sahney Steel and Press Works Ltd. [1997] 228 ITR 253 (SC) (at page 257), this court categorically stated that the scheme in hand was an incentive scheme and it was not a scheme for setting up the industries. In fact, in Sahney Steel and Press Works Ltd. [1997] 228 ITR 253 (SC) (at page 257), this court categorically stated that the scheme in hand was an incentive scheme and it was not a scheme for setting up the industries. In the said case, the salient features of the scheme were examined and it was noticed that the scheme formulated by the Government of Andhra Pradesh was admissible only after the commencement of production. In income-tax matters, one has to examine the nature of the item in question, which would depend on the facts of each case. In the present case, we are concerned with power subsidy whereas in the case of CIT v. Ponni Sugars and Chemicals Ltd. reported in [2008] 306 ITR 392, the subsidy given by the Government was for repaying loans. Therefore, in each case, one has to examine the nature of subsidy. This exercise cannot be undertaken under section 154 of the Act. There is one more reason why section 154 in the present case was not invokable by the Department. Originally, the Commissioner of Income-tax, while passing orders under section 264 of the Act on April 30, 1997, had taken the view that the subsidy in question was a capital receipt not taxable under the Act. After the judgment of this court in Sahney Steel and Press Works Ltd. [1997] 228 ITR 253, the Commissioner of Income-tax has taken the view that the subsidy in question was a revenue receipt. Therefore, in our view, the present case is a classic illustration of change of opinion. ... Before concluding, we may state that in Deva Metal Powders (P.) Ltd. v. Commissioner, Trade Tax, Uttar Pradesh, reported in [2008] (2) SCC 439, a Division Bench of this court held that a 'rectifiable mistake' must exist and the same must be apparent from the record. It must be a patent mistake, which is obvious and whose discovery is not dependent on elaborate arguments. To the same effect is the judgment of this court in the case of Commissioner of Central Excise, Calcutta v. A. S. C. U. Ltd. [2003] 151 ELT 481, wherein it has been held that a 'rectifiable mistake' is a mistake which is obvious and not something which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning or where two opinions are possible. Decision on debatable point of law cannot be treated as 'mistake apparent from the record'.” (emphasis supplied) 12. That apart, the Supreme Court in CIT v. Palani Andavar Cotton and Synthetic Spinners Ltd., [2010] 317 ITR (St) 3, dismissed the Department’s Special Leave Petition against the judgment dated 27.8.2007 of this Court in Tax Case (Appeal) Nos.96 to 98 of 2004, whereby the High Court confirmed the order of the Tribunal holding that since on the date of exercise of jurisdiction under Section 154 of the Act the issue was debatable, the Revenue had no jurisdiction to make rectification and that the decision of this Court in 258 ITR 56 not having been available at the time of exercise of the power under section 154 of the Act, it could not be applied with retrospective effect. 13. In the instant case, when the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) passed the order on 22.1.1999, the decision of this Court in Srivinayaga Pictures case, referred supra, was binding on him. At that point, if the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) had taken a contrary view, it would have been a mistake apparent. However, that is not the case here. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), by order dated 28.10.2002, allowed the application filed by the Assessing Officer seeking rectification relying on a decision rendered by this Court in Beardsell Ltd. case, referred supra, decided on 14.3.2000, in favour of the Revenue subsequently (i.e.) after the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) passed the order. The subsequent order passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), by way of rectification, by no stretch of imagination, could be stated a case of rectification. There is no mistake apparent on record on the date of passing the original order in Appeal. It is a case of rectification based on change of opinion. In our considered opinion, the rectification order passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) is erroneous and not sustainable in law. For the foregoing reasons, the substantial questions of law are answered against the Revenue and the appeal is dismissed. No costs.