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2014 DIGILAW 3416 (MAD)

Rajamani Ammal v. Poovayee

2014-09-18

PUSHPA SATHYANARAYANA

body2014
Judgment 1. Legal representatives of the plaintiff in a suit for recovery of possession of the suit property, recovery of arrears of rent and also for damages for use and occupation, have focused the instant Second Appeal challenging the judgment and decree dated 16.7.2004 passed by the I Additional Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore, in A.S. No. 60 of 2003 wherein and by which the judgment and decree dated 11.08.2003 made in O.S. No. 28 of 1998 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Cuddalore, were reversed. 2. Pending suit, the plaintiff died and his legal representatives have been brought on record before the trial Court. 3. As per the averments set out in the plaint, the suit property is the ancestral property of the plaintiff, who had been in possession and enjoyment of the same. The plaintiff was also paying tax as he was in a thatched shed in the property and as he had been in long and uninterrupted enjoyment of the property, also claimed prescribed title to the suit property. It is stated that in 1992, the first defendant requested the plaintiff to permit him to occupy the property as a tenant and considering his request, agreeing the same, the plaintiff executed a rental agreement dated 13.3.1992 for a period of three years for a monthly rental of Rs.5/-. Even after the expiry of the lease period, the defendant did not hand over possession of the property. According to the plaintiff, there is also a tamarind tree in the property but, however, only the plaintiff had the right to use the trees. The plaintiff also contended that the defendant defaulted in payment of rent. Hence, the suit was filed for recovery of possession and arrears of rent and also for the relief of damages for use and occupation. 4. Resisting the suit, the first defendant filed written statement contending that the plaintiff never had any right or title over the suit property. The defendants also denied the alleged rent agreement executed and contended that it was a forged and fabricated one created for the purpose of the suit. It was the further case of the defendants that the suit property is a grama natham and the first defendants father Govindan was in possession of the suit property after whose death, it devolved on the first defendant and his siblings. It was the further case of the defendants that the suit property is a grama natham and the first defendants father Govindan was in possession of the suit property after whose death, it devolved on the first defendant and his siblings. It was also the case of the first defendant that he has been paying B Memo charges to the Government and that on 31.7.1996, he also obtained patta from the Government in his name. Therefore, according to the first defendant, the suit has to be dismissed as the plaintiff cannot have any right or claim over the property. 5. Before the trial Court, on the side of the plaintiffs, the third plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 besides examining four more witnesses as P.W.2 to P.W.5 and marked Exs. A.1 to A.22. On the side of the defendants, the third defendant examined himself as D.W.1 besides examining D.W.2 to D.W.5 and marked Exs. B.1 to B.35. 6. The trial Court, on an evaluation of the evidence available on record, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, had framed as many as 15 issues and finding that the plaintiffs have obtained patta in respect of the suit property, decreed the suit as prayed for as the suit property belonged to the plaintiffs. On appeal by the defendants, the Lower Appellate Court, after appreciating the facts, holding that the plaintiffs have not proved that the suit property is ancestral property, reversed the judgment and decree of the trial Court and allowed the appeal. Feeling aggrieved, the legal representatives of the plaintiff have come up with this Appeal. 7. At the time of admission of this Second Appeal, the following substantial questions of law were framed for consideration:- (i) Whether in law the lower appellate Court was right in holding that the suit property belonged to the respondents merely on the basis of patta without holding that patta is not a document of title? (ii) Whether in law the lower appellate Court was not wrong in ignoring Ex. A.22 which is an ancient document and whose evidentiary value is unimpeachable under Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act? 8. Heard Mrs. R. Meenal, learned counsel appearing for the appellants and Mr. R. Sunilkumar, learned counsel for the respondents and perused the records. 9. Admittedly, the suit property is a grama natham situate in S.No. 110/1 measuring 96' X 95'. 8. Heard Mrs. R. Meenal, learned counsel appearing for the appellants and Mr. R. Sunilkumar, learned counsel for the respondents and perused the records. 9. Admittedly, the suit property is a grama natham situate in S.No. 110/1 measuring 96' X 95'. It is claimed in the plaint that the suit property belonged to him ancestrally and it devolved upon the first plaintiff since deceased and he had been in enjoyment of the same. But no document has been filed to evidence the same. The plaintiffs have filed only Exs. A.4 to A.12 which are the house tax receipts and Ex. A.22 is a sale deed dated 21.6.1947 between one Venkatesa Mudaliar and Jagadambal and Rukmani Thayar. Admittedly, the said document is not inter parties. But, the plaintiffs have filed the same to establish their title to the suit property placing reliance on the boundary description in Ex. A.22 wherein in the description of the property, one of the boundary is described as belonging to Anand Narayana Pillai, who is the deceased first plaintiff. Excepting the said document in which the defendants are not parties, the plaintiffs have not filed any other document of title to prove their ownership. 10. Learned counsel for the respondents contended that Ex. A.22, being a document not inter parties, is not admissible in evidence. He further contended that even if the document is admissible and received as evidence, the boundary description in the said document will not bind a person who is not a party to the document. Besides, according to the learned counsel, the said transaction under Ex. A.22 will not recognise the right or title of the plaintiffs. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance on the decision in V.A. Amiappa Nainar (died) and others vs. V. Annamalai Chettiar (died) and others [84 LW 691] wherein it has been held as follows:- “On a consideration of the aforesaid decisions, we hold that this decision of the Division Bench of the Court in Sripala Venkatarayagopala Raju v. Fota Narasayya, is not in accordance with preponderance of authorities in various High Courts that recitals as to boundaries in documents not inter partes are inadmissible in evidence under sections 11, 13(a), 32 (3) and 32 (7). As pointed; out by Wadsworth, J., in Thygaraja v. Narayana, the only method by which recitals in a document not inter partes could be admitted in evidence is by examination of the executant of the document in which such recitals as to boundaries are found. In this view we hold that the judgment of Ramaswami, J., in Rangayya v. Innasimuthu, is wrongly decided. The result is that Exhibits A-2 to A-6 in the present case are inadmissible in evidence.” 11.In view of the above proposition, this Court has no hesitation to hold that Ex. A.22 is inadmissible in evidence and the plaintiffs cannot place reliance on the same to establish title and the plaintiffs also cannot take advantage of Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act on the ground that Ex. A.22 is an ancient document. The plaintiffs also had not filed any other document to establish their title independent of Ex. A.22. As such, question of law No. 2 is answered against the plaintiffs. 12.Insofar as possession of the defendants is concerned, it is alleged in the plaint that the first defendant was a tenant and to evidence the same, Ex. A.13 was filed. A perusal of Ex. A.13 would show that the deceased first plaintiff had executed the same in favour of the defendants and it is said to be a lease deed with respect to a vacant site. The said Ex. A.13 lease deed is vehemently opposed by the respondents/defendants as there was no such document executed at all and the same is fabricated for the purpose of the case. A perusal of Ex. A.13 also appears to be a fabricated document as the rental clause is inserted on top of the agreement which is not usual practice. The stamp paper in which Ex. A.13 typed also seems to have been purchased in the High Court campus from one Santhanam stamp vendor on 13.3.1995. Further, the plaintiffs themselves have produced Exs. A.5 to A.12 house tax receipts prior to 1993, that is prior to Ex. A.13. A recital in Ex. A.13 indicates that what was leased out was only a vacant site and the defendants were permitted to put up a thatched shed and live in the same. Further, the plaintiffs themselves have produced Exs. A.5 to A.12 house tax receipts prior to 1993, that is prior to Ex. A.13. A recital in Ex. A.13 indicates that what was leased out was only a vacant site and the defendants were permitted to put up a thatched shed and live in the same. It is pertinent to point out at this juncture that if what was leased out was a vacant site and the defendants were permitted to put up the structure only after taking the property on lease, then the plaintiffs could not have paid property tax for the suit property prior to 1993. 13.From the above discrepancy and a perusal of chief examination of P.W.1, it is clear that the plaintiffs have not come to Court with true facts. On the date of Ex. A13, if there was a building or thatched shed on the suit property, certainly, the plaintiffs would have mentioned it in the document. There is no reason why it was stated that what was leased out was a vacant site. It cannot also be presumed that it was a mistake because as per Ex. A.13, there is a permission to the defendants to put up thatched shed in the suit property. As such, the only document relied upon by the plaintiffs is held to be forged and fabricated one for the purpose of the suit. 14.On the other hand, the defendants filed Exs. B.1, B.2 and B.15 to B.20 which are all pattas issued in their favour. It was the definite case of the defendants that the suit property was a grama natham and they have been in possession of the same based on which the thoraya patta was issued in their favour. It is to be noted that the suit property, which is a grama natham, being a village house site, the patta was issued based on the possession. The defendants have also filed other documents, viz., Exs. B.21 to B.35, electricity receipts for the suit property. It is also to be seen that excepting a few of them, rest of the receipts relate to the suit property prior to the filing of the suit. The defendants have also filed other documents, viz., Exs. B.21 to B.35, electricity receipts for the suit property. It is also to be seen that excepting a few of them, rest of the receipts relate to the suit property prior to the filing of the suit. 15.In view of the above facts, the plaintiffs, who have come with the specific case claiming ownership of the property and seeking to evict the defendants based on the lease agreement which has not been proved, are not entitled to the decree as prayed for whereas the defendants had categorically established that the suit property was a grama natham and the first defendant had got the patta in his favour based on his possession and he has been in continuous possession of the suit property. The documents relied on by the plaintiffs to establish title, viz., Exs. A.22 and Ex. A.13, are found to be false by the Lower Appellate Court. When the first defendant has established a better title to the suit property, there is no reason to interfere with the finding of the Lower Appellate Court. 16. Suffice it for this Court to point out that in the light of qualitative and quantitative discussion mentioned supra and on a careful consideration of respective contentions, this Court comes to an inevitable conclusion that the appellants/plaintiffs had not derived title in respect of the suit property for the simple reason that the suit property is Grama Natham and that the deceased first plaintiff had allowed the defendants to construct a thatched house and the Lower Appellate Court has rightly dismissed the suit taking into account all the relevant facts and circumstances of the case in a right perspective. Resultantly, the instant Appeal filed by the plaintiffs fails and the substantial question of law No. 1 is answered accordingly. In the result, the Second Appeal fails and the same stands dismissed confirming the judgment and decree of the Lower Appellate Court dated 16.7.2004 passed in A.S. No. 60 of 2003. But in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.