Judgment : 1. This Civil Revision Petition has been filed to call for the records pertaining to the impugned order, dated 25.04.2014, passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Thoothukudi, in I.A.No.678 of 2014 in O.S.No.152 of 2012 and set aside the same. 2. The revision petitioners herein are the defendants, whereas the respondents 1 and 2 herein are the plaintiffs in the suit in O.S.No.152 of 2012 on the file of Subordinate Court, Thoothukudi and the respondents 3 to 24 are the third parties newly impleaded in the civil revision petition. 3. The respondents 1 and 2 filed the suit for declaration that holding of post by the second and third petitioners as Secretary and Vice President of the first petitioner society respectively is illegal and for permanent injunction restraining any member of the society from contesting to any of the posts to the committee or to Office bearer of the first petitioner society violating Byelaw 10 (d) of the first petitioner Society and for interim mandatory injunction directing neutral person appointed by this Court as an Election Officer to hold the elections to the first petitioner Society with the finalized list of members prepared and approved by the Court. 3. The respondents 1 and 2 also filed I.A.No.678 of 2012 along with the suit to appoint an Advocate Commissioner for the relief stated therein. The petitioners filed their counter affidavit. The learned Subordinate Judge, by the order dated 31.07.2012, made in I.A.No.678 of 2012, appointed Mr.P.Ganapathi Subramaniam as Commissioner to prepare the list of the Members of the first petitioner Society after including genuine persons and deleting bogus persons from membership. 4. Against the said order, the petitioners filed C.R.P.(MD) No.1839 of 2012. Before this Court, both the petitioners as well as the respondents 1 to 3 agreed for seven member committee to receive applications from persons to become members, to scrutinise the same and publish the tentative list of members and after considering the objections if any received, to publish the final list. This Court recorded the said consent and passed an interim order, on 17.04.2013. 5. Subsequently, the civil revision petition was taken up for final hearing. After hearing the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners, respondents and the newly impleaded parties, this Court by the order, dated 28.10.2013, upheld the validity of appointment of Advocate Commissioner by the learned Subordinate Judge. 5. Subsequently, the civil revision petition was taken up for final hearing. After hearing the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners, respondents and the newly impleaded parties, this Court by the order, dated 28.10.2013, upheld the validity of appointment of Advocate Commissioner by the learned Subordinate Judge. Series of allegations were made against Mr.P.Ganapathy Subramaniam, Advocate Commissioner. Hence, this Court directed the learned Subordinate Judge to appoint a Senior Advocate of Bar as new commissioner. This Court directed to include 127 persons as members, whose applications were rejected in the list published by the District Registrar, who scrutinised the voters list of the first petitioner as per directions of this Court, dated 17.04.2013. With the above directions, this Court disposed the civil revision petition on 28.10.2013. 6. After the order of this Court, dated 28.10.2013, made in C.R.P.(MD) No.1839 of 2012, the second petitioner filed an application in I.A.No.905 of 2013 in O.S.No.152 of 2012 on the file of Sub-Court, Thoothukudi, seeking suspension of order of this Court, by two weeks. The learned Subordinate Judge, by the order, dated 07.11.2013, dismissed the said application. Against the said order, the second petitioner filed C.R.P.(MD) No.2207 of 2013. This Court, by the order dated 02.01.2014, dismissed the said civil revision petition. 7. The petitioners filed Review Application (MD)No.51587 of 2013, to review the order of this Court, dated 28.10.2013 made in C.R.P.(MD) No.1839 of 2012 with a petition to condone the delay. This Court, by the order, dated 19.06.2014, dismissed the petition to condone the delay holding that the petitioner has not given sufficient reasons for condoning the delay in filing the review application. Against the said order dated 28.10.2013, the petitioners also filed S.L.P.No.170 of 2014. The Apex Court, by order dated 17.01.2014, dismissed the said S.L.P. 8. On receipt of a copy of the order of this Court, dated 28.10.2013, made in C.R.P.(MD) No.1839 of 2012, the learned Subordinate Judge, by the order dated 07.11.2013, appointed Mr.K.Pon James, as Advocate Commissioner to prepare voters list of the first petitioner and include 127 persons as members as per the directions of this Court. 9. The advocate Commissioner filed an interim report on 06.01.2013. 9. The advocate Commissioner filed an interim report on 06.01.2013. The learned Judge considered the said interim report and heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners as well as the respondents and by the order, dated 25.04.2014, directed the Advocate Commissioner, to conduct elections in respect of the first petitioner Society as per the orders of this Court, dated 28.10.2013, made in C.R.P.(MD) No.1839 of 2012. 10. Challenging the said order, the petitioners have filed the present civil revision petition. 11. Along with the civil revision petition, P.S.P.K.J.Somu, R.S.Nithanantham and two others and K.Ponraj and seventeen others have filed M.P.(MD) Nos.2 to 4 of 2014 respectively to get themselves impleaded as party respondents in the civil revision petition. The petitioners and the respondents 1 and 2 did not object the said application. Hence, M.P.(MD) Nos.2 to 4 were allowed. Therefore, the proposed respondents were permitted to make their submissions on merits. 12. Heard Mr.Issac Mohanlal, learned counsel for the revision petitioners, Mr.VR.Shanmuganathan, learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 3 assisted by Mr.D.Srinivasaraghavan, learned counsel for the first respondent, Mr.J.Mahendran, learned counsel for the second respondent and Mr.AL.Kannan, learned counsel for the third respondent and Mr.N.Mohideen Basha, learned counsel for the respondents 4 to 6 and Mr.H.Thayumanaswamy, learned counsel for the respondents 7 to 24. 13.Learned counsel for the revision petitioners argued that the impugned order of learned Sub Judge is illegal, as the said order has allowed the suit itself in favour the respondents 1 and 2. The Interim order which has the effect of granting final relief should not be granted. For this proposition, the learned counsel for the petitioners relied on the following Judgments: (i) Dr. M. Thirunavukarasu Vs. Indian Psychiatric Society Tribunal [ 2008 (2) CTC 51 ], wherein in paragraph No.10, it has been held as follows:- "10. As on date, the appellant/applicant/plaintiff is not in Office and that the individuals nominated by the Executing Council by their decision on 14.07.2007 are incharge of the Society till election is conducted afresh. The prayer for an order of Interim Injunction in O.A.No.874 of 2007 and the second prayer in the Suit relating to the grant of permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their men, servants and agents, etc. The prayer for an order of Interim Injunction in O.A.No.874 of 2007 and the second prayer in the Suit relating to the grant of permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their men, servants and agents, etc. in any way interfering with the functions of the appellant/applicant/plaintiff as the Vice President/President Elect, Indian Psychiatric Society for the year 2007-2008 are one and the same. An Interim Injunction which has the effect of granting final relief should not be granted, in our considered opinion." (ii) The Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi Limited v. Spartex Ceramics India Limited [ 2007 (3) CTC 11 ], wherein in paragraph No.14, it has been held as follows:- "14. From a reading of the above-referred catena of judgments and taking an overall view of the matter, we find that there is no such circumstance warranting the learned Single Judge to give a finding to the effect that the shares are standing in the name of the second plaintiff and were not transferred and therefore, prima facie they belong to the second plaintiff and thus, the plaintiffs have right for an interim injunction against the second defendant also not to deal with the shares, pending disposal of the Suit. Similarly, there is no warranting circumstance for the learned Single Judge to direct the appellant herein to deposit the original share certificate in this Court. These reliefs granted by the learned Single Judge at the interim stage is nothing but the prayer in the Suit itself which has to be considered only at the ultimate stage of final decree. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge, without going into the legal proposition involved in this regard, has granted the main relief itself which is sought in the Suit at the interim stage, which in other words, tantamounts to a pre-trial decree." 14. The learned counsel for the revision petitioners further argued that a person become a member only when he fulfils the conditions contained in the bye-laws. According to the learned counsel for the revision petitioners, a society can restrict class of persons, who can became members. The learned counsel for the revision petitioners further argued that a person become a member only when he fulfils the conditions contained in the bye-laws. According to the learned counsel for the revision petitioners, a society can restrict class of persons, who can became members. The learned counsel for the revision petitioners relied on the following Judgments:- (i) Zoroastrian Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. and Another v. District Registrar Cooperative Societies (Urban) and Others [ 2005 (5) SCC 632 ], wherein in paragraph Nos.17 and 22, it has been held as follows:- "17.Daman Singh case [ 1985 (2) SCC 670 : AIR 1985 SC 973 ], in our view, is not an answer to the claim of the Society that it had the right to decide with whom it wants to associate or to deny membership to a person who was not qualified to be one in terms of the bye-laws of the Society. The effect of the observations in Daman Singh case [ 1985 (2) SCC 670 : AIR 1985 SC 973 ], (SCC pp. 680-81, para 9) is only that cooperative societies, from their very inception are governed by the statute, the Cooperative Societies Act, that they are created by statute, they are controlled by the statute and so, there can be no objection to statutory interference with their composition or functioning and there is no merit in a challenge to statutory interference based on contravention of the individual right of freedom of association. As we understand the statement of the law by this Court in Daman Singh case [ 1985 (2) SCC 670 : AIR 1985 SC 973 ], it only means that the action of the Society in refusing membership to a person has to be tested on the anvil of the provisions of the Act, the Rules and its bye-laws. Be it noted that the bye-laws had already been approved on the basis that they were consistent with the Act and the Rules. Even then, it may be possible in a given case to point out that a particular bye-law was against the terms of the Act or the Rules. Be it noted that the bye-laws had already been approved on the basis that they were consistent with the Act and the Rules. Even then, it may be possible in a given case to point out that a particular bye-law was against the terms of the Act or the Rules. Daman Singh [ 1985 (2) SCC 670 : AIR 1985 SC 973 ], does not indicate that the Act, the Rules and the bye-laws for that matter, have to be given the go-by, merely because the particular bye-law or action of the Society may not accord with our concept of fairness or propriety in terms of the rights available to an ordinary citizen. Therefore, in the light of the observations in Daman Singh [ 1985 (2) SCC 670 : AIR 1985 SC 973 ], what one has to search for, is a provision in the Act or the Rules which prevails over Bye-law 7 of the Society, confining membership in it to only a person who is a Parsi. Section 24 of the Act, no doubt, speaks of open membership, but Section 24(1) makes it clear that open membership is the membership of a person duly qualified therefor under the provisions of the Act, the Rules and the bye- laws of the society. In other words, Section 24(1) does not contemplate an open membership dehors the bye-laws of the society. Nor do we find anything in the Act which precludes a society from prescribing a qualification for membership based on a belief, a persuasion or a religion for that matter. Section 30(2) of the Act even places restrictions on the right of a member to transfer his right. In fact, the individual right of the member, Respondent 2, has got submerged in the collective right of the Society. In State of U.P. v. C.O.D. Chheoki Employees? Coop. Society Ltd. [ 1997 (3) SCC 681 ], this Court after referring to Daman Singh case [ 1985 (2) SCC 670 : AIR 1985 SC 973 ], held in para 16 that: (SCC p. 691) “16. Thus, it is settled law that no citizen has a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(c) to become a member of a cooperative society. His right is governed by the provisions of the statute. So, the right to become or to continue being a member of the society is a statutory right. Thus, it is settled law that no citizen has a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(c) to become a member of a cooperative society. His right is governed by the provisions of the statute. So, the right to become or to continue being a member of the society is a statutory right. On fulfilment of the qualifications prescribed to become a member and for being a member of the society and on admission, he becomes a member. His being a member of the society is subject to the operation of the Act, rules and bye-laws applicable from time to time. A member of the society has no independent right qua the society and it is the society that is entitled to represent as the corporate aggregate. No individual member is entitled to assail the constitutionality of the provisions of the Act, rules and the bye-laws as he has his right under the Act, rules and the byelaws and is subject to its operation. The stream cannot rise higher than the source.” 22. The validity of a bye-law, that too an approved bye-law, has to be tested in the light of the provisions of the Act and the Rules governing cooperative societies. In so testing, the search should be to see whether a particular bye-law violates the mandate of any of the provisions of the Act or runs counter to any of its provisions or to any of the rules. Section 24(1) of the Act only provides for open membership subject to a person, aspiring to be a member, possessing the qualification prescribed by the bye-laws. It is not an open membership dehors the qualification prescribed by the bye-laws. When in Daman Singh [ 1985 (2) SCC 670 : AIR 1985 SC 973 ], this Court held that when a cooperative society is governed by the appropriate legislation it will be subject to the intervention made by the legislation concerned, it only meant that a legislative provision in the Act can be introduced for the purpose of eliminating a qualification for membership based on sex, religion or a persuasion or mode of life. But so long as there is no legislative intervention of that nature, it is not open to the court to coin a theory that a particular bye-law is not desirable and would be opposed to public policy as indicated by the Constitution. But so long as there is no legislative intervention of that nature, it is not open to the court to coin a theory that a particular bye-law is not desirable and would be opposed to public policy as indicated by the Constitution. The Constitution no doubt provides that in any State action there shall be no discrimination based either on religion or on sex. But Part III of the Constitution has not interfered with the right of a citizen to enter into a contract for his own benefit and at the same time incurring a certain liability arising out of the contract. As observed by the High Court of Bombay in Karvenagar Sahakari Griha Rachana Sanstha Maryadit v. State of Maharashtra6 the members have joined the society in accordance with the bye-laws and the members join a housing society by ascertaining what would be the environment in which they will reside. It is not permissible for the State Government to compel the society to amend its bye-laws as it would defeat the object of formation of the society. In that case, the society was constituted with the object of providing peaceful accommodation to its members. Though there may be circumstances justifying the State taking steps to meet shortage of accommodation, it was not open to the State Government to issue a direction to the Registrar of Cooperative Societies to direct a cooperative society to make requisite amendments to their bye-laws and grant permission to its members to raise multi-storeyed constructions. In appeal from that decision in State of Maharashtra v. Karvanagar Sahakari Griha Rachana Sanstha Maryadit [ 2009 (9) SCC 295 ], this Court while dismissing the appeal stated that it was clear that though a power was conferred on the Registrar to direct amendment of the bye-laws of a society, yet the paramount consideration is the interest of the society. So also, the power of the State Government to issue directions in public interest, could not be exercised so as to be prejudicial to the interest of the society. In the view of this Court, what was in the interest of the society was primarily for the society alone to decide and it was not for an outside agency to say. In the view of this Court, what was in the interest of the society was primarily for the society alone to decide and it was not for an outside agency to say. Where, however, the Government or the Registrar exercised statutory powers to issue directions to amend the bye-laws, such directions should satisfy the requirement of the interest of the society. This makes it clear that the interest of the society is paramount and that interest would prevail so long as there is nothing in the Act or the Rules prohibiting the promotion of such interest. Going by Chheoki Employees” Coop. Society Ltd. case [ 1997 (3) SCC 681 ] neither the member, Respondent 2, nor the aspirant to membership, Respondent 3 had the competence to challenge the validity of the bye-laws of the Society or to claim a right to membership in the Society." (ii) State of U.P. and Another v. C.O.D. Chheoki Employees' Cooperative Society Ltd. and Others [ 1997 (3) SCC 681 ], wherein in paragraph No.16, it has been held as follows:- "16. Thus, it is settled law that no citizen has a fundamental rightunder Article 19(1)(c) to become a member of a Cooperative Society. His right is governed by the provisions of the statute. So, the right to become or to continue being a member of the society is a statutory right. On fulfilment of the qualifications prescribed to become a member and for being a member of the society and on admission, he becomes a member. His being a member of the society is subject to the operation of the Act, rules and bye-laws applicable from time to time. A member of the society has no independent right qua the society and it is the society that is entitled to represent as the corporate aggregate. No individual member is entitled to assail the constitutionality of the provisions of the Act, rules and the bye-laws as he has his right under the Act, rules and the bye-laws and is subject to its operation. The stream cannot rise higher than the source." 15. The learned counsel for the petitioners also argued that S.L.P.(C) No.18136 of 2014 has been filed against the order, dated 19.06.2014, dismissing the petition to condone the delay in filing the review application and the Apex Court by the order, dated 30.07.2014, ordered notice returnable by ten weeks. 16. The stream cannot rise higher than the source." 15. The learned counsel for the petitioners also argued that S.L.P.(C) No.18136 of 2014 has been filed against the order, dated 19.06.2014, dismissing the petition to condone the delay in filing the review application and the Apex Court by the order, dated 30.07.2014, ordered notice returnable by ten weeks. 16. Mr.N.Mohideen Basha, learned counsel for the respondents 4 to 6 argued that the impugned order of the learned Judge is in the nature of final order in the suit itself and hence, the same is liable to be set aside as illegal. In support of his submission, he relied on the following Judgements: (i) P.Sivaraman (minor) Rep. by its father and natural guardian, S.Periyasamy, Tuticorin v. The Selection Committee, Rep. by its Secretary, Directorate of Medical Education, Chennai and Others [ 2005 (2) CTC 242 ], wherein in paragraph No.2, it has been held as follows:- "2. It has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court that by interim orders final relief should not be granted vide State of U.P. v. Ram Sukhi Devi, AIR 2005 SC 284 . Hence we see no infirmity in the impugned order. The writ appeal is, therefore, dismissed. However, we direct that the Writ Petition No.31585 of 2004 be listed next week before the appropriate learned single Judge for final hearing. No costs. Consequently, WAMP No.7661 of 2004 is also dismissed." (ii) State of U.P. and Others v. Ram Sukhi Devi [ AIR 2005 SC 284 : 2005 (9) SCC 733 ], wherein in paragraph No.8, it has been held as follows:- "8. ..... We, therefore, set aside the order passed by learned single Judge as affirmed by the Division Bench without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case we have interfered primarily on the ground that the final relief has been granted at an interim stage without justifiable reasons. Since the controversy lies within a very narrow compass, we request the High Court to dispose of the matter as early as practicable preferably within six months from the date of receipt of this Judgement." 17. The learned counsels for the respondents 1 to 3 argued that the impugned order passed by the learned Subordinate Judge is as per the direction given by this Court on 28.10.2013 in C.R.P. (MD) No.1839 of 2012. The petitioners filed S.L.P. against the order dated 28.10.2013. The learned counsels for the respondents 1 to 3 argued that the impugned order passed by the learned Subordinate Judge is as per the direction given by this Court on 28.10.2013 in C.R.P. (MD) No.1839 of 2012. The petitioners filed S.L.P. against the order dated 28.10.2013. The Apex Court dismissed the said S.L.P. Further, the review application filed by the petitioners was rejected as no sufficient cause was shown by them to condone the delay. The learned counsel for the respondents further argued that only civil Court has power to decide the dispute with regard to the elections and Registrar of Societies has no such power. 18. In support of their submissions, the learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 3 relied on the Judgement in C.M.S.Evangelical Suvi David Memorial Higher Secondary School Committee, Karisal and Others v. The District Registrar Cheranmahadevi and Others [ 2005 (2) CTC 161 ], wherein in paragraph Nos.18 to 20, it has been held as follows:- "18. The power of the Registrar to enquire into the affairs of the society is only to hold a summary inquiry for his own satisfaction. The said power cannot be construed as the power of appeal. Under Section 36, the Registrar has not been empowered to adjudicate upon the conflicting claims to represent the society based upon question of fact. A plain reading of Section 36 shows that the Registrar could look only the provisions of the Act and the Rules and prima facie materials to arrive at a conclusion either to believe or not to believe Form No. VII in order to effect change in the register. The power of the Registrar to call for information and explanation under Section 34 does not contemplate any power to examine witnesses or to allow opportunity for cross examination of witnesses. The power in our view is incidental and it is only for the purpose of maintaining correct records. As the power to conduct inquiry is only limited in order to find out whether constitution of members are valid, the inquiry is limited only for the purpose of making entries in the register. However, the exercise of power must not be arbitrary as the orders passed or directions issued by the Registrar is amenable to challenge in the Writ Jurisdiction. 19. However, the exercise of power must not be arbitrary as the orders passed or directions issued by the Registrar is amenable to challenge in the Writ Jurisdiction. 19. In this context it could also be kept in mind the intention of the Legislature not to confer a power of supersession of the Committee on the Registrar as by insertion of Tamil Nadu Act 16 of 1994, such power is vested only in the Government and even when the Registrar is satisfied after enquiry under Section 36 that the society which has contravened any of the provisions of the Act or the Rules made thereunder or the society is insolvent or must necessarily become so or that the business of any such registered society is conducted fraudulently or not in accordance with the bye-laws or the objects specified in the memorandum filed with the Registrar, he may only cancel the registration. 20. As the power of the Registrar to hold enquiry is only to arrive at a prima facie conclusion as to the correctness of the particulars given in Form VII, the provision of sub-section (9) of Section 36 should also be understood to mean that he could issue such directions to the registered society or any of the member of the society only with reference to the details furnished in Form VII. It must also be borne in mind that the enquiry under Section 36 is not only limited to the regular affairs of the society and such affairs not only include the constitution of a registered society but also to the working and financial condition, and hence the power of the Registrar to issue such direction under sub-section (9) of Section 36 of the Act, in regard to the constitution of the registered society must be understood in the context of Form VII. Section 14 obligates the registered society to maintain a register containing the names, addresses and occupations of its members. Section 15 further mandates such registered society shall file with the Registrar a copy of the register maintained by it under Section 14 and from time to time file with the Registrar notice of any change among the members of the committee. In the absence of failure to comply with Section 14, the Registrar could only resort to to the power under Section 37 to cancel the registration. In the absence of failure to comply with Section 14, the Registrar could only resort to to the power under Section 37 to cancel the registration. Hence, the power under sub-section (9) of Section 36 cannot be stretched to a power on the Registrar to direct the registered society to hold fresh election. A direction to hold fresh election would amount to indirectly setting aside the earlier election and such power is not conferred on the Registrar under any of the provisions of the Act. So long as the election is not declared invalid in the manner known to law, no direction for fresh election could be ordered. Validity of the election could very well be decided only by the competent Civil Court as the parties are entitled to let in their evidence to sustain their respective claims. In the event the Registrar satisfies himself as to the particulars furnished in Form VII as correct, he should enter he names in the register maintained for that purpose. In the event if he does not satisfy as to the particulars and thereby does not accept Form VII, he has to issue a direction relegating the parties to approach the Civil Court for appropriate orders and thereafter shall act as per the orders of the Civil Court. Accordingly, the issue is answered. Post the Writ Appeals for disposal accordingly." 19. I have carefully perused all the materials on record, the various Judgements passed by the Apex Court as well as this Court and the Judgements relied on by the learned counsel for the parties and considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the revision petitioners as well as the respondents. 20. There is no dispute with regard to the proposition advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the Society is entitled to restrict the admission of persons as members and qualifications to be fulfilled to become members. This aspects is not an issue in this proceedings. The learned Subordinate Judge, directed the Advocate Commissioner, to verify the list of members and after enquiry to delete the ineligible persons from membership and include eligible persons as members, who were wrongly excluded. Further, as per the orders of this Court, the Registrar of Societies, after enquiry, submitted list of members. This list was prepared as per Bye-laws of the first petitioner Society. Further, as per the orders of this Court, the Registrar of Societies, after enquiry, submitted list of members. This list was prepared as per Bye-laws of the first petitioner Society. This Court directed the Advocate Commissioner to include 127 persons as members, as their applications were wrongly rejected. In view of these facts, the list of members furnished by the Registrar of Societies, and 127 members included as per the orders of this Court, is valid. 21. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners as well as the learned counsel for the newly impleaded parties, who support the petitioners that the learned Subordinate Judge has passed final order itself in the guise of interim order is untenable and unsustainable. The learned Subordinate Judge, by the impugned order appointed new Advocate Commissioner and gave directions to verify the voters list and conduct elections. This order is passed in compliance of the directions given by this Court. The second petitioner has filed application in I.A.No.905 of 2013 to suspend the order of this Court, dated 28.10.2013, made in C.R.P.(MD) No.1839 of 2012, which was dismissed by the learned Subordinate Judge and the said dismissal order was held valid by this Court. The petitioners have also filed review application to review the order, dated 28.10.2013, with a petition to condone the delay. This Court dismissed the petition for condonation of delay, as the petitioners have not given sufficient reason to condone the delay. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners have filed S.L.P.(C) No.18136 of 2014, challenging the order of dismissing the petition for condonation of delay and the Apex Court on 19.06.2014, ordered notice returnable by ten weeks. But the Apex Court on 17.01.2014, dismissed S.L.P.No.170 of 2014, filed against the order, dated 28.10.2013, made in C.R.P.(MD) No.1839 of 2012. Hence, the order dated 25.04.2014, has become final. The impugned order dated 28.10.2013, cannot be held to be illegal and cannot be set aside on the ground that the learned Subordinate Judge has passed the final order at the time of passing interim order itself. The impugned order has been passed in compliance of directions given by this Court, by the order dated 28.10.2013, made in C.R.P.(MD) No.1839 of 2012. 22. The impugned order has been passed in compliance of directions given by this Court, by the order dated 28.10.2013, made in C.R.P.(MD) No.1839 of 2012. 22. The contentions of the learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 and the newly impleaded respondents supporting the said contentions that only civil Court is competent to decide the dispute with regard to allegations to Societies has considerable force. The Judgements relied on by the learned counsel for the respondents squarely apply to the facts of this case. 23. For the above reasons, I hold that there is no irregularity or infirmity in the impugned order of the learned Subordinate Judge. There is no reason warranting interference by this Court. 24. In the result, this civil revision petition is dismissed, confirming the impugned order of the learned Subordinate Judge. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed. 25. On 07.05.2014, this Court in M.P.(MD) No.1 of 2014 in C.R.P.(MD) No.1053 of 2014, directed the Advocate Commissioner to conduct the elections on 18.06.2014 as per the schedule, but not to announce the results. This Court further directed the Advocate Commissioner to file report before this Court. As per the direction of this Court, the Advocate Commissioner conducted elections and filed his report and did not announce the results. As the civil revision petition is dismissed, the Advocate Commissioner is directed to announce the results and file his further report before the learned Subordinate Judge, Tuticorin, for further orders to be passed by the learned Subordinate Judge.