C.A.V. JUDGMENT 1. At an initial stage, the applicant who are spouse namely, Kumari Abha, Sheo Shakti Kumar prayed for directing the respondents to open lock put by respondents at the petitioner”s residential house, got redressed during midst of pendency of instant writ petition on account of opening of lock by the respondent however, by way of addition of prayer asked for compensation. Because of the fact that the house has now been unlocked by the respondents hence lis lies over question of compensation if so, the quantum thereof. 2. Respondents have filed counter affidavit. 3. It is evident from respective pleading that one Gyan Krishan Kuliyar, District Welfare Officer was found in possession of unaccountable amount appertaining to Rs.5,87,760/- along with other items on 09-09-2012 and for that Civil Line P.S. Case No.339 of 2012 on the basis of which Special Case No.26 of 2012 (Vigilance) has been registered on the written report of Additional Collector, Gaya. Petitioner Sheo Shakti Kumar, who happens to be Assistant at District Welfare Office, Gaya was perceived actively involved with Gyan Krishan Kuliyar and on account thereof, his house was also intended to be searched and for that purpose when the administrative team gone to his place, it was found locked and on account thereof, another lock was put by the administration to facilitate search. It is also evident that during course thereof absence of Sheo Shakti Kumar from his office was also noticed adverse to his conduct. By way of supplementary affidavit, along with annexures, search and seizure without recovery of any incriminating article has been brought up on record. In likewise manner, absence of petitioner no.2 has also been reasoned. 4. From the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent nos.5 & 6 more particularly para-9 thereof, it is apparent that the house was sealed by the SDO on account of absence of petitioner at his office as well as at his house whereupon search could not taken place in connection with recovery of un-accountable money from the possession of District Welfare Officer, wherein petitioners involvement was also suspected. 5. From perusal of counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent nos. 5. From perusal of counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent nos. 3 & 4, petitioners connivance was perceived with the District Welfare Officer from whose possession Rs.5,87,760/- were recovered and in the aforesaid background, the house of petitioner was also to be searched to find out connecting evidence which got frustrated on account of their absence and for that, his house was sealed. Respondent nos. 3 & 4 have tried to justify their action by way of incorporating the fact under para-10 as well as para-12 wherein they have disclosed that although for the present petitioner Sheo Shakti Kumar does not happens to be an accused in connection with Civil Line P.S. Case No.339 of 2012 wherein investigation is going on and further shown their callousness in following manner:- “…It is apprehended that during the investigation he could be made a co-accused. Hence till the submission of final report and charge sheet it is totally wrong, false and concocted to say that only DWO, Gaya Krishna Kuliar is accused in this case and petitioner no.2 is not a co-accused in this case” 6. Because of the fact that neither respondent no.3 nor 4 are Investigating Officer nor would substitute the function as an Investigating Officer, on account thereof, making such kind of disclosure clearly, suggest action of respondent no.3 and 4 deeply influenced with biasness. 7. In para-12, the respondent no.3 and 4 justified their action on the fact that the house of Sheo Shakti Kumar, in their opinion happens to be corroborative place of occurrence and in this way they explained the event which needs to be incorporated in verbatim. “…it is apprehended that there must be or should be any peace of evidence is available in the house of petitioner no.1 hence the action of authority to lock the house of petitioner no.1 hence the action of authority to lock the house of petitioner is not unconstitutional and unlawful, rather it is lawful and comes within the rules and regulation” 8. From Annexure-A, it is evident that the house was opened on 26-11-2012 and by way of supplementary affidavit, it is evident that petitioner’s house was searched on 29-12-2012 at 02:30 P.M. in presence of so many responsible police officials, administrative officers by the Investigating Officer (Annexure-5). It is further perceived that up till now, petitioner no.2 has not been made co-accused in Special Case No.26/2012. 9. It is further perceived that up till now, petitioner no.2 has not been made co-accused in Special Case No.26/2012. 9. It has been submitted on behalf of petitioner that the action of the administration was not at all legally permissible because of the fact that respondent no.3 and 4 were not at all authorized to put lock at the house of petitioners nor were competent one. Even in worst case, it was Investigating Officer who could have exercised such power after getting search warrant from competent court. Therefore, the action of the respondent no.3 and 4 happens to be illegal and for that petitioner should be adequately compensated by the State as their employees have committed unconstitutional activities. 10. On the other hand, the learned counsel representing the State as well as vigilance controverted the argument made on behalf of petitioners and submitted that the action of administration was justified because of the fact that they were competent enough to lock the premises as the aforesaid premises was apprehended to have some sort of evidence of circumstance exposing the conduct of main accused District Welfare Officer as well as connivance of petitioner Sheo Shakti Kumar with the main accused. However, fairly submitted that after search, nothing incriminating has been recovered. It has also been acceded on their behalf that up till now Sheo Shakti Kumar has not been arrayed as an accused. To justify action of administration, also relied upon decision reported in 1940 Cal 30. 11. After hearing rival parties as well as going through the relevant pleading, it is apparent that the house of petitioners were sealed by the administration on 09-09-2012 on account of their absence which was found adverse to their interest by the administration in the background of recovery of huge unaccounted amount from physical possession of District Welfare Officer with whom, close intimacy of petitioner was suspected. As soon as case is registered, then it happens to be duty of the Investigating Officer to inspect the place of occurrence, detect complicity of any person if not named with the commission of the alleged crime on the basis of the material collected during course of investigation. Criminal Procedure Code cautiously deals with each and every eventuality. In likewise manner the Criminal Procedure Code deals with the power to be exercised by the administration. Criminal Procedure Code cautiously deals with each and every eventuality. In likewise manner the Criminal Procedure Code deals with the power to be exercised by the administration. Be it District Magistrate or S.D.M. and in the aforesaid background, the decision cited on behalf of respondents as reported in AIR 1940 Cal. 30 is not going to give any sort of relief on that very score nor it justify action of respondent. 12. In the aforesaid background, having absence of legal empowerment to put lock at the residential house of petitioners, the respondent no.3 and 4 shown noverlal conduct and to justify their illegal stand detailed under hollowness under para-10 and 12 of the counter affidavit which, in the facts and circumstances of the case is not at all appreciable and on account thereof, did not attract nod. Hence, the action of the respondent by way of locking the residential house of the petitioner is found contrary to law. 13. Now coming over question of compensation, in Raghuvansh Dewanchand Bhasin v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2012) 9 SCC 791 the issue has been dealt with in detailed by the Hon”ble Apex Court. The facts of the case happens to be with regard to apprehension of petitioner on the basis of the warrant by the police official after the date during midst thereof having the petitioner got bailed out as well as the order of the court for recalling of warrant of arrest so issued against him. “16. That takes us to the core issue, namely, whether the appellant is entitled to any compensation for the humiliation and harassment suffered by him on account of the wrong perpetrated by Respondent 2 in addition to what has been awarded by the High Court. As aforesaid, the grievance of the appellant is that imposition of a fine of Rs 2000 on Respondent 2 is grossly inadequate. His prayer is that in addition to an adequate amount of compensation, Respondent 2 should also be prosecuted and proceeded against departmentally for his wrongful confinement. 17. It is trite principle of law that in matters involving infringement or deprivation of a fundamental right, abuse of process of law, harassment, etc., the courts have ample power to award adequate compensation to an aggrieved person not only to remedy the wrong done to him but also to serve as a deterrent for the wrongdoer. 18. 17. It is trite principle of law that in matters involving infringement or deprivation of a fundamental right, abuse of process of law, harassment, etc., the courts have ample power to award adequate compensation to an aggrieved person not only to remedy the wrong done to him but also to serve as a deterrent for the wrongdoer. 18. In Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar (1983) 4 SCC 141 , Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J., speaking for a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court had observed thus: (SCC p. 147, para 10) “10. … One of the telling ways in which the violation of that right can reasonably be prevented and due compliance with the mandate of Article 21 secured, is to mulct its violators in the payment of monetary compensation. Administrative sclerosis leading to flagrant infringements of fundamental rights cannot be corrected by any other method open to the judiciary to adopt.” 19. In Bhim Singh v. State of J&K (1985) 4 SCC 677 , holding the illegal detention in police custody of the petitioner Bhim Singh to be violative of his rights under Articles 21 and 22(2) of the Constitution, this Court, in exercise of its power to award compensation under Article 32, directed the State to pay monetary compensation to the petitioner. Relying on Rudul Sah (1983) 4 SCC 141 , O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. echoed the following views: (SCC p. 686, para 2) “2. … When a person comes to us with the complaint that he has been arrested and imprisoned with mischievous or malicious intent and that his constitutional and legal rights were invaded, the mischief or malice and the invasion may not be washed away or wished away by his being set free. In appropriate cases we have the jurisdiction to compensate the victim by awarding suitable monetary compensation….” 20. In appropriate cases we have the jurisdiction to compensate the victim by awarding suitable monetary compensation….” 20. In Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa (1993) 2 SCC 746 clearing the doubt and indicating the precise nature of the constitutional remedy under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution to award compensation for contravention of the fundamental rights which had arisen because of the observation that “the petitioner could have been relegated to the ordinary remedy of a suit if his claim to compensation was factually controversial” in Rudul Sah (1983) 4 SCC 141 (SCC p. 147, para 10), J.S. Verma, J. (as His Lordship then was) stated as under: (Nilabati Behera case (1993) 2 SCC 746 , SCC pp. 762-63, para 17) “17. It follows that “a claim in public law for compensation” for contravention of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the protection of which is guaranteed in the Constitution, is an acknowledged remedy for enforcement and protection of such rights, and such a claim based on strict liability made by resorting to a constitutional remedy provided for the enforcement of a fundamental right is “distinct from, and in addition to, the remedy in private law for damages for the tort” resulting from the contravention of the fundamental right. The defence of sovereign immunity being inapplicable, and alien to the concept of guarantee of fundamental rights, there can be no question of such a defence being available in the constitutional remedy. It is this principle which justifies award of monetary compensation for contravention of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, when that is the only practicable mode of redress available for the contravention made by the State or its servants in the purported exercise of their powers, and enforcement of the fundamental right is claimed by resort to the remedy in public law under the Constitution by recourse to Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution. This is what was indicated in Rudul Sah (1983) 4 SCC 141 and is the basis of the subsequent decisions in which compensation was awarded under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, for contravention of fundamental rights.” (emphasis supplied) 21. In the same decision, in his concurring judgment, Dr A.S. Anand, J. (as His Lordship then was), explaining the scope and purpose of public law proceedings and private law proceedings stated as under: (Nilabati Behera case (1993) 2 SCC 746 , SCC pp. In the same decision, in his concurring judgment, Dr A.S. Anand, J. (as His Lordship then was), explaining the scope and purpose of public law proceedings and private law proceedings stated as under: (Nilabati Behera case (1993) 2 SCC 746 , SCC pp. 768-69, para 34) “34. The public law proceedings serve a different purpose than the private law proceedings. The relief of monetary compensation, as exemplary damages, in proceedings under Article 32 by this Court or under Article 226 by the High Courts, for established infringement of the indefeasible right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law and is based on the strict liability for contravention of the guaranteed basic and indefeasible rights of the citizen. The purpose of public law is not only to civilise public power but also to assure the citizen that they live under a legal system which aims to protect their interests and preserve their rights. Therefore, when the court moulds the relief by granting “compensation” in proceedings under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution seeking enforcement or protection of fundamental rights, it does so under the public law by way of penalising the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the State which has failed in its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citizen. The payment of compensation in such cases is not to be understood, as it is generally understood in a civil action for damages under the private law but in the broader sense of providing relief by an order of making “monetary amends” under the public law for the wrong done due to breach of public duty, of not protecting the fundamental rights of the citizen. The compensation is in the nature of “exemplary damages” awarded against the wrongdoer for the breach of its public law duty and is independent of the rights available to the aggrieved party to claim compensation under the private law in an action based on tort, through a suit instituted in a court of competent jurisdiction or/and prosecute the offender under the penal law.” (emphasis supplied) 22. The power and jurisdiction of this Court and the High Courts to grant monetary compensation in exercise of their jurisdiction respectively under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution of India to a victim whose fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution are violated are thus, well established. However, the question now is whether on facts in hand, the appellant is entitled to monetary compensation in addition to what has already been awarded to him by the High Court. Having considered the case in the light of the fact situation stated above, we are of the opinion that the appellant does not deserve further monetary compensation.” 14. Because of the fact that by putting lock the respondent no.3 and 4 illegally deprived of the petitioners to enjoy their right of residence, a sibling of fundament right and by such action their fundamental right has illegally been infringed at the behest of respondent no.3 and 4 who happens to be an employee of the State. Therefore, State is answerable as well as accounted for the negligence or the illegal act of respondents by which petitioners were deprived of from enjoying their fundamental right for such long period and on account thereof respondent no.1, State is directed to pay a sum of Rs.10,000/-(Ten thousand) as compensation to the petitioners within three months from the date of passing of instant order. Petition is allowed. If the State so desire may recover it from the concerned respondents. To facilitate the implementation of the order at an earliest, let a copy of instant order be served upon learned Standing Counsel-24.