JUDGMENT Shashi Kant Gupta,J. 1. This revision has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 30.10.2006 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 1, Varanasi in S.C.C. Suit No. 4 of 1997 whereby the S.C.C. Suit No. 4 of 1997 filed by the revisionists/plaintiffs for arrears of rent and ejectment has been dismissed. Brief facts of the case are as follows: 2. The plaintiff no. 1 is a Cooperative Society under U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965 having its registered office at Premises No. D-13/27 Bans Phatak, Varanasi. The State Bank of India for its Branch Office occupied an accommodation forming part of premises No. D-13/27-25, Bans Phatak, Varanasi. The Suit No. 11 of 1984 was filed by the plaintiff no. 1 against the defendants/respondents for ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent, mense profit etc, in the Court of District Judge, Varanasi, which suit was transferred to the Court of Xth Additional District Judge, Varanasi. The parties, in that suit no. 11 of 1984 entered into a settlement and compromise and accordingly a compromise petition dated 07.09.1990 was filed and the suit was decided in terms of that compromise on 26.11.1990. For ready reference, Clause (a) of the said compromise dated 07.09.1990 is quoted herein below: "That the defendant Bank has agreed to pay the rent for the accommodation in this Suit Rs.10,000/- (Ten Thousand only) per month inclusive of all taxes with effect from 01.01.1989 That the plaintiff-landlord shall execute registered deed of lease for a period of 5 years with effect from 01.01.1989 with further option in favour of the Bank for another term of five years with 20% increase in rent i.e. payable Rs.12,000/- (Rupees Twelve Thousand only) from 01.01.1994. The cost for execution of lease deed will be borne by the Bank." 3. In terms of that compromise decree, the plaintiff did not press for ejectment and in lieu thereof the defendants were allowed to remain in possession of the accommodation for a period of five year w.e.f. 01.01.1989 on payment of Rs.10,000/- per month as rent. The respondents/bank did not vacate the accommodation after 31.12.1993, after the expiry of 5 years and retained the possession and occupation over the disputed accommodation even after 31.12.1993 despite no written option was exercised by the respondents/bank for another term of five years with 20% increase rent i.e. 12,000/- per month from 01.01.1994. The respondents/bank did not vacate the accommodation after 31.12.1993, after the expiry of 5 years and retained the possession and occupation over the disputed accommodation even after 31.12.1993 despite no written option was exercised by the respondents/bank for another term of five years with 20% increase rent i.e. 12,000/- per month from 01.01.1994. The respondents/bank despite having retained possession and occupation even after 31.12.1993 did not pay rent with 20% increase rent i.e. at the rate of Rs.12,000/- per month, therefore, plaintiff/revisionist wrote to the respondents/bank that whatever payments being made would be accepted only under protest and without prejudice as part payments towards rent. 4. The respondents/bank paid and cleared the entire rent which fell due upto 31.12.1993 at the rate of Rs.10,000/- per month. Thereafter, a notice dated 09.01.1997 was sent by the plaintiff to the respondents/bank calling upon the respondents/bank to pay him entire arrears of rent and by that notice tenancy of the respondent-bank was also terminated and the respondents/bank were called upon to vacate the accommodation and hand over the possession to the plaintiff. Despite expiry of notice period, the respondents/bank neither vacated the accommodation nor paid the alleged rent, hence the suit for arrears of rent and ejectment was filed by the plaintiff no. 1. Besides the decree of ejectment, the plaintiff no. 1 further prayed for decree for recovery of Rs.70,000/- being rent of Rs. 4000/- of August, 1996 and Rs.66,000/- as rent from September, 1996 till 15.02.1997 and Rs.26,000/- as mesne profit from 16.02.1997 till filing of this suit and further prayed for decree for recovery of pendentelite and future mesne profit at the rate of Rs.50,000/- per month from the date of institution of this suit till the eviction of the respondents/bank and also prayed for decree for pendentelite and future interest at the rate of Rs.15% per annum on the above sum of Rs.96,000/-. 5. The respondents/bank filed its written statement denying and disputing the allegations made in the plaint. The main pleas taken were that since no registered lease deed for a period of 5 years w.e.f. 01.01.1989 with further option in favour of the Bank for another term of 5 years with 20% increase in rent i.e. payable Rs.12,000/- per month from 01.01.1994, was executed after 01.01.1989, the respondents/bank was liable to pay only at the rate of Rs.10,000/- per month with effect from 01.01.1994. It was further pleaded that the plaintiff defaulted in execution of the lease deed as per the terms of the compromise in as much as the plaintiff did not procure Income Tax Clearance Certificate and ceiling permission. No arrears of rent are due. Plaintiff is not entitled to mesne profits at the rate of Rs.50,000/- per month. 6. During the pendency of the suit by sale deed dated 20.01.2005, the plaintiff no. 1 transferred the portion of the tenanted accommodation to plaintiff nos. 2, 3 and 4 and the transferees applied for their joining as plaintiffs by filing an impleadment application. No objection was filed by the respondents/bank to the said application and the said application was allowed by the Court below by order dated 21.05.2005 impleading revisionist nos. 2, 3 and 4 as plaintiffs in the suit. However, after amendment, the respondents/bank did not file any additional written statement. 7. The Court below after the exchange of pleadings framed several issues in the suit. Interalia issues were framed with regard to the validity of the notice dated 09.01.1997 under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act issued by the plaintiffs to the respondents/bank and whether the plaintiffs were entitled to receive the rent from 01.01.1994 at the rate of Rs.12,000/- per month and Rs.50,000/- per month as mesne profit. The Court below by its impugned order held that the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was illegal and further held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to received rent at the rate of Rs.12,000/- w.e.f 01.01.1994 and Rs.50,000/- as mesne profits. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said judgement and order dated 30.10.2006, the present revision has been filed by the plaintiffs/revisionists. 8. Learned counsel for the revisionists/plaintiffs has submitted that the order dated 30.10.2006 passed by the lower Court is based on complete misreading of the case and misconception of legal position relevant to the matter. He further submitted that the Court below has committed illegality for not decreeing the suit for arrears of rent w.e.f. 01.01.1994 at the rate of Rs.12,000/- and awarded Rs.50,000/- as mesne profit per month. He further submitted that the Court below has also committed illegality in holding that according to the compromise the responsibility was on the plaintiffs to get lease deed executed. He further submitted that the Court below has also committed illegality in holding that according to the compromise the responsibility was on the plaintiffs to get lease deed executed. He further submitted that the notice issued under Section 106 Transfer of Property Act can not be held to be illegal even if the written registered lease deed was not executed between the parties. He further submitted that during the pendency of the suit by a registered sale deed dated 20.01.2005, the plaintiff no. 1 transferred the portion of the tenanted accommodation to plaintiff nos. 2, 3 and 4 and the transferees applied for their joining as plaintiffs in the suit by an impleadment application. No objection was filed by the respondents/bank to the said application and the said application was allowed by the Court below by order dated 21.05.2005 impleading revisionist nos. 2, 3 and 4 as plaintiffs in the suit. However, after the amendment, the respondents/bank did not file any additional written statement. He further submitted that even though lease deed as provided in the compromise decree was not executed between the parties but according to the basic term of the compromise arrived at in Suit No. 11 of 1984, the rent payable by the defendant to the plaintiff after the expiry of 5 years was with 20% increase in rent i.e. at the rate of Rs.12,000/- per month. He further submitted that the plaintiff is entitled to mesne profit at the rate of Rs.50,000/- per month. He further submitted that notice dated 09.01.1997 under Section 106 T.P. Act was a valid notice terminating the tenancy of the respondent bank and the subsequent transfer of the disputed accommodation in favour of plaintiff nos. 2, 3 and 4 during the pendency of the suit would not make it invalid. 9. Learned counsel for the revisionists has further submitted that the notice dated 09.01.1997 was a valid notice asking the defendants to quit on expiry of 31st day under Section 106 of T.P. Act and it would not be invalid notice merely there is also demand of rent. In this regard, it is noted that Rent Control Act (U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972) is not applicable and notice to quit under Section 106 of T.P. Act clearly indicate the intention of the landlord to terminate the tenancy. Hence there is no illegality in the notice. In this regard, it is noted that Rent Control Act (U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972) is not applicable and notice to quit under Section 106 of T.P. Act clearly indicate the intention of the landlord to terminate the tenancy. Hence there is no illegality in the notice. Even though, there is additional demand of the rent for this purpose. The revisionists relied upon the judgment passed in Vinod Kumar Rastogi Vs. Vith Additional District and Sessions Judge, 2003(52) ALR, 787, para-6, wherein it has been held as follows: - "Under Section 106 of T.P. Act, the language used in the notice expresses a clear intention of terminating the tenancy after the expiry of 30 days. Though, the tenant is not defaulter and no relief regarding payment of rent may have been claimed in the suit. However, in case the tenant is also defaulter, then the relief for recovery of arrears of rent may also be included in the suit. This relief will be in the nature of additional relief having got no concern with other relief of ejectment. The relief for recovery of rent will not at all dependent upon relief of ejectment. 10.He further submitted that admittedly the total area of the disputed Branch premises occupied by the Bank is 4200 Sq. feet in first floor, and apart from it the bank has illegally occupied some area on the ground floor for installation of Generator without permission of the landlord. He further submitted that the rate of rent has gone high due to rising of circle rate and it is minimum Rs.1 Lac per month. In this respect, Regional Office of the bank has issued letters dated 03.12.2013 and 17.10.2013 respectively under right to information act. The bank has admitted in its letter dated 17.02.2013 that another nearby City branch of the State Bank of India paying Rs.90,255/- per month for the total area of 4597 sq. feet, as such, the plaintiffs were also entitled to get Rs. 1 Lac per month as rent of the disputed premises. 11. Per contra, learned counsel for the landlord/opposite party has supported the findings recorded by the court below and submitted that the impugned order is just and proper and the same have been passed in accordance with law. 12. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 13. 1 Lac per month as rent of the disputed premises. 11. Per contra, learned counsel for the landlord/opposite party has supported the findings recorded by the court below and submitted that the impugned order is just and proper and the same have been passed in accordance with law. 12. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 13. Admittedly, the premises in disputed does not come within the ambit of Rent Control Act as the rate of rent is above Rs.2000/- per month. It was also admitted that the parties entered into a compromise in the previous suit where the defendant Bank had agreed to pay the rent for the accommodation in this Suit Rs.10,000/- (Ten Thousand only) per month inclusive of all taxes with effect from 01.01.1989 and the plaintiff-landlord was to execute a registered deed of lease for a period of 5 years with effect from 01.01.1989 with further option in favour of the Bank for another term of five years with 20% increase in rent i.e. payable Rs.12,000/- (Rupees Twelve Thousand only) from 01.01.1994. The cost for execution of lease deed was to be borne by the Bank. The respondents/bank did not vacate the accommodation and retained the possession and occupation of the disputed accommodation even after 31.12.1993 despite no written option was exercised by the respondents/bank for another term of five years with 20% increase in rent i.e. 12,000/- per month from 01.01.1994. The respondents/bank despite having retained possession and occupation even after 31.12.1993 did not pay rent as agreed at the rate of Rs.12,000/- per month, therefore, plaintiff/revisionist wrote to the respondents/bank that whatever payments being made would be accepted only under protest and without prejudice as part payments towards rent. 14. The question now that arises for consideration before this Court is whether for want of execution of registered lease deed executed between the parties, notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act can be held to be illegal. This Court is of the view that non execution of the registered lease deed as provided under the compromise decree would not make the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act as illegal. At the most, the revisionist would become month to month tenant after the expiry of the lease period and his tenancy could be terminated by a notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act. At the most, the revisionist would become month to month tenant after the expiry of the lease period and his tenancy could be terminated by a notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act. If a Rent control Act does not apply, then suit for ejectment may be filed and decreed after termination of tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, even though the tenant may not be a defaulter and no relief regarding payment of rent may have been claimed in the suit. However, in case the tenant is also a defaulter, then the relief for recovery of arrears of rent may also be included in the suit. This relief will be in the nature of additional relief having absolutely no concern with other relief of ejectment. In such situation, relief for recovery of arrears of rent will not at all be dependent upon relief of ejectment. In this connection, it is relevant to refer paragraphs 15 and 16 of the judgment in the case of Mohammad Nasir Vs. District Judge, Nainital and others, 1999 (35) ALR, 239, which reads as follows: 15. The perusal of the notice in question does show that it mentions about the tenant having not paid rent from a particular date but it also recited about the termination of tenancy and vacant possession of the premises in question was demanded by the landlord on the expiry of 30 days from the date of receipt of notice. The notice clearly mentioned that the tenancy was being terminated under Section 106. T. P. Act. In the suit also, rent was not claimed in respect of the period subsequent to the notice period and for that period only, damages for illegal use and occupation have been claimed. The notice itself shows that it was clause (h) of Section 111 which was pressed into service because the requirements of notice as mentioned in Section 106, T, P. Act were duly borne in mind. By no stretch of imagination, this notice could be held to be a notice under Section 111(g) of the T. P. Act. The mere fact that while terminating the tenancy under Section 106 of the T. P. Act, the landlord also made a demand of arrears of rent and possession will not convert the notice as one given under Section 111(g). 16. The mere fact that while terminating the tenancy under Section 106 of the T. P. Act, the landlord also made a demand of arrears of rent and possession will not convert the notice as one given under Section 111(g). 16. It is well-established that the nature and purpose of the notice must be gathered by reading the document as a whole and not from any words read out of the context or from any omission to use the formal language of a lawyer. In the present case, the landlord simply intimated the tenant that on account of his not paying rent regularly, a great inconvenience was being caused to the landlord and he was no more interested in keeping him as a tenant and his tenancy was being terminated by giving a 30 days notice under Section 106, T. P. Act. This clearly signified that the tenancy was terminated under Section 106. T. P. Act and not under Section 111(g) by invoking forfeiture clause for nonpayment of rent. Demand of rent was made only in addition to the demand of vacant possession. There is nothing in Sections 106 and 111(g) of the T. P. Act to indicate that if a notice terminating the tenancy contains demand of rent also, it will cease to be a notice under Section 106. T. P. Act and would acquire the character of a notice under Section 111(g) of the T. P. Act. The salient features in the notice leave no room of doubt in the mind of the Court that the present case is not one of forfeiture but of determination of tenancy. 15. It is notable that the notice dated 09.01.1997 was sent by the plaintiff to the respondents/bank calling upon the respondents/bank to pay him entire arrears of rent and by that notice tenancy of the accommodation was determined and terminated and respondents/bank were called upon to vacate the accommodation and hand over the possession to the plaintiff and despite expiry of notice period, the respondents/bank did not vacate the accommodation nor paid the arrears of rent, hence the suit for arrears of rent and ejectment was rightly filed by the plaintiff no. 1. 16. The notice dated 09.01.1997 under Section 106 T.P. Act giving 30 days time is valid for termination of tenancy and due to subsequent transfer in favour of plaintiff nos. 1. 16. The notice dated 09.01.1997 under Section 106 T.P. Act giving 30 days time is valid for termination of tenancy and due to subsequent transfer in favour of plaintiff nos. 2, 3 and 4 during the pendency of the suit would not make it invalid. Section 109 of T.P. Act would be applicable and notice given by the predecessor landlord was valid and the subsequent transfers were not liable to issue any fresh notice. In this context it is relevant to remember what was held in Basant Kumar Radhakishan Vora Vs. Board of Trustees of Port of Bombay, AIR 1991 SC Page 14 (Para 8), which is quoted below: - 8. It is no doubt true that per se sec. 109 of T.P. Act does not apply to the facts of this case. It contemplates transfer of lessor's right inter vivos. But when right, title and interest in immovable property stand transferred by operation of law, the spirit behind Sec. 109 per force would apply and successor in interest would be entitled to the rights of the predecessor. This is what the learned single Judge of the High Court in the impugned judgment has held and we approve of the view as correct. We, accordingly, hold that the notice terminating the tenancy of Vasantkumar would enure to the benefit of the respondent and it could be availed of by the respondent to lay the suit for ' ejectment. 17. The parties, in suit no. 11 of 1984 entered into a settlement and compromise and accordingly a compromise petition dated 07.09.1990 was filed and the suit was decided in terms of that compromise on 26.11.1990. At the cost of repetition, Clause (a) of the said compromise dated 07.09.1990 is quoted again herein below: "That the defendant Bank has agreed to pay the rent for the accommodation in this Suit Rs.10,000/- (Ten Thousand only) per month inclusive of all taxes with effect from 01.01.1989 That the plaintiff-landlord shall execute registered deed of lease for a period of 5 years with effect from 01.01.1989 with further option in favour of the Bank for another term of five years with 20% increase in rent i.e. payable Rs.12,000/- (Rupees Twelve Thousand only) from 01.01.1994. The cost for execution of lease deed will be borne by the Bank." 18. The cost for execution of lease deed will be borne by the Bank." 18. Admittedly, no registered lease deed was executed between the parties but the respondent bank continued to occupy the disputed premises at the rate of Rs.10,000/- per month not only upto 31.12.1993 but also continued to occupy the disputed premises after the expiry of five years i.e. 31.12.1993. 19. Submission of the learned counsel for the respondent bank is that it can not be made liable to pay at the rate of Rs.12000/- after 31.12.1993 as no registered lease deed was executed between the parties giving further option in favour of the respondent bank for another term of five years with 20% increase in rent. I am not impressed with this contention advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent bank. The execution of lease deed as provided in the compromise deed was merely a ministerial Act. According to the compromise decree respondent bank was liable to pay rent Rs.10,000/- per month for the period of five years from 01.01.1989 up to 31.12.1993 with further option for another term of five years with 20% increase in rent i.e. payable Rs.12,000/-. Now in the present case, the respondent bank continued to occupy the disputed premises even after 31.12.1993 i.e. after the expiry of five years and therefore was liable to pay Rs.12,000/- per month as provided in the compromise decree in place of Rs.10,000/- for the period subsequent to 31.12.1993. If the respondent bank was not prepared/willing to pay Rs.12000/- per month it should have vacated the disputed premises immediately after 31.12.1993. But instead of vacating the premises it opted to retain the premises meaning thereby it impliedly consented to pay Rs. 12000/- per month as provided in the compromise decree. It is noteworthy that in the compromise decree it was specifically mentioned that after 31.12.1993 respondent bank had further option for another term of five years at the rate of Rs.12000/- per month with 20% increase in rent. The respondent bank can not be permitted to take unfair advantage of the fact that no registered lease deed was executed between the parties. The contention of the respondent bank that the landlord was responsible for non execution of the leased deed as he did not provide the Income Tax Clearance Certificate and ceiling permission is also not tenable. The respondent bank can not be permitted to take unfair advantage of the fact that no registered lease deed was executed between the parties. The contention of the respondent bank that the landlord was responsible for non execution of the leased deed as he did not provide the Income Tax Clearance Certificate and ceiling permission is also not tenable. Learned Counsel for the respondent bank has not been able to demonstrate as to how and under what provision of law the landlord was liable to furnish the aforesaid documents for executing the registered rend deed. Besides this. There is nothing on record to show that the respondent made any endeavour or took any steps for getting the rent deed executed in pursuance of the compromise decree if the revisionists failed to fulfil his obligation. 20. Thus, the entire discussion made herein above clearly indicates that the court below has totally overlooked the fundamental aspect of the matter and thereby fell into a grave error in dismissing the suit filed by the revisionist for arrears of rent and ejectment. Impugned judgement passed by the court below is patently misconceived and erroneous and can not be sustained. 21. In view of what has been discussed herein above, this revision deserves to be allowed and is hereby allowed. The judgement and order dated 30.10.2006 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 1, Varanasi in S.C.C. Suit No. 4 of 1997 is set aside and the matter is remanded to the concerned court to pass afresh order within a period of 3 months after the receipt of the certified copy of this judgement in the light of the observations made as above. I make no order as to costs. Let the record of the case be remitted to the concerned lower Court forthwith.