JUDGMENT Mahendra Dayal,J. The petitioners being aggrieved by the orders dated 30.05.2014 and 08.10.2012 as contained Annexures No.9 & 8 respectively to the writ petition, have filed this writ petition challenging both the aforesaid orders. 2. The facts in brief are that the opposite party no.3 filed an application for release under Section 21(1)(a) against the petitioners in respect of the shop in question situated in Bartan Bazar, Lakhimpur Kheri. It was stated in the application that the opposite party no. 3 has been carrying on business of selling utensils in a shop and he has three more shops which are in possession of the defendant-tenants. One of the shop is in occupation of the petitioners on a monthly rent of Rs.200/-. It was further stated that the opposite party no.3 has two sons namely, Atul Kumar and Deepak Kumar, who were aged about 36 and 34 years respectively. Both of his sons are unemployed and jobless. Atul Kumar is a Law Graduate and he also practiced for some time but when he found that he was not in a position to continue with the profession, he left the same and decided to start his own business. It was also stated by the opposite party no.3 that both of his sons are married and both of them require separate shops to start their own business. Atul Kumar has an experience of three years in the business of selling of ready-made cloths and wants to start his own business of ready-made cloths. The petitioners are residents of Oyal and they are also carrying of business over there, hence, they will not feel much hardship in case they are asked to vacate the shop in dispute. 3. The petitioners filed their written statement opposing release of shop inter-alia on the ground that the father of the opposite party no.3, namely, Rameshwar Dayal had moved an application for release on same grounds but during the pendency of the application, he died and the opposite party no.3 was substituted in his place. The said earlier release application was dismissed by the learned Prescribed Authority against which an appeal was preferred before the learned District Judge which too was dismissed. The opposite party no.3 had then filed a Writ Petition No.135 of 1995 before this Hon'ble Court. The said earlier release application was dismissed by the learned Prescribed Authority against which an appeal was preferred before the learned District Judge which too was dismissed. The opposite party no.3 had then filed a Writ Petition No.135 of 1995 before this Hon'ble Court. It was further stated in the written statement that Atul Kumar and Deepak Kumar both the sons of the opposite party no.3 are carrying on business in the shop of their father. Another shop in which the father of the opposite party no.3 - Rameshwar Dayal was carrying on business, fell vacant on his death and in the year 1989, the said shop was let out to one Jiyaudeen Beg without any allotment order. Thus, the said shop would be deemed vacant and in case the opposite party no.3 has any need of additional shop, the same could be released on the ground of vacancy. The petitioners further stated that after filing of the release application, they tried to find out some alternative arrangement, but no suitable shop was available for them to shift their business. They have been carrying on the said business since 1981 and their shop has earned a goodwill and in case the petitioners are vacated and the shop in question is released, they will suffer irreparable loss. 4. The parties led their evidence before the learned Prescribed Authority, who framed three points on determination and on the basis of evidence on record, learned Prescribed Authority found that the need of the opposite party no.3 was bonafide and the hardship caused to the opposite party no.3 by refusal of the release application would not be greater than the hardship caused to the petitioners in case the release application is refused. On the basis of the aforesaid findings, the learned Prescribed Authority allowed the release application and allowed three months' time to the petitioners to vacate the shop. 5. Feeling aggrieved by the order of the learned Prescribed Authority, the petitioners preferred an appeal before the learned District Judge which too was dismissed by the judgment and order dated 30.05.2014. The appeal was partly allowed only to the extent that the petitioners would be entitled to get amount equal to two months' rent, which was mandatory provision of release of a commercial building. 6. I have heard Shri N.N. Jaiswal on behalf of the petitioners and Shri Mohd. The appeal was partly allowed only to the extent that the petitioners would be entitled to get amount equal to two months' rent, which was mandatory provision of release of a commercial building. 6. I have heard Shri N.N. Jaiswal on behalf of the petitioners and Shri Mohd. Arif Khan, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Mohd. Aslam Khan, on behalf of the opposite party no.3. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners Shri Jaiswal has assailed the orders of both the courts below mainly on the ground that the second release application filed by the opposite party no.3 was barred by the principle of res-judicata. His submission is that the earlier release application filed by late Rameshwar Dayal and on his death, having been continued by the opposite party no.3, was for the need of Atul Kumar and when the release application was dismissed and the appeal was also dismissed, the opposite party no.3 filed a writ petition before this Hon'ble Court. During the pendency of the writ petition, the opposite party no.3 moved another application for release on the same ground and subsequently got the writ petition dismissed as not pressed. Thus, the order dismissing the earlier release application as well as the appeal filed against the same, became final. The said finding attained finality when the writ petition was dismissed. The findings in the earlier release application was that the need of the opposite party no.3 was not bonafide. The second release application filed in the year 2010 is exactly on the same ground and the facts pleaded are identical, therefore, the second release application is barred by the principle of res-judicata. The next submission is that the opposite party no.3 while moving the second release application, concealed fact of filing of earlier release application and the pendency of the writ petition. Both the courts below did not take into consideration this important fact that the opposite party no.3 had not come with clean hands and as such was not entitled to the relief claimed by him. Both the courts below did not take into consideration this important fact that the opposite party no.3 had not come with clean hands and as such was not entitled to the relief claimed by him. The courts below also did not take into consideration that the petitioners have no other alternative accommodation while the opposite party no.3 has two shops, one in which he is presently carrying on business and the other which has fallen vacant on account of the death of Rameshwar Dayal and which has been illegally let out to another person without any allotment order. 8. Learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the opposite party no.3 submitted that the principle of res-judicata does not apply to the facts of the present case because Rule 18 framed under the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 restricts the landlord from moving the second release application within a year of dismissal of the first. The submission of the learned Senior Advocate is that the only restriction imposed by Rule 18 is that the landlord cannot move a second application within a year of the dismissal of the earlier release application but it nowhere restricts the filing of the second release application on the same ground. In support of his arguments, he has relied upon the case law reported in 1983 Allahabad Rent Cases Page 782 - Dr. Sita Ram Gandhi vs. IVth Additional District Judge, Meerut and another in which it has been held that the legislature do not want the principle of res-judicata to apply in an application under Section 21, the only restriction imposed is that within a year of the dismissal of the previous application, the second one cannot be moved. The principle behind the res-judicata is different than the one which led to the legislature to frame Rule 18. The Hon'ble High Court has further clarified that the two things should not be mixed up and confused. 9. Thus, from the perusal of Rule 18 and the law laid down in the aforesaid decision one thing is clear that if a subsequent release application has been moved after the expiry of one year from the dismissal of earlier release application, the principle of res-judicata would not apply. The first submission raised on behalf of the petitioners has, therefore, no force. The first submission raised on behalf of the petitioners has, therefore, no force. 10.Learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the opposite party no.3 has further submitted that since the disposal of the writ petition filed against the dismissal of the earlier release application and the appeal, was taking considerable period of time, the opposite party no.3 thought it proper to move subsequent release application instead of pursuing the release application through the writ petition. It was for this reason that the writ petition was got dismissed as not pressed and the subsequent release application was pursued. Since the findings recorded in the earlier release application were not to be considered in the subsequent release application, there was, therefore, no need to disclose those facts in the subsequent release application. 11. So far as the question of bonafide need is concerned, the learned Prescribed Authority while deciding the point no.1 has recorded a finding that one of the shop is in occupation of Jiyaudeen Beg and is not available to the opposite party no.3. Another shop is in occupation of Deepak Kumar in which he is carrying on his own business. Thus, the shop in occupation of the petitioners is the only shop available to the opposite party no.3 and it has further been held by the learned Prescribed Authority that the tenant cannot dictate his landlord to choose the shop for release because the landlord being the owner of the shop has a right to choose the shop of his own choice. While considering the question of comparative hardship, the learned Prescribed Authority has recorded a finding that the petitioners have not made sincere efforts to find out an alternative accommodation for shifting their business while on the other hand the opposite party no.3 has no other alternative shop for establishing business of his son and as such the hardship of the opposite party no.3 is more pressing and urgent. Learned appellate court below has also considered all these aspects in detail and has found that the findings recorded by the learned Prescribed Authority are correct and do not call for any interference. Thus, with regard to bonafide need and comparative hardship, both the courts below have recorded a concurrent finding and the learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to point out any illegality or infirmity so as to call for any interference by this Court. 12. Thus, with regard to bonafide need and comparative hardship, both the courts below have recorded a concurrent finding and the learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to point out any illegality or infirmity so as to call for any interference by this Court. 12. In view of above, I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the orders impugned in this writ petition and as such the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 13. The writ petition is hereby dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, the petitioners are given three months' time to vacate the shop in question and hand over its vacant peaceful possession to the opposite party no.3. It is also made clear that in case the petitioners fail to vacate the shop within the aforesaid period, the opposite party no.3 shall have an option to enforce the release order through the process of law.