JUDGMENT (S.C. Dharmadhikari, J.) 1. This LPA raises an arguable question and, therefore, it is admitted and taken up for final hearing by consent of parties, forthwith. 2. It challenges the order passed by the learned Single Judge, dismissing the writ petition, preferred by the appellant, bearing W.P. No. 6381 of 2010 by the order under challenge dated 21st March, 2011. The learned Single Judge, in dismissing the writ petition, has confirmed the order passed by the Presiding Officer, School Tribunal, Solapur dated 9.9.2009, in Misc. Application No. 11 of 2009. 3. The petitioner/appellant, approached the School Tribunal by way of filing an appeal under Section 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service and Regulation) Act, 1977, (for short, “the MEPS Act”), questioned the action of the management in refusing to permit her to sign the muster roll since 18th July, 2008. Since she terms this as a termination or dismissal from service, that she was advised that the same furnished a cause of action to approach the competent School Tribunal. That she did, by filing the appeal. However, that appeal was barred by limitation. The period of limitation is 30 days, but the appeal was delayed by 217 days. Naturally, therefore, she had to make an application, setting out as to why the appeal was delayed. She, therefore, filed Miscellaneous Application No. 11 of 2009 and pointed out the cause. The cause shown was that she was employed in Haribhau Ghogre High School on temporary basis as a Shikshan Sevak, from 18.7.2005. Her services were approved by respondent No.3 to the appeal w.e.f. 18.7.2005. She continued to teach the subjects which were assigned to her and her work was also satisfactory in her opinion. Since she completed the requisite period of 3 years for being absorbed as Assistant Teacher, the management demanded a Caste Verification Certificate from her. 4. Petitioner belongs to Vimukta Jati (Nomadic Tribe) and was appointed against a post reserved for such candidate. Since she could not produce a Caste Validity Certificate, not for her fault, but because the verification proceedings were not concluded, that she requested the management to give her time. However, the management did not do so and restrained her from teaching students and signing the muster roll from 18th July, 2008. 5. Since she could not produce a Caste Validity Certificate, not for her fault, but because the verification proceedings were not concluded, that she requested the management to give her time. However, the management did not do so and restrained her from teaching students and signing the muster roll from 18th July, 2008. 5. While it is true that the applicant should have approached the Tribunal within 30 days of this date, but from the facts it is clear that she approached a Union which upholds the interest and protects the rights of the candidates like her. That Union took up her cause, but, since it was not redressed and she was advised to file an appeal that eventually, she approached the Tribunal. She pointed out that she was pursuing the management. She was requesting the management through this Backward Classes Union, from 18th September, 2008, but this was without any success. She relies upon the correspondence in that behalf. Ultimately, finding that there is no redressal of her grievances, even when she approached the management through this Union, that she filed this appeal which was barred by 217 days. 6. The presiding Officer of the Tribunal though referred to this factual position, the stand of the Management but in one paragraph, and without issuing any reasons, as to whether cause shown for delay can be said to be sufficient or otherwise, dismissed the application. The only reasoning is that the petitioner/applicant did not satisfy the Tribunal to take a liberal approach while condoning the delay and the reasons stated by her does not give proper explanation and sufficient cause for delay. 7. None of the decisions that have been brought to our notice or relied before the Single Judge states that as a matter of rule or principle that the liberal approach that one is required to adopt in such matters should not be adopted. All such judgments, as are relied upon, indicate that the cause shown should be sufficient. The cause shown should be such as would in the ordinary circumstances and going by the common course of human conduct inspire confidence. The cause shown should not be patently false or demonstrate utter negligence or callousness on the part of the applicant. 8. All such judgments, as are relied upon, indicate that the cause shown should be sufficient. The cause shown should be such as would in the ordinary circumstances and going by the common course of human conduct inspire confidence. The cause shown should not be patently false or demonstrate utter negligence or callousness on the part of the applicant. 8. All these tests ought to have been applied and when the Presiding Officer was obliged to record a satisfaction in the above terms, that we find that the learned Single Judge erred in law, in refusing to interfere in writ jurisdiction. 9. The writ jurisdiction is conferred on this court to render justice. The writ jurisdiction ought to be exercised when there is a patent illegality or error apparent on the face of the record or perversity on the part of the courts below. Equally, that is to be exercised to correct the miscarriage of justice. 10. The courts below and which are subordinate to this court, have to act within the limits or bounds of their authority and jurisdiction and that is the purpose, in conferring the writ jurisdiction and power of superintendence in this court. Precisely, all this has been lost sight of, when the Tribunal's order has been upheld. The Tribunal's order could not be said to be in accordance with law, or the guiding principles. 11. For all the aforementioned reasons, we quash and set aside the order of the School Tribunal and that of the learned single Judge and allow the application for condonation of delay, but, by imposing costs on the petitioner/appellant and quantify the same at Rs.5,000/-, which shall be condition precedent for allowing the application. Upon costs being paid to the respondent No.1 within a period of 4 weeks from today, and proof being produced in relation thereto, the competent School Tribunal shall register the appeal, and thereafter, decide it in accordance with law. All contentions on merits of the controversy are kept open. It is clarified that merely because delay is condoned, does not mean that the petitioner/appellant, would be automatically entitled to the reliefs, and in terms of power conferred on the Tribunal. The Tribunal has adequate powers to mould the reliefs, depending upon its decision or opinion on merits of the controversy. 12. The appeal stands allowed in above terms.