JUDGMENT Mr. Mehinder Singh Sullar, J. (Oral):- As identical questions of law & facts are involved, therefore, I propose to dispose of the indicated five revision petitions between the same parties, arising out of the similar impugned orders, by virtue of this common judgment, in order to avoid the repetition. However, the conspectus of the facts, which needs a necessary mention for deciding the core controversy, involved in the instant revision petitions, have been extracted from (1) CR No.4 of 2014 titled as “M/s AGS Retail Private Limited & another Vs. Mrs. Usha Gupta & another” for ready reference in this respect. 2. The matrix of the facts and material, culminating in the commencement, relevant for deciding the instant revision petitions and emanating from the record, is that Usha Gupta (respondent-plaintiff No.1) wife of M.L.Gupta (respondent-plaintiff No.2) had purchased the property in dispute from M/s Aerens Goldsouk International Ltd. Company (petitioner-defendant No.2) along with the rights in common passage, stair cases and all other common facilities and amenities, vide agreement to sell dated 6.11.2009 for a total sale consideration of Rs.1,31,88,000/- (Rupees One Crore Thirty One Lac Eighty Eight Thousand Only). The entire sale consideration was paid by plaintiff No.2 for and on behalf of plaintiff No.1 to defendant No.2, by way of cheque, bearing No.474831 dated 6.11.2009, drawn on HDFC Bank Ltd., Greater Kailash-I, New Delhi. According to plaintiffs that at the time of execution of the pointed agreement to sell, defendant No.2 had leased out the property to defendant No.1 and it was in symbolic possession thereof. The notional possession of the suit property was transferred from defendant No.2 to plaintiff No.1 and there was substitution of plaintiff No.1 in place of defendant No.2 as its landlord. In this manner, defendant No.1 was inducted as a lessee of plaintiff No.1 and a written lease agreement dated 6.11.2009 on the same day was executed between the parties on a stamp paper of Rs.50/-. The lease amount was settled at the rate of Rs.2,35,500/- (Rupees Two Lac Thirty Five Thousand Five Hundred only) per month, which was payable in advance every month on or before the 10th day of each English calendar month. As per clause 3 of the lease agreement, it was obligatory on the part of defendant No.1 to bear the stamp duty, registration charges etc. and to register the lease deed. As per clause 3 of the lease agreement, it was obligatory on the part of defendant No.1 to bear the stamp duty, registration charges etc. and to register the lease deed. Defendant No.1-company had initially paid the security deposit and monthly rent for nine months from April, 2010 to December, 2010. Thereafter, it stopped paying the rent to the landlord with effect from January, 2011 onwards. 3. Sequelly, the plaintiffs claimed that in the absence of registered deed of lease between the parties, the tenancy of suit premises has taken the shape of monthly tenancy, by means of legal fiction. Thereafter, plaintiff No.1 issued legal notice, terminated the monthly tenancy and called upon defendant No.1 to hand over the vacant and peaceful possession of the premises in dispute to her after the expiry of the period of 15 days from the date of receipt of legal notice and not later than 31.12.2011. The refundable security was adjusted against the rent for the months of January to March, 2011 and defendant No.1-lessee was accordingly informed, through the medium of legal notice dated 7.12.2011, which was duly served on defendant No.1 by registered AD as well as courier. 4. Likewise, the plaintiffs claimed that since the lease agreement contains an arbitration clause, so, plaintiff No.1 gave another notice dated 17.1.2012 to defendant No.1 to invoke the arbitration clause, suggested the names of three Hon’ble retired Judges of the Delhi High Court and requested defendant No.1 to give consent to either of the three names to act as sole arbitrator to resolve the disputes that had arisen between the parties by arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter to be referred as “the Act”). In the wake of receipt of legal notice dated 7.12.2011, defendant No.1 sent the reply dated 4.2.2012 and came up with an incredible and false, though irrelevant narrative, inter-alia, admitting the execution of the agreement of lease & possession and other factual matrix. However, the objection was raised that the arbitration was not a remedy available to plaintiff No.1, because according to defendant No.1, the arbitration clause was un-enforceable. Thereafter, plaintiff No.1 filed an application dated 18.7.2011 u/s 9 of the Act in the Court of District Judge against defendant No.1, seeking interim measure of protection in respect of the suit property, including the arrears of rent along with the interest per annum. Thereafter, plaintiff No.1 filed an application dated 18.7.2011 u/s 9 of the Act in the Court of District Judge against defendant No.1, seeking interim measure of protection in respect of the suit property, including the arrears of rent along with the interest per annum. Plaintiff No.1 has also filed an application u/s 11 of the Act against defendant No.1 in the High Court for the appointment of sole arbitrator to adjudicate and decide all the disputes and differences, pertaining to the agreement between the parties and to pass an award accordingly. Defendant No.1 contested the claim of plaintiff No.1, filed the reply, vehemently resisted and opposed the appointment of an arbitrator, inter-alia, on the ground that the lease agreement executed between the parties was under stamped, was not enforceable and raised objection with regard to the maintainability of the petition in the High Court. 5. Faced with the situation, plaintiff No.1 sought leave of the High Court and withdrew the application for appointment of arbitrator, with liberty to avail her alternative proceedings against defendant No.1 for appropriate relief. The leave was granted to her by the High Court, by virtue of order dated 25.1.2013 (Annexure P6). The petition u/s 9 of the Act was also withdrawn by plaintiff No.1. 6. Thereafter, plaintiff No.1 has instituted the civil suit (Annexure P7A) against the defendants for recovery of possession, arrears of rent, mesne profit and interest in the civil Court along with the application for ad interim injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 read with Section 151 and another application under Order 15 Rule 5 CPC to claim the rent during the pendency of the civil suit. 7. Strange enough, the defendants, instead of submitting to the jurisdiction of, filing written statement in, the civil Court and making the payment of rent during the pendency of the civil suit, as contemplated under Order 15 Rule 5 CPC, straightway jumped to file the applications U/ss 5 ,7 and 8 of the Act read with Order 7 Rule 11 CPC (Annexure P8) for return/rejection of the plaint, mainly on the ground that as the agreement of lease dated 6.11.2009 contains an arbitration clause, therefore, the suit filed by the plaintiffs in the civil Court was not maintainable. That being so, the defendants prayed that their suit be rejected. 8. That being so, the defendants prayed that their suit be rejected. 8. The plaintiffs refuted the prayer of defendants and filed the reply (Annexure P9), inter-alia, pleading certain preliminary objections of maintainability of the petition and cause of action of the defendants to file the petition. It was claimed that the defendants have neither paid any arrears of rent nor handed over the possession of premises in dispute to plaintiffs. They themselves repeatedly raised the objection for appointment of arbitrator on the ground that lease agreement is under stamped and not enforceable. It will not be out of place to mention here that the plaintiffs have stoutly denied all other allegations contained in the applications and prayed for their dismissal. Taking into consideration the entire material on record, the trial Court dismissed the applications of the defendants, vide impugned order dated 4.12.2013 (Annexure P10). 9. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner-defendants have preferred the present revision petitions to challenge the impugned order, invoking the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution of India. That is how I am seized of the matter. 10. Having heard the learned Senior counsel for the petitioners, having gone through the legal provisions & record with his valuable help and after bestowal of thoughts over the entire matter, to my mind, there is no merit in the instant revision petitions in this context. 11. Ex facie, the celebrated argument of learned Senior counsel that since the plaintiffs have based their claim on the basis of agreement of lease dated 6.11.2009, which contained an arbitration clause, so, the civil suit filed by them, is not maintainable, is neither tenable nor the observations of Hon’ble Apex Court in case SMS Tea Estates Private Limited v. Chandmari Tea Company Private Limited, [2012(1) Law Herald (SC) 559] : (2011) 14 Supreme Court Cases 66, Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. M/s Pinkcity Midway Petroleums AIR 2003 Supreme Court 2881 and of this Court in cases M/s Magma Leasing Limited v. Inder Pal, [2010(1) Law Herald (P&H) 319] : 2010(1) PLR 774 & M/s Enco Engineers Combine Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s Bhupindera Steel (P) Ltd. 2011 (2) PLR 758, are at applicable to the facts of the present case at this stage. 12. 12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in SMS Tea Estates Private Limited’s case (supra) has held as under (para 23):- “Where a lease deed is for a term of thirty years and is unregistered, the terms of such a deed cannot be relied upon to claim or enforce any right under or in respect of such lease. It can be relied upon for the limited purposes of showing that the possession of the lessee is lawful possession or as evidence of some collateral transaction. Even if an arbitrator is appointed, he cannot rely upon or enforce any term of the unregistered lease deed. Where the arbitration agreement is not wide and does not provide for arbitration in regard to all and whatsoever disputes, but provides only for settlement of disputes and differences arising in relation to the lease deed, the arbitration clause though available in theory is of little practical assistance, as it cannot be used for deciding any dispute or difference with reference to the unregistered deed.” 13. Sequelly, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd’s case and this Court in M/s Magma Leasing Limited and M/s Enco Engineers Combine Pvt. Ltd . ‘ s cases (supra) have observed that in case, where there is an arbitration clause in the agreement and once the execution of the agreement between the parties containing arbitration clause was proved, then, it was obligatory for the Court to refer the matter to the arbitrator. 14. Possibly, no one can dispute with regard to the ratio of law laid down in the aforesaid judgments, relied on behalf of petitioner-defendants, but, to me, the same would not come to their rescue and the instant revision petitions deserve to be dismissed for the reasons mentioned here-in-below. 15. As is evident from the record that defendant No.1 was inducted as a lessee of plaintiff No.1 in the manner depicted here-in-above and written lease agreement dated 6.11.2009 was executed between the parties on a stamp paper of Rs.50/- in this respect. The lease amount was settled at the rate of Rs.2,35,500/- per month, which was payable in advance every month on or before the 10th day of each English calendar month. As per clause 3 of the lease agreement, it was obligatory on the part of defendant No.1 to bear the stamp duty, registration charges etc. and to register the lease deed. As per clause 3 of the lease agreement, it was obligatory on the part of defendant No.1 to bear the stamp duty, registration charges etc. and to register the lease deed. The lessee paid the rent only for nine months from April, 2010 to December, 2010. Thereafter, it stopped paying the rent to the landlord with effect from January, 2011 onwards. Plaintiff No.1 moved an application claiming arrears of the rent during the pendency of the suit under Order 15 Rule 5 CPC (State amendments), which postulates that in any suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee after the determination of his lease and for the recovery from him of rent or compensation for use and occupation, the defendant shall, at or before the first hearing of the suit, deposit the entire amount admitted by him to be due together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum, failing which, the defence of the defendants was liable to be struck-off. Indeed, possibly, it cannot be denied that the tendency and frequency of lessees not to make payment of lease money, have been tremendously increasing day-by-day in order to harass the landlords, adversely affecting the trust and relationship between the lessor and lessee. 16. Not only that, in the present case, as noticed by the trial Court in the impugned order that even the petitioner-defendants did not file the original agreement of lease or duly certified copy thereof. Still, they filed the petitions u/ss 5, 7 and 8 for referring the matter to the arbitrator, which is a condition precedent u/s 8 (ii) of the Act, which posits that the application referred to in sub-section (1) shall not be entertained, unless it is accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof. In the absence of the same, the applications (Annexure P8) are not at all otherwise maintainable. 17. What cannot possibly be disputed here is that when the lessee utterly failed to make the payment of lease money, then the lessor issued a legal notice dated 7.12.2011, by virtue of which, the tenancy was determined and the lessee was asked to vacate the premises in dispute within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of legal notice and not later than 31.12.2011. In this manner, once the tenancy was determined by the landlord, then, the the lessee was bound to vacate and hand over the vacant possession of property in question to her. Thus, the lessee is guilty of misconduct and is not entitled for any discretionary relief in the instant revision petitions. Since the lessee failed to do so, so, no option was left with the landlord to file the present suit for recovery of possession and arrears of rent against the lessee. Therefore, the suit was very much maintainable and the contrary arguments of learned Senior counsel for the petitioners “stricto sensu” deserve to be and are hereby repelled under the present set of circumstances. 18. There is yet another very important aspect of the matter, which can be viewed entirely from a different angle. It is not a matter of dispute that plaintiff No.1 got issued another legal notice dated 17.1.2012 to defendant No.1, whereby, they intended to invoke the arbitration clause, suggested the names of three Hon’ble retired Judges of the Delhi High Court and requested defendant No.1 to give consent to either of the three names to act as sole arbitrator to resolve the disputes that had arisen between the parties. The defendant No.1 sent the reply dated 4.2.2012, objected to refer the matter to the arbitrator and came up with a plea that arbitration was not a remedy available to plaintiff No.1, as according to defendant No.1, the agreement was under stamped and was not legally enforceable. Thereafter, plaintiff No.1 filed the application dated 18.7.2011 u/s 9 of the Act in the Court of District Judge seeking pointed interim measures of protection. It was strongly opposed by defendant No.1. 19. Not only that, plaintiff No.1 filed another application u/s 11 of the Act against defendant No.1 in the High Court for the appointment of sole arbitrator to adjudicate and decide all the disputes & differences, pertaining to the agreement between the parties and to pass an award accordingly. Defendant No.1 contested her claim, filed the reply, vehemently resisted and opposed the appointment of arbitrator, inter-alia, on the ground that the impugned lease agreement between the parties was under stamped, was not enforceable and raised objection in regard to the appointment of sole arbitrator. Defendant No.1 contested her claim, filed the reply, vehemently resisted and opposed the appointment of arbitrator, inter-alia, on the ground that the impugned lease agreement between the parties was under stamped, was not enforceable and raised objection in regard to the appointment of sole arbitrator. The petition came to be decided by Hon’ble the Chief Justice and in the wake of objection of defendant No.1, the following order was passed by this Court on 25.1.2013 (Annexure P6):- “CM No.30327-CII of 2012 Written statement on behalf of the respondent is taken on record and CM disposed of. CM No.30328-CII of 2012 Allowed subject to all just exceptions and CM disposed of. Arbitration Case No.43 of 2012 (O&M) Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner fairly states at the bar that having regard to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex court in case M/s SMS Tea Estates Pvt. Ltd. Vs. M/s Chandmari Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. 2011(7) SCALE 747 the petition is not maintainable. He, therefore, wishes to withdraw this petition with liberty to take other appropriate legal proceedings. Liberty granted. Dismissed as withdrawn.” Similar orders were passed in the other connected petitions. 20. Thereafter, under these compelling circumstances, the plaintiffs filed the present suit for the pointed reliefs. That means, once the defendants have repeatedly and stoutly resisted the prayer of plaintiff No.1 for the appointment of arbitrator in the indicated proceedings, then, to my mind, the defendants are estopped from now claiming that the matter be referred to the arbitrator and plaint of plaintiffs be returned/rejected in this relevant connection. They cannot possibly be permitted to blow hot and cold in the same breath. In case, the contentions of learned Senior Counsel for petitioners are accepted, then, the plaintiffs would be rendered remediless to prosecute their legitimate claim, which is not legally permissible. 21. Meaning thereby, the trial court has examined the matter in right perspective and recorded the cogent grounds in this relevant direction. The learned Senior Counsel for petitioners did not point out any material irregularity, so as to interfere in the impugned order of the trial Court. Such order, containing the valid reasons, cannot legally be set aside, in exercise of limited revisional jurisdiction of this Court, as envisaged under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, unless & until, the same is perverse and without jurisdiction. Such order, containing the valid reasons, cannot legally be set aside, in exercise of limited revisional jurisdiction of this Court, as envisaged under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, unless & until, the same is perverse and without jurisdiction. Since, no such patent illegality or legal infirmity has been pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel for petitioners, so, the impugned order (Annexure P10) and similar impugned orders in the connected revision petitions deserve to be and are hereby maintained in the obtaining circumstances of the case. 22. No other legal point, worth consideration, has either been urged or pressed by the learned Senior counsel for the petitioners. 23. In the light of aforesaid reasons, thus seen from any angle and without commenting further anything on merits, lest it may prejudice the case of either side during the course of trial of civil suits, as there is no merit, therefore, the instant revision petitions filed by the petitionersdefendants are hereby dismissed with costs as such. 24. Needless to mention that nothing observed here-in-above, would reflect on the merits of the civil suits, in any manner, during the trial, as the same has been so recorded for the limited purpose of deciding the present revision petitions only. ---------0.B.S.0------------ ----------------