JUDGMENT : This appeal by the defendant is directed against the concurring judgment and decree dated 21-12-2013 passed in Civil Appeal No. 54A/2013 by X Additional District Judge, Gwalior, District Gwalior affirming the judgment and decree dated 19-8-2013 passed in Civil Suit No. 34A/2009 by V Civil Judge, Class-I, Gwalior under section 100 of Civil Procedure Code whereby suit of the plaintiff has been decreed as regards 'bona fide need of non-residential accommodation' as envisaged under section 12(1)(f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). 2. The subject-matter of the suit is a shop situated at Bhonsle Ka Bada, in front of Mrignayan show room, Patankar Bazar, Lashkar, Gwalior (hereinafter referred to as 'the suit premises') which was part of the property in dispute. The suit premises was purchased by the plaintiffs/respondents. 3. As per the plaint allegations, the defendant/appellant was occupying the suit premises as tenant on rent at the rate of Rs. 2,000/- per month. 4. There was a dispute between one Umaji Rao Bhonsle, predecessor-in-title of plaintiffs' (plaintiff) and one Ramji Das (defendant) in respect of the suit premises. During pendency of the suit, both had died and their legal representatives were substituted in that suit, i.e., 35A/2001. The said suit was decreed and the legal heirs of Ramji Das were directed to hand over the suit premises to the decree-holder vide the judgment and decree dated 13-9-2004. 5. Against the aforesaid judgment and decree dated 13-9-2004, defendant No. 3 therein had filed F. A. No. 14/2005, Dr. Om Prakash Gupta vs. Umaji Rao Bhonsle and others and an interim order was passed vide order dated 14-2-2005 by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court to the following effect: "Execution of the decree so far as it relates to possession shall remain stayed. Cost of the suit shall be deposited by the appellant within one month." 6. On 13-9-2008, the plaintiffs herein had purchased the suit premises which was part of suit property referred to hereinabove from the legal heirs of Umaji Rao Bhonsale. 7. On 15-6-2009, the plaintiffs' had filed a suit for eviction of the defendant in respect of the suit premises on the grounds enumerated in sections 12(1)(a) 'arrears of rent' and 12(1)(c) "nuisance" of the Act. 7. On 15-6-2009, the plaintiffs' had filed a suit for eviction of the defendant in respect of the suit premises on the grounds enumerated in sections 12(1)(a) 'arrears of rent' and 12(1)(c) "nuisance" of the Act. Section 12(1)(f) "bona fide need of non-residential accommodation" for the need of plaintiff No. 1, Sanjeev Jain, Advocate claiming that he has no other suitable alternate accommodation in Gwalior city of his own for running his lawyer's office and at present he somehow accommodated himself in small chamber of his father Puttanlal Jain, Advocate situated at Jinsi Nala No. 1, Khetan Chambers (Ambasdor Hotel), Lashkar, Gwalior. The office was also shared by his elder brother, Sourab Jain, 8. Defendant filed written statement and denied the plaint allegations that the suit premises was of the plaintiffs' ownership. It was averred that there was dispute as regards the suit premises between Umaji Rao Bhonsle and Ramji Das Gupta in the form of Civil Suit No. 35A/2001. Though the suit has been decreed in favour of Umaji Rao Bhonsle, further appeal being F. A. No. 14/2005 has been filed and the same is pending before this Court wherein vide interim order dated 14-2-2005 (supra) had been passed, as such, the alleged sale of the suit premises in favour of plaintiffs' by legal heirs of Umaji Rao Bhonsle during currency of interim order dated 14-2-2005 (supra) does not confer a valid title upon the plaintiffs' and, therefore, it was denied that plaintiffs' are ownership over the suit premises. Hence, the suit for bona fide need under section 12(l)(f) of the Act was not maintainable at their instance. It was further averred that in fact, the defendant was tenant of Umaji Rao Bhonsle and his legal heirs. It was also denied that the rent was ? 2,000/- per month instead rent was ? 25/- per month. It was also averred that the plaintiff No. 1 has other alternate suitable accommodation in the city of Gwalior where his need as canvassed for non-residential accommodation of establishing advocate's office can be fulfilled. 9. The trial Court based upon the aforesaid pleadings had framed issues and allowed parties to lead evidence. 25/- per month. It was also averred that the plaintiff No. 1 has other alternate suitable accommodation in the city of Gwalior where his need as canvassed for non-residential accommodation of establishing advocate's office can be fulfilled. 9. The trial Court based upon the aforesaid pleadings had framed issues and allowed parties to lead evidence. Trial Court upon analysis of the evidence brought on record dismissed the suit primarily on the ground of pendency of F. A. No. 14/2005 before this Court and there was an interim order dated 14-2-2005 (supra) and, therefore, suit at the instance of plaintiffs' on the strength of sale deed dated 13-9-2008 was found to be not maintainable vide judgment and decree dated 15-9-2011. 10. However, on 9-11-2011, the legal heirs of Umaji Rao Bhonsle (predecessor-in-title) had filed an application in F. A. No. 14/2005 (supra) for modification of the interim order dated 14-2-2005 (supra). A coordinate Bench of this Court considered and allowed the application vide order dated 1-2-2012 to the following effect: "Keeping in view the averments made in the application, I. A. No. 503/12, the interim order dated 14-2-2005 passed by this Court stands modified to the effect that; "The sale deed dated 13-9-2008 executed by the legal heirs of respondent No. 1, in favour of Smt. Sarika Jain, Sanjeev Jain and Smt. Prabha Sharma shall not affect the rights of the purchasers in pursuance to the interim order passed by this Court dated 14-2-2005." The interim order passed by this Court dated 14-2-2005 shall stands modified accordingly. I. A. No. 503/12 stands disposed of." 11. Against the aforesaid judgment and decree dated 15-9-2011 passed by the trial Court, the plaintiffs' have preferred an appeal in the Court of VIII Additional District Judge, Gwalior as Civil Appeal No. 24/2012. Along with the appeal, an application under Order XLI, Rule 27 of Civil Procedure Code was filed to take on record, an order dated 1-2-2012 passed in F. A. No. 14/2005 modifying the interim order dated 14-2-2005 (supra). 12. The first Appellate Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court dismissing the suit and remanded the matter back to the trial Court vide order dated 22-11-2012. 12. The first Appellate Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court dismissing the suit and remanded the matter back to the trial Court vide order dated 22-11-2012. This order withstood the judicial scrutiny and was sustained vide order dated 4-4-2013 passed in M. A. No. 146/2013, Buddhi Prakash Sharma vs. Sanjeev Jain and others by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court. 13. The trial Court after remand, allowed the parties to lead evidence and decreed the suit on the ground envisaged under section 12(1)(f) of the Act vide the Judgment and decree dated 19-8-2013. The said Judgment and decree stands affirmed by the first Appellate Court vide the impugned judgment and decree dated 21-12-2013 passed in Civil Appeal No. 54A/13. As such, both the Courts] below have recorded a concurring finding of fact as regards bona fide need of plaintiff No. 1. 14. Before the first Appellate Court, first submission advanced by the defendant was to the effect that though suit premises was said to have been purchased by the plaintiffs vide registered safe deed dated 13-9-2008 but in the light of order dated 1-2-2012 in F. A. No. 14/2005 (supra) modifying the interim order dated 14-2-2005, the suit could not be filed before the expiry of one year] from 1-2-2012 in view of section 12(4) of the Act and, therefore, the suit was premature. The first Appellate Court has rejected the submission on the premises that the safe deed was executed on 13-9-2008 and the suit was filed on 5-1-2010. Besides, interim order dated 14-2-2005 (supra) passed by this Court was only to the extent of staying delivery of possession and did not affect title of the predecessor-in-title of the premises and, therefore, sale deed dated 13-9-2008 was validly executed. As such, the suit was filed beyond the period of one year from the date of acquisition of the title of the suit premises, in any case, the interim order dated 14-2-2005 (supra) was clarified vide order dated 1-2-2012 (supra) to the effect that the said order shall not affect rights of the plaintiffs' by virtue of the sale deed dated 13-9-2008. Under such circumstances, the submission with regard to section 12(4) of the Act was rejected. 15. Under such circumstances, the submission with regard to section 12(4) of the Act was rejected. 15. It would be appropriate at this stage to quote section 12(4) of the Act which reads as under : "Where a landlord has acquired any accommodation by transfer, no suit for the eviction of tenant shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) on the ground specified in clause (e) or clause (f) thereof, unless a period of one year has elapsed from the date of acquisition." 16. After bare perusal of the aforesaid provision, this Court is of the considered opinion that it is unambiguously clear that a landlord who acquired any accommodation by transfer can institute a suit against the tenant thereof immediately after expiry of one year from the date of acquisition or in other words from the date of valid registered sale deed in terms of the grounds, specified in clause (e) or clause (f) of section 12(1) thereof, in the present case, the landlords' acquired the suit premises by way of registered sale deed dated 13-9-2008 and the suit had been filed on 5-1-2010 wherein by amendment eviction on the ground of bona fide need was added as envisaged under clause 12(1)(f) of the Act on 17-3-2010. Hence, the first Appellate Court has not committed an error of law in rejecting the first submission of the defendant. (Emphasis supplied) 17. The second submission advanced by the defendant was to the effect that as per safe deed dated 13-9-2008, the plaintiff No. 1 has only 10% share whereas other co-owners, Smt. Sarika Jain w/o Sanjeev Jain has 60% share and Smt. Prabha Sharma has 30% share and, therefore, for the need of the plaintiff No. 1, no decree could have been passed under section 12(1)(f) of the Act as according to the defendant, 10% share of the suit premises is less than the area of the suit premises. This submission was also rejected by the first Appellate Court primarily on the ground that eviction suit can be instituted by any one of the co-owners or joint owners in respect of the suit property for eviction on any grounds enumerated in the Rent Act or otherwise for eviction of a tenant and it is not necessary that all the joint owners should be joined as plaintiffs for maintaining suit for eviction. That apart, if the need of one of the co-owners in a eviction suit filed at the instance of such co-owner can also be looked into for eviction from suit premises. As such, rejection of this submission stands fully justified being in consonance with the law laid down by the Apex Court in the following cases : (i) Smt. Kanta Gael vs. P. Pathak and others, AIR 1977 SC 1599 , (ii) Pal Singh vs. Sunder Singh (dead) by LRs. and others, AIR 1989 SC 758 ; and (iii) Harbans Singh (Lt. Col.) vs. Smt. Margret G. Bhingardive, 1990 MPLJ (F.B.) 112 = 1990 JLJ 97 (Full Bench). 18. In Smt. Kanta Gael (supra) while dealing with Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 it was observed as under : "5. The scheme of the statute is plain and has been earlier explained by this Court with special reference to sections 14-A and 25-B. The government servant who owns his house, lets it out profitably and occupies at lesser rent official quarters has to quit but, for that very purpose to be fulfilled, must be put in quick possession of his premises. The Legislative project and purpose turn not on niceties of little verbalism but on the actualities of rugged realism, and so, the construction of section 14A(1) must be illumined by the goal, though guided by the word. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that section 14A(1) is available as a ground, if the premises are owned by him as inherited from propitious in whose name the property stood. In his name, and let out by him read in the spirit of the provision and without violence to the words of the section, clearly convey the idea that the premises must be owned by him directly and the lease must be under him directly, which is the case where he, as heir, steps into his father's 'shoes who owned the building in his own name and let it out himself. He represents the former owner and lessor and squarely falls within section 14A. The accent on 'name' is to pre-empt the common class of benami evasions, not to attach special sanctity to nominalism. Refusing the rule of ritualism we accept the reality the ownership and landlordism as the touchstone. 6. He represents the former owner and lessor and squarely falls within section 14A. The accent on 'name' is to pre-empt the common class of benami evasions, not to attach special sanctity to nominalism. Refusing the rule of ritualism we accept the reality the ownership and landlordism as the touchstone. 6. Nor do we set much store by the submission that the 1st respondent is not a landlord, being only a co-heir and the Will in his favour having been disputed. Equally without force in our view is the plea that one co-lessor cannot sue for eviction even if the other co-lessors have no objection. Section 2(e) of the Act defines 'landlord' thus : "2(e) 'Landlord' means a person. Who, for the time being is receiving, or is entitled to receive, the rent of any premises, whether on his own account or on account of or on behalf of, or for the benefit of, any other person or as a trustee, guardian or receiver for any other person or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the premises were let to a tenant." 'Tenant', by definition [section 2(1)] means any person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any premises is payable. Read in the context of the Rent Control law, the simple sense of the situation is that there should be a building which is let. There must be a landlord who collects rent and a tenant who pays it to the one whom he recognizes as landlord. The complications of estoppel or even the concepts of the Transfer of Property Act need not necessarily or inflexibly be imported into the proceedings under the rent control law, tried by special Tribunals under a special statute. In this case, rent was being paid to the late Das who had let out to the appellant, on the death of the former, the rent was being paid by the 1st respondent who signed his name and added that it was on behalf of the estate of the deceased Das. At a later stage the rent was being paid to and the receipts issued by the 1st respondent in his own name. At a later stage the rent was being paid to and the receipts issued by the 1st respondent in his own name. Not that the little change made in the later receipts makes much of a difference, but the fact remains that the tenant in this case had been paying the rent to the 1st respondent. Therefore, the latter fell within the definition of 'landlord' for the purposes of the Act we are not impressed with the investigation into the law of real property and estoppel between landlord and tenant, Shri Nariman invited us to make. A fair understanding of the relationship between the parties leaves little room for doubt that the appellant was the tenant of the premises. The 1st respondent, together with the other respondents, constituted the body of landlords and, by consent, implicit or otherwise, of the plurality of landlords, one of them representing them all, was collecting rent. In short, he functioned, for all practical purposes as the landlord, and was therefore entitled to institute proceedings qua land- lord. 7. This Court, in Sri Ram Pasricha vs. Jagannath, AIR 1976 SC 2335 clarified that a co-owner is as much an owner of the entire property as any sole owner of the property is: "Jurisprudentially, it is not correct to say that a co-owner of property is not its owner. He owns very part of the composite property along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a part owner or a fractional owner of the property. It is therefore, not possible to accept the submission that the plaintiff, who is admittedly the landlord and co-owner of the premises, is not the owner of the premises within the meaning of section 13(1)(f). It is not necessary to establish that the plaintiff is the only owner of the property for the purpose of section 13(l)(f) as long as he is a co-owner of the property, being at the same time acknowledged landlord of the defendants." That case also was one for eviction under the rent control law of Bengal. The law having been thus put beyond doubt, the contention that the absence of the other co-owner on record disentitled the first respondent from suing for eviction, fails. The law having been thus put beyond doubt, the contention that the absence of the other co-owner on record disentitled the first respondent from suing for eviction, fails. We are not called upon to consider the piquant situation that might arise if some of the co-owners wanted the tenant to continue contrary to the relief claimed by the evicting co-owner." 19. As regards third submission relating to availability of alternate accommodation, the first Appellate Court re-appreciated the evidence in paragraphs 17, 18, 21 and 22 of its judgment. The gist thereof reads as under : "17. That, the plaintiff No. 1 has stated in examination-in-chief, at present he is running his business somehow accommodated in a tenanted small chamber of his father Puttanlal Jain situated at Jinsi Nala No. 1, Khetan Chambers (Ambasdor Hotel), Lashkar, Gwalior. The said shop was owned by Khaintan. In addition, his elder brother, Sourab Jain is also doing his profession in the said shop. As such, there is no sufficient space in the said shop to carry on business by the plaintiff No. 1 and he does not have any other alternate suitable accommodation in the city of Gwalior. 18. That, plaintiffs' witness, namely; Nilesh Sharma husband of Smt. Prabha Sharma, one of the co-owners deposed to the same effect. He further deposed that the duplex accommodation of 700 sq. feet situated at city centre, Gwalior was a residential one and, therefore, not suitable for the plaintiff No. 1 for carrying on the profession of advocacy as the family of the plaintiff No. 1 is residing therein. 21. That, by placing reliance on judgment of Apex Court in the case of Madhusudan Das vs. Narayani Bai, AIR 1983 SC 114 , it was observed that if two views are possible, the finding of the trial Court ought not to upset unless there is glaring error at the appellate stage. In the present case, such a situation arises as two views are possible, however, the finding of the trial Court deserves to be not interfered with. 22. That, based on re-appreciation of the evidence, it was concluded by the first Appellate Court that the plaintiff No. 1 has successfully established that he has no alternate suitable accommodation in the city of Gwalior for carry on his profession and upheld the finding of the trial Court in that regard." 20. 22. That, based on re-appreciation of the evidence, it was concluded by the first Appellate Court that the plaintiff No. 1 has successfully established that he has no alternate suitable accommodation in the city of Gwalior for carry on his profession and upheld the finding of the trial Court in that regard." 20. The main thrust of the defendant was that the plaintiff No. 1 could establish his advocate office even in residential area, therefore, in view of availability of alternate accommodation, the need of the plaintiff No. 1 of the suit premises could not be said to be bona fide. The first Appellate Court has considered this submission in extenso and on appreciation of evidence on record, it has been found that in the residential accommodation occupied by the plaintiff No. 1, he is residing with his wife and children which does not have sufficient space to make a provision for establishing a professional office. 21. That apart, the plaintiff No. 1 being a owner of the suit premises has a right to run his advocate's office in the suit premises owned by him as per his choice or preference or selection or convenience or favourite place etc., and he cannot be left to be satisfied on the plea of availability and justifiability of alternate accommodation as advanced by the defendant As such, both the Courts below upon critical evaluation of the evidence on record have reached a conclusion that the need of the plaintiff No. 1 in respect of the suit premises was bona fide for opening and establishing advocate office to be run by him. With the aforesaid findings both the Courts below have decreed the suit. 22. The Supreme Court in Shiv Sarup Gupta vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, AIR 1999 SC 2507 has held as under : "13. Chambers 20th Century Dictionary defines bona fide to mean 'in good faith: genuine'. The word 'genuine' means 'natural; not spurious; real: pure: sincere'. In Law Dictionary, Mozley and Whitley define bona fide to mean 'good faith, without fraud or deceit'. Thus the term bona fide or genuinely refers to a state of mind. Requirement is not a mere desire. The degree of intensity contemplated by 'requires' is much more higher than in mere desire. In Law Dictionary, Mozley and Whitley define bona fide to mean 'good faith, without fraud or deceit'. Thus the term bona fide or genuinely refers to a state of mind. Requirement is not a mere desire. The degree of intensity contemplated by 'requires' is much more higher than in mere desire. The phrase 'required bona fide' is suggestive of legislative intent that a mere desire which is outcome of whim or fancy is not taken note of by the Rent Control Legislation. A requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in centra-distinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family would entitle him to seek ejectment of the tenant. Looked at from this angle, any setting of the facts and circumstances protruding the need of landlord and its bona fides would be capable of successfully withstanding the test of objective determination by the Court. The Judge of facts should place himself in the arm chair of the landlord and then ask the question lo himself-whether in the given facts substantiated by the landlord the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest, if the answer be in the positive, the need is bona fide. The failure on the part of the landlord to substantiate the pleaded need, or, in a given case, positive material brought on record by the tenant enabling the court drawing an inference that the reality was to the contrary and the landlord was merely attempting at finding out a pretence or pretext for getting rid of the tenant, would be enough to persuade the Court certainly to deny its judicial assistance to the landlord. Once the court is satisfied of the bona fides of the need of the landlord for premises or additional premises by applying objective standards then in the matter of choosing out of more than one accommodation available to the landlord his subjective choice shall be respected by the court. Once the court is satisfied of the bona fides of the need of the landlord for premises or additional premises by applying objective standards then in the matter of choosing out of more than one accommodation available to the landlord his subjective choice shall be respected by the court. The court would permit the landlord to satisfy the proven need by choosing the accommodation which the landlord feels would be most suited for the purpose; the court would not in such a case thrust its own wisdom upon the choice of the landlord by holding that not one but the other accommodation must be accepted by the landlord to satisfy his such need. In short, the concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by realities of life. An approach either too liberal or too conservative or pedantic must be guarded against. 14. The availability of an alternate accommodation with the landlord i.e. an accommodation other than the one in occupation of the tenant wherefrom he is sought to be evicted has a dual relevancy. Firstly, the availability of another accommodation, suitable and convenient in all respects as the suit accommodation, may have an adverse bearing on the finding as to bona fides of the landlord if he unreasonably refuses to occupy the available premises to satisfy his alleged need. Availability of such circumstance would enable the Court drawing an Inference that the need of the landlord was not a felt need or the state of mind of the landlord was not honest, sincere, and natural. Secondly, another principal ingredient of clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 14, which speaks of non-availability of any other reasonably suitable residential accommodation to the landlord, would not be satisfied. Wherever another residential accommodation is shown to exist as available then the court has to ask the landlord why he is not occupying such other available accommodation to satisfy his need. The landlord may convince the court that the alternate residential accommodation though available is still of no consequence as the same is not reasonably suitable to satisfy the felt need which the landlord has succeeded in demonstrating objectively to exist. Needless to say that an alternate accommodation, to entail denial of the claim of the landlord, must be reasonably suitable, obviously in comparison with the suit accommodation wherefrom the landlord is seeking eviction. Needless to say that an alternate accommodation, to entail denial of the claim of the landlord, must be reasonably suitable, obviously in comparison with the suit accommodation wherefrom the landlord is seeking eviction. Convenience and safety of the landlord and his family members would be relevant factors. While considering the totality of the circumstances, the court may keep in view the profession or vocation of the landlord and his family members, their style of living, their habits and the background wherefrom they come." 23. Apart from that, defendant raised a plea before the first Appellate Court that there was no attornment of tenancy of the defendant by the predecessor-in-title, namely; Umaji Rao Bhonsle or his legal heirs in favour of the plaintiffs and, therefore, the suit was not was maintainable at the instance of the plaintiffs as there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiffs and the defendant was also justifiably rejected. 24. As regards to the aforesaid, the sale deed of the suit premises was executed by legal heirs of Umaji Rao Bhonsle in favour of plaintiffs on 13-9-2008. At that time, the defendant was in occupation of the suit premises as tenant and in fact, the power of attorney holder of the appellant, Dr. Om Prakash Gupta in F. A. No. 14/2005 had consented for the sale deed dated 13-9-2008. The plaintiffs have served a notice to the defendant dated 10-2-2009 wherein it was clearly mentioned that the plaintiffs have purchased the suit premises from their predecessor-in-title vide registered sale deed dated 13-9-2008. It was further stated therein that the defendant became tenant of the plaintiffs (exhibit P/3 notice, exhibit P/4 postal receipt and exhibit P/5 acknowledgment). That apart, defendant in paragraph 8 of the written statement has also admitted that the plaintiffs are valid title-holders having purchased the suit premises from the legal heirs of Umaji Rao Bhonsle. As such, defendant had knowledge of the fact that the plaintiffs' have acquired valid title over the suit premises by virtue of sale deed dated 13-9-2008 executed by the legal heirs of the predecessor-in-title, namely; Umaji Rao Bhonsle. Exhibit D/l, a rent note was in relation to the suit premises which was given on rent by the predecessor-in-title, namely; Umaji Rao Bhonsle executed in favour of defendant. Exhibit D/l, a rent note was in relation to the suit premises which was given on rent by the predecessor-in-title, namely; Umaji Rao Bhonsle executed in favour of defendant. Under such circumstances, conclusion as regards absence of attornment of tenancy of the suit premises is de hors on record. Hence, the judgment relied upon in the case of C. Chandramohan vs. Sengottaiyan (Dead) by LRs and others, (2000) 1 SCC 451 will not render any assistance in favour of defendant in any manner whatsoever. 25. After having gone through the concurrent impugned judgments of the Courts below, this Court is of the view that both the Courts below have recorded a comprehensive findings of fact upon critical evaluation of the evidence on record that the plaintiff No. 1 has been able to establish bona fide need of non-residential accommodation as contemplated under section 12(1)(f) of the Act and decreed the suit. The entire gamut of matter is in realm of facts, No question of law much less substantial question of law arises warranting interference under section 100 of the Code. 26. The appeal sans merit and is accordingly dismissed. Certified copy as per rules. Appeal dismissed.