ORDER : 1. The writ petition is filed with the following prayer:- "to issue a writ of certiorari to call for the records in Endt. No. 9391/Legal/ON/9/MTC/07 on the file of the 1st Respondent dated 11.01.2011 and quash the same." The case of the petitioner is that he joined the services of the Corporation in the year 1988 as a Driver and he was working in T. Nagar Depot. It is the further case of the petitioner that he was suffering from ulcer for nearly a year and he was on medical leave. He submitted leave letters regularly. When he reported for work in March 2008, he was informed that he was dismissed from service from 14.02.2008 and he was served with proceedings dated 14.02.2008 issued by the Joint Managing Director of the respondent Corporation, wherein it is stated that two charges were framed against him and a show cause notice dated 24.12.2007 was sent by Registered Post as to why the proposed punishment of removal from service should not be imposed on him and since there was no reply, a copy of the same was pasted in the notice Board of the 3rd respondent Corporation and even for that as there was no reply, the final order, removing the petitioner from service dated 14.02.2008 was issued. Aggrieved against the said order, the present writ petition is filed. 2. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the impugned order refers to earlier incidents and it had been passed as if show cause notice and other notices were served on the petitioner. Further, according to him, the petitioner is a resident of 4/15, Moopan Maistry II Street, Varadharajanpet, Kodambakkam, Chennai 24, but the show cause notice and the proposed punishment was addressed to No. 15, Moppavumudali Street, Varadharajanpet, Kodambakkam, Chennai 24 and not to the address where the petitioner was residing and hence, according to him, this cannot be treated as proper service of notice. 3. That apart, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the petitioner, on receiving the order of removal, he preferred an appeal before the 1st respondent on 31.03.2008 by registered post, raising all the points including non serving of the show cause notice indicating proposed punishment and also stating his disinclination to resign the job and requested that the punishment of dismissal may be recalled and he may be reinstated. Further, according to the learned counsel, since the said appeal was not disposed of, the petitioner preferred a writ petition before this Court in W.P. No. 26175 of 2010 and this Court, by order dated 22.11.2010 directed the 1st respondent to dispose of the appeal dated 31.03.2008, within a period of eight weeks. The appellate authority has concurred with the finding of the disciplinary authority by the order dated 11.01.2011 and the said order is the subject matter of the present writ petition. 4. It is the further submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that none of the communications sent to the petitioner was received by him, as the Management has sent the communications to a wrong address and hence he could not participate in the enquiry. He further submitted that no proper enquiry has been conducted and no notice has been served on him and hence, it is a clear case of violation of principles of natural justice. That apart, according to the learned counsel, the reason given by the Management that the petitioner has no inclination to work is without basis. He further submitted that the absence from 17.09.2007 to 3.10.2007 and from 21.11.2007 is only due to his health conditions, for which the petitioner has already submitted leave letters. Further, according to him, the authorities have failed to take into account the services rendered by him and the extreme punishment of dismissal from service for the absence of two months that too due to chronic ulcer is highly disproportionate. 5. The Corporation has filed a counter affidavit and relying on the same, the learned counsel for the respondent Corporation has contended that the petitioner is a workman, he has a remedy before the industrial forum and hence the writ petition is not maintainable and in view of availability of alternative remedy, he prayed for dismissal of the writ petition on that score. 6. However, on merits, relying on the counter affidavit, the learned counsel for the respondent Corporation contended that the petitioner was unauthorisedly absent from 7.3.2007 till 5.9.2007 and hence a charge memo dated 6.4.2007 was issued. On 31.8.2007, the petitioner sent a reply and he was allowed to join duty on 05.09.2007. 6. However, on merits, relying on the counter affidavit, the learned counsel for the respondent Corporation contended that the petitioner was unauthorisedly absent from 7.3.2007 till 5.9.2007 and hence a charge memo dated 6.4.2007 was issued. On 31.8.2007, the petitioner sent a reply and he was allowed to join duty on 05.09.2007. Thereafter, a report was sent by the Branch Manager of the T. Nagar Depot on 08.12.2007 complaining that he was unauthorisedly absent from the date of joining duty on 11.09.2007 and he reported duty only one day. Thereafter, he was on unauthorized absence from 17.09.2007 to 03.10.2007 also. Further, he was on unauthorized absence from 21.11.2007 to 6.12.2007. Thereafter, the petitioner stayed away from work or absented from duty and he abandoned from service and hence the petitioner Corporation was constrained to issue a show cause notice on coming to the provisional conclusion of removal from service on 21.12.2007, for seeking his response. The petitioner did not evince to send any reply and hence the Management came to the conclusion and arrived at and on account of his abandonment from service, he was removed from service. 7. Further, according to the learned counsel for the respondent Corporation, it is true that the petitioner has approached this Court for a direction from this Court to dispose of his appeal dated 31.03.2008 and pursuant to the orders of this Court, the appeal was rejected on 11.01.2011. That apart, according to him, the petitioner has admitted his misconduct and that the petitioner has tried to concoct a story for his unauthorized absence by quoting a reason that he was suffering from ulcer. 8. In reply, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that no notice was served on the petitioner at all and though the identity card dated 18.04.1995 shows the correct address, the impugned order has been sent to a wrong address. 9. The case of the Corporation is that the communication has been sent to the very same address mentioned in the impugned order and that mere entry of a different address in the identity card could not absolve the petitioner of his intention to abandon the service and the petitioner ought to have informed the management of his absence. 10. It is not correct that the petitioner was absent only for two months, but on record, it appears that he had been absented for more than a year. 10. It is not correct that the petitioner was absent only for two months, but on record, it appears that he had been absented for more than a year. 11. In reply, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on a decision of the three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in Shri Bhagwan Lal Arya vs. Commissioner of Police Delhi and Others, (2004) 4 SCC 560 and submitted that for absence from service, the extreme punishment should not be imposed. The relevant paragraphs of the above decision are extracted below: "10. In the instant case, the appellant had absented himself for 2 months, 7 days and 17 hours on medical grounds. The above two rules provide that penalty of removal can be imposed only in cases if grave misconduct and continued misconduct indicate incorrigibility and complete unfitness for police service. The absence of the appellant on medical grounds with application for leave as well as sanction of leave can under no circumstances, in our opinion, be termed as grave misconduct or continued misconduct rendering him unfit for police service. 11. The order dated 16-1-1995 passed by the respondents was produced by the respondents themselves in their reply to CWP before the High Court of Delhi that they had sanctioned leave without pay for the period from 7-10-1994 to 15-12-1994, the period of alleged unauthorised absence. The High Court has failed to appreciate and evaluate this aspect of the matter. The High Court also did not appreciate that after issuing sanction for leave for the period in question, the employee's legitimate expectation would be that no stern action would be taken against him with respect to the alleged act of misconduct which by no stretch of imagination can be considered an act of gross misconduct or continued misconduct indicating incorrigibility and complete unfitness for police service. It is not the case of the respondents that the appellant is a habitual absentee. He had to proceed on leave under compulsion because of his grave condition of health and, therefore, the punishment of removal from service is excessive and disproportionate. We are of the view that the punishment of dismissal/removal from service can be awarded only for acts of grave nature or as cumulative effect of continued misconduct proving incorrigibility or complete unfitness for police service. We are of the view that the punishment of dismissal/removal from service can be awarded only for acts of grave nature or as cumulative effect of continued misconduct proving incorrigibility or complete unfitness for police service. Merely one incident of absence and that too because of bad health and valid and justified grounds/reasons cannot become the basis for awarding such a punishment. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the decision of the disciplinary authority inflicting a penalty of removal from service is ultra vires Rules 8(a) and 10 of the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980 and is liable to be set aside. The appellant also does not have any other source of income and will not get any other job at this age and the stigma attached to him on account of the impugned punishment. As a result of which, not only he but his entire family totally dependent on him will be forced to starve. These are the mitigating circumstances which warrant that the punishment/order of the disciplinary authority is to be set aside. 12.... 13. In B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India (three-Judge Bench) the question posed for consideration was as to whether the High Court/Tribunal can direct the authorities to reconsider punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof or reconsider themselves to shorten the litigation. In this case, at para 18, this Court has observed as under: (SCC p. 762) "18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof." 14. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof." 14. Thus, the present one is a case wherein we are satisfied that the punishment of removal from service imposed on the appellant is not only highly excessive and disproportionate but is also one which was not permissible to be imposed as per the Service Rules. Ordinarily we would have set aside the punishment and sent the matter back to the disciplinary authority for passing the order of punishment afresh in accordance with law and consistently with the principles laid down in the judgment. However, that would further lengthen the life of litigation. In view of the time already lost, we deem it proper to set aside the punishment of removal from service and instead direct the appellant to be reinstated in service subject to the condition that the period during which the appellant remained absent from duty and the period calculated up to the date on which the appellant reports back to duty pursuant to this judgment shall not be counted as a period spent on duty. The appellant shall not be entitled to any service benefits for this period. Looking at the nature of partial relief allowed hereby to the appellant, it is now not necessary to pass any order of punishment in the departmental proceedings in lieu of the punishment of removal from service which has been set aside. The appellant must report on duty within a period of six weeks from today to take benefit of this judgment." 12. Heard both sides and perused the materials available on record. 13. It is an admitted case that the petitioner did not join the work. The petitioner has stated that he was absented only for two months in the affidavit. There is no reason given by him for his continued desertion of work. A perusal of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court cited supra, the relevant paragraphs of which are extracted above, makes it clear that the employer can come to the conclusion about the punishment of service. 14. There is no reason given by him for his continued desertion of work. A perusal of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court cited supra, the relevant paragraphs of which are extracted above, makes it clear that the employer can come to the conclusion about the punishment of service. 14. As far as the decision cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner reported in AIR 2004 Supreme Court 2131 is concerned, that was a case where the appellant therein was absent for a period of two months, 8 days and 17 hours. It is not in dispute that the concerned official has sent applications for leave on medical grounds supported by the medical certificates from the competent medical authorities in accordance with the rules. The competent police authority passed an order sanctioning leave without pay for the period of illness as no other leave was due him. But, as far as the present case on hand is concerned, the petitioner has not produced any evidence to show that the medical leave has been sanctioned. He has also not produced any medical certificate. 15. In this regard, it is worthwhile to mention the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Padmasundara Rao and Others vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Others, (2002) 3 SCC 533 , wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has enunciated as to how to make reliance of the decisions and it has been held so as under: "Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. There is always peril in treating the words of speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case, said Lord Morris in Herrington vs. British Railways Board, (1972) 2 WLR 537 . Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases." 16. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases." 16. Even assuming for the sake of argument to avoid the disputed question of fact, that I accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner as contended by him in the affidavit that his absence is for only for a period of two months and there is medical certificate to that effect, there is no evidence or averment that he has no disinclination to report for work. As he has deserted the work, in terms of the standing order, the Corporation was right in coming to the conclusion that he has abandoned the service. An employee cannot seek sympathy from this Court on the ground that his family would be in streets. If an employee wanted to avail leave, he should have informed the Management by enclosing a medical certificate sent it by registered post. Further, the work of a driver is not a part time job and it is a full time job, but the petitioner has taken it as a pass time job, which cannot be accepted by this Court. The decision taken by the Management cannot be found fault with and the order of the respondent management in coming to the conclusion that he has abandoned the service is perfectly justified. However, taking note of the length of service put in by the petitioner, it is open to the petitioner to work out his remedy for consequential benefits thereof in the light of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in UCO Bank and Others vs. Sanwar Mal, (2004) 4 SCC 412 and Syndicate Bank, Bangalore vs. Satya Srinath, (2007) 6 SCR 242.