Judgment C.R. Sarma, J. 1. This appeal, under Section 100 of the CPC, is directed against the judgment and order, dated 09.03.2006, passed by the learned Civil Judge No. 3, Kamrup, Guwahati in Title Appeal No. 27/2002, whereby the learned Civil Judge dismissed the appeal, preferred by the appellants and upheld the judgment and decree, dated 30.03.2002, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Divn.) No. 3, Kamrup, Guwahati, in Title Suit No. 200/94. I have heard Mr. G.N. Sahewalla, learned Sr. Counsel, appearing for the appellants. 2. The facts, relevant for disposal of this appeal, in brief, are as follows: The appellants, as plaintiffs, instituted the said title suit against the respondent/defendant, seeking a decree for ejectment and injunction. The plaintiffs' case was that he constructed and owned a "Tin Chali" (a shed with CIC sheet roof), measuring 25ft x 12ft, on a plot of land, covered by dag No. 309 (Government land) and dag Nos. 457/458 and 459 of patta No. 3, as fully described in the schedule to the plaint. The said shed was given on rent to one Md. Baharul Islam, at a monthly rent of Rs. 200/- and he occupied the same till January, 1994, for running a car repairing centre. Though the said tenant had vacated the suit premises, the defendant, with illegal motive, occupied the same and refused to vacate. According to the plaintiffs, the said 'tin shed' was damaged by heavy rain and storm, but the defendant tried to, illegally construct a new shed on the suit land. 3. As the defendant refused to vacate the suit premises, the plaintiffs instituted a suit seeking decree for ejectment, permanent injunction etc. The plaintiffs' suit was contested by the defendant by filing written statement. The defendant, in his written statement, taking the pleas of nonjoinder, absence of cause of action, non maintainability of the suit, averred that he, along with one Sri Tarun Deka, occupied a plot of land measuring 1 katha 10 lessa covered by Dag No. 309 in the year 1987 and constructed a tin shed in the suit land, for running a car repairing business. Thus, the defendant denied the claim of the plaintiffs. 4. Upon the pleadings of both the parties, the following issues were framed by the trial Court. (1) Whether there is cause of action for the suit? (2) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form? Thus, the defendant denied the claim of the plaintiffs. 4. Upon the pleadings of both the parties, the following issues were framed by the trial Court. (1) Whether there is cause of action for the suit? (2) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form? (3) Whether the plaintiffs have been possessing the suit land since 40 years back paying Tauji Bahir Revenue? (4) Whether the defendant has been possessing the suit land since 1980 and paying Tauji revenue? (5) Whether the defendant is trespasser in the suit land and liable to be ejected? (6) To what relief the parties are entitled? (7) Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of Baharul Islam? (8) Whether Baharul Islam was a tenant under the plaintiffs or a licensee under the defendants? 5. In order to prove their case, the plaintiffs examined as many as 6 (Six) witnesses and proved some documents including land revenue paying receipt. The defendant also examined himself and Mr. Baharul Islam, as DWs-1 and 2 respectively. He also exhibited certain papers. 6. Considering the evidence, on-record, the learned trial Judge dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiffs failed to prove that he was possessing the said land and that the defendant had illegally occupied the same dispossessing the plaintiffs there from. 7. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the plaintiffs, as appellants, preferred the Title Appeal No. 27/2002. The learned Civil Judge, while dismissing the appeal, upheld the judgment and decree, passed by the learned trial Court. 8. Dissatisfied by the said judgment and decree of dismissal, the plaintiffs, as appellants, have come up with this second appeal. 9. The appeal has been admitted for hearing on the following substantial questions of law. 1. Whether the learned First Appellate Court erred in law in passing the impugned judgment and decreed by not acting as per provision of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC? 2 Whether the impugned judgment is perverse? 10. The grounds of assailing the concurrent findings, rendered by the Courts below, are that (i) the appellate Court failed to comply with the requirement of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC, (ii) that the appellate Court failed to consider the issue No. 3, (iii) that the Courts below failed to consider the entire evidence and as and such, the findings are perverse and that (iv) the Courts below failed to consider plaintiffs' documents i.e. Ext. No. 1(9) to 1(14) i.e. land revenue paying receipts. 11. Having heard the learned Counsel, appearing for the appellants, I have carefully perused the record, including the impugned judgment and orders. 12. Mr. Sahewala, learned Sr. Counsel, appearing for the appellants, has submitted that the learned appellate Court, while dismissing the appeal, failed to formulate the points for determination, as required by Order 41 Rule 31 CPC and that both the Courts below committed gross error by failing to properly appreciate the evidence, on-record, more particularly, the revenue paying receipts. It is submitted that the said revenue paying receipts are sufficient evidence to substantiate the plaintiffs' claim that he was possessing the suit property by paying due revenue. It is also submitted that the evidence, that Mr. Baharul was a tenant in respect of the suit property and that he had handed over the possession of the tenanted premises to the plaintiffs shows that the plaintiffs were in possession of the said land prior to his dispossession by the defendant from the suit premises. 13. In view of the above stated arguments, placed by the learned Counsel for the appellants, I feel it necessary to examine if the first appellate Court complied with the requirement of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC and if the findings of the Courts below are perverse, requiring interference, in second appeal. 14. It will be convenient to have a fresh look at the provision of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC, which reads as follows: Contents, date and signature of judgment.-The judgment of the Appellate Court shall be in writing and shall state- (a) the points for determination; (b) the decision thereon; (c) the reasons for the decision; and (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varies, the relief to which the appellant is entitled, and shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed and dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein. 15. From the appellate Court's judgment, it is found that the Court, under the heading "Points for determination", recorded as follows: "After going through the memorandum of appeal the points for determination arose in this appeal is whether the issue Nos. 3,4 and 5 have been wrongly decided." In deciding the appeal, the appellate Court, is found to have re-examined the evidence, on-record. The trial Court decided the issue Nos. 3,4 and 5 have been wrongly decided." In deciding the appeal, the appellate Court, is found to have re-examined the evidence, on-record. The trial Court decided the issue Nos. 1, 2, 4, 7 and 8 in favour of the plaintiffs/appellants. The issue Nos. 3 and 5 were the most vital issues for determining the fate of the plaintiffs' suit. The learned appellate Court framed points for determination to determine the correctness of findings, given by the trial Court, in deciding the issue Nos. 3, 4 and 5. It transpires that while re-examining the said issues and rendering his findings, the appellate Court scrutinised the evidence and findings in respect of the said issues, including issue Nos. 7 and No. 8. The appellate Court's findings are found to be based on the evidence, on-record and the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division) No. 3 has given his decisions with reasons. In view of the above, I find that the learned appellate Court, while re-appreciating the evidence, on-record, and rendering concurrent findings, complied with the requirement of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC. 16. In order to examine the allegation regarding perversity in respect of the findings of the Courts below, I feel it appropriate to scrutinise the evidence, on-record. As pleaded by the plaintiffs, the disputed shed was situated on a plot of land covered by patta land and government land. Their case was that the government land was covered by dag No. 309. They also pleaded that, though his tenant Mr. Baharul Islam had vacated the 'Tinchali' (Tin shed) in the month of January, 1994, after enjoying the same from 19.03.1979, as tenant, the defendant illegally occupied the same and started a car repairing shop of his own. According to the plaintiffs, the said land being government land, he used to pay 'Tauzi Bahira Revenue' and that they were possessing it for 40 years. Their further case, as pleaded in the plaint, was that, after the said 'Tin shed' was destroyed by storm on 18.05.1994, the defendant illegally, tried to construct a new shed and that the said Tin shed was situated on a plot of land measuring 25 x 12 covered by dag No. 309 (Government land) and dag No. 459/457/458 of patta No. 3. Thus, the Tin shed was partly on patta land and partly on the government land. Thus, the Tin shed was partly on patta land and partly on the government land. On the other hand, according to the defendant, he and his friend were occupying 1 Katha 10 Lecha of Government land covered by dag No. 309, by establishing a car repairing business since 1980 and that they constructed a Tin shed, therein, in 1987. The plaintiffs examined six witnesses as PW No. 1 to PW. No. 6 and the defendant examined himself and Mr. Baharul Islam as DW -1 and 2, in support of their respective cases. Upon a careful perusal of the trial Court's judgment, it appears that the learned trial Judge, while deciding the issues, recorded his findings on the basis of the evidence, on-record. The basic question, whether the plaintiffs' land with the 'Tin shed' was illegally and unauthorisedly occupied by the defendant, has been answered against the plaintiff by deciding issue Nos. 3 and 5 in negative. Though the plaintiffs pleaded that his 'Tin shed' was situated on the land covered by patta land and government land, but the plaintiff in his evidence given as PW-1, stated that the said 'Tin shed' was situated on land covered by dag No. 457, 458 and 459 i.e. patta land He failed to state that the same was situated on land covered by dag No. 309 i.e. government land. Hence, in my considered opinion, the learned trial Judge has rightly held that the plaintiffs travelled beyond his pleadings and, failed to substantiate his plea that the 'Tinchali', situated on government land, was occupied by the defendant. In deciding the issue No. 3, which is the basic issue, having a bearing on the merit of the case, the learned trial Judge observed "there is no record that the plaintiffs were possessing the government land i.e. dag No. 309 since last 40 years. Land revenue documents exhibited by plaintiff also do not reflect as to whether "touzi revenue" was paid in respect of 309 of Govt. Land. Ext. 1(1)to Ext. 1(8) appear to be revenue paying receipts of patta No. 3 & 11 and Ext. 1(9) to Ext. 1(14) appears to be "touzi revenue" receipts, however, whether they are the receipts of dag No. 309 govt. Land or not is not clear from the said exhibits. Land. Ext. 1(1)to Ext. 1(8) appear to be revenue paying receipts of patta No. 3 & 11 and Ext. 1(9) to Ext. 1(14) appears to be "touzi revenue" receipts, however, whether they are the receipts of dag No. 309 govt. Land or not is not clear from the said exhibits. No other plaintiffs witness has given evidence to the effect that the plaintiffs were possessing the Dag No. 309 (i.e. govt. Land) since last 40 years". I have perused the evidence, on-record and find that the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Divn.) has committed no error in holding that there was no substantive evidence to show that Ext. Nos. 1(9) to 1(14) i.e. the Touzi revenue receipts related to the land covered by dag No. 309. As the plaintiffs failed to substantiate that the said receipts pertained to dag No. 309, the trial Court, while deciding the issue, properly appreciated the evidence, on-record, and rightly came to the findings that the plaintiffs failed to establish that they were possessing the suit land for 40 years by paying Touzi revenue. Though, in their plaint, the plaintiffs pleaded that the land was covered by dag No. 309 (i.e. government land) also, he, while deposing as PW-1, did not state anything about dag No. 309. He stated that his 'Tin Shed' was on a plot of land measuring one bigha, covered by dag Nos. 457, 458 and 459 of Patta No. 3. Hence, it appears that he failed to substantiate his plea that the 'tin shed' was on government land, covered by Dag No. 309 and that he paid touzi bahira revenue vide Exts. No. 1(9) to 1(14). Therefore, he failed to prove that he had possession and right over the government land covered by dag No. 309. Here, he is found to have travelled beyond his pleadings. It was not his pleading that the suit land was covered by patta land only. Hence, his evidence, which is beyond pleadings, has been rightly rejected. Even the plaintiffs tenant i.e. Mr. Baharul Islam (D.W.-2), also supporting the evidence of defendant ((DW-1) stated that the defendant was running a garage beside his welding shop. This shows that the defendant was possessing the land with his workshop therein since the time when the DW-2 i.e. Mr. Baharul Islam had his workshop. Even the plaintiffs tenant i.e. Mr. Baharul Islam (D.W.-2), also supporting the evidence of defendant ((DW-1) stated that the defendant was running a garage beside his welding shop. This shows that the defendant was possessing the land with his workshop therein since the time when the DW-2 i.e. Mr. Baharul Islam had his workshop. The said evidence that D.W.-2 and D.W.-1 were running their workshops during the same period, negates the plaintiffs claim that the defendant had occupied the workshop i.e. the 'Tin chali' after it was vacated by the defendant No. 1. In the absence of any other substantive evidence, the findings, that the plaintiffs failed to establish that the defendant was a trespasser, is found to be correct. Therefore, the decision of the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Divn.), that the plaintiff was not entitled to get the relief sought for, can't be held to be without any evidence. In view of the above discussion, it is found that the first appellate Court, considering the evidence, on-record, rightly came to the concurrent findings that the plaintiffs failed to prove that he was possessing the suit land for 40 years and that the plaintiffs' land covered by dag No. 309, was forcefully occupied by the defendant. The questions regarding possession and dispossession are matters of fact. As discussed above, both the Courts below based theirs findings on evidence on-record and as such, the impugned judgment and order do not suffer from any illegality and perversity. Therefore, this Court, in second appeal, finds no sufficient reason to interfere with the said consequent findings on fact. In view of what has been discussed above, I find no merit in this second appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed on contest No cost. Return the LCR. Appeal dismissed.