Judgment This Writ Petition is directed against the order dated 10 August, 2012, suspending the petitioner from service and the consequential orders dated 25 February, 2013, and 21 February, 2014, on the file of Deputy Inspector General of Police, Tiruchirappalli, whereby and whereunder, her application for review of suspension was rejected. THE FACTS: 2. While the petitioner was working as Sub-Inspector of Police, the Vigilance and Anti Corruption Wing laid a trap and she was arrested on 10 August, 2012. The Vigilance and Anti Corruption Wing registered a case in Crime No.4 of 2012 against the petitioner under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. In view of her arrest and remand and involvement in a criminal case, the petitioner was placed under suspension, by proceedings dated 10 August, 2012. The petitioner submitted an application on 07 January, 2013, requesting the disciplinary authority to revoke the suspension. The request was rejected. According to the petitioner, the Investigating Officer filed a final report on 29 November, 2013, after completion of investigation and as such, there is no need to continue the suspension. The petitioner now challenges the legality and correctness of the orders dated 10 August, 2012, 25 February, 2013 and 21 February, 2014, on the file of Deputy Inspector General of Police, Tiruchirappalli. SUBMISSIONS: 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner, by placing reliance on a judgment of this Court dated 02 July, 2012 in W.P.Nos.29195 of 2010, etc., batch, contended that this Court, under similar circumstances, revoked the suspension orders and directed the Department to post the officers in a non sensitive post. According to the learned counsel, the police have already laid the charge sheet and as such, there is no question of petitioner interfering with the process of investigation. The learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner is prepared to work anywhere in the State of Tamil Nadu and as such, a direction should be issued to revoke the suspension. 4. The learned Government Advocate submitted that the criminal case registered against the petitioner is still pending and as such, there is no question of revoking the suspension at this point of time. ANALYSIS: 5. The Vigilance and Anti Corruption Wing laid a trap against the petitioner, on the basis of a complaint that she demanded illegal gratification. The petitioner was arrested on 10 August, 2012 and remanded to custody. ANALYSIS: 5. The Vigilance and Anti Corruption Wing laid a trap against the petitioner, on the basis of a complaint that she demanded illegal gratification. The petitioner was arrested on 10 August, 2012 and remanded to custody. The petitioner was suspended, vide proceedings dated 10 August, 2012. Her subsequent application for review was rejected by the respondent. 6. The petitioner is an accused in a corruption case. The petitioner now wanted this Court to exercise the power of judicial review and to decide as to whether the respondent was correct in passing the impugned orders. 7. The petitioner was suspended on account of her involvement in a corruption case. A public servant, who is charged of corruption, in ordinary circumstances, should be kept away from the office, until he/she is absolved from criminal charges. The fact that the trial of the criminal case would be delayed further by itself would not be a ground for revoking suspension. In case a police officer, who is involved in a corruption case, is allowed to rejoin duty by revoking suspension, it would impair the morale of other employees. 8. The Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court in R.P.Kapur v. Union of India [ AIR 1964 SC 787 ] made it very clear that the appointing authority is entitled to suspend the employee pending departmental enquiry. The observation reads thus: THE LAW: "11. The general principle therefore is that an employer can suspend an employee pending an enquiry into his conduct and the only question that can arise on such suspension will relate to the payment during the period of such suspension. If there is no express term in the contract relating to suspension and payment during such suspension or if there is no statutory provision in any law or rule, the employee is entitled to his full remuneration for the period of his interim suspension; on the other hand if there is a term in this respect in the contract or there is a provision in the statute or the rules framed thereunder providing for the scale of payment during suspension, the payment would be in accordance therewith. These general principles in our opinion apply with equal force in a case where the government is the employer and a public servant is the employee with this modification that in view of the peculiar structural hierarchy of Government, the employer in the case of government, must be held to be the authority which has the power to appoint a public servant. On general principles therefore the authority entitled to appoint a public servant would be entitled to suspend him pending a departmental enquiry into his conduct or pending a criminal proceeding, which may eventually result in a departmental enquiry against him. This general principle is illustrated by the provision in Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, No.X of 1897, which lays down that where any Central Act or Regulation gives power of appointment that includes the power to suspend or dismiss unless a different intention appears. Though this provision does not directly apply in the present case, it is in consonance with the general law of master and servant. But what amount should be paid to the public servant during such suspension will depend upon the provisions of the statute or rule in that connection. If there is such a provision the payment during suspension will be in accordance therewith. But if there is no such provision, the public servant will be entitled to his full emoluments during the period of suspension. This suspension must be distinguished from suspension as a punishment which is a different matter altogether depending upon the rules in that behalf. On general principles therefore the Government, like any other employer, would have a right to suspend a public servant in one of two ways. It may suspend any public servant pending departmental enquiry or pending criminal proceedings; this may be called interim suspension. Or the Government may proceed to hold a departmental enquiry and after his being found guilty order suspension as a punishment if the rules so permit. This will be suspension as a penalty. These general principles will apply to all public servants but they will naturally be subject to the provisions of Art.314 and this brings us to an investigation of what was the right of a member of the former Secretary of State's Services in the matter of suspension, whether as a penalty or otherwise." 9. These general principles will apply to all public servants but they will naturally be subject to the provisions of Art.314 and this brings us to an investigation of what was the right of a member of the former Secretary of State's Services in the matter of suspension, whether as a penalty or otherwise." 9. The Supreme Court in B.R.Patel v. State of Maharashtra [ AIR 1968 SC 800 ], reiterated the power of the employer to suspend the employee pending disciplinary proceedings. "4. The general principle therefore is that an employer can suspend an employee pending an inquiry into his misconduct and the only question that can arise in such suspension will relate to payment during the period of such suspension. If there is no express term relating to payment during such suspension or if there is no statutory provision in any enactment or rule the employee is entitled to his full remuneration for the period of his interim suspension. On the other hand, if there is a term in this respect in the contract of employment or if there is a provision in the statute or the rules framed thereunder providing for the scale of payment during suspension the payment will be made in accordance therewith. This principle applies with equal force in a case where the Government is an employer and a public servant is an employee with this qualification that in view of the peculiar structural hierarchy of Government administration, the employer in the case of employment by Government must be held to be the authority which has the power to appoint the public servant concerned. It follows therefore that the authority entitled to appoint the public servant is entitled to suspend him pending a departmental enquiry into his conduct or pending a criminal proceeding, which may eventually result in a departmental enquiry against him. But what amount should be paid to the public servant during such suspension will depend upon the provisions of the statute or statutory rule in that connection. If there is such a provision the payment during suspension will be in accordance therewith. But if there is no such provision, the public servant will be entitled to his full emoluments during the period of suspension. On general principles therefore the Government, like any other employer, would have a right to suspend a public servant in one of two ways. But if there is no such provision, the public servant will be entitled to his full emoluments during the period of suspension. On general principles therefore the Government, like any other employer, would have a right to suspend a public servant in one of two ways. It may suspend any public servant pending departmental enquiry or pending criminal proceedings; this may be called interim suspension. The Government may also proceed to hold a departmental enquiry and after his being found guilty order suspension as a punishment if the rules so permit. This will be suspension as a penalty. As we have already pointed out, the question as to what amount should be paid to the public servant during the period of interim suspension or suspension as a punishment will depend upon the provisions of the statute or statutory rules made in that connection." 10. The order rejecting the request for revoking suspension is essentially a discretionary order passed by the disciplinary authority. Such discretionary orders are not liable to be interfered lightly by the superior Courts invoking the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The fact that on an earlier occasion, this Court has directed the authorities to revoke the suspension and post the officers in any of the non sensitive posts would not give a right to all the employees who were charged under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act to apply for similar reliefs. This Court has not decided any law in the earlier order dated 02 July, 2012 in W.P.Nos.29195 of 2010, etc., batch, to the effect that employees, who have been suspended for their involvement in corruption cases, should be reinstated in service, after revoking the suspension. This Court has passed an order in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the said case. However, in the present case, charge is serious. It is a trap case. There is no question of exercising the power of judicial review in a matter of this nature. 11. The petitioner is a Sub-Inspector of Police. Allowing a person, like the petitioner, charged with serious acts of corruption to discharge her duties and enjoy the fruits of the post, would be against public policy and it would also not in public interest to maintain purity in public administration. Therefore, I do not find any reason to take a different view in the matter. 12. Allowing a person, like the petitioner, charged with serious acts of corruption to discharge her duties and enjoy the fruits of the post, would be against public policy and it would also not in public interest to maintain purity in public administration. Therefore, I do not find any reason to take a different view in the matter. 12. In the result, the Writ Petition is dismissed. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are also dismissed. No costs.