JUDGMENT Dr. Devendra Kumar Arora,J. Heard learned counsel for petitioner Sri Neeraj Kumar Jaiswal and Sri Badrul Hasan, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the opposite parties. 2. By means of the instant writ petition, the petitioner is seeking a writ of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 02.04.2011 passed by Sub Divisional Magistrate (Finance & Revenue) District Unnao and is also seeking a writ of mandamus commanding the opposite parties to pay him retiral benefits and pension etc. along with other service consequential benefits treating him to be regularized in service in accordance with law for the aforesaid benefits. 3. Submission of learned counsel for petitioner is that the petitioner has initially been engaged on the post of seasonal collection Amin under the opposite parties on 04.07.1983 having requisite qualification for appointment on class III post and his assistance towards recovery was more than 72%. It is also submitted by the learned counsel for petitioner that the name of petitioner finds place at sl. no.6 in the District seniority list. The name of petitioner also finds place at sl. no.2 in the seniority list which has been issued by opposite party no.3 vide order dated 15.02.2008. As the petitioner became over age, as per rules, for regularization of services of seasonal collection Amin, therefore, he requested vide letter dated 15.02.2008 for relaxation in age through proper channel and the same was allowed vide order dated 22.10.2008 and an order for approval for regularization of the services of petitioner was also passed. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for petitioner that vide order dated 22.07.2009 the petitioner?s name finds place in the list of regular seasonal collection Amin, which were to be considered for regularization, but as per the provisions of U.P. Collection Amin Service Rules, 2004, the services of the petitioner have not been regularized and with the lapse of time, petitioner retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation on 31.10.2009. 4. The grievance of the petitioner is that inspite of the order having been passed by the opposite parties, the services of the petitioner were not regularized and ultimately on attaining the age of superannuation, he retired on 31.10.2009. Since the date of retirement of the petitioner till date, he has not been paid his retiral benefits and pension etc. along with other service consequential benefits, treating his services as having been regularized. Since the date of retirement of the petitioner till date, he has not been paid his retiral benefits and pension etc. along with other service consequential benefits, treating his services as having been regularized. The petitioner approached the opposite parties time and again but of no avail and vide impugned order dated 22.04.2011, his representation dated 05.04.2010 has been rejected. Therefore, the petitioner, is constrained to approach this Court by means of the instant writ petition seeking directions against the opposite parties for payment post retiral benefits and pension etc. along with other service consequential benefits treating him to be regularized in accordance with law for the aforesaid benefits. 5. Sri Badrul Hasan, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel while opposing the writ petition submitted that the impugned order dated 22.04.2011 passed by opposite party no.3, has been challenged by the petitioner after a lapse of about three years eight months and no explanation, with respect to delay, has been given by the petitioner in the writ petition, therefore the writ petition is not maintainable, being barred by the provisions of Law of Limitation. 6. I have gone through the record. 7. This Court on a careful scrutiny of the averments made in the writ petition, finds that the petitioner while filing the instant writ petition does not utter even a single word with respect to delay in filing the writ petition. From the perusal of the averments made in the writ petition, it appears that after rejection of representation of the petitioner dated 05.04.2011, vide order dated 22.04.2011, the petitioner slept over the issue and woke up only in the month of December 2014 and raised the issue by means of present writ petition, without explaining the delay in filing the writ petition. 8. It is settled law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to him on the ground of delay and laches. 9. In the matter of State of M.P. vs. Nandlal Jaiswal reported in (1986) 4 SCC 556 it is observed: "The High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. 9. In the matter of State of M.P. vs. Nandlal Jaiswal reported in (1986) 4 SCC 556 it is observed: "The High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised and unreasonable delay, it may have the effect or inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weights with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction." 10. The Hon'ble Apex Court considered the effect of delay and laches in the case reported in 2009 (2) SCC 479 , (S.S. Balu and another vs. State of Kerala & othersJ and pleased to observe as under: "It is also well settled principle of law that "delay defeats equity". The Government Order was issued on 15.01.2002. The appellants did not file any writ application questioning the legality and validity thereof. Only after the writ petitions filed by others were allowed and the State of Kerala preferred an appeal there against, they impleaded themselves as party-respondents. It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment. It is, thus, not possible for us to issue any direction to the State of Kerala or the Commission to appoint the appellants at this stage." 11. It is, thus, not possible for us to issue any direction to the State of Kerala or the Commission to appoint the appellants at this stage." 11. Similarly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Yunus (Baboobhai) A. Hamid Padvekar vs. State of Maharashtra & others reported in (2009) 3 SCC 281 held: "Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extra ordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prasad v. Controller of Imports and Exports. Of Course, the discretion has to be exercise judicially and reasonably." 12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Cicily Kallarackal vs. Vehicle Factory reported in (2012) 8 SCC 524 , held in paragraph 7 as under: - "In the instant case, condoning such an inordinate delay without any sufficient cause would amount to substituting the period of limitation by this Court in place of the period prescribed by the legislature for filing the special leave petition. Therefore, we do not see any cogent reason to condone the delay." 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of U.P. and others vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava, decided by his Lordship on 17.10.2014, held in sub para 2 of paragraph 23 as under: - "23(2). However, this principle is subject to well recognized exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the Court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. The would be treated as fence-sisters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim." 14. The would be treated as fence-sisters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim." 14. Thus, in view of the settled proposition of law, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as the High Court, in catena of decisions, each and every day delay, must be explained, by the petitioner. In absence of any such averment? in the writ petition, which is filed at such a belated stage, the same cannot be entertained and is liable to be dismissed on the sole ground of delay and laches. 15. Accordingly, the writ petition is hereby dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.