JUDGMENT HON'BLE ANIL KUMAR SHARMA, J This appeal challenges the judgment and order dated 8th December, 1982 passed by Sri D.L. Soni, the then 2nd Addl. Sessions Judge, Ghaziabad in S.T. No. 171 of 1980 whereby the appellant has been convicted for the offence punishable under section 306 IPC and sentenced to undergo four years' RI. 2. Shorn of details, the prosecution story as contained in the first information report as also appearing in the evidence adduced during trial is that on 01.10.1979 complainant of the case Brij Kishore submitted a written report at P.S. Modi Nagar, District Ghaziabad at 07:50 PM alleging that he has married his daughter Nirmala Devi with accused appellant Vinod Kumar on 03.06.1979. Day before yesterday i.e. on 28.09.1979 he has sent his son Manmohan to take back Nirmala Devi from her matrimonial home where she told her brother that she is being harassed and tortured by her in-laws as they say that unless her father gives them Rs.10,000/- and a television, they would not send her and she suspected threat to her life. She returned her brother back to send the father. On 30.09.1979 at 6:00 p. m. the complainant reached at the house of the accused in Modi Nagar to have talks with Bhajan Lal (father of Vinod Kumar) and his family members where he came to know that the accused persons after setting his daughter ablaze had taken her in burnt condition to Meerut Medical College. He immediately rushed to Medical College where she was found dead. On inquiry, the accused did not tell him anything about the incident. The complainant has concluded that in greed of dowry the accused persons namely Vinod Kumar and his father Bhajan Lal have burnt his daughter alive. On the basis of this report case u/s 302 IPC was registered at P. S. Modi Nagar, investigation whereof was entrusted to SI P. P Singh, who after completing the investigatory formalities submitted charge sheet against accused Vinod Kumar, his brother Chhidda Lal and father Bhajan Lal for the offence punishable under section 306 IPC. 3. After committal of case to the Court of Session, charge for the offence punishable under section 306 IPC was framed against all the three accused. 4. 3. After committal of case to the Court of Session, charge for the offence punishable under section 306 IPC was framed against all the three accused. 4. In support of its case, the prosecution has examined the complainant Brij Kishore PW-1, Dharam Veer PW-2, Vasi Ram PW-3, Manmohan Lal PW-5, Constable Praduman Kumar PW-6 and SI Pokh Pal Singh PW-7. The affidavit of Constable Gajendra Singh was taken on record as PW-4. 5. In statement under section 313 Cr.P.C. all the accused persons have admitted the marriage of the deceased with Vinod Kumar on 03.06.1979 and denied other circumstances appearing in the evidence against them. In defence they have examined Bhagwan Sahai DW-1 and Shobha Devi DW-2. 6. The learned Trial Court after hearing the parties' counsel through the impugned judgment has acquitted the other co-accused Chhidda Lal and Bhajan Lal. However, the accused appellant has been convicted and sentenced, as noted in para-1 of the judgment. Aggrieved, the accused has come up in appeal. 7. I have heard the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, learned AGA for State and perused the original record of the trial Court. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued that the findings recorded by the learned trial Court are based on conjectures and surmises; that the prosecution has utterly failed to prove that the appellant has abetted or instigated the deceased to commit suicide within the meaning of section 107 IPC; that the incident had taken place prior to the insertion of section 498-A, 304-B IPC or section 113-A Evidence Act, so no presumption can be raised by the Court that the appellant has abetted the deceased to end her life. It has been next argued that the deceased was cantankerous woman and used to pick up anger very soon and no dowry was ever demanded either from the deceased or her family members. On the day of incident she did not provide food to her father-in-law and he left home in hungry state, so she was rebuked by the accused-appellant. After an hour when she served food to him, he threw the thali and left for Meerut without eating anything and when he came to know about the incident he went to Medical College. 9. After an hour when she served food to him, he threw the thali and left for Meerut without eating anything and when he came to know about the incident he went to Medical College. 9. Per contra learned AGA supporting the impugned judgment has argued that the deceased was married with appellant only on 3.6.1979, thereafter she resided with her parents only for few days, she was not being sent by her in-laws as their demand of television and scooter was not met by her parents; that she was harassed for demand of dowry and she could not bear the atrocities of the appellant who was her husband and responsible for her welfare in his family, has abetted her to commit suicide. The trial Court after very exhaustive analysis of the evidence led by the parties during trial has convicted the accused-appellant for the offence punishable u/s 306 IPC and his elder brother and father had been acquitted of the charge. The appeal has no merits and is liable to be dismissed, argued the learned AGA. 10. Before I proceed to analyse the evidence adduced in support of the charge by the prosecution against the accused-appellant, it would be pertinent to note the concept of 'abetment'. Section 306 of the Code deals with 'abetment of suicide' which reads as under: "306. Abetment of suicide - If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine." 11. Word 'suicide' in itself is not defined in the Indian Penal Code, however, its meaning and import is well known and requires no explanation. `Sui' means `self' and `cide' means `killing', thus implying an act of self-killing. In short a person committing suicide must commit it by himself, irrespective of the means employed by him in achieving his object of killing himself. 12. Our Penal Code does not prescribe any punishment for suicide, because the offender is no more in the world, however attempt to suicide is an offence under section 309 of I.P.C. 'Abetment of a thing' has been defined under section 107 of the Code, which reads as under: "107. 12. Our Penal Code does not prescribe any punishment for suicide, because the offender is no more in the world, however attempt to suicide is an offence under section 309 of I.P.C. 'Abetment of a thing' has been defined under section 107 of the Code, which reads as under: "107. Abetment of a thing - A person abets the doing of a thing, who - First - Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly - Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes places in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly - Intentionally aides, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation 2 which has been inserted along with section 107 reads as under: Explanation 2 - Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitate the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act." 13, In the case of Ramesh Kumar Vs. State of Chhatisgarh (2001) 9 SCC 618 , a three Judge bench of the Apex Court in para-20 of the report, after examining different shades of the word 'instigation', has observed as under: "20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do 'an act';. To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. the present one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation." 14. In State of West Bengal Vs. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation." 14. In State of West Bengal Vs. Orilal Jaiswal and another (1994) 1 SCC 73 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has cautioned that the Court should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide. If it appears to the Court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and difference in domestic life, quite common to the society, to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and difference were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the Court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty. 15. In Chitresh Kumar Chopra Vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) 2009 (16) SCC 605 , the Apex Court had an occasion to deal with this aspect of abetment. The court dealt with the dictionary meaning of the word 'instigation' and 'goading'. The court opined that there should be intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing of an act by the latter. Each person's suicidability pattern is different from the others. Each person has his own idea of self-esteem and self-respect. Therefore, it is impossible to lay down any straight-jacket formula in dealing with such cases. Each case has to be decided on the basis of its own facts and circumstances. 16. In the instant case the marriage of the deceased with accused-appellant took place on 3.6.1979 and the deceased suffered death on account of extensive burn injuries sustained by her in her matrimonial home on 30.9.1979. However, at that time Section 113-A was not introduced in the Evidence Act, which came into existence by way of amendment since 26.12.1983, but as it is a matter of procedure and evidence, so it has retrospective operation. In this connection, I find support from the case of Gurbachan Singh Vs. However, at that time Section 113-A was not introduced in the Evidence Act, which came into existence by way of amendment since 26.12.1983, but as it is a matter of procedure and evidence, so it has retrospective operation. In this connection, I find support from the case of Gurbachan Singh Vs. Satpal Singh, AIR 1990 SC 209 , wherein the Apex Court has observed that the provisions of section 113-A does not create any new offence and as such it does not create any substantial right but it is merely a matter of procedure of evidence and as such it is retrospective. The presumption under the section is also available in cases where the incident took place prior to 26.12.1983 when the section was engrafted into the Evidence Act. 17. In the case of State Of Punjab vs Iqbal Singh And Ors 1991 SCR (2) 790, the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court were as under: "On a plain reading of this provision it is obvious that if a wife is shown to have committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of marriage and there is evidence that she was subjected to cruelty by her husband or his relative, it would be permissible for the court to presume that such suicide was abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. The Amendment Act 46 of 1983 received the assent of the President on 25th December, 1983 and was published in the Gazette of India, dated 26th December, 1983. The trial court rendered its Judgment on 23rd February, 1984 and it does not appear if the prosecution concentrated on section 113A, Evidence Act, for otherwise it would have tried to place on record the exact date of marriage to take advantage of the presumption arising thereunder. The High Court referred to this provision but did not say anything in regard to its application. Being a rule of evidence it could perhaps have been invoked if proof regarding the exact date of marriage was laid. Since there is no cogent evidence that the marriage was solemnised within seven years from the date of incident we need not dilate on that point. The law underwent a further change with the introduction of section 304B in the Penal Code and section 113B in the Evidence Act by the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1986. Since there is no cogent evidence that the marriage was solemnised within seven years from the date of incident we need not dilate on that point. The law underwent a further change with the introduction of section 304B in the Penal Code and section 113B in the Evidence Act by the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1986. Where the death of a woman is caused by burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and evidence reveals that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any of his relative for or in connection with any demand for dowry, such death is described as dowry death under section 304B for which the punishment extends to imprisonment for life but not less than imprisonment for seven years. By section 113B, Evidence Act, the court has to raise a presumption of dowry death if the same has taken place within seven years of marriage and there is evidence of the woman having been subjected to cruelty and/or harassment. The legislative intent is clear: to curb the menance of dowry deaths, etc., with a firm hand. We must keep in mind this legislative intent. It must be remembered that since such crimes are generally committed in the privacy of residential homes and in secrecy, independent and direct evidence is not easy to get. That is why the legislature has by introducing sections 113A and 113B in the Evidence Act tried to strengthen the prosecution hands by permitting a presumption to be raised if certain foundational facts are established and the unfortunate event has taken place within seven years of marriage. This period of seven years is considered to be the turbulent one after which the legislature assumes that the couple would have settled down in life. If a married woman is subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his family members section 498A, I.P.C. would be attracted. This period of seven years is considered to be the turbulent one after which the legislature assumes that the couple would have settled down in life. If a married woman is subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his family members section 498A, I.P.C. would be attracted. If such cruelty or harassment was inflicted by the husband or his relative for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry immediately preceding death by burns and bodily injury or in abnormal circumstances within seven years of marriage, such husband or relative is deemed to have caused her death and is liable to be punished under section 304B, I.P.C. When the question at issue is whether a person is guilty of dowry death of a woman and the evidence discloses that immediately before her death she was subjected by such person to cruelty and/or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, section 113B, Evidence Act provides that the court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Of course if there is proof of the person having intentionally caused her death that would attract section 302, I.P.C. Then we have a situation where the husband or his relative by his wilful conduct creates a situation which he knows will drive the woman to commit suicide and she actually does so, the case would squarely fall within the ambit of section 306, I.P.C. In such a case the conduct of the person would tantamount to inciting provoking or virtually pushing the woman into a desperate situation of no return which would compel her to put an end to her miseries by committing suicide." 18. In the instant case, admittedly Smt. Nirmala has committed suicide in her matrimonial home just within four months of her marriage with the accused-appellant i.e. 'within seven years from the date of her marriage' then in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Gurbachan Singh and Iqbal Singh (supra) presumption in terms of Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short, "the Evidence Act") to the effect that suicide by the deceased was abetted by the appellant can surely be raised. Section 113-A, Evidence Act runs thus: 113A. Section 113-A, Evidence Act runs thus: 113A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman.- When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. Explanation.-- For the purposes of this section, "cruelty" shall have the same meaning as in section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860 ). 19. In the case of M. Mohan vs State represented by Dy. Supdt. of Police (2011) 3 SCC 626 , a constitution Bench of the Supreme Court consisting of 7-Hon'ble Judges after crystallizing the law relating to suicide and its abetment has observed that abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. Thus, we have to find out whether there was any positive act on the part of the accused-appellant to instigate or aid in committing suicide by the deceased and for this purpose the oral evidence led by the prosecution would be required to be analysed. 20. Now reverting back to the evidence on record, there are certain undisputed facts, which are as under: i) that deceased Nirmala aged about 18-years was married with accused-appellant on 3.6.1979. 20. Now reverting back to the evidence on record, there are certain undisputed facts, which are as under: i) that deceased Nirmala aged about 18-years was married with accused-appellant on 3.6.1979. The complainant is resident of Kotla Mubarakpur, New Delhi while the accused resided in Modi Nagar District Ghaziabad; ii) that she resided with her husband, three brothers-in-law, father Bhajan Lal (co-accused, acquitted by the trial Court), elder sister-in-law Shobha DW-2 and her children; iii) that the deceased suffered extensive burn injuries in her matrimonial home on 30.9.1979 at about 3:00 p.m. and died the same evening on way to Medical College, Meerut; iv) that the complainant submitted a written report of the incident in P. S. Modi Nagar on 1.10.1979 at 7:50 p.m. in which along with accused-appellant his father Bhajan Lal was also named and the case u/s 302 IPC was registered; v) that the inquest upon the cadaver of the deceased was conducted in Medical College, Meerut on 30.9.1979 at 5:35 p.m. before registration of the case and the accused-appellant is not among the panch witnesses; vi) that the autopsy of the deceased was conducted by Dr. V. P. Singh on 1.10.1979 and he found superficial burn injuries and signing of hairs all over the body. The cause of death was shock as a result of extensive burn injuries about a day before; vii) that after investigation the police submitted charge-sheet against the named accused persons as also Chhidda Lal, elder brother of accused-appellant and husband of Shobha DW-2 for the offence punishable u/s 306 IPC; viii) that the deceased suffered matrimonial life only for about 4-months and during this period she stayed in her parents' home only for few days just after the marriage; ix) that complainant Braj Kishore PW-1 had written two letters to father of the accused-appellant on 26.7.1979 and 22.6.1979 which are Ex. Kha-1 and Kha-2 respectively; x) that on the eve of 1st Teej, as is customary, neither the deceased nor sindara was sent by the accused-appellant's side to her parents' home; xi) that on 27.6.1979 the complainant sent his son Man Mohan Lal PW-2 to Modi Nagar to take Nirmala to Delhi along with letter of request dated 22.6.1979 (Ex. Kha-2) but she was not sent by the accused-appellant. 21. The learned counsel for the accused-appellant has admitted the genuineness of the autopsy report (Ex. Kha-2) but she was not sent by the accused-appellant. 21. The learned counsel for the accused-appellant has admitted the genuineness of the autopsy report (Ex. Ka-2) of the deceased in which the doctor has found her uterus gravid containing 5 inch long male foetus of about 4-months and uterus was about 6 inch long. This finding or circumstance has lost sight of the trial Court in the impugned judgment, which will certainly go against the accused-appellant and will show/prove the mental agony and the trauma which was being suffered by the deceased in her matrimonial home at the hands of her in-laws including the accused-appellant so as to take the extreme step of her committing suicide. 22. In his statement u/s 313 Cr. P. C. accused-appellant has admitted that his marriage with deceased Nirmala Devi was solemnised on 3.6.1979, three days' thereafter her brother took her back but on 8.6.1979 he along with his brother Chhidda Lal on the pretext of marriages in the relations brought her back to Modi Nagar. In answer to question no. 2 he has denied that 20-22 days thereafter Man Mohan Lal had gone to Modi Nagar to take his sister to Delhi and then he demanded a television and scooter and until these articles are not given they would not send Nirmala back to her parents' home. However, in cross-examination of PW-1 it has been suggested that i.e. 20-22 days after Nirmala returned back her matrimonial home, she had accompanied her brother to Delhi and had lived there for 4-5 days. The visit of Man Mohan in the last week of June, 1979 is also proved by letter dated Ex. Kha-2, which had come from the custody of the accused persons. The letter dated 26.7.1979 (Ex. Kha-1) addressed to the father and elder brother of the accused-appellant and sent along with sindara through Harpal Singh and son Man Mohan Lal narrate a hidden pain in his heart. Kha-2, which had come from the custody of the accused persons. The letter dated 26.7.1979 (Ex. Kha-1) addressed to the father and elder brother of the accused-appellant and sent along with sindara through Harpal Singh and son Man Mohan Lal narrate a hidden pain in his heart. The relevant portion of the letter reads as under: ^^------ ckdh eSa gjiky flag dks eqUuh dk flankjs dk lkeku Hkst jgk gwW lks d`I;k Lohdkj djuk D;ksafd ykyk th ge xjhc vkneh gS o csVh okys gSaA nwljs ?kj esa dksbZ laHkkyus okyk ugha gSaA blfy, Hkh etcwj gSA vxj dksbZ xyrh gks lks {kek djuk gekjs yk;d dksbZ lsok gks lks fy[kukA-----** The contents of the letter clearly demonstrate that all was not well with the deceased in her matrimonial home. 23. There are consistent statements of Braj Kishore PW-1 and Man Mohan Lal PW-5 regarding dowry demand by the accused-appellant of a television and scooter accompanied with threat that if these articles are not given, they would not send Nirmala to her parents' house. The accused-appellant had surely fulfilled the promise (threat) by making life of the deceased so miserable that she was compelled to immolate her without caring for the baby child nurturing in her womb. Even the colours of wedding mehndi have not faded till the date of incident, but the poor pregnant young girl had to embrace death by setting herself ablaze due to the mental and physical atrocities of the accused-appellant. Smt. Shobha Devi DW-2 has admitted that two months after the marriage of the deceased, her father-in-law had separated them and the burden of cooking food and all other family chores was put on the newly wed deceased, which included her two brothers-in-law and father-in-law although they all were residing in the same house, rather adjacent rooms as shown in the site plan. The learned trial Court has discussed the oral evidence led by the prosecution in detail in the impugned judgment, I need not burden this judgment by simply reiterating the same. I have carefully perused the statements of PW-1 to PW-4. 24. PW-2 and PW-3 are the witnesses who had seen the accused persons taking out the deceased in burnt condition from their house for her medical treatment. Their testimony is not useful for proving any sort of cruelty on the deceased at the hands of her in-laws. I have carefully perused the statements of PW-1 to PW-4. 24. PW-2 and PW-3 are the witnesses who had seen the accused persons taking out the deceased in burnt condition from their house for her medical treatment. Their testimony is not useful for proving any sort of cruelty on the deceased at the hands of her in-laws. However, they have proved one important circumstance, which is that the accused-appellant and his father Bhajan Lal were among the persons, who had taken Nirmala to Medical College, Meerut from Modi Nagar and the learned trial Court after elaborate exercise of evaluating evidence on record has concluded that at the time of incident accused-appellant and Chhidda Lal were inside the house. 25. The learned trial Court for adequate reasons given in the impugned findings after appreciation of evidence had discarded the testimony of DW-1 and DW-2. The accused-appellant has failed to discharge the burden which was on him/them u/s 106 Evidence Act. They were the best persons to list the circumstances which have led the deceased to take extreme step by ending her precious life. PW-1 has stated in his examination-in-chief that when he saw the dead body of her daughter before autopsy, on his enquiry accused-appellant and his brother Chhidda Lal told him that the deceased was of bad character, so she had committed suicide. Even the defence story is not consistent on this point. It has been suggested to PW-1 at the end of his cross-examination that on the day of incident on account of some dispute with accused-appellant, the deceased did not prepare food and his father had left the house hungry and again scuffle took place between the spouse. However, in his statement u/s 313 Cr. P. C. Bhajan Lal (father of the accused-appellant) had stated that on that day (day of incident) Nirmala woke up late and could not prepare food, so he along with his younger son Dinesh left home without taking food. It is important to note that although Shobha Devi DW-2 claims separate living with the deceased just two months after her marriage, but this fact does not find corroboration from any other evidence including the statements of accused persons recorded u/s 313 Cr. It is important to note that although Shobha Devi DW-2 claims separate living with the deceased just two months after her marriage, but this fact does not find corroboration from any other evidence including the statements of accused persons recorded u/s 313 Cr. P. C. Chhidda Lal accused has stated that he resides in the same house along with his children and his kitchen is separate, but he has not given circumstances, which had led to their separation within months after marriage of accused-appellant with the deceased. In the site-plan Ex. Ka-7 only one kitchen had been shown by the investigating officer and there is no cross-examination from him, who had deposed in the case as PW-7, on this point. Thus, the story of separate kitchen of DW-2 had been cooked up only to save the accused persons. 26. On appreciation of evidence of PW-1 and PW-5, I have no doubt in my mind that the learned trial Court had given cogent and valid reasons to accept their testimony and I have no occasion to take a different view. Their testimony is cogent, consistent and reliable and fully prove that the deceased was treated with cruelty by the accused-appellant by making persistent direct demand of television and scooter as dowry and further by not sending her to the house of the complainant even on important festivals like Teej and Rakshabandhan, and her father was also insulted and suffered misbehaviour at the hands of the accused-appellant. The young married girl of Indian society can tolerate atrocities on herself at the hands of her husband or his relatives, but she cannot bear the burden of misbehaviour or maltreatment with her parents or brother-sister by her in-laws may be her husband. 27. The prosecution story had been clear and consistent right from the inception of the FIR which was prepared on the day of incident and registered on 1.10.1979. The complainant has noted in the written report about the demand of dowry by the accused-appellant and his family members as also the fact that on 28.9.1979 he had sent his son Man Mohan Lal to Modi Nagar to take Nirmala, but she was not sent with him and the complainant came to know that she was being harassed and tortured and till her father does not give them Rs. 10,000/- and television they would not send her and she also suspected danger to her life. The following day i. e. 30.9.1979 he had reached Modi Nagar at about 6:00 p.m. to talk with Bhajan Lal and his family members and did not find any of them. He came to know that in burnt condition they had taken Nirmala to Medical College, Meerut. It has not been proved that the deceased was hypersensitive. The persistent demand of dowry from the deceased during a very short span of her matrimonial life and cruel behaviour of the accused-appellant with his wife has instigated her to self immolate and end her life. The presumption of section 113-A Evidence Act, in the facts and circumstances of the case is available to presume that it was the accused-appellant alone who had abetted her wife (deceased) to commit suicide and thus, he has been rightly held guilty by the learned trial Court for the offence punishable u/s 306 IPC. Considering the fact that the deceased, a young pregnant woman, has committed suicide within four months of her marriage with the accused-appellant, in the opinion of the Court, he does not deserve any sympathy with regard to quantum of sentence. 28. For all the above reasons, this Court finds that the appeal sans merit and is accordingly dismissed. The impugned judgment and order are confirmed. The appellant is on bail. He is directed to surrender in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad immediately to serve out the sentence as awarded by the learned trial Court, subject to adjustment of the period of his previous judicial custody in this case as provided in section 428 Cr. P. C. 29. Let copy of the judgment be sent to the Court concerned and the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad for compliance, which should be reported to the Court within 6-weeks. ——————