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2014 DIGILAW 358 (KER)

Valsala v. Sarojini Prabhu

2014-05-22

K.ABRAHAM MATHEW, T.R.RAMACHANDRAN NAIR

body2014
Judgment Ramachandran Nair, J. 1. This appeal is filed against the judgment and decree dated 10.4.2013 in O.S. No.748/2009 of the Sub Court, Irinjalakuda. There was a counter claim filed by the defendants which was also dismissed by the impugned judgment. The Registry has raised an objection regarding the maintainability of the appeal before this Court by pointing out that, the valuation of the suit is below Rs.2 Lakhs. The same has been contested by the learned counsel for the appellants by stating that the jurisdiction valuation will have to be taken as per the valuation in the suit as well as that of the counter claim. Accordingly, the matter was placed before the Bench for consideration as requested by the learned counsel for the appellants. 2. We heard learned counsel for the appellants, Shri Dinesh R. Shenoy and learned counsel for the respondents, Shri K.V. Sadananda Prabhu. 3. Shri Dinesh R. Shenoy, learned counsel for the appellants relied upon the decision of a Full Bench of this Court in A.Z. Mohammed Farooq v. State Government ( 1984 KLT 346 -FB) to contend that the Full Bench has taken the view therein while interpreting Section 13 of the Kerala Civil Courts Act, 1957 and the meaning of the term "subject mater" that "having regard to the provisions in 0.8 of C.P.C., it is possible to hold that the 'subject-matter' of the suit would be the aggregate of the amounts claimed in the plaint and in the written statement by way of counter-claim. Issues are very much interlocked and the subject-matter of the suit itself becomes rolled up and inflated as the aggregate of the claims put forward in the suit and in the counter-claim." 4. Shri K.V. Sadananda Prabhu, learned counsel for the respondents then submitted that in the light of the recent amendment to Section 13 of the Civil Courts Act raising the appellate jurisdiction of the District Court to Rs.20 Lakhs, the appeal, in any way, has to be filed only before the District Court concerned and not before the High Court. Both the learned counsel argued elaborately on the scope of the amendment and the applicability of the same to the appeal herein. 5. Section 13 of the Kerala Civil Courts Act, 1957 provides for the appellate jurisdiction of the District Court and subordinate courts. Both the learned counsel argued elaborately on the scope of the amendment and the applicability of the same to the appeal herein. 5. Section 13 of the Kerala Civil Courts Act, 1957 provides for the appellate jurisdiction of the District Court and subordinate courts. An amendment for the first time raising the limit to Rs.10,000/- was made by Act 12/1959 in Section 13(1) with effect from 26.3.1959. By Amendment Act 1984 with effect from 6.1.1984 it was raised to Rs.25,000/-. By the later amendment by Act 6/1996 it was raised to Rs.2 lakhs. The recent amendment is by Act 26/2013 with effect from 6.5.2013 and the limit has been raised to Rs.20 Lakhs. This appeal is filed on 9.10.2013 against the judgment and decree dated 10.4.2013. 6. Shri Dinesh R. Shenoy, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that in the light of the consistent view taken by this Court in Clara v. Augustine ( 1984 KLT 377 ), Knnappadi Kalliani v. Lekharaj ( 1996 (2) KLT 106 ) and in Sasi @ Sasikumar & others v. Soudamini and others ( 2003 (2) KLJ 888 ) that the amendments are not retrospective in operation, the Amendment Act 26/2013 will not govern the appeal herein. 7. The above argument is contested by Shri K.V. Sadananda Prabhu by submitting that the dictum laid down in the above cases requires a reconsideration. According to the learned counsel, no litigant has got a vested right with regard to a particular forum of appeal and this aspect has not been considered by the various Division Bench decisions noted above. Learned counsel submitted that, in a case of this nature, the right of appeal is not affected or taken away by the amendment and therefore there is no question of any vested right being affected by the amendment. The real question is whether a party has got a right of appeal to a particular forum. The right of appeal is well preserved and is untouched by the amendment. What is involved is only raising of a pecuniary limit by which the District Court concerned will be the forum for filing appeal upto the limit of Rs.20 Lakhs. As the appellants are still entitled to approach the said forum, their remedy of appeal is not at all affected. What is involved is only raising of a pecuniary limit by which the District Court concerned will be the forum for filing appeal upto the limit of Rs.20 Lakhs. As the appellants are still entitled to approach the said forum, their remedy of appeal is not at all affected. In that view of the matter, the learned counsel submitted that the appellants cannot insist that their appeal will have to be entertained by this Court. 8. Learned counsel for the respondents elaborated his arguments by relying upon various judgments of the Apex Court and other High Courts. According to the learned counsel, the Division Bench in Clara's case ( 1984 KLT 377 ) wrongly relied upon the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in Garikapati Veeraya v. Subbiah Chaudhry ( AIR 1957 SC 540 ). It is argued that this is not a case where the statute, by the amendment notification, has introduced a new restriction or condition with regard to the filing of the appeal. In this context, learned counsel relied upon the decisions of the Apex Court in Messrs. Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and others ( AIR 1953 SC 221 ), Mukund Deo (Dead) represented by his L.Rs. Kasibai and others v. Mahadu and others ( AIR 1965 SC 703 ) and Maria Cristina De Souza Sodder and others v. Amria Zurana Pereira Pinto and others { (1979) 1 SCC 92 } to contend for the position that a party has no vested right of appeal in a particular forum. He also relied upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in Vasu v. Pathooty Umma ( 1990 (1) KLT 670 ). Apart from that, a decision of the Apex Court in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and others v. State of Maharashtra and others { (1994) 4 SCC 602 ) was also relied upon by the learned counsel. It is submitted that a like amendment of the Orissa Civil Court Act and its effect was considered by the Orissa High Court in Duryodhan Samal v. Smt. Uma Dei and others (AIR 1986 Orissa 30) and the High Court had taken a view that by the effect of the amendment raising the limit, the appeal had to be filed before the District Court and not before the High Court and the situation herein is similar. Learned counsel also brought to our notice various amendments to the Civil Courts Act from time to time. It is submitted that the Kerala Civil Courts Act was brought into force in 1957. For the first time a similar issue was considered by this Court in Chinna Kunju Kunju v. Kutti Neelakantan ( 1957 KLT 980 ) and after the said judgment was rendered, there was a further amendment introducing sub-section (2) to Section 13 of the Act to get over the effect of the said judgment. 9. We will now proceed to consider the various aspects as covered by the dictum laid down in various judgments of the Apex Court and this Court. Kerala Civil Courts Act, 1957 came into force on 15.2.1957. Prior to the said enactment, Travancore-Cochin Civil Courts Act, 1951 and the Madras Civil Courts Act, 1873 were applicable in respect of the different areas in the State. In Chinna Kunju Kunju's case ( 1957 KLT 980 ), in respect of three appeals filed before the High Court an objection was raised that as the appeals have been filed after the coming into force of the Kerala Civil Courts Act, going by the limits provided therein, it should be returned to be filed before the appropriate District Courts. Under Section 13, the limit provided then was upto Rs.7,500/- as regards appeals to be filed before the District Court. The Division Bench consisting of K.T. Koshi, C.J. and Vaidialingam, J. considered the matter elaborately, especially in the light of the decision of the Apex Court in Garikapati's case ( AIR 1957 SC 540 ). 10. The facts of the case as narrated in paragraph 2 of the judgment will show that in each of the suits the valuation of the subject matter exceeded Rs.5,000/- but was below Rs.7,500/-. The Division Bench considered the question as to whether the venue for appeals against the three decrees appealed against should be determined with reference to the provisions of the Kerala Civil Courts Act, 1957 or with respect to the corresponding provisions in the Travancore-Cochin and the Madras Civil Courts Act. In paragraph 4, the Bench speaking through K.T. Koshy, C.J. laid down the principles thus: "It is settled law that a right of appeal is a vested right and not a matter relating to practice or procedure. In paragraph 4, the Bench speaking through K.T. Koshy, C.J. laid down the principles thus: "It is settled law that a right of appeal is a vested right and not a matter relating to practice or procedure. It is equally well settled that a party in whose favour a vested right has accrued cannot be deprived of that right by supervening legislation unless the legislation by express words or by necessary intendment took away that right." Their Lordships considered in detail the dictum laid down by the Privy Council in Colonial Sugar Refining Company v. Irving {(1905) AC 369} which was affirmed by the Privy Council itself in Delhi Cloth Mills v. Income Tax Commissioner, Delhi (AIR 1927 RC. 242). Their Lordships further relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Garikapati's case ( AIR 1957 SC 540 ) wherein the above decisions of the Privy Council have been followed. 11. In the course of the discussion, their Lordships distinguished the judgment of the Madras High Court in Parthasarathi Naidu In re {(1957) I Madras Law Weekly 595}, which was decided by a Division Bench consisting of Chief Justice Rajamannar and Panchapakesa Ayyar, J.. The discussion in paragraphs 5 to 10 of the judgment will show that the Madras High Court, in the said case, was of the view that the amendment notification therein is retrospective in nature and accordingly their Lordships were of the view that the appeals will have to be considered in the light of the amended provisions of the Madras Civil Courts Act. Therein, the Madras Civil Courts Act, 1873 provided an appeal to the High Court if the valuation was Rs.5,000/-and above, but the Amending Act VII of 1956 substituted the figure Rs.5,000/- occurring in Section 13 of the main Act by the figure Rs.10,000/-. In paragraph 12 of the judgment in Chinna Kunju Kunju's case ( 1957 KLT 980 ), the Division Bench differed from the view taken by the Madras High Court in Parthasarathi Naidu, In re {(1957) I Madras Law Weekly 595} and held as follows: "12. On the whole, with respect, we differ from the view taken in Parthasarathi Naidu, In re and we are unable to find our way to hold that the Kerala Civil Courts Act was intended to be retrospective in its operation." (emphasis supplied by us) Finally, in paragraph 13, the following view was taken: "13. On the whole, with respect, we differ from the view taken in Parthasarathi Naidu, In re and we are unable to find our way to hold that the Kerala Civil Courts Act was intended to be retrospective in its operation." (emphasis supplied by us) Finally, in paragraph 13, the following view was taken: "13. The necessary result of the view taken by us is not only that these appeals have been properly laid here, but also that if appeals in like cases have already been preferred before the District Courts, they will have to be returned for presentation to this court. Appeals arising from decisions of the Subordinate Judges' courts in suits instituted before the Kerala Civil Courts Act was enacted, where the valuation is below Rs.7,500 will have to be filed in this Court irrespective of the date on which the judgment is pronounced. We are not now called upon to decide whether the same rule would apply to suits instituted after the enactment of the Act and before it was brought into force. The provision as to appeals to the District Courts from the decisions of Subordinate Judges' courts will remain a dead-letter for some years to come unless the Legislature thinks it proper to make the provision retrospective. It is however not a novel thing for such provisions in similar enactments to remain dead- letters for some considerable period-see the judgment of Courts Trotter, C, J., in Vasudeva Samiar, In re -A. I. R. 1929 Madras 381 (S. B.)" Thus, the Division Bench upheld the vested right of the appellants to file the appeal before this Court by holding the view that the amendment is not retrospective in operation. 12. After the above judgment was rendered, sub-section (2) was introduced by Act 12/1959 which reads as follows: "(2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply to original decrees and orders of a Subordinate Judge's Courts passed after the commencement of the Kerala Civil Courts (Amendment) Act, 1959, notwithstanding the fact that the suits in respect of which such decrees and orders have been passed were instituted before such commencement." Thus, the effect of the judgment was sought to be somewhat taken away by the above said provision. It is to be noted that in respect of any of the subsequent amendments to Section 13(1) of the Kerala Civil Courts Act, 1957 such similar provisions have not been introduced, including in respect of the recent amendment. 13. We will now come to the decision of the Division Bench in Clara's case ( 1984 KLT 377 ). Therein, the suits were instituted as O.S. Nos. 166/1982 on 5.7.1982 and 220/1979 on 5.9.1978. After the decrees were passed in the two cases, Section 13 of the Kerala Civil Courts Act was amended by substituting the words "Rs.25,000/-" for the words "Rs. 10,000/-". This was done by Ordinance 9 of 1984 which came into force on 6.1.1984. When the appeals were filed before this Court, the Registry raised a doubt going by the valuation shown, as to whether the appeals could be maintained before this Court or whether they will have to be filed before the District Court. The Division Bench (consisting of Balagangadharan Nair and V. Bhaskaran Nambiar, JJ.) speaking through Balagangadharan Nair, J., considered the question whether the enhancement of the value by the Ordinance is retrospective so as to take in suits instituted before the introduction of the amendment or not. Their Lordships relied upon paragraph 23 of the judgment of the Apex Court in Garikapati's case ( AIR 1957 SC 540 ) and held as follows: "It is clear from the above pronouncement that the right of appeal is a substantive right and not a mere matter of procedure and that the institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties till the rest of the career of the suit. It also established that this vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise. The appellants in these appeals had a right vested in them on 5-7-1982 and 5-9-1978, the dates at which the suits were instituted, to bring adverse decisions (provided of course they are appealable) on appeal to this Court. That right was available to them on the dates they brought the appeals unless it was taken away in the meanwhile by Ordinance 9 of 1984. That right was available to them on the dates they brought the appeals unless it was taken away in the meanwhile by Ordinance 9 of 1984. We considered the Ordinance and we could find nothing in its provisions that either expressly or even by necessary implication takes away that right. That being the position, the appeals lie to this Court and have to be entertained." 14. According to learned counsel Shri K.V. Sadananda Prabhu, the dictum laid down in Garikapati's case ( AIR 1957 SC 540 ) was wrongly applied by the Division Bench. Learned counsel explained the various principles, by referring to the different sets of facts considered by the Apex Court in three different cases, viz. Messrs. Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd.'s case (1953 SC 221), Garikapati Veeraya's case ( AIR 1957 SC 540 ) and Kasibai's case ( AIR 1965 SC 703 ). 15. First we will consider Messrs. Hoosein Ksam Dada (India) Ltd.'s case ( AIR 1953 SC 221 ). That was a case where the right of appeal of a litigant under the pre-existing provisions of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947 in the light of the amendment to Section 22(1) of the said Act was considered. Going by the unamended Section 22(1) of the Act, an appeal can be preferred against an order under the Act to the prescribed authority and the proviso stipulated that no appeal against an order of assessment with or without penalty, shall be entertained by the said authority unless it is satisfied that such amount of tax or penalty or both as the appellant may admit to be due from him, has been paid. This proviso was amended stipulating that no appeal against an order of assessment, with or without penalty shall be admitted by the said authority unless such appeal is accompanied by a satisfactory proof of the payment of the tax with, penalty, if any, in respect of which the appeal has been preferred. There is marked difference in the wording of these provisions. The Apex Court, relying upon the dictum laid down in Colonial Sugar Refining Co. There is marked difference in the wording of these provisions. The Apex Court, relying upon the dictum laid down in Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd.'s case {(1905) A.C. 369} addressed the question whether the imposition of restriction by the amendment of the section can affect the assessee's right of appeal from a decision in proceedings which commenced prior to such amendment and which right of appeal was free from such restriction under the section as it stood at the time of the commencement of the proceedings. The Apex Court noted the dictum laid down in Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd.'s case {(1905) A.C. 369} which was followed in Nana v. Sheku (32 Bom. 337), Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd.'s case (A.I.R. 1927 RC. 242) and a Full Bench of Lahore High Court in Kirpa Singh v. Rasalldar Ajaipal Singh (AIR1928 Lah. 627 (FB)). It was held by the Apex Court as follows: "It was there regarded as settled that the right of appeal was not a mere matter of procedure but was a vested right which inhered in a party from the commencement of the action in the Court of first instance and such right could not be taken away except by an express provision or by necessary implication." Their Lordships further considered certain other decisions also and held in paragraph 8 that "an intention to interfere with or to impair or imperil such a vested right cannot be presumed unless such intention be clearly manifested by express words or necessary implication." It was held further in paragraph 9 as follows: "The true implication of the above observation as of the decisions in the other cases referred to above is that the preexisting right of appeal is not destroyed by the amendment if the amendment is not made retrospective by express words or necessary intendment. The fact that the pre-existing right of appeal continues to exist must, in its turn, necessarily imply that the old law which created that right of appeal must also exist to support the continuation of that right. The fact that the pre-existing right of appeal continues to exist must, in its turn, necessarily imply that the old law which created that right of appeal must also exist to support the continuation of that right. As the old law continues to exist for the purpose of supporting the pre-existing right of appeal that old law must govern the exercise and enforcement of that right of appeal and there can then be no question of the amended provision preventing the exercise of that right." It was held that the new proviso is wholly inapplicable in the light of the above legal position. 16. The importance of the dictum in the said judgment, according to the learned counsel Shri K.V. Sadananda Prabhu, is that that was a case where a new restriction was imposed with regard to the exercise of appellate remedy in respect of an action which was already commenced which is absent in the present situation. It is therefore submitted that as this is not a case where any new restriction or conditions are imposed for filing an appeal, the only question is whether the right of appeal is preserved, whatever may be the forum and nothing else. But it can be seen that the Apex Court therein was of the view that it is settled law that right of appeal was not a mere matter of procedure but was a vested right which inhered in the party from the commencement of the action in the Court of first instance. The said right cannot be taken away if the amendment is not made retrospective by express words or by necessary implication. Therefore, the crucial question will be whether the amendment is retrospective by express words or by necessary intendment. In the absence of such contingencies, the pre-existing right of appeal continues to exist and the old law will continue to exist for the purpose of supporting the pre existing right of appeal. These principles are clear from the above judgment of the Apex Court. 17. The celebrated decision of the Privy Council in Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd/s case {(1905) A.C. 369} was elaborately considered by the Apex Court in Garikapati's case ( AIR 1957 SC 540 ), by a Constitution Bench consisting of five learned Judges. We will refer to the facts of these two cases also to go into the relevant principles governing the matter. Ltd/s case {(1905) A.C. 369} was elaborately considered by the Apex Court in Garikapati's case ( AIR 1957 SC 540 ), by a Constitution Bench consisting of five learned Judges. We will refer to the facts of these two cases also to go into the relevant principles governing the matter. The facts in Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd.'s case (supra) will show that the appellants therein disputed the claim for payment of excise duty on sugar. They deposited the money with the Collector of Customs and brought an action in the Supreme Court of Queensland against the steps for recovery which gave a judgment for the Collector, on 4th September, 1903. As on the date of institution of the said action the Order in Council of June 30, 1860 gave a right of appeal to His Majesty in Council from the judgment of the Supreme Court. Another Act, viz. Judiciary Act, 1903 came into force ten days before the judgment was delivered by the Supreme Court. Under the new provision the appeal from the order of the Supreme Court lay to the High Court of Australia. The appellants obtained leave from the Supreme Court of Queensland and filed the appeal before the Privy Council. The respondent raised an objection regarding the maintainability of the appeal by contending that the appeal lies only to the High Court of Australia. It was argued on behalf of the appellants that the provisions of the Judiciary Act, 1903 were not retrospective so as to defeat the right in existence at the time when the Act received the royal assent. The application by the respondent was dismissed and the judgment of the Privy Council was delivered by Lord Macnaghten who laid down the following principles: "MAs regards the general principles applicable to the case there was no controversy. On the one hand, it was not disputed that if the matter in question be a matter of procedure only, the petition is well founded. On the other hand, if it be more than a matter of procedure, if it touches a right in existence at the passing of the Act, it was conceded that, in accordance with a long line of authorities extending from the time of Lord Coke to the present day, the appellants would be entitled to succeed. The Judiciary Act is not retrospective by express enactment or by necessary intendment. The Judiciary Act is not retrospective by express enactment or by necessary intendment. And therefore the only question is, was the appeal to His Majesty in Council a right vested in the appellants at the date of the passing of the Act, or was it a mere matter of procedure? It seems to their Lordships that the question does not admit of doubt. To deprive a suitor in a pending action of an appeal to a superior tribunal which belonged to him as of right is a very different thing from regulating procedure. In principle, their Lordships see no difference between abolishing an appeal altogether and transferring the appeal to a new tribunal. In either case there is an interference with existing rights contrary to the well- known general principle that statutes are not to be held to act retrospectively unless a clear intention to that effect is manifested." The above paragraph will show the following: (a) The issue is not a matter of procedure only; (b) The question is whether it touches a right in existence at the passing of the Act; and (c) Whether the new Act is retrospective by express words or by necessary intendment. The appellant had a vested right of appeal to His Majesty in Council. There is no difference between abolishing an appeal altogether and transferring the appeal to a new tribunal and in either case there is an interference with existing rights contrary to the well-known general principle that statutes are not to be held to act retrospectively unless a clear intention to that effect is manifested. In paragraph 5 of Garikapati's case (supra), it was noted by the Supreme Court that the above proposition of law has been firmly established in English jurisprudence and the said decision was accepted as sound and cited with approval in leading text books and has been followed in numerous decisions in England and India. With regard to the later decisions, reference has been made from paragraph 6 onwards wherein the principle stated in Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd.'s case {(1905) A.C. 369) was followed. They are: Nana Aba v. Sheku Andu (ILR 32 Bom 337) and Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd.'s case (54 Ind. App. 421 = AIR 1927 PC 242). 18. With regard to the later decisions, reference has been made from paragraph 6 onwards wherein the principle stated in Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd.'s case {(1905) A.C. 369) was followed. They are: Nana Aba v. Sheku Andu (ILR 32 Bom 337) and Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd.'s case (54 Ind. App. 421 = AIR 1927 PC 242). 18. Their Lordships then went on to consider, as is evident from paragraph 8 of the judgment, the question whether a right of appeal in respect of a pending action could be treated as a substantive right vesting in the litigant on the commencement of the action. In this context, reference was made to various decisions including Ramakrishna Iyer v. Sithai Ammal (ILR 48 Mad. 620 - FB), Daivanayaga Reddiyar v. Renukambal Ammal ( AIR 1927 Mad. 977 -FB), Ram Singha v. Shankar Dayal (AIR 1928 A11.437 - FB), Kirpa Singh v. Ajaipal Singh (AIR 1928 Lah. 627 -FB), Sadar Ali v. Dalimuddin (ILR 56 Cal. 512) and In re, Vasudeva Samiar (AIR 1929 Mad. 381). Paragraph 12 of the judgment will show that Their Lordships were of the view that the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Ram Singha's case (AIR 1928 All. 437) is very important. Therein, the Full Bench, in an identical issue, wherein the pecuniary limit for filing appeal was raised, was of the view that "the right to appeal to the court of the District Judge was governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit, and not by the law that prevailed at the date of its decision, or at the date of the filing of the appeal." Therein, the unamended provision gave a right of appeal to the District Judge from the decision of the Assistant Collector, when the amount or value of the subject matter of suit exceeded Rs.100/- which was amended by raising the amount to Rs.200/-. After the amendment was brought in, the suit was decreed and the defendant presented the appeal to the District Judge. It is in that context the issue was considered by the Full Bench and the already quoted view was taken. After the amendment was brought in, the suit was decreed and the defendant presented the appeal to the District Judge. It is in that context the issue was considered by the Full Bench and the already quoted view was taken. The Apex Court, in paragraph 13 of the judgment, was of the view that the amended provision cannot be regarded as containing anything which expressly or by necessary intendment took away the right of appeal which vested in the parties on the date of institution of the suit on the mere ground that the decree had been made after the new amendment came into force. Their Lordships of the Apex Court held as follows in paragraph 13: "This case clearly establishes that the right of appeal vests in the parties at the date of the suit and is governed by the law prevailing at that time and the date of the decree or of the filing of the appeal does not affect this right unless some subsequent enactment takes away this right expressly or by necessary intendment. It also establishes that the wide language of S.242(l) of the new Act, namely, "An appeal shall lie to the District Judge from the decree of an Assistant Collector " could not be construed as covering the decree passed after the date of the new Act in a suit instituted before its date." Finally, in paragraph 14 with regard to the right of appeal, it was held as follows: "It was regarded as settled that the right of appeal was not a mere matter of procedure but was a vested right which inhered in a party from the commencement of the action in the court of first instance and that such right could not be taken away except by an express provision or by necessary implication." The Apex Court then considered the cases where the dictum laid down in Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd.'s case {(1905) A.C. 369} was applied by Courts in India on different circumstances. The first batch of cases considered are the cases in which the subsequent legislation did not take away the entire right of appeal, but imposed certain onerous conditions on such right. In that context, the judgment of the Apex Court in Messrs. Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd.'s case ( AIR 1953 SC 221 ) has been discussed in paragraph 20. The first batch of cases considered are the cases in which the subsequent legislation did not take away the entire right of appeal, but imposed certain onerous conditions on such right. In that context, the judgment of the Apex Court in Messrs. Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd.'s case ( AIR 1953 SC 221 ) has been discussed in paragraph 20. Their Lordships have considered certain other decisions like Nagendra Nath Bose v. Mon Mohan Singh (34 Cal. WN 1009) and Ganpat Rai Hiralal v. Aggarwal Chamber of Commerce Ltd. ( AIR 1952 SC 409 ). It was also held in paragraph 22 that the same principle has been adopted in cases where court fees were increased by subsequent amendment of the Court-fees Act. The cases considered are R.M. Seshadri v. Province of Madras ( AIR 1954 Mad. 543 ), In re, Reference under S.5 of Court Fees Act (AIR 1955 Bom.287) and Sawaldas Madhavdas v. Arati Cotton Mills Ltd. ( AIR 1955 Bom. 332 ). Finally, in paragraph 23 the following principles have been laid down by the Apex Court: "(i) That the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding. (ii) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right. (iii) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit. (iv) The right of appeal is a vetted right and such a right to enter the superior Court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the lis commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal. (v)This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise." 19. (v)This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise." 19. Their Lordships thereafter went on to consider whether the vested right of appeal has been taken away expressly or by necessary intendment by subsequent enactment. The facts of the case considered by the Apex Court show that the suit which was valued above Rs. 10,000/-, was filed before the Constitution came into effect, on 22.4.1949. The judgment of the trial court was on 14.11.1950 dismissing the suit. The appeal was filed before the Madras High Court. After Andhra State was formed, the appeal was transferred to the High Court of Andhra and the said court reversed the decree of the trial court and decreed the suit. The application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was then filed. The appellant relied upon the then existing decisions whereby he had an unfettered right to file an appeal to the Federal Court in respect of the judgment of reversal by the High Court where the value is above Rs.10,000/-. He contended that he acquired a vested right to file appeal to the Federal Court which has since been replaced by the Supreme Court. Various provisions of the Constitution were also interpreted by the Apex Court and the following view was taken in paragraph 48: "48. For reasons stated above we think that the suit, out of which this application arises having been instituted before the date of the Constitution the parties thereto had, from the date of the institution of the suit, a vested right of appeal upon terms and conditions then in force and the judgment sought to be appealed from being a judgment of reversal and the value of the subject-matter being above Rs.10,000 the applicant had a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court under the provisions of the old Civil RC. read with the Government of India Act, 193 5 and the Federal Court (Enlargement of Jurisdiction) Act, 1947. read with the Government of India Act, 193 5 and the Federal Court (Enlargement of Jurisdiction) Act, 1947. Such a vested right of appeal was a matter which did not fall within Art. 133 and jurisdiction and powers with respect to such right of appeal was exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of the Constitution and consequently the applicant had a right of appeal under Art. 135 and the High Court was in error in refusing leave to appeal to the petitioner. As in our opinion the petitioner was entitled under Art. 135 to come up on appeal to this Court as of right and such right has been wrongly denied to him we are prepared in the circumstances of this case to grant him special leave to appeal to this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution. The petitioner will have the costs of this application from the respondents Nos.l and 2." Thus, in effect it was held that the right of appeal was not taken away by the provisions of the Constitution. This was the majority view taken in the judgment of S.R. Das, C.J. (Venkatarama Ayyar, J. dissenting). The dictum laid down in paragraph 23 was followed by the Division Bench of this Court in Clara's case ( 1984 KLT 377 ). 20. In the light of the above decisions of the Apex Court, it can be seen that: (a) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure, but is a substantive right; (b) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit; (c) The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the lis commences; and (d) The vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment which should either expressly or by necessary intendment provides so. 21. The facts of the above case are not similar to the earlier case decided by the Apex Court in Messrs. Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd.'s case ( AIR 1953 SC 221 ), as the amendment brought therein was in effect restricting the right of appeal by providing a particular condition for filing the appeal, viz. 21. The facts of the above case are not similar to the earlier case decided by the Apex Court in Messrs. Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd.'s case ( AIR 1953 SC 221 ), as the amendment brought therein was in effect restricting the right of appeal by providing a particular condition for filing the appeal, viz. deposit of the amount of tax or penalty disputed in the appeal. But as we have already noticed, the Apex Court has considered the applicability of the relevant principles in different circumstances. The present one is not a case where any retrospective effect is given to the provision. There is nothing to show that it has expressly been made applicable to pending suits or decrees passed prior to the amendment. Therefore, it cannot be said to be retrospective in nature. 22. Kasibai's case ( AIR 1965 SC 703 ) is by a three Judges Bench of the Apex Court. Therein also, the principles stated in Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd.'s case {(1905) AC 369}, Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd.'s case (AIR 1927 PC 242) and Garikapati Veeraya's case ( AIR 1957 SC 540 ) were relied upon and it was held in para 3 as follows: "It is true that as a general rule, alterations in the law of procedure are retrospective, but a right of appeal to a particular forum is a substantive right and is not lost by alteration in the law unless provision is made expressly in that behalf, or a necessary implication arises." Therein, the question was whether in respect of a Second Appeal filed before the High Court, it had to be dealt with under Section 602 of the Hyderabad Code of Civil Procedure or under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Under the Hyderabad Code, a Second Appeal lay to the High Court on question of fact as well as on law which is different from Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The suit was filed in 1944, at the time when the Hyderabad Code was in force. The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was brought into force from 1.4.1951. The Apex Court held that the provisions are not retrospective in nature. It was held in paragraph 5 as follows: "5. The suit was filed in 1944, at the time when the Hyderabad Code was in force. The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was brought into force from 1.4.1951. The Apex Court held that the provisions are not retrospective in nature. It was held in paragraph 5 as follows: "5. There is nothing in the Act which applies the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to the territory of the State of Hyderabad which either expressly or by necessary intendment invests S. 100 of the Code with retrospective operation. The power of the High Court to deal with the appeal before it must, therefore, be derived from the Hyderabad Code, untrammelled by anything contained in S. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.It is true that by S. 100, Code of Civil Procedure the power of the High Court in dealing with a second appeal was restricted, but the restriction could only apply to cases instituted in the Court of First Instance on or after April 1, 1951, and the jurisdiction of the High Court would, in respect of cases instituted before that date, would continue to be governed by S. 602 of the Hyderabad Code of Civil Procedure." 23. The next decision is Maria Cristina De Souza Sodder's case { (1979) 1 SCC 92 }. That was a case where the suit was filed in 1960 under the Portuguese Civil Procedure Code, which was repealed by Goa, Daman and Diu (Extension of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Arbitration Act, 1940) Act, 1965. Goa, Daman and Diu Civil Courts Act, 1965 was also brought into force providing for the forum of appeal. It was held that in the light of the express provisions of the new Act appeal will have to be lodged in the forum provided in the repealing Act. The Apex Court, in paragraph 5, held that "if the repealing Act provides new forum where the remedy or the legal proceeding in respect of such vested right can be pursued after the repeal, the forum must be as provided in the repealing Act." The facts of the said case are different from the one arising herein. The Apex Court, in paragraph 5, held that "if the repealing Act provides new forum where the remedy or the legal proceeding in respect of such vested right can be pursued after the repeal, the forum must be as provided in the repealing Act." The facts of the said case are different from the one arising herein. While coming to the said conclusion it was observed that the forum where such appeal can be lodged is a procedural matter and the appeal, the right to which has arisen under a repealed Act, will have to be lodged in the forum provided for by the repealing Act. 24. The next decision that is heavily relied upon by Shri K.V. Sadananda Prabhu is that of a Division Bench of Orissa High Court in Duryodhan Samal's case (AIR 1986 Orissa 30). Therein, the suit O.S.No.136/1978 for partition was filed on 6.10.1978 and a decree was passed on 28.2.1985. The valuation of the appeal was Rs.5,900/-, the same being the valuation of the suit and appeal was filed before the High Court on 3.5.1985. Before filing of the appeal, Orissa Civil Courts Act, 1984 was given assent to by the President of India on 30.7.1984 and it was brought into effect by notification dated 21.12.1984 with effect from 1.1.1985. Section 25 of the Act has repealed the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 in its application to the State of Orissa with effect from the date of coming into force of the Act. The question was whether under the new enactment appeal will have to be filed before the District Court where the valuation does not exceed Rs.20,000/-. Going by paragraph 5 of the judgment it can be seen that under the repealed enactment, the appellate jurisdiction of the District Judge was upto Rs.5,000/-. The provisions concerned are Sections 16(1) and 16(2) which we extract below:- "16(1) Save as otherwise provided by any enactment for the time being in force.— (a) an appeal from a decree or order of a District Judge or Additional District Judge shall lie to the High Court; (b) an appeal shall not lie to the High Court from a decree or order of an Additional District Judge in any case, in which if the same had been made by the District Judge an appeal would not lie to the High Court. (2) Save as aforesaid, an appeal from the decree or order of a Subordinate Judge shall lie- (a) to the District Judge, where the value of the original suit in which or in any proceeding arising out of which the decree or order was made, did not exceed twenty thousand rupees; and (b) to the High Court, in any other case." After referring to the various decisions of the Apex Court, viz. Messrs. Hoosain Kasim Dada (India) Ltd.'s case ( AIR 1953 SC 221 ), Garikapati's case ( AIR 1957 SC 540 ) and other decisions, the Division Bench went on to consider whether the provision under Section 16(1) of the Act is retrospective or not. In paragraph 15, it was held that the litigant has no vested right for appeal to a particular forum. With respect to the particular wordings in Section 16(2), viz. "where the value of the original suit in which or in any proceeding arising out of which the decree or order was made did not exceed twenty thousand rupees", the Division Bench took the view that "the change of forum was meant to be operative retrospective irrespective of the fact as to when the cause of action for the suit arose or when the suit was actually filed." 25. Even though the learned counsel Shri Sadananda Prabhu heavily relied upon the dictum laid down in the above case, we are of the view that the Division Bench therein took the view as noted above, only in the light of the language of Section 16(2) which was held as retrospective in nature. Under the Kerala Act no such parallel provisions are there. Therefore, the decision rendered by the Orissa High Court in Duryodhan Samal's case (AIR 1986 Orissa 30) is distinguishable on facts. 26. Another important decision relied upon is that of a Division Bench of this Court in Vasu v. Pathootty Umma ( 1990 (1) KLT 670 ) by U.L. Bhat, J. (as he then was) and Balanarayana Marar, JJ. That was a case where under the Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1965 by way of a notification dated 31.8.1989 issued under Section 18 of the Act, the State Government conferred on District Judges the power of the Appellate Authorities. That was a case where under the Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1965 by way of a notification dated 31.8.1989 issued under Section 18 of the Act, the State Government conferred on District Judges the power of the Appellate Authorities. The question was whether pending appeals could be heard by the Subordinate Judges who were the Appellate Authorities constituted under Section 18 of the Act by an earlier notification. The learned Single Judge, by relying upon the dictum laid down in Garikapati's case (supra) and other decisions took the view that the notification issued by the Government will not affect the power to dispose of appeals filed before the date 31.8.1989 by the Subordinate Judges, which was reversed by the Division Bench. The Division Bench has elaborately considered the dictum laid down in Garikapati's case ( AIR 1957 SC 540 ), Ittyavira Mathai v. Varkey Varkey and another ( AIR 1964 SC 907 ) and Kasibai's case ( AIR 1965 SC 703 ) and other decisions. The point raised therein is slightly different as far as the present case is concerned. Therein, under the Rent Control Act the Government has power to constitute appellate authorities and by taking away the power given to Subordinate Judges, the District Judges were constituted as appellate forums. The said significant distinction has been elaborately discussed by the Division Bench speaking through U.L. Bhat, J. (as he then was). It was held in paragraph 10 as follows: "10. This is not a case where the jurisdiction of an existing court in the hierarchy of courts under the Civil Court Act or the Criminal Procedure Code is sought to be altered. Jurisdiction of civil courts is defined under law. A litigant before a civil court has a vested right of appeal under the then existing law. Such vested right survives or continues as long as it is not taken away expressly or by necessary implication by a new law or amendment. Where at any point of time, jurisdiction of appellate court is altered, the litigant who had approached the trial court earlier may have a right of appeal to the appellate court as per the law existing at the time of institution of suit, unless there is a specific provision to the contrary in the new law or amendment or a contrary implication necessarily arises. This principle cannot apply to a case like the present one which does not deal with jurisdiction of appellate court in the existing hierarchy of the courts, but deals with powers of officers on whom specific appellate power is conferred as persona designata by a notification under S.18 of the Act. It is open to the Government to take away that power. Once that power is taken away, the officer though he does not ceases to be a Judge presiding over the Subordinate Judge's Court, cease to be appellate authority for the purpose of S.18 of the Act. Thereby he loses his jurisdiction, competency and power to function as appellate authority. As long as the notification dated 31-8-1989 stands, Subordinate Judge cannot be asked to hear and dispose of an appeal filed before him at a time when he had the power of appellate authority; nor can he entertain any appeal against an order passed by Rent Controller in a petition filed before 31-8-1989. If the Subordinate Judge proceeds to entertain or dispose of such an appeal after he is denied of the power of appellate authority by virtue of the notification dated 31-8-1989 he will be doing an act without authority." The view taken by the Division Bench with regard to the jurisdiction of an existing hierarchy of courts in the courts under the Civil Courts Act is significant in the context of this case also. The Division Bench also laid down that there is a vested right of appeal under the then existing law which survives or continues as long as it is not taken away by an express provision to the contrary in the new law or amendment. With regard to the power of the Government under Section 18 of the Rent Control Act, it was noticed that the section empowers the Government to confer the appellate power on designated authorities and once that power is exercised, the authority who was exercising the power earlier, ceased to be the appellate authority. That was therefore a case where a particular authority's power was taken away and a new appellate authority was constituted which is permissible under law. Therefore, the significant aspect considered was whether under the new law there is an alteration by which the vested right of a litigant for prosecuting the appeal has been taken away. 27. That was therefore a case where a particular authority's power was taken away and a new appellate authority was constituted which is permissible under law. Therefore, the significant aspect considered was whether under the new law there is an alteration by which the vested right of a litigant for prosecuting the appeal has been taken away. 27. Shri Prabhu then relied upon paragraph 26 of the decision of the Apex Court in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and others v. State of Maharashtra and others { (1994) 4 SCC 602 } wherein the following principles have been laid down: "26. The Designated Court has held that the amendment would operate retrospectively and would apply to the pending cases in which investigation was not complete on the date on which the Amendment Act came into force and the challan had not till then been filed in the court. From the law settled by this Court in various cases the illustrative though not exhaustive principles which emerge with regard to the ambit and scope of an Amending Act and its retrospective operation may be culled out as follows: (i) A statute which affects substantive rights is presumed to be prospective in operation unless made retrospective, either expressly or by necessary intendment, whereas a statute which merely affects procedure, unless such a construction is textually impossible, is presumed to be retrospective in its application, should not be given an extended meaning and should be strictly confined to its clearly defined limits. (ii) Law relating to forum and limitation is procedural in nature, whereas law relating to right of action and right of appeal even though remedial is substantive in nature. (iii) Every litigant has a vested right in substantive law but no such right exists in procedural law. (iv) A procedural statute should not generally speaking be applied retrospectively where the result would be to create new disabilities or obligations or to impose new duties in respect of transactions already accomplished. (v) A statute which not only changes the procedure but also creates new rights and liabilities shall be construed to be prospective in operation, unless otherwise provided, either expressly or by necessary implication." He contended that the same will show that there cannot be any vested right to a litigant for a particular forum of appeal. 28. (v) A statute which not only changes the procedure but also creates new rights and liabilities shall be construed to be prospective in operation, unless otherwise provided, either expressly or by necessary implication." He contended that the same will show that there cannot be any vested right to a litigant for a particular forum of appeal. 28. We will now come to the decisions cited by Shri Dinesh R. Shenoy, learned counsel for the appellants, to contend that right of appeal to a particular forum is also a substantive right. It is submitted that the Division Bench of this Court in Kunnappadi Kalliani's case ( 1996 (2) KLT 106 ) has adverted to that aspect apart from the aspect of non retrospectivity of the notification amending the provisions of the Civil Courts Act. 29. In Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Dhadi Sahu {(1993) 199 ITR Page 610) the Apex Court at pages 616 and 617 has laid down the following principles: "The general principle is that a law which brings about a change in the forum does not affect pending actions unless an intention to the contrary is clearly shown. One of the modes by which such an intention is shown is by making a provision for change over of proceedings from the court or the tribunal where they are pending to the court or tribunal which under the new law gets jurisdiction to try them. It is also true that no litigant has any vested right in the matter of procedural law but, where the question is of change of forum, it ceases to be a question of procedure only. The forum of appeal or proceedings is a vested right as opposed to pure procedure to be followed before a particular forum. The right becomes vested when the proceedings are initiated in the Tribunal or the court of first instance and, unless the Legislature has, by express words or by necessary implication, clearly so indicated, that vested right will continue in spite of the change of jurisdiction of the different Tribunals or forums." The above dictum was followed in Commissioner of Income Tax, Bangalore v. Smt. R. Sharadamma (JT 1996 (4) SC 90). 30. The next decision relied upon is Ramesh Singh and another v. Cinta Devi and others { (1996) 3 SCC 142 }. It arose under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 30. The next decision relied upon is Ramesh Singh and another v. Cinta Devi and others { (1996) 3 SCC 142 }. It arose under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Under the proviso to Section 173 of the Act for filing appeal, the appellant will have to deposit an amount of Rs.25,000/- or fifty per cent of the amount awarded. The Apex Court, after examining the provisions of the repealing section under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, held that the new Act does not expressly or by necessary implication make the relevant provision retrospective in character. But we notice that that is a case where a new restriction with regard to the filing of the appeal was imposed by way of deposit of a portion of the amount. The Apex Court held that the provision under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act is not retrospective and the general principle that the right of appeal will crystallise in the appellant on the institution of the application in the Tribunal of first instance, will come to the aid of the appellant and that he will be entitled to file the appeal without being required to make the deposit under the proviso to Section 173 of the Act. The situation herein is different. 31. Union of India v. Sukumar Pyne ( AIR 1966 SC 1206 ) is by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court. Therein, the Apex Court rejected the contention that a person accused of a commission of an offence has a vested right to be tried by a particular court or by a particular procedure. 32. The decision rendered in P. Mohammed Meera Lebbai v. Thirumalaya Gounder Ramaswamy Goundar and others ( AIR 1966 SC 430 ) is also on different factual aspects. Therein, the Apex Court held that right to appeal to the High Court does not mean right to be heard by a specific number of Judges. 33. Daji Saheb and others v. Shankar Rao Vithalrao Mane and another ( AIR 1956 SC 29 ) is a decision of a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court which is also relied upon by Shri Dinesh R. Shenoy. 33. Daji Saheb and others v. Shankar Rao Vithalrao Mane and another ( AIR 1956 SC 29 ) is a decision of a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court which is also relied upon by Shri Dinesh R. Shenoy. The right of a litigant to approach the Federal Court by filing appeal under the law as it stood prior to the commencement of the Constitution wherein the value of the property was above Rs. 10,000/-, came up for consideration. The Federal Court was abolished after the Supreme Court was established. The contention by the respondent was that as the value is below Rs.20,000/-, no appeal can be entertained. In paragraphs 8 to 10 the following principles have been laid down: "(8). Though Art. 133 does not apply we have still to see whether it is a matter as regards which jurisdiction and powers were exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of the Constitution. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the earlier enactments defining the jurisdiction of the Privy Council, and the Government of India Act, 1935 establishing the Federal Court and conferring a limited jurisdiction on the same. It is sufficient to point out that as the law then stood, the Federal Court had jurisdiction to entertain and hear appeals for a decree of a High Court which reversed the lower court's decree as regards properties of the value of more than Rs.10,000. The aggrieved party had a right to go before it, without any special leave being granted. It was a matter over which jurisdiction was "exercisable" by the Federal Court. The construction that it was "exercisable" only if the matter was actually pending before the Federal Court and that it could not be said to be pending until the appeal is declared admitted under Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code is too narrow, and does not give full and proper scope to the meaning of the word "exercisable" in the Article. Pending matters are dealt with under Article 374(2), and we must give some meaning to the provisions of Art. 135. As soon as the decree of the High Court came into existence, the jurisdiction of the Federal Court to hear an appeal for that decree became exercisable, provided certain conditions as to security and deposit were complied with, which are not material for our present purpose. (9). As soon as the decree of the High Court came into existence, the jurisdiction of the Federal Court to hear an appeal for that decree became exercisable, provided certain conditions as to security and deposit were complied with, which are not material for our present purpose. (9). Reference may be made here to paragraph 20 of the Adaptation of Laws, Order 1950, as amended in 1951, which provides : "Nothing in this Order shall affect the previous operation of, or anything duly done or suffered under, any existing law, or any right, privilege, or incurred under any such law …….." By this Order S. 110 Civil P. C. was adapted to the new situation but the requirement as to value was raised from 10,000 to 20,000. What is provided is that this adaptation will not affect the right of appeal already accrued. (10). If we accede to the argument urged by the respondents, we shall be shutting out altogether a large number of appeals, where the parties had an automatic right to go before the Federal Court before the Constitution and which we must hold was taken away from them for no fault of their own, merely because the Supreme Court came into existence in place of the Federal Court. An interpretation or construction of the provisions of the Constitution which would lead to such a result should be avoided, unless inevitable. The Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in - 'Veeranna v. G. China Venkanna AIR 1953 Mad 878 (A), was a case where the decree of the High Court and the application for leave to appeal were both after the Constitution came into force. Whether in all matters where there was a right of appeal under S. 110 Civil P. C. it continues in respect of all suits filed prior to the Constitution is a question that does not arise for decision now." 34. In Maxwell on "The Interpretation of Statutes" 12th Edn. page 220, under the heading "Pending actions", the following principles have been stated: "In general, when the substantive law is altered during the pendency of an action, the rights of the parties are decided according to the law as it existed when the action was begun, unless the new statute shows a clear intention to vary such rights." 35. page 220, under the heading "Pending actions", the following principles have been stated: "In general, when the substantive law is altered during the pendency of an action, the rights of the parties are decided according to the law as it existed when the action was begun, unless the new statute shows a clear intention to vary such rights." 35. The decision of the Apex Court in Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd., Chandigarh v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh and others { (1990) 3 SCC 682 } has been relied upon by Shri K.V. Sadananda Prabhu to contend that in the decisions of the Division Benches of this Court in Clara's case ( 1984 KLT 377 ) and Kunnappadi Kalliani's case ( 1996 (2) KLT 106 ) are per incuriam. According to the learned counsel, the principles stated by the Apex Court have not been correctly understood and applied by the three Division Benches of this Court. 36. We will therefore come to the view taken by the various Division Benches of this Court. We have already referred to Chinna Kunju Kunju's case ( 1957 KLT 980 ) wherein the view taken is that the Kerala Civil Courts Act, 1957 is not retrospective in nature. The same is the view taken with respect to the amendment of Section 13 in Clara's case ( 1984 KLT 377 ). In both the cases, the principles stated by the Privy Council in Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd.'s case {(1905) A.C. 369) which have been followed in Garikapati's case ( AIR 1957 SC 540 ), (paragraph 23 of Garikapati's case (supra)) have been relied upon. We have already noticed that the Division Bench, in Clara's case (supra) was of the view that the Ordinance was not retrospective in nature. 37. In Kunnappadi Kalliani's case ( 1996 (2) KLT 106 ), the Division Bench consisting of P.K. Balasubramanyan, J. (as he then was) and P. Shanmugam, J. considered the effect of the amendment made with effect from 27.3.1996 further raising the valuation from Rs.25,000/- to Rs.2 lakhs. It was held by the Division Bench as follows: "While making the amendment of 1996 the Legislature had adopted the same device by merely enhancing the valuation of the subject - matter from Rs. 25,000/-to Rs. 2 lakhs. It was held by the Division Bench as follows: "While making the amendment of 1996 the Legislature had adopted the same device by merely enhancing the valuation of the subject - matter from Rs. 25,000/-to Rs. 2 lakhs. Since it must be taken that the legislature was aware of the legal position laid down by this court when the same device was adopted by it in the year 1984, no intention could now be attributed to the Legislature that it was intended by the amendment of S. 13(1) of the Civil Courts Act to interfere with the accrued right of the litigants to appeal to this Court. Appeals from decree of Subordinate Judge's Courts in suits instituted prior to 27.3.1996 would continue to lie in this Court, if they were maintainable in this Court, prior to 27.3.1996." Their Lordships have fully relied upon the view taken in Clara's case ( 1984 KLT 377 ), Garikapati's case ( AIR 1957 SC 540 ), Kasibai's case ( AIR 1965 SC 703 ), Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd.'s case {(1905) A.C. 369}, Dhadi Sahu's case {(1993) 199 ITR 610) and R. Sharadamma's case (JT 1996 (4) SC 90). It has also been noted in paragraph 8 that the correctness of the decision in Clara's case ( 1984 KLT 377 ) was canvassed before another Division Bench and the said Bench, in Joshua v. Geevarghese Mar Discourus (1979-85 KUC 243) agreed with the view expressed in Clara's case (supra). The Division Bench then held that "no intention could now be attributed to the Legislature that it was intended by the amendment of S. 13(1) of the Civil Courts Act to interfere with the accrued right of the litigants to appeal to this Court." 38. In Joshua's case (1979-85 KUC 243) the amendment of the Kerala Civil Courts Act by Ordinance 9 of 1984 came up for consideration, before a Division Bench of this Court consisting of K. Sukumaran, J. and K.S. Paripoornan, J. (as he then was). Therein also, the argument raised was that there is a distinction between preservation of the right of appeal and the preservation of the forum of appeal. In paragraph 41, the said contention was rejected by the Division Bench speaking through Sukumaran, J., in the following words: "41. Counsel for the respondents raised a question of maintainability of the appeal. Therein also, the argument raised was that there is a distinction between preservation of the right of appeal and the preservation of the forum of appeal. In paragraph 41, the said contention was rejected by the Division Bench speaking through Sukumaran, J., in the following words: "41. Counsel for the respondents raised a question of maintainability of the appeal. According to him, in view of the amendment of the Civil Courts Act by Ordinance of 1984, the appeal should have been filed before the District Court. A similar contention was repelled by a Bench of this Court in Clara v. Augustine, 1984 KLT 377 . We are in agreement with the above view. It is therefore unnecessary to discuss the question at greater length. The only argument put forward as against the above view is that the above decision overlooked a distinction between preservation of the right of appeal and the preservation of the forum of appeal. While the former is preserved, according to counsel, the latter is not. The decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Firm Murlidhar v. Firm Kishorilal, AIR 1959 Rajasthan 246 was relied on in that connection. That decision which has given importance to the provisions of S. 17(2) of the Matsya Civil Courts Ordinance, 1948 the like of which does not exist in the present case, has no application to the facts of the case. We do not see any merit in this contention. It is accordingly overruled. 39. The next decision is by another Division Bench consisting of Justice K.S. Radhakrishnan (as he then was) and Pius C. Kuriakose, J., reported in Sasi @ Sasikumar and others v. Soudamini and others ( 2003 (2) KLJ 888 ). Therein also, the effect of the Amendment Act 1996 came up for consideration. That was a case where the plaintiff instituted the suit for damages as indigent person, on 13.2.1996 as P.O.P.No.9/1996 which application was dismissed and the court gave time for payment of court fee. It was held that the suit would relate back the date on which the application was filed. An appeal was filed from the judgment and decree before this Court. Noting that the valuation is below Rs.2 Lakhs, the Registry raised an objection with regard to the maintainability of the appeal before this Court. It was held that the suit would relate back the date on which the application was filed. An appeal was filed from the judgment and decree before this Court. Noting that the valuation is below Rs.2 Lakhs, the Registry raised an objection with regard to the maintainability of the appeal before this Court. The Division Bench, speaking through K.S. Radhakrishnan, J. (as he then was), after evaluating the dictum laid down in an earlier Division Bench decision in Kunnappadi Kalliani's case ( 1996 (2) KLT 106 ), held as follows: "We have to determine the rights of the parties as per the law which stood on the date of the filing of the O.P.O. The Civil Courts (Amendment) Act 6 of 1996 came into effect on 27.3.1996. In the instant case, as we have already indicated pauper application was filed on 13.2.1996 prior to the amendment. Prior to the amendment position was that appeals from decrees of Sub Court would lie to the High Court. Plaintiff as well as defendants in the suit are therefore governed by the law as it stood at the time of filing of the application, irrespective of the fact whether the application is allowed or not. In view of the above legal position, objection raised by the registry is overruled. Appeal is perfectly maintainable to this court." 40. Therefore, the consistent view taken in Chinna Kunju Kunju's case ( 1957 KLT 980 ), Clara's case ( 1984 KLT 377 ), Kunnappadi Kalliani's case ( 1996 (2) KLT 106 ) and Sasi @ Sasikumar's case ( 2003 (2) KLJ 888 ) are in favour of the appellants herein. The notification herein, dated 6.5.2013 has raised the limit for exercise of jurisdiction by the District Court, to Rs.20 Lakhs. We reproduce paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the amendment hereinbelow: "1. Short title and commencement.- (1) This Act may be called the Kerala Civil Courts (Amendment) Act, 2013. (2) It shall come into force at once. 2. Amendment of Section 11.—In sub-section (2) of section 11 of the Kerala Civil Courts Act, 1957 (1 of 1957) (hereinafter referred to as the principal Act, for the words "one lakh rupees", the words "ten lakh rupees" shall be substituted. 3. (2) It shall come into force at once. 2. Amendment of Section 11.—In sub-section (2) of section 11 of the Kerala Civil Courts Act, 1957 (1 of 1957) (hereinafter referred to as the principal Act, for the words "one lakh rupees", the words "ten lakh rupees" shall be substituted. 3. Amendment of section 13.— In sub-section (1) of section 13 of the principal Act, for the words "two lakh rupees", the words "twenty lakh rupees" shall be substituted." It is evident that going by para 1(2), the notification is expected to come into force at once. Therefore, it can be seen that it has not been given any retrospective effect. There is no provision indicating that the said amendment is retrospective in nature, so as to apply to all situations. In the absence of an express provision or any words to imply such retrospectivity or any contrary intention by necessary implication, we are of the view that the objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents cannot hold good. Of course, in cases where there is an abolition of the forum for appeal and substitution of the same by another forum it has been held that there cannot be any vested right. Such was a case considered by the Division Bench in Vasu's case ( 1990 (1) KLT 670 ) where, instead of Subordinate Judges as appellate authorities under the Rent Control Act, District Judges were constituted as appellate authorities. Herein, there is no abolition of the forum for hearing the appeal as such by any express provision. In that view of the matter the principle stated by the Apex Court in Garikapati's case ( AIR 1957 SC 540 ) in paragraph 23 and by the Privy Council in Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd.'s case {(1905) A.C. 369} will squarely apply. The vested right of the appellants to file appeal by the then existing provision is clearly preserved. 41. Even though it is argued by Shri K.V. Sadananda Prabhu that the decision of the Apex Court in Garikapati's case ( AIR 1957 SC 540 ) does not lay down that the right to approach a particular forum is a substantive right, we do not subscribe to the said argument in the context of the particular facts of this case, as already discussed. Herein, the crucial issue is whether the litigant's right to carry the appeal has been substantially altered by the new provision. We find no contrary intention by the Legislature to do so. In fact in Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd.'s case {(1905) A.C. 369} the change of appellate forum itself was the issue. The appeal herein is supported by the then existing provision, which is one of the tests laid down by the Apex Court in Garikapati's case ( AIR 1957 SC 540 ). The right of appeal in a pending action being a substantive right and herein what is involved is alteration of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Court in entertaining the appeal which is not shown as retrospective, we cannot agree with the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents. 42. As far as the objection raised by the Registry is concerned, in the light of the view taken by the Full Bench in Mohammed Farooq's case ( 1984 KLT 346 - FB), the valuation of the suit as well as the counter claim can be taken together. The Registry will therefore number the appeal.