JUDGMENT : Alok Sharma, J. This appeal has been filed against the order dated 18-8-2012 passed by the District Judge Dholpur dismissing the appellant-plaintiff's (hereinafter `the plaintiff') application under Order 39 Rules 1&2 CPC filed along with the suit for specific performance of a purported agreement dated 1-10-2010 between the plaintiff and the respondent-defendant (hereinafter `the defendant'). 2. The learned trial court vide its impugned order dated 18-8-2012 has held that the agreement to sell dated 1-10-2010 propounded by the plaintiff did not prima facie make out a case for the reason that it was neither stamped nor registered nor notarised. The trial court further held that the thumb impression of the defendant Bhagirath was denied by him and that further ground for suspicion as to the agreement to sell propounded lay in the factum that witnesses to agreement dated 1-10-2010 did not detail their address. In these circumstances the learned trial court found that aside of prima facie case for the plaintiff being not made out, balance of convenience and irreparable injury were also absent for the plaintiff-applicant in the event interim directions as sought were not to be granted. 3. Mr. Manish Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff submitted that in terms of the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 an agreement to sell is not required to be registered. He submitted that the lacuna with regard to agreement dated 1-10-2010 not being stamped can be and will be rectified by the plaintiff by resort to proviso to Section 35 of the Rajasthan Stamp Act, 1994 on payment of requisite penalty. He submitted that the agreement was duly drawn and signed by an Advocate Ramesh Chand Jha as also signed by two identifiable witnesses Rakesh and Laxmi Narayan. He submitted that it is not unusual that a vendor denies his signatures or thumb impression on an agreement to sell and nothing can turn on such a denial alone. Learned counsel for the plaintiff further submitted that a sum of Rs. 90,000/- out of Rs. 100,000/-agreed as consideration between the plaintiff vendee and the defendant vendor was paid by the plaintiff and receipted by the defendant under a receipt no doubt denied. Learned counsel for the plaintiff further submitted that a sum of Rs. 90,000/- out of Rs. 100,000/-agreed as consideration between the plaintiff vendee and the defendant vendor was paid by the plaintiff and receipted by the defendant under a receipt no doubt denied. It is submitted that in a suit for specific performance preservation of property is fundamentally important lest a judgment and decree in favour of the plaintiff if subsequently passed is rendered incapable of execution. 4. Mr. Dinesh Garg, learned counsel for the defendant would submit that the impugned order dated 18-8-2012 dismissing plaintiff's application under Order 39 Rules 1&2 CPC is a well considered order and brooks no interference by this court as it is well settled that until an order of the trial court is perverse or vitiated by misdirection in law no interference therewith should be made by the appellate court. 5. Heard. Considered. 6. In my considered opinion in a suit for specific performance the suit property ought to be ordinarily preserved until the plaintiff's case is complete moonshine, lest a judgment and decree subsequently passed by the court is rendered of little consequence or otherwise leaves the decree holder with more litigation to pursue. This court does not intend to make any observation with regard to merits or lack of it in the plaintiff's case, but thinks it proper in the facts obtaining to restrain the defendant from alienating, transferring or otherwise creating third party rights over the suit property during pendency of the suit for specific performance. To ensure that no injustice is caused to the defendant, the trial court is directed to decide the suit expeditiously and in any event not later than twelve months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. Adjournment if any whenever sought shall be entertained only on application in writing and granted only by a speaking order. The trial court should be also conscious of the observations of the Hon'ble Apex court in the case of Shiv Cotex v. Tirgun Auto Plast (P) Ltd., (2011) 9 SCC 678 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that adjournment should be ordinarily limited to three/four times in the life of a suit. The appeal stands allowed accordingly.