Judgment : L. Narasimha Reddy, J. This Criminal Appeal, under Section 374(2) Cr.P.C., is filed by the sole accused in S.C.No.62 of 2009 on the file of II Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad. He was tried for the offence of committing the murder of Shruthi Mittal, his wife, on 24.10.2007 at about 1.00 p.m. The case of the prosecution was that Shruthi Mittal was married to the accused on 07.07.2007 against her will, and that she had an affair with one Hafeez of Hussaini Alam. About 1 ½ months prior to the incident, the deceased is said to have come back to the house of her parents, on account of her difference with the accused, and that on 23.10.2007, a customary divorce between the parties has taken place. On 24.10.2007 at about 1.00 p.m., Shruthi Mittal was said to be sitting in the entrance of the house of her parents, and at that time, the accused came there wearing a black coloured helmet on head and has thrown acid on her face to disfigure and kill her. The paternal grand-father and cousin brother of the deceased are said to have rescued her and took her to the Osmania General Hospital. A statement (Ex.P.4) was recorded by the S.I. of Police, Charminar P.S., at 14.30 hours on 24.10.2007. On the basis of the statement, Crime No.187 of 2007 was registered under Section 307 IPC against the accused. Another statement (Ex.P.2) was recorded by the 12th Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, at 11.00 p.m. on 24.10.2007. While undergoing treatment, Shruthi Mittal died on 20.01.2008. The provision in the F.I.R. was altered, and after further investigation, charge sheet was filed. After committal, the trial Court framed the charge. The accused pleaded not guilty. The case was taken up for trial. The prosecution examined P.Ws.1 to 9 and filed Exs.P.1 to P.10. M.Os.1 to 4 were also taken on record. A customary deed of divorce was filed as Ex.D.1, and relevant portions of the statement of P.W.1, the grand-father of the deceased, recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., were filed as D.2 and D.3. Through its judgment, dated 07.08.2009, the trial Court convicted the accused for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and imposed the punishment of imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days. Through its judgment, dated 07.08.2009, the trial Court convicted the accused for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and imposed the punishment of imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days. Smt. A. Gayatri Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant/accused, submits that there is absolutely no evidence whatever to prove that the accused caused the death of the deceased. She submits that even according to the deceased and her family members, there was an affair between the deceased and one Mr. Hafeez, and the marriage of the deceased with the accused was not to her liking. She contends that once divorce has taken place, may be in a customary manner, there is no question of the accused turning to the deceased once again. She submits that even if one goes by the version of the prosecution, it is clear that the distance between the place, where the deceased was sitting, and the place from where, the accused is said to have poured acid, is 94 feet, and one just cannot imagine that throwing of acid, or for that matter, any liquid up to such a distance, is possible. She further submits that when the person, who threw the acid, has worn a helmet, it is impossible for anyone to immediately recognize the identity of the person, from a distance of about 100 feet. Learned Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, submits that the accused had a different grievance vis-à-vis the deceased, viz., of her leaving him, shortly after the marriage, and that though the customary divorce has taken place between the parties, his grievance still subsisted. She contends that the deceased was consistent in her both the dying declarations, and that she was able to recognize the deceased, based on the way of his walking. She submits that the trial Court has arrived at the correct conclusion and the judgment passed by it does not warrant interference. The matrimonial life of Shruthi Mittal had a miserable start. Even according to the prosecution, the deceased had an affair with one person, by name, Hafeez. It was said to be not to the liking of her parents and other members of the family. The marriage of the deceased with the accused was performed on 07.07.2007. The matrimonial life of Shruthi Mittal had a miserable start. Even according to the prosecution, the deceased had an affair with one person, by name, Hafeez. It was said to be not to the liking of her parents and other members of the family. The marriage of the deceased with the accused was performed on 07.07.2007. It was elicited from P.W.1 that he stated before the police that his grand-daughter had an affair with one Hafeez, and since that boy happens to be a Muslim, they were not prepared to arrange the marriage between the deceased and Hafeez and, accordingly, the marriage between the accused and the deceased was arranged (Ex.D.2). It was also elicited from him that the deceased did not express any interest to live with the accused. Even from a perusal of the two dying declarations recorded from the deceased, it is evident that one day prior to the incident, a customary divorce took place between her and the accused. The dying declarations (Exs.P.2 and P.4), no doubt, were recorded, in accordance with the prescribed procedure, and if they are supported by any circumstantial evidence, they can certainly be taken into account and may constitute the basis for conviction. The deceased lived almost for a period of three months, after the incident. Both the dying declarations were recorded on the date of incident with a gap of few hours. In both of them, she stated that when she was sitting in the front room of their house, the accused came up to the gate wearing a helmet, and from there, he poured acid. In the statement itself, she mentioned that she was able to recognize the person as the accused, by observing the way he walked. The relevant statement in Ex.P.2 reads: “Today at about 1.00 or 1.30 p.m. I was sitting in front of first room of our house inside main gate. At that time, Bhajrang Gupta i.e., my husband came by wearing helmet and threw acid on me from outside gate only. I received injuries on my back, both hands, right leg and on right side of face below right ear.” In Ex.P.4, however, she stated that on noticing the accused and sensing that he may throw acid on her face, she turned back and the acid was thrown on her back, neck and other parts of the body. I received injuries on my back, both hands, right leg and on right side of face below right ear.” In Ex.P.4, however, she stated that on noticing the accused and sensing that he may throw acid on her face, she turned back and the acid was thrown on her back, neck and other parts of the body. Though in Ex.P.4 she stated that on hearing the hue and cries raised by her, her grand-father and cousin brother rescued her, she did not mention about the cries, in Ex.P.2. The dying declaration has its own value, and in the given case, even if there does not exist any other evidence to corroborate it, the Court can rest its conclusions upon such declaration, if it is found to be true. However, if the person, whose declaration was recorded, lived for a considerable time, the sanctity, which can be attached to it, needs to be examined carefully. In the instant case, the deceased was alive almost for three months, after her statement was recorded. Just as any other evidence in a criminal case, the dying declaration is also subject to scrutiny, if it emerges that any statement made in it is patently improbable. The mere fact that an untenable or equivocal statement is contained in a dying declaration, does not make any difference. In the scene of offence panchanama (Ex.P.6), the descriptive particulars are furnished. The residence of the parents of the deceased was in a big complex known as ‘Vaidik Vachanalaya Bhavan’. A Hanuman Mandir also existed in that complex. The residence is comprised of two rooms with tin sheets roof. According to Ex.P.6, the distance between the spot, where the deceased was sitting at the door sill, and the gate or main door of the complex, from which the acid is said to have been thrown, is 94 feet. It is humanly impossible for anyone to throw a liquid up to a distance of 100 feet, unless some mechanical device is used. The trial Court did not take this aspect into account. Added to that, the deceased herself stated that a customary divorce was taken by both of them on the preceding day itself, obviously, with their consent. Therefore, pouring of acid upon the deceased by the accused is highly improbable. The trial Court did not take this aspect into account. Added to that, the deceased herself stated that a customary divorce was taken by both of them on the preceding day itself, obviously, with their consent. Therefore, pouring of acid upon the deceased by the accused is highly improbable. Though P.W.1, the grand-father of the deceased, stated that the deceased cried ‘Bhajrang Bhajrang’, that was not stated by the deceased herself either in Ex.P.2 or in Ex.P.4. When this is the inconsistent evidence with full of contradictions, omissions and improbabilities, it is not at all safe to convict the accused. Hence, the Criminal Appeal is allowed, and the conviction and sentence ordered against the appellant/accused, in S.C.No.62 of 2009 on the file of II Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, through judgment dated 07.08.2009, are set aside. The appellant shall be set at liberty forthwith, unless his detention is needed with reference to any other crime. The fine amount, if any, paid by the appellant shall be refunded to him.