Ram Gopal v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, Kanpur Nagar
2014-12-04
ANJANI KUMAR MISHRA
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DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Anjani Kumar Mishra, J. 1. Heard Sri C.K. Rai, learned Counsel for the petitioners and Sri Krishna Mohan, holding brief of Sri VKS Somvamshi, who appears for respondent Nos. 4 to 11. The writ petition arises out of title proceedings, i.e. objection under section 9A(2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (for short, 'the Act') and has been filed challenging the orders dated 22.9.2011 and 4.6.2011 passed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2, respectively. 2. In the basic year record, the land in question, namely, plot Nos. 716 and 756/2, were recorded in the name of the fathers of respondent Nos. 4 to 11. The objection under section 9 of the Act was filed by the father of the petitioner, claiming co-tenancy to the extent of half share on the basis of a family settlement. 3. The Consolidation Officer (for short, 'the CO') by his order dated 16.6.1966 is said to have accepted the family settlement, and directed that the name of the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest be recorded over 1 - 10 - 0 of old plot No. 756/2 (new plot No. 541). 4. It is the case of the petitioners that against this order a recall application was filed by the contesting respondents on 7.8.1975. Notices are alleged to have been issued to the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest on the restoration application, but were never served. The CO by his order dated 30.7.1976 allowed the restoration application. 5. Since, according to the petitioners, this order was ex parte they were not aware of such order, and on coming to know about the same, they preferred an appeal which was 22 years beyond time. The Settlement Officer, Consolidation (for short, 'the SOC') by his order dated 5.7.1999 rejected the appeal on the ground of delay. 6. The consequential revision filed by the petitioners was allowed on 5.1.2000, and the matter was remanded back to the SOC for passing a fresh order. 7. Subsequent to the order of remand, the SOC by order dated 21.3.2006 condoned the delay in filing the appeal and by the subsequent order dated 12.9.2008, allowed the appeal, and remanded the matter to the CO for deciding the restoration application of the contesting respondents afresh. 8. The Consolidation Officer (for short, 'the CO') vide order dated 3.12.2010 rejected the restoration application of the contesting respondents and affirmed the order dated 16.6.1966.
8. The Consolidation Officer (for short, 'the CO') vide order dated 3.12.2010 rejected the restoration application of the contesting respondents and affirmed the order dated 16.6.1966. The consequential appeal filed by the contesting respondents was allowed by order dated 4.6.2011, holding the order dated 16.6.1966 to be a forged order, since the record of those proceedings was not traceable. This order was affirmed by the Revisional Court on 22.9.2011, hence this writ petition challenging the orders dated 4.6.2011 and 22.9.2011. 9. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that in the restoration application filed by the contesting respondents on 7.8.1975, they had categorically averred that the record of the proceedings, wherein the order dated 16.6.1966 had been passed, had been inspected by them. He has referred to the said restoration application, a copy whereof is available on record, specially paragraph 7 of the affidavit filed in its support, wherein it has been averred that the deponent Basant Lal went to the Court and inspected the record of Case No. 3955 wherein the order dated 16.6.1966 came to be passed. In the face of this averment, it was not open for the Courts below to have rejected the claim of the petitioners, holding the order dated 16.6.1966 to be a farzi order. It is further submitted that such a finding, in the facts and circumstances of the case, is a perverse finding as it fails to notice the categorical averments that the record of this case had been inspected by the respondents. 10. Learned Counsel for the respondents has tried to justify the orders impugned. He has further stated that the petitioners have not narrated the complete facts of the case. He has stated that the village was brought under consolidation operation. Subsequently on 10.8.1973 a notification under section 6(1) of the Act was issued cancelling the consolidation operations in the unit in question. This notification was challenged by means of Writ Petition No. 5646 of 1973. The writ petition was allowed on 6.10.1983 and the notification under section 6(1) of the Act was quashed. Against the said judgment, a Special Leave Petition has been preferred before the Apex Court, which is pending consideration even today. 11. However, learned Counsel for the parties are not at issue that there is no interim order operating in the said SLP. 12.
Against the said judgment, a Special Leave Petition has been preferred before the Apex Court, which is pending consideration even today. 11. However, learned Counsel for the parties are not at issue that there is no interim order operating in the said SLP. 12. I have considered the rival submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 13. Insofar as the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents that the consolidation operations had been cancelled in 1973, and that such notification, in turn, was quashed by the High Court on 6.10.1983, which order is engaging the attention of the Apex Court, it would suffice to state that in the absence of any interim order in the SLP, alleged to be pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the consolidation operations would have to proceed and the pendency of the SLP will in no way curtail the efficacy of the orders passed by the consolidation authorities. 14. From the facts noticed above, the only point which requires consideration in the writ petition is whether the Appellate and the Revisional Courts were justified in holding that the order dated 16.6.1966 was a forged order merely on the ground that the record of the proceedings was not available. 15. In this connection, it is the categorical case of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that this record has since been weeded out, and the finding returned by the SOC and the DDC has been assailed primarily on the ground that the contesting respondents had admitted to have examined the record of Case No. 3955 and, therefore, it was never their case that no such record existed. It is not the case of the contesting respondents in the restoration application filed by them in 1975 that no such record existed or that the order dated 16.6.1966 had not been passed therein. Accordingly, in my considered opinion, the impugned orders, which hold that the order dated 16.6.1966 to be a farzi and fictitious order, cannot be sustained and are, therefore, liable to be set aside. 16. However, since the orders are extremely old ones, and the parties have been litigating for almost 50 years now, I do not consider it appropriate to remand the matter back either to the CO or the SOC.
16. However, since the orders are extremely old ones, and the parties have been litigating for almost 50 years now, I do not consider it appropriate to remand the matter back either to the CO or the SOC. The interest of justice would stand served in case only the Revisional Court's order dated 22.9.2011 (annexure 11 to the writ petition) is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the DDC, Kanpur Nagar, to pass fresh orders after hearing all concerned and after affording them adequate opportunity to adduced evidence, if any, in support of their respective claims. Accordingly, I allow the writ petition, set aside the order dated 22.9.2011 and remand the matter back to the DDC, Kanpur Nagar, to pass fresh orders in the light of the observations made hereinabove. The DDC, respondent No. 1, may decide the revision after affording the parties opportunity to adduce evidence and after hearing them. He may complete this exercise expeditiously, preferably within a period of 4 months from the date of production of certified copy of this order before him.