Management of Deccan Enterprises (P) Ltd. , Hyderabad v. Addl. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Addl. Labour Court, Hyderabad
2014-03-07
R.KANTHA RAO
body2014
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER Heard the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners-management and the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents-workmen in all the writ petitions. 2. Since common questions of fact and law would arise for consideration in these writ petitions, this Court passed the following common order : The respondents-workmen filed a claim statement under Section 2-A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, before the Additional Industrial Tribunal, Hyderabad, stating that the respondents who are the workmen and active members of the Trade Union i.e., Deccan Enterprises Private Limited Employees Union, used to represent the grievances of employees to the management and tried to settle the same amicably by way of bilateral discussion. Therefore, according to them, the management bore grudge against them and other workmen and started harassing them and ultimately retrenched them without issuing any charge-sheet and without conducting any enquiry. Therefore, they filed the Industrial Dispute cases to set aside the retrenchment and direct the petitioner management to reinstate the workmen into service with continuity of service and full back wages and other attendant benefits. The Additional Industrial Tribunal-cum-Additional Labour Court, Hyderabad passed awards in the said Industrial Dispute cases, when the petitioners-management set ex parte on 17.4.2000 on the ground that though they were served with notice, there was no representation on behalf of the management and none appeared for them. In the Awards, the Industrial Tribunal acceded to the submission made by the respondents workmen that the management has terminated the services since the workmen and other workers participated in the Trade Union activities and were also raising disputes before the management The Tribunal also held that the management has not paid retrenchment compensation. Having arrived at the said conclusion the Tribunal directed the petitioner management to reinstate the workmen into service with continuity of service, but without back wages and with other attendant benefits. The Management filed Interlocutory Applications under Section 11 of Industrial Disputes Act to set aside the ex parte wards passed on 4.8.2000. The said Interlocutory Applications were heard am disposed of by the Industrial Tribunal. Ultimately, the Tribunal took the view that the notice was served on the Works Manager and in spite of the said fact, none appeared for the Management on the date of hearing on 17.4.2000.
The said Interlocutory Applications were heard am disposed of by the Industrial Tribunal. Ultimately, the Tribunal took the view that the notice was served on the Works Manager and in spite of the said fact, none appeared for the Management on the date of hearing on 17.4.2000. Thus, the non-appearance on behalf of the management is on account of carelessness on the part of the petitioner-management and having reached the aforesaid conclusion, the learned Tribunal dismissed the petitions. Feeling aggrieved, the management filed the aforesaid writ petitions praying to quash and set aside the order passed in the aforesaid interlocutory applications by issuing a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ or order. 3. The writ petitions were filed in the year 2002. The respondents-workmen filed vacate stay petitions on 2.4.2011. In the vacate stay petitions, apart from seeking vacate the stay granted by this Court the writ petitions, they prayed for payment of full wages to them pending disposal the writ petitions as provided for under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act. They also filed affidavits to that effect. 4. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners-management would submit that though the writ petitions were filed in the year 2002, the respondents-workmen have not chosen to file any vacate stay petition till 2.4.2011, therefore, the writ petitions since they are filed to set aside the ex parte awards passed by the Industrial Tribunal, can be disposed of on merits instead of passing an order under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act. 5. On the other hand, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents-workmen would submit that since the management filed the writ petitions against the awards passed by the Tribunal directing the reinstatement of the workmen, they have to pay the wages as contemplated under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and the question as to the payment of wages to the workmen under the said provision has to be considered prior to disposing of the writ petitions. 6. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners-management relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and others, 1980 (Supp) SCC 420, wherein, the Supreme Court held that "the Tribunal is competent to set aside its ex parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause". 7.
7. The judgment only refers to the powers of the Tribunal for setting aside the award within the meaning of Order IX Rule 13 of C.P.C. According to the learned Counsel, there is sufficient ground in the instant case for setting aside the award. 8. Whether there is sufficient cause shown by the petitioners-management for setting aside the ex parte award is the question, which has to be determined in the writ petitions when they are finally disposed of and this Court has to give a finding as to whether prior to disposing of the writ petitions, the order under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act is required to be passed. 9. In this context, it is relevant to refer to the judgment relied on by the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents-workmen. 10. In Ch. Saraiah v. Executive Engineer, Panchayat Raj Department and another, (1999) 9 SCC 229 , the Supreme Court held as follows: "Having examined the provisions of Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act, we are of the considered view that the Court has no jurisdiction to direct non-compliance with the same when the condition precedent for passing an order in terms of Section 17B of the Act is satisfied, and this being the legislative mandate, the Division Bench of the High Court committed serious error in interfering with the direction of the learned Single Judge. We accordingly set aside the impugned order passed by the Division Bench and direct that the order of the learned Single Judge requiring compliance with Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act shall be complied with by the employer." 11. In Workmen, represented by Hindustan V.O. Corpn. Ltd. v. Hindustan Vegetable Oils Corporation Ltd., and others, (2000) 9 SCC 534 , the Supreme Court held as follows : "The order under challenge has been passed by a Division Bench of the High Court at Calcutta. Its operative portion states that the writ petition filed by the present appellants and their application under Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act should be disposed of together, expeditiously. We are of the view that an application under Section 17B should be disposed of before the principal petition and it should be disposed of most expeditiously.
Its operative portion states that the writ petition filed by the present appellants and their application under Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act should be disposed of together, expeditiously. We are of the view that an application under Section 17B should be disposed of before the principal petition and it should be disposed of most expeditiously. We, therefore, set aside the order under challenge to the extent that it requires the disposal of the writ petition and the Section 17B application together and we direct that the Section 17B application should be disposed of with great promptitude and before disposal of the writ petition." 12. In Uttaranchal Forest Development Corporation and another v. K.B. Singh and others, (2005) 11 SCC 449 , wherein, the Supreme Court held that "the benefit under Section 17-B is available only to workmen in whose favour there are awards of reinstatement and who have filed affidavits of their not having been in gainful employment during the period of discontinuance from service. The benefit shall accrue from the date of filing of affidavit. The Supreme Court ultimately directed that only such workmen in whose favour there are awards of reinstatement and who have filed affidavits of their not being in gainful employment, shall be entitled to be granted reinstatement or in lieu thereof paid wages last drawn by them on respective dates of their termination from services. Their entitlement for such wages would be from the respective dates by filing affidavits by each of them in compliance with Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947." 13. From the aforesaid judgments relied on by the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents-workmen, legal position is clear that the High Court or Supreme Court has to dispose of the claim petitions under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act before deciding the main writ petitions in view of the specific mandate of the said provision. In the instant case, there is an award passed by the Tribunal in favour of the workmen reinstating them into service. The said award is questioned before the High Court stating that it was an ex parte award and it is required to be set aside. As per Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, the management is liable to pay the wages to the workmen.
The said award is questioned before the High Court stating that it was an ex parte award and it is required to be set aside. As per Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, the management is liable to pay the wages to the workmen. This relief is available to the petitioners-management notwithstanding the fact that this Court granted stay of operation of award since the main writ petitions are pending before this Court. 14. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners-management submitted that in fact notices were given to the workmen and retrenchment compensation was offered to them, but they declined to receive the notices. The learned Counsel also submits that subsequent to their retrenchment they were offered re-employment, but they did not respond to the said offer. 15. All these questions are relevant at the time of disposal of main writ petitions, but not while disposing of the claims preferred under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act. Section 17-B obligates the Management to pay wages to the workmen under the said provision and the Management cannot avoid liability by taking the plea that the main writ petitions can be disposed of as may have been pending since long time. 16. Therefore, the petitioners-management are directed to pay the wages to the respondents-workmen in whose favour the Awards of reinstatement have been passed and who have filed affidavits stating that they have not been gainfully employed, from the date of filing their affidavits, within a period of one month from the date of receipt of copy of this order. The payment of wages shall be at the rate the wages last drawn by them on the respective dates of their termination from service, failing which, the interim stay granted shall stand vacated.