Judgment V. Ramasubramanian, J. 1. All these revision petitions are filed purportedly under Sections 397 read with 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking modification of the orders of acquittal passed by the Trial Courts in various cases against the petitioners, from one of acquittal on "benefit of doubt" to the "honourable acquittal". 2. We have heard M/s. J. John, K.N. Govardhanan, K.K. Ramakrishnan for Mr. K. Guhan, V.K. Saravanan, N. Mohamed Asif, M/s. Vairam & Villiam Associates, T. Vadivelan, T. Lajapathi Roy, S. Sundara Pandian, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mrs. S. Prabha, learned Government Advocate (Crl. side) for the respondents. 3. The petitioners in these revision petitions were involved in various criminal cases before various Courts. All of them were acquitted, after trial, of the charges framed against them. But, the acquittal was ordered by various Courts on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. 4. Since the orders of acquittal passed by criminal courts, using appendages such as "beyond reasonable doubt", "benefit of doubt" etc., are looked down upon by employers, particularly the State Government, the petitioners have come up with these revisions, praying for conversion of such acquittals into "honourable acquittals". 5. These cases were actually posted for hearing in the usual course, before the concerned Portfolio Judge P.N. Prakash, J. The learned Judge himself had allowed such revision petitions on the basis of similar orders passed by various other learned Judges of this Court, some of which are reported in Ramasamy v. State [2013-1-L.W. (Crl.) 420], R. Ramar v. State [2013-1-L.W. (Crl.) 431], and A. Stephen Raj v. State [2013 (2) MLJ (Crl) 28]. 6. But, when the present batch of cases were posted before P.N. Prakash, J, the learned Judge took note of a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in Commissioner of Police v. Mehar Singh [ 2013 7 SCC 685 ]. In the said decision, the Supreme Court pointed out that expressions such as "honourable acquittal", "acquitted of blame" and "fully exonerated" are unknown to the Criminal Procedure Code. Therefore, the learned Judge felt that an authoritative pronouncement on this issue was needed from a Division Bench of this Court. Hence P.N. Prakash, J, passed an order on 01.04.2014, which reads as follows: "4. I gave my anxious consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioners. Therefore, the learned Judge felt that an authoritative pronouncement on this issue was needed from a Division Bench of this Court. Hence P.N. Prakash, J, passed an order on 01.04.2014, which reads as follows: "4. I gave my anxious consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioners. No judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court has been placed before me in support of the contention of the revision petitioners that a criminal court can employ the expression "Honourable Acquittal" while acquitting the accused. Therefore, I am of the opinion that for an authoritative pronouncement on this aspect, it would be in the fitness of things to place the matter before a Division Bench. 5. Therefore, the Registry is directed to place these matters before The Hon'ble Administrative Judge for posting batch of cases before a Division Bench." 7. Therefore, these cases were placed before us for consideration of the question as to whether it is possible for a Court to recognize such distinctions and if they could, whether the Court can convert one form of acquittal into another form. All the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners focussed upon one thing namely that the Criminal Procedure Code, by itself, does not create any distinction between one form of acquittal and another form of acquittal. Section 232 of the Code speaks only of one acquittal, which reads as follows:- "232. Acquittal. If after taking the evidence for the prosecution, examining the accused and hearing the prosecution and the defence on the point, the Judge considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence, the Judge shall record an order of acquittal." 8. Insofar as the cases instituted otherwise than on police report are concerned, Section 248 speaks about acquittal or conviction, which reads as follows:- "248. Acquittal or conviction. (1) If, in any case under this Chapter in which a charge has been framed, the Magistrate finds the accused not guilty, he shall record an order of acquittal. (2) Where, in any case under this Chapter, the Magistrate find the accused guilty, but does not proceed in accordance with the provisions of Section 325 or Section 360, he shall, after hearing the accused on the question of sentence, pass sentence upon him according to law. (2) Where, in any case under this Chapter, the Magistrate find the accused guilty, but does not proceed in accordance with the provisions of Section 325 or Section 360, he shall, after hearing the accused on the question of sentence, pass sentence upon him according to law. (3) Where in any case under this Chapter, a previous conviction is charged under the provisions of Sub-Section (7) of Section 211 and the accused does not admit that he has been previously convicted as alleged in the charge, the Magistrate may, after he has convicted the said accused, take evidence in respect of the alleged previous conviction and shall record a finding thereon: Provided that no such charge shall be read out by the Magistrate nor shall the accused be asked to plead thereto nor shall the previous conviction be referred to by the prosecution or in any evidence adduced by it, unless and until the accused has been convicted under Sub-Section (2)." 9. Chapter XX of the Code deals with trial of summons cases by Magistrates. Section 255, which forms part of Chapter XX, again deals with acquittal or conviction and it reads as follows: "255. Acquittal or Conviction. (1) If the Magistrate, upon taking the evidence referred to in Section 254 and such further evidence, if any, as he may, of his own motion, cause to be produced, finds the accused not guilty, he shall record an order of acquittal. (2) Where the Magistrate does not proceed in accordance with the provisions of Section 325 or Section 360, he shall, if he finds the accused guilty, pass sentence upon him according to law. (3) A Magistrate may, under Section 252 or Section 255, convict the accused of any offence triable under this Chapter, which form the facts admitted or proved he appears to have committed, whatever may be the nature of the complaint or summons if the Magistrate is satisfied that the accused would not be prejudiced thereby." 10. Therefore, based upon the usage of the word "acquittal" without any adjectives in the above three provisions of the Code, it is contended by Mr. K.K. Ramakrishnan, learned counsel appearing for some of the petitioners that the Magistrates, who passed orders of acquittal in these cases, overstepped their jurisdiction and created a cloud over the acquittals, by using such phrases as "benefit of doubt" etc. 11. Mr. K.K. Ramakrishnan, learned counsel appearing for some of the petitioners that the Magistrates, who passed orders of acquittal in these cases, overstepped their jurisdiction and created a cloud over the acquittals, by using such phrases as "benefit of doubt" etc. 11. Mr. K.K. Ramakrishnan, learned counsel also contended that as per the statistics released by the National Crime Records Bureau, 30% of the criminal cases are actually false cases foisted on innocents. Therefore, relying upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation v. Brojnath Ganguly [1986) 3 SCC 178], Janata Dal v. H.S.Chowdhary & Ors [ AIR 1993 SC 892 ] and Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan [ AIR 1994 SC 1775 ], Mr. K.K. Ramakrishnan, learned counsel contended that the Court has to take note of the ground realities. According to the learned counsel, many persons are, today, victims of motiveless malignancy, on the part of others. Therefore, there is a possibility that the career of youngsters gets spoiled due to such false cases. Eventually, even when they are acquitted, they become disabled from realising the fruits of such acquittal on account of the terminology used by the Trial Courts as a matter of routine, without any application of mind. In other words, it is contended by Mr. K.K. Ramakrishnan, learned counsel for the petitioners that so long as the Trial Courts do not follow the language of the statutory provisions of Sections 232, 248 and 255 of the Code and keep employing mechanically the phrases such as "benefit of doubt", the only remedy available to such persons is to come up before this Court. 12. Supplementing the arguments of Mr. K.K. Ramakrishnan, it is contended by Mr. M. Karunanidhi, learned counsel for some of the petitioners that very rarely the Magistrates exercise the power conferred upon them under Section 250 of the Code for the grant of compensation for any accusation without reasonable cause. Therefore, the learned counsel contended that the valuable rights of persons, including the fundamental right to live with dignity and honour conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution, cannot be allowed to be defeated. 13. Drawing our attention to Section 235 of the Code, Mr. M. Karunanidhi, learned counsel contended that the said provision also uses the bare expression "acquittal" without any adjectives. 13. Drawing our attention to Section 235 of the Code, Mr. M. Karunanidhi, learned counsel contended that the said provision also uses the bare expression "acquittal" without any adjectives. He further contended that even in Meharsingh, the Supreme Court ultimately used the expression "honourable acquittal" and hence, the learned counsel submitted that persons, who are aggrieved by the use of such expressions, are entitled to come before this court. 14. Mr. K.N. Govardhanan, learned counsel appearing for some of the petitioners submitted that the revisional jurisdiction of this Court flows not only out of Section 397, but also out of Section 401 of the Code. Under Section 397(1), the High Court or the Sessions Court may call for and examine the records of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. Under Section 401(1), the High Court is empowered in its discretion, to exercise any of the powers conferred upon a Court of Appeal by Sections 386, 389, 390 and 391, in cases where any proceeding, the record of which, had been found fault by itself or which otherwise comes to its knowledge. The language of Sections 397 and 401 is required to be noted and hence, these provisions are extracted as follows:- "397. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision. (1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself' or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court, and may, when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record. Explanation. All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this Sub-Section and of Section 398. Explanation. All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this Sub-Section and of Section 398. (2) The powers of revision conferred by Sub-Section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. (3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them." "401. High Court's powers of revision. (1) In the case of any proceeding, the record of which has been called for by itself or which otherwise comes to its knowledge, the High Court may, in its discretion, exercise any of the powers conferred on a Court of Appeal by Sections 386, 389, 390 and 391 or on a Court of Session by Section 397 and, when the Judges composing the court of revision are equally divided in opinion, the case shall be disposed of in the manner provided by Section 392. (2) No order under this section shall be made to the prejudice of the accused or other person unless he has had an opportunity of being heard either personally or by pleader in his own defence. (3) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to authorise a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. (4) Where under this Code an appeal lies and no appeal is brought, no proceeding by way of revision shall be entertained at the instance of the party who could have appealed. (5) Where under this Code an appeal lies but an application for revision has been made to the High Court by any person and the High Court is satisfied that such application was made under the erroneous belief that no appeal lies thereto and that it is necessary in the interests of justice so to do, the High Court may treat the application for revision as a petition of appeal and deal with the same accordingly." 15. Section 386 of the Code, which deals with the powers of the Appellate Court, states that in an appeal from any other order, the High Court may alter or reverse such order or may make any amendments or any consequential or incidental order that may be just or proper. Since Section 401(1) confers upon the High Court, the same powers as available to a Court of Appeal, subject to the restrictions contained in Sub-Sections (2) to (5) of Section 401, we may have to have a look at Section 386 also. Hence, Section 386 is extracted as follows:- "386. Powers of the Appellate Court. After perusing such record and hearing the appellant or his pleader, if he appears, and the Public Prosecutor, if he appears, and in case of an appeal under Section 377 or Section 378, the accused, if he appears, the Appellate Court may, if it considers that there is no sufficient ground for interfering, dismiss the appeal, or may- (a) In an appeal from an order of acquittal, reverse such order and direct that further inquiry be made, or that the accused be re-tried or committed for trial, as the case may be, or find him guilty and pass sentence on him according to law; (b) In an appeal from a conviction- (i) Reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or discharge the accused, or order him to be re-tried by a court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to such appellate Court or committed for trial, or (ii) Alter the finding, maintaining the sentence, or (iii) With or without altering the finding, alter the nature or the extent, or the nature and extent, of the sentence, but not so as to enhance the same; (c) In an appeal for enhancement of sentence-(i) Reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or discharge the accused or order him to be re-tried by a court competent to try the offence,-or (ii) Alter the finding maintaining the sentence, or (iii) With or without altering the finding, after the nature or the extent, or the nature and extent, of the sentence, so as to enhance or reduce the same; (d) In an appeal from any other order, alter or reverse such order; (e) Make any amendment or any consequential or incidental order that may be just or proper. Provided that the sentence shall not be enhanced unless the accused has had an opportunity of showing cause against such enhancement: Provided further that the Appellate Court shall not inflict greater punishment for the offence, which in its opinion the accused has committed, than might have been inflicted for that offence by the Court passing the order or sentence under appeal." 16. In view of the powers conferred upon an Appellate Court under Clauses (d) and (e) of Section 386, it is contended by Mr. Govardhanan, learned counsel for some of the petitioners that this Court, exercising jurisdiction under Section 401, is entitled to amend the order of "benefit of doubt acquittal" into one of "honourable acquittal". 17. Relying upon Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the learned counsel also contended that by such (doubtful) acquittals, the human rights of individuals are affected, as they cast a stigma upon the person, who is acquitted only on benefit of doubt. The learned counsel further contended that if "benefit of doubt acquittal" is unknown to law, it should also be unknown to Criminal Courts. So long as the Trial Courts use such phraseology, there is no alternative for persons affected thereby, to challenge the same. 18. From the arguments advanced by all the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, we are of the view that the following questions arise for our consideration: (i) When Sections 232, 235, 248 and 255 of the Code of Criminal Procedure use only a simple expression namely "acquittal", without any adjectives, is it open to the Criminal Courts to use the expression such as "benefit of doubt" and " beyond reasonable doubt" etc. ? and (ii) Whether this Court has power in terms of Section 401(1) read with Section 386(d) and (e) of the Code, to alter or amend the order of "acquittal" of the Trial Court into one of "honourable acquittal". QUESTION No.(i) : 19. The first question that arises for consideration is as to whether or not the Criminal Courts can use expressions such as "benefit of doubt", when Sections 232, 235, 248 and 255 of the Code of Criminal Procedure do not use such expressions as adjuncts to the acquittals ordered by them. To find an answer to this question, let us first analyse the origin of the expression 'benefit of doubt'. To find an answer to this question, let us first analyse the origin of the expression 'benefit of doubt'. The Third Edition of P. Ramanatha Aiyar's 'Law Lexicon' explains 'benefit of doubt' as "The advantage derived from doubt about guilt, a possible error or the weight of the evidence". This expression is not (and possibly cannot be) defined either in the Code of Criminal procedure or in the Indian Evidence Act. This expression cannot exist alone and it always follows as an adjunct of the expression 'proof beyond reasonable doubt'. 20. Sir James Fritzjames Stephen, the father of the Indian Evidence Act, in his epic work 'The Indian Evidence Act : with an Introduction on the Principles of Judicial Evidence' (Macmillan Co., London, 1872 at page 36) has stated: "It is commonly said in reference to judicial inquiries, that in criminal cases guilt ought to be proved "beyond all reasonable doubt," and that in civil cases the decision ought to be in favour of the side which is most probably right. To the latter part of this rule there is no objection, though it should be added that it cannot be applied absolutely without reserve. For instance, a civil case in which character is at stake partakes more or less of the nature of a criminal proceeding; but the first part of the rule means nothing more than that in most cases the punishment of an innocent man is a great evil, and ought to be carefully avoided; but that, on the other hand, it is often impossible to eliminate an appreciable though undefinable degree of uncertainty from the decision that a man is guilty. The danger of punishing the innocent is marked by the use of the expression "no doubt," the necessity of running some degree of risk of doing so in certain cases is intimated by the word "reasonable." The question, what sort of doubt is "reasonable" in criminal cases is a question of prudence. Hardly any case ever occurs in which it is not possible for an ingenious person to suggest hypotheses consistent with the prisoner's innocent. The hypothesis of falsehood on the part of the witnesses can never be said to be more than highly improbable. Hardly any case ever occurs in which it is not possible for an ingenious person to suggest hypotheses consistent with the prisoner's innocent. The hypothesis of falsehood on the part of the witnesses can never be said to be more than highly improbable. Though it is impossible to invent any rule by which different probabilities can be precisely valued, it is always possible to say whether or not they fulfill the conditions of what Mr. Mill describes as the Method of Difference; and if not, how nearly they approach to fulfilling it. The principle is precisely the same in all cases, however complicated or however simple, and whether the nature of the inquiry is scientific or judicial. In all cases the known facts must be arranged and classified with reference to the different hypotheses, or unknown or suspected facts, by which the existence of the known facts can be accounted for. If every hypothesis except one is inconsistent with one or more of the known facts, that one hypothesis is proved. If more than one hypothesis consistent with the knowns facts, but one only is reasonably probable-that is to say, 'if one only is in accordance with the common course of events, that one in judicial inquiries may be said to be proved "beyond all reasonable doubt." The word "reasonable" in this sentence denotes a fluctuating and uncertain quantity of probability (if the expression may be allowed), and shows that the ultimate question in judicial proceedings is and must be in most cases a question of prudence." 21. Though he had this philosophy in the back of his mind, he did not want the Judges to be left groping in the dark without any parameters for arriving at a finding whether or not a particular fact has been proved. In any judicial enquiry, there will be facts, which are in issue and the party asserting a fact in issue will have to prove several facts, which will form the basis for the Judge to draw an inference with regard to the fact in issue which is under enquiry. In order to guide the Judicial Officers, Sir Stephens defined the words 'Proved', 'Not Proved' and 'Disproved'. In order to guide the Judicial Officers, Sir Stephens defined the words 'Proved', 'Not Proved' and 'Disproved'. A Judge, while deciding whether a particular fact has been proved or not, should bear in mind the definition of the word 'Proved' in Section 3 of the Evidence Act and give a finding from the standpoint of a prudent man. Dr. V. Nageswara Rao in his treatise The Indian Evidence Act-A Critical Commentary Covering Emerging Issues and International Developments (2012 Lexis Nexis Butterworths Wadhwa page 446) says: "The bulk of the Indian Evidence Act applies equally to criminal as well as civil proceedings. Only about 16 sections of the Act apply exclusively to criminal proceedings. The Act does not make any distinction between civil and criminal proceedings with regard to much of the procedure, kinds of evidence, examination of witnesses or even with regard to burden of proof or standard of proof. However, one must hasten to add that though the Act itself does not make any distinction whatsoever between the standards of proof required in civil and criminal proceedings, for decades the Indian Courts have been following the great English legacy in the administration of justice with regard to standards of proof in civil and criminal proceedings. While in a civil case, the scales of justice, so to say, are held even between the plaint and the defendant, in a criminal case the balance tilts in favour of the accused." 22. Indian Courts very often quote the following passage of Lord Sankey, L.C. in Woolmington vs. Director of Public Prosecutions (1935 ALL E.R. Page 1): "Throughout the web of the English criminal law one golden thread is always to be seen--that is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner's guilt subject to what I have already said as to the defence of insanity and subject also to any statutory exception. If, at the end of and on the whole of the case, there is a reasonable doubt, created by the evidence given by either the prosecution or the prisoner, as to whether the prisoner killed the deceased with a malicious intention, the prosecution has not made out the case and the prisoner is entitled to an acquittal. If, at the end of and on the whole of the case, there is a reasonable doubt, created by the evidence given by either the prosecution or the prisoner, as to whether the prisoner killed the deceased with a malicious intention, the prosecution has not made out the case and the prisoner is entitled to an acquittal. No matter what the charge or where the trial, the principle that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the prisoner is part of the common law of England and no attempt to whittle it down can be entertained." 23. This judgment was rendered by the House of Lords under the Common law. Subsequently in Jayasena v. Reginam (1970 1 All E.R.219), Lord Devlin of the Privy Council, while considering the word 'Proved' in Ceylon Evidence Ordinance (pari materia to the definition in Section 3 of Indian Evidence Act) said : "Their Lordships do not think that proof means anything different in English law. But at any rate in the law of Ceylon, where the mode of proof is clearly spelt out, it is impossible to suppose that there can be more than one kind of burden of proof or that the burden imposed by s 105 can be anything less than proof in accordance with s 3. Their Lordships will not elaborate further since the incongruities of any such supposition are fully exposed in the judgments of the majority in R v Chandrasekera particularly the judgment of Soertsz J. Even if there were any ambiguity in the language of ss 3 and 105 of the Evidence Ordinance, their Lordships would not be aided in resolving it by the decision in Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions." 24. As rightly pointed out by Dr. V. Nageswara Rao, the concept of 'proof beyond reasonable doubt' and 'benefit of doubt' have been imported into our Criminal Jurisprudence by Superior Courts and they have come to stay now. In a criminal case, it is the burden on the prosecution to prove various relevant facts and it is enough if the quality of proof satisfies the definition of the word 'Proved' in Sec.3. At that juncture, the Court should not test the evidence on the anvil of the concept of 'proof beyond reasonable doubt', but should test it on the touchstone of the definition of the word 'Proved' in Sec.3. At that juncture, the Court should not test the evidence on the anvil of the concept of 'proof beyond reasonable doubt', but should test it on the touchstone of the definition of the word 'Proved' in Sec.3. After all the relevant facts are proved, while drawing inference from the proved facts, if the Judge has a reasonable doubt about coming to the inference in respect of the fact in issue, then only the benefit of that doubt should be extended to the accused. This principle has been very clearly explained by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana vs. Bhagirath & Others ( 1999 (5) SCC 96 ) as follows: ".....But the principle of benefit of doubt belongs exclusively to criminal jurisprudence. The pristine doctrine of benefit of doubt can be invoked when there is reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused. It is the reasonable doubt which a conscientious judicial mind entertains on a conspectus of the entire evidence that the accused might not have committed the offence, which affords the benefit to the accused at the end of the criminal trial. Benefit of doubt is not a legal dosage to be administered at every segment of the evidence, but an advantage to be afforded to the accused at the final end after consideration of the entire evidence, if the Judge conscientiously and reasonably entertains doubt regarding the guilt of the accused. 8. It is nearly impossible in any criminal trial to prove all the elements with a scientific precision. A criminal court could be convinced of the guilt only beyond the range of a reasonable doubt. Of course, the expression "reasonable doubt" is incapable of definition. Modern thinking is in favour of the view that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the same as proof which affords moral certainty to the Judge." 25. Therefore, 'proof beyond reasonable doubt' and 'benefit of doubt' are concepts that fall within the realm of appreciation of evidence by a judge while appraising the evidence in totality and they are subjective elements in an otherwise objective enquiry. In our Criminal Justice system, the appellate Court can re-appreciate the evidence and can either deny the benefit of doubt in an appeal against acquittal or extend the benefit in an appeal against conviction. What is doubt for the trial Judge need not be a doubt for the appellate Judge. 26. In our Criminal Justice system, the appellate Court can re-appreciate the evidence and can either deny the benefit of doubt in an appeal against acquittal or extend the benefit in an appeal against conviction. What is doubt for the trial Judge need not be a doubt for the appellate Judge. 26. As pointed out earlier, the two standards of proof namely (i) proof beyond reasonable doubt, and (ii) proof based on the balance of probabilities, also known as preponderance of probabilities, came to be imported into our system originally from the common law. While the first standard of proof is adopted in criminal cases, the latter is the standard of proof in civil cases and departmental proceedings. The second standard of proof, namely that of balance of probabilities is considered to be a lower standard of proof than the first. 27. But, when confronted with certain special types of civil cases, including contempt of court and allegations relating to sexual harassment, the Courts came to realise that there are varying degrees of the scope of balance of probabilities. In Hornal v. Neuberger Products Ltd. [1957 (1) QB 247], the plaintiff claimed damages for breach of warranty or alternatively for fraud. The defendant had sold a lathe to the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that one of the company directors had represented that the lathe had been reconditioned. If the director had represented so, there was clearly a fraudulent misrepresentation because he knew that the machine had not been reconditioned. The question was whether the representation had been made or not. The claim was dismissed on the ground that he was satisfied on a balance of probabilities, but not beyond reasonable doubt that the statement was made and accordingly, awarded damages for fraud. The Court of Appeal held that on an allegation of a crime in civil proceedings, the standard of proof is on a balance of probabilities. One of the reasons for such a conclusion was described by Denning. The Court of Appeal held that on an allegation of a crime in civil proceedings, the standard of proof is on a balance of probabilities. One of the reasons for such a conclusion was described by Denning. L,J, as follows : "I think it would bring the law into contempt, if a Judge were to say on the issue of warranty he finds the statement was made and that on the issue of fraud, he finds it was not made." Relying on his earlier decision in Bater v. Bater, he said civil cases must be proved by a preponderance of probability, but that there may be degrees of probability within that standard. 28. It appears that from out of what was stated to be varying degrees of probability, a third standard of proof was evolved or at least suggested. But the third standard of proof, which has come to be known as 'enhanced balance of probabilities', was rejected in common law jurisdictions. However, the courts in the United States of America accepted this third standard. 29. In the case of Addington v. Texas [441 U.S. 418], Chief Justice Burger of the Supreme Court of the United States referred to the standards of proof in legal cases in the following manner: “Generally speaking, the evolution of this area of the law has produced across a continuum three standards or levels of proof for different types of cases. At one end of the spectrum is the typical civil case involving a monetary dispute between private parties. Since society has a minimal concern with the outcome of such private suits, plaintiff’s burden of proof is a mere preponderance of the evidence. The litigants thus share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion. In a criminal case, on the other hand, the interests of the defendant are of such magnitude that historically and without any explicit constitutional requirement they have been protected by standards of proof designed to exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of an erroneous judgment. In the administration of criminal justice, our society imposes almost the entire risk of error upon itself. This is accomplished by requiring… that the state prove the guilt of an accused beyond a reasonable doubt. In the administration of criminal justice, our society imposes almost the entire risk of error upon itself. This is accomplished by requiring… that the state prove the guilt of an accused beyond a reasonable doubt. The intermediate standard, which usually employs some combination of the words ‘clear’, ‘cogent’, ‘unequivocal’ and ‘convincing’, is less commonly used but nonetheless ‘is no stranger to the civil law’… One typical use of the standard is in civil cases involving allegations of fraud or some other quasi-criminal wrongdoing by the defendant. The interests at stake in those cases are deemed to be more substantial then mere loss of money and some jurisdictions accordingly reduce the risk to the defendant of having his reputation tarnished erroneously by increasing the plaintiff’s burden of proof”. The above case involved a person civilly committed by reason of mental disorder and he argued that because he was facing a form of incarceration, the fact that he presented a danger to himself or others should be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the Court concluded that the intermediate standard should be applied and that the fact finder should be persuaded on the basis of “clear and convincing” evidence. This standard has come to be referred to as an “enhanced balance of probabilities”. 30. This intermediate standard was considered in Canada in the case of Re: Robinson and Hislop [(1981) 114 DLR (3d) 620]. In that case, the British Columbia Supreme Court declined to follow Addington v. Texas, relying on Canadian authority, including the case of Smith v. Smith [(1952) 2 SCR 312], in which Justice Cartwright of the Supreme Court of Canada stated that civil cases may be proved by a preponderance of evidence, but that whether a court can be reasonably satisfied that a matter has been proven will “…depend upon the totality of the circumstances on which its judgment is formed including the gravity of the consequences of the finding”. The Robinson and Hislop decision was followed in Ontario in the case of Re: Hoskins and Hislop [(1981) 121 DLR (3d) 337]. 31. In 1982, the Supreme Court of Canada decided the case of Continental Insurance Co. v. Dalton Cartage Co. [ (1982) 1 SCR 164 ]. The case involved a denial of coverage under an insurance policy based on fraudulent or dishonest acts by the insured. 31. In 1982, the Supreme Court of Canada decided the case of Continental Insurance Co. v. Dalton Cartage Co. [ (1982) 1 SCR 164 ]. The case involved a denial of coverage under an insurance policy based on fraudulent or dishonest acts by the insured. The Court held that even where “…there is an allegation of conduct that is morally blameworthy or that could have a criminal or penal aspect and the allegation is made in civil litigation, the relevant burden of proof remains proof on a balance of probabilities”. 32. The Supreme Court of Canada went on to state that it did not view Lord Denning’s approach (in Bater vs. Bater) “as a departure from a standard of proof based on a balance of probabilities nor as supporting a shifting standard. The question in all civil cases is what evidence with what weight that is accorded to it will move the court to conclude that proof on a balance of probabilities has been established”. 33. In a case decided in October 2013, the Supreme Court of Canada appears to have put to the rest the argument over the existence of an intermediate standard. The case of F.H. v. McDougall involved allegations of sexual assault by a former resident of an Indian residential school in British Columbia against an Oblate Brother who was a teacher at the school. The action was commenced in the year 2000 and related to incidents which took place in 1968 and 1969. There were no independent witnesses and the case boiled down to a matter of the credibility of the plaintiff as opposed to the defendant. The trial judge believed the plaintiff and awarded damages. The British Columbia Court of Appeal reversed that decision, stating that the trial judge had given insufficient weight to inconsistencies in the plaintiff’s testimony. The matter went to the Supreme Court of Canada, where a significant issue related to the burden of proof. The Supreme Court reviewed the case law and summarized the various approaches in civil cases as follows: “1. The criminal standard of proof applies in civil cases depending upon the seriousness of the allegations; 2. An intermediate standard of proof between the civil standard and the criminal standard commensurate with the occasion applies to civil cases; 3. The Supreme Court reviewed the case law and summarized the various approaches in civil cases as follows: “1. The criminal standard of proof applies in civil cases depending upon the seriousness of the allegations; 2. An intermediate standard of proof between the civil standard and the criminal standard commensurate with the occasion applies to civil cases; 3. No heightened standard of proof applies in civil cases, but the evidence must be scrutinized with greater care where the allegation is serious; 4. No heightened standard of proof applies in civil cases, but evidence must be clear, convincing and cogent; and 5. No heightened standard of proof applies in civil cases, but the more improbable the event, the stronger the evidence is needed to meet the balance of probabilities test.” 34. Justice Rothstein, writing for a unanimous bench, stated that “…it is time to say, once and for all in Canada, that there is only one civil standard of proof at common law and that is proof on a balance of probabilities. Of course, context is all important and a judge should not be unmindful, where appropriate, of inherent probabilities or improbabilities or the seriousness of the allegations or consequences. However, these considerations do not change the standard of proof. I am of the respectful opinion that the alternatives I have listed above should be rejected for the reasons that follow”. Justice Rothstein went on to refer to the inherent problems in an intermediate standard of proof, quoting one commentator who said that to suggest that the standard of proof is “higher” than the “mere balance of probabilities” leads one inevitably to inquire what percentage of probability must be met? This is unhelpful because while the concept of “51% probability”, or “more likely than not” can be understood by decision makers, the concept of 60% or 70% probability cannot”. 35. Justice Rothstein went on to say that to suggest “…that depending upon the seriousness, the evidence in the civil case must be scrutinized with greater care implies that in less serious cases the evidence need not be scrutinized with such care. I think it is inappropriate to say that there are legally recognized different levels of scrutiny of the evidence depending upon the seriousness of the case. I think it is inappropriate to say that there are legally recognized different levels of scrutiny of the evidence depending upon the seriousness of the case. There is only one legal rule and that is that in all cases, evidence must be scrutinized with care by the trial judge… Similarly, evidence must always be sufficiently clear, convincing and cogent to satisfy the balance of probabilities test”. 36. But as pointed out in Addington v. Texas, by Chief Justice Burger, “the ultimate truth as to how the standards of proof affect decision-making, may well be unknowable”. He also said that “adopting a standard of proof is more than an empty semantic exercise”. 37. In a family case (Re B [2008] UKHL 35), Lord Hoffman used a mathematical analogy to explain the principle thus: "If a legal rule requires a fact to be proved (a 'fact in issue'), a judge or jury must decide whether or not it happened. There is no room for a finding that it might have happened. The law operates a binary system in which the only values are 0 and 1. The fact either happened or it did not. If the tribunal is left in doubt, the doubt is resolved by a rule that one party or the other carries the burden of proof. If the party who bears the burden of proof fails to discharge it, a value of 0 is returned and the fact is treated as not having happened. If he does discharge it, a value of 1 is returned and the fact is treated as having happened." 38. But, the Courts cannot and do not work with mathematical precision. If this is the fate of civil and criminal Courts manned by Judicial Officers trained in the skillful art of appreciation of evidence, one can imagine the fate of departmental enquiries conducted by employers against employees. Since a contract of employment, whether elevated to one of status or not, is dependent upon the trust and confidence that the employer has to have on the employee, the standard of proof in domestic enquiries disallowed any degree of variation on the principle of preponderance of probabilities. This is despite the fact that charges may reflect upon the character of the employee and might have required an enhanced degree of proof in a civil court, if the test in Bater vs. Bater is applied. This is despite the fact that charges may reflect upon the character of the employee and might have required an enhanced degree of proof in a civil court, if the test in Bater vs. Bater is applied. Unlike in civil cases, what is at stake in departmental proceedings is not only the character of the employee, but also the confidence and trust of the employer in such employee. Therefore, employers refuse to accept any enhancement of the standard of proof, insofar as matters relating to employment and disciplinary proceedings are concerned. This is where a wedge was created as between what a criminal court considered as proved or not proved and what an Enquiry Officer in a departmental proceeding comes to hold. 39. Therefore, two situations kept on coming up. One is where an employer is confronted with the question of appointment of a person involved in a criminal case, but acquitted and another where a serving employee is charged with certain acts of misconduct, which also amounted to punishable offences under the Indian Penal Code or any other law. In both these situations, the employees find it convenient to rely upon the ultimate decision of the Court to order acquittal, but the employers find it difficult to accept the standard of proof that the criminal Courts applied, to order the acquittal. This is where and this is how an artificial dichotomy was created and it slowly crept into the system of administration of justice. If acquittal is the one and only possible conclusion that could be reached by applying either of the two standards of proof, the employers were prepared to go by the same. But in cases where the decision to acquit, as seen from the discussion of the criminal Court, could not have been reached by applying the civil standard, there was a temptation to brand those acquittals as something inferior to the other form. Once this is realised, we would have no difficulty in understanding that while the word "acquittal" used in the judgment of a criminal Court denotes the ultimate conclusion reached by them (which is also in tune with the language employed in the Code), the expressions such as "benefit of doubt" etc., denote the decision making process through which the mind of the Judge goes, when he acquits a person. 40. 40. Therefore, our answer to the first question is that there is no prohibition in law for the criminal Courts to use the expressions such as 'benefit of doubt' and 'beyond reasonable doubt', despite the fact that Sections 232, 235, 248 and 255 of the Code of Criminal Procedure use only a simple expression namely 'acquittal' without any adjectives. But, these adjectives or expressions such as 'benefit of doubt' and 'beyond reasonable doubt' will have no meaning or significance insofar as criminal jurisprudence is concerned. In civil law and service jurisprudence, there is a world of difference between 'not proved' and 'disproved'. In criminal jurisprudence, there is no distinction between these expressions namely 'not proved' and 'disproved', as both would result only in one consequence, namely acquittal. Consequently, an acquittal is an acquittal and there are not different forms nor different degrees of acquittal in so far as criminal jurisprudence is concerned. The different adjectives used by various courts, to the acquittals granted by them, actually indicate the process of reasoning through which they arrive at the decision to acquit a person. 'Proof beyond reasonable doubt' and 'Benefit of doubt' are actually tools that guide the subjective mind of the Judge to arrive at a finding whether the accused is guilty or not. QUESTION No.(ii) : 41. We would now take up the second question with regard to the revisional power of the High Court to convert an acquittal from 'benefit of doubt' into one of 'honourable acquittal'. All these petitions have been filed by persons who have been acquitted by the trial Court. They seek to convert their acquittal on 'benefit of doubt' as one of 'honourable acquittal'. Normally, if a person is acquitted, his acquittal can be challenged under Section 378 Cr.P.C. by the opposite party and definitely not by the acquitted accused. Section 397 of the Code empowers the High Court and the Sessions Court to call for and examine the record of a subordinate Court in order to satisfy as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, and as to the regularity of any proceedings. As we have stated earlier, 'Proof beyond reasonable doubt' and 'Benefit of doubt' are not findings or sentence or order. As we have stated earlier, 'Proof beyond reasonable doubt' and 'Benefit of doubt' are not findings or sentence or order. They are just tools with which the subjective mind of the Judge undertakes a judicial tour to arrive at a finding whether the accused is guilty or not. 42. But, it is contended by Mr. K.N. Govardhanan, learned counsel for the petitioners that Section 386 of the Code is telescoped into Section 401, which speaks about the High Court's power of revision. Therefore, the learned counsel contends that in view of Section 386(d), the revisional Court has the power to alter or reverse any order. 43. The wide range of powers conferred upon the Appellate Court under Section 386 of the Code are worth noting. The range of such powers vary, depending upon whether it is an appeal from an acquittal or an appeal from conviction or an appeal from any other order. 44. In an appeal from an order of acquittal, Section 386(a) confers the following powers upon the Appellate Court – (i) to reverse the order of acquittal and direct further enquiry to be made; (ii) to reverse the order of acquittal and direct that the accused be re-tried or committed for trial; and (iii) to reverse the order of acquittal and find him guilty and impose the sentence on him according to law. 45. In an appeal from a conviction, the Appellate Court has the following powers : (i) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or discharge the accused; (ii) reverse the finding and sentence and order the accused to be re-tried by a court of competent jurisdiction; (iii) reverse the finding and sentence and order the accused to be committed for trial; (iv) alter the finding, maintaining the sentence; and (v) alter the nature or extent or alter both (nature and extent) of the sentence with or without altering the finding. 46. In an appeal for enhancement of the sentence, the Appellate Court has the following powers : (i) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or discharge the accused; (ii) reverse the finding and sentence and order him to be re-tried by a Court competent to try the sentence; (iii) alter the finding, while maintaining the sentence; and (iv) alter the nature or extent or alter both so as to enhance or reduce the sentence, with or without altering the finding. 47. 47. In an appeal from any other order, the Appellate Court has the power to alter or reverse such order, under Clause (b). Similarly, under Clause (e), the Appellate Court has residual powers namely to make any amendment or any consequential or incidental order that may be just or proper. 48. A careful look at Clauses (a) to (e) of Section 386 shows that all of them deal only with the powers of the Appellate Court, while dealing with (a) appeals against acquittal; (b) appeals against conviction; (c) appeals for enhancement of sentence; and (d) appeals against any order. Therefore, Section 386 cannot be read in isolation. Under Section 372, no appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a criminal court except as provided for by the Code or any other law for the time being in force. The proviso to Section 372 enables the victim alone to file an appeal against the order of acquittal. This proviso was inserted by Act V of 2009. Section 373 also provides for appeals from orders requiring security or refusal to accept or rejecting surety for keeping peace and good behaviour. Section 374 deals with appeals from conviction. Sections 375 and 376 bar appeals in cases where the accused pleads guilty and in cases, which are petty in nature. Section 377 provides for appeal by the State Government against the sentence on the ground of inadequacy. Section 378 provides for the appeal in case of acquittal. 49. Therefore, the power of revision conferred upon the High Court under Section 401(1) cannot be read in isolation from the various provisions for appeals available under Sections 372 to 380 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Neither Section 386 nor the proviso under Section 372 enables an accused to file an appeal against his own acquittal. Unless an appeal is maintainable, the question of invocation of Clause (b) or Clause (e) of Section 386 would not arise. To put it differently, an appeal should be one, which falls under any of the categories of appeals stipulated in Sections 373 to 380, to enable the High Court to exercise the power under Section 386(d) by invoking Section 401(1). To put it differently, an appeal should be one, which falls under any of the categories of appeals stipulated in Sections 373 to 380, to enable the High Court to exercise the power under Section 386(d) by invoking Section 401(1). If a revision filed by an accused, who is acquitted by the Trial Court, is not maintainable either as an appeal under any of the provisions of Sections 373 to 380 or as revision under Section 397, the power under Section 401(1) read with Section 386(d) cannot be invoked. Under Sub-Section (4) of Section 401, no proceeding by way of revision can be entertained at the instance of a party, who had a right of appeal under the Code, but who did not file such appeal. Sub-Section (5) of Section 401 empowers the High Court to treat an application for revision as a petition of appeal. But, fundamentally, a revision can be maintained only if the parameters are satisfied. As a matter of fact, the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, while dealing with an order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court is narrower in its scope. Right from Bansilal v. Lakshman Singh [ AIR 1986 SC 1721 ], up to Johar and Others v. Mangal Prasad [2008 Crl.L.J. 1627 (SC)], the Supreme Court repeatedly pointed out that the revisional power of the High Court is much more restricted in its scope and that it cannot interfere with orders of acquittal so easily. To say on the one hand that the revisional powers cannot be used to upset an order of acquittal so easily, but to entertain revisions on the other hand, for converting the so called benefit of doubt acquittals into honourable acquittals, will be to pervert the provision relating to revisional jurisdiction. 50. If we understand the revisional power of the High Court to be narrower in scope than the powers of an Appellate Court, we would realise that a Revisional Court cannot do what an Appellate Court itself cannot do. If an appeal by an acquitted person is not maintainable in law in terms of any of the provisions of Sections 373 to 380 of the Code, we do not know how a revision, which is narrower in scope than an appeal, could be maintained at the instance of such a person. 51. If an appeal by an acquitted person is not maintainable in law in terms of any of the provisions of Sections 373 to 380 of the Code, we do not know how a revision, which is narrower in scope than an appeal, could be maintained at the instance of such a person. 51. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Pranab Kumar Mithra v. State of West Bengal [ AIR 1959 SC 144 ], the revisional powers vested in the High Court under the Code do not create any right in the litigant, but only conserve the powers of the High Court to see that justice is done in accordance with the recognised rule of criminal jurisprudence and that the Subordinate Criminal Courts do not exceed in their jurisdiction or abuse their powers vested in them by the Code. These boundaries within which a revisional Court can function, will stand completely breached, if a revision can be entertained at the instance of an acquitted person, on the ground that the quality of his acquittal should be much more than what it is. 52. Moreover, in any case, an order of acquittal will not come within the definition of the expression 'any other order' appearing in Clause (d) of Section 386. Judgments are given under Chapter XXVII of the Code and a judgment of acquittal will not come within the definition of the expression 'any other order' in Section 386(d). Therefore, the revisions filed by acquitted persons, are not maintainable. 53. On the concern expressed by Mr. K.K. Ramakrishnan, learned counsel for the petitioners that there is a tendency to foist false cases on innocent persons, we need to do nothing more, than to quote the opinion of the Privy Council in Bhuboni Sah v. The King [ AIR 1949 PC 261 ] wherein the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council commented: "The tendency to include the innocent with the guilty is peculiarly prevalent in India, as Judges have noted in innumerable occasions and it is very difficult for the Court to guard against this danger. An Indian villager is seldom in a position to place cogent evidence of alibi." 54. An Indian villager is seldom in a position to place cogent evidence of alibi." 54. But, repeatedly the Courts have also lamented about the failure of the Investigating Agencies to conduct a thorough and scientific investigation and also about various other factors such as the lack of adequate protective measures for witnesses, resulting in acquittal in a majority of the cases relating to heinous crimes. In Masalati and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh [ AIR 1965 SC 202 ], the Supreme Court stated as follows : "It is not unknown that where serious offences like the present are committed and a large number of accused are tried, attempts are made either to terrorise or win over prosecution witnesses." 55. It is to be noted that the concept of witnesses turning hostile is unknown to English jurisprudence, but Sir Stephens was aware of the conditions that obtain in India and hence, he drafted Section 154 of the Evidence Act. Pursuant to the Law Commissions recommendations, Section 154 has been further amended by Central Act 2 of 2006 whereby a party, whose witness has turned hostile, can rely upon any part of the evidence of such a witness. 56. It is on account of the fact that many times, persons, who are really guilty, escape from the clutches of law due to a variety of reasons other than the merits of their own case, that employers tend to scan the judgments of acquittal of criminal courts before they venture to select a person for appointment. The law does not provide a relief within the system of administration of criminal justice, to an acquitted person to seek before any forum, an enhancement of the quality of the order of acquittal passed by a criminal Court. Therefore, the recourse that clever lawyers have invented in the past six years, is not founded upon any of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. 57. If we have a careful look at the history of this development, namely that of acquitted persons approaching this Court for an order of honourable acquittal, we would find that this invention by lawyers, has as its mother, an amendment introduced to Rule 14(b) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Rules. The validity of this Rule came to be challenged before this Court. The validity of this Rule came to be challenged before this Court. By a decision rendered by the Full Bench, to which one of us was a party (VRSJ), in Manikandan v. Chairman, Tamil Nadu Uniformed Services Recruitment Board [ 2008 (2) CTC 97 ], the Rule was upheld. 58. It was only after the Rule was upheld that some lawyers and jurists, who could not reconcile themselves to the ratio of the Full Bench, invented this new remedy under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code. An attempt was also made to test the soundness of the ratio laid down by the Full Bench. But, a Larger Bench reiterated the decision in Manikandan, in J. Alex Ponseelan v. The Director General of Police, Tamil Nadu [ 2014 (2) CTC 337 ]. Therefore, the flash of creative genius that came as a spark in 2008, inventing a remedy unavailable under the Criminal Procedure Code, cannot survive for long. 59. In view of the above, we hold on the second question that no revision or appeal or any other petition under any of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code can be entertained by this Court for converting an order of acquittal passed by a Trial Court into an order of honourable acquittal. Therefore, all these petitions deserve to be dismissed. 60. It appears that several suggestions have emanated, some from the judiciary itself, for reconsideration of the amended Rule 14 of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Services Rules, on the ground that several innocent youths are fixed falsely in criminal cases and that therefore, their future would be doomed if the mere registration of a first information report is considered to be a bar for entry into service. But, we do not think that such sentiments can really have a place when it comes to the question of recruitment to a disciplined force like the police force in the State. History shows that from time immemorial, the application of any rule framed in the larger interest of society, has always caused hardship to a few genuine individuals. But, such exceptions cannot make the very rule itself condemnable. Persons whose hearts bleed for those few innocent youths who are falsely implicated in criminal cases and whose aspirations to get into police force gets spoiled, may take note of two facts. But, such exceptions cannot make the very rule itself condemnable. Persons whose hearts bleed for those few innocent youths who are falsely implicated in criminal cases and whose aspirations to get into police force gets spoiled, may take note of two facts. The first is that other than an employment in the police force, there are several avenues open to such youths. The bar of entry into police force does not mean that the world of opportunities available in all other areas are also shut down. The second is that our system of administration of criminal justice is such that most of the times, the offenders escape the clutches of law. Most of the times, the victims of crime suffer in silence. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the State as well as the Director General of Police should discard all suggestions for an amendment to the Rules, in the larger interest of society. The State and the Director General of Police should remember that the validity of the Rule has been upheld not once, but twice, first by a three Member Bench and by a five Member Bench. Therefore, the effect of those judgments cannot be whittled down. In the result, all these revision petitions shall stand dismissed.