Gayathri, Rep. by her father and Natural Guardian, P. Ramar v. Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu, Health and Family Welfare Department
2014-09-25
M.JAICHANDREN, R.MAHADEVAN
body2014
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment M. Jaichandren, J. Heard the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the parties concerned. 2. Since common issues are arising for the consideration of this Court, all the Writ Appeals are heard together and a Common Judgment is being passed. 3. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to, according to their litigative status in the Writ Petitions. 4. These Writ Appeals have been filed challenging the Common Order of the learned Single Judge, dated 05.06.2014, made in W.P. [MD].Nos.16470 and 16509 of 2013. 5. The Writ Petition, in W.P.[MD].No.16509 of 2013, had been filed praying for the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus to direct the fifth respondent therein to admit the petitioner therein in the first year M.B.B.S. Course, for the academic year 2013 - 2014, in the fifth respondent college, pursuant to the call letter given by the fifth respondent, dated 24.09.2013. 6. The Writ Petition, in W.P.[MD].No.16470 of 2013, had been filed praying for the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus to direct the respondents 6 and 7 therein to admit the daughter of the petitioner – R. Gayathri therein in the M.B.B.S. Course for the academic year 2013-2014 in the seventh respondent college. 7. The case of the petitioner, in W.P.[MD].No.16509 of 2014, is that he had completed Higher Secondary Examination, in March 2013 and scored 944 marks, out of 1200 marks. He had submitted application before the fourth respondent, for admission to M.B.B.S. Course, on 26.08.2013, with Application No.3006. The fourth respondent viz., Tamil Nadu Private Professional Colleges Association-Health Sciences is a consortium of Private Health Sciences Professional Colleges in Tamil Nadu, affiliated to the Tamil Nadu Dr. M.G.R. Medical University. The fourth respondent had published the results, on 23.09.2013, in which the petitioner was placed in Rank No.731. He had approached the fourth respondent, on 24.09.2013, and requested for providing necessary orders for allotting seat in the fifth respondent college. The petitioner was directed to approach the fifth respondent college for admission stating that the provisional list of selection was already sent to the fifth respondent college. The father of the petitioner had approached the fifth respondent college, on 24.09.2013, and requested them to furnish the status of his son in the Selection List. As no reply had been given by the college, the petitioner had approached the second respondent and made a complaint, in this regard.
The father of the petitioner had approached the fifth respondent college, on 24.09.2013, and requested them to furnish the status of his son in the Selection List. As no reply had been given by the college, the petitioner had approached the second respondent and made a complaint, in this regard. Based on such request, the second respondent had sent a communication, dated 24.09.2013, to the fifth respondent and directed them to offer their remarks, forthwith, through fax. Even thereafter, the fifth respondent did not give any response, thereby denying the seat to the petitioner. Hence, the petitioner had approached the fourth respondent and made a complaint against the fifth respondent college, by way of representations, dated 26.09.2013 and 27.09.2013. There was no fruitful response from any of the respondents. On the other hand, the fifth respondent had instructed the petitioner to appear for Counselling, on 26.09.2013, through a letter dated 24.09.2013, posted on 29.09.2013, and received by the petitioner, on 01.10.2013. Immediately, after receiving the said letter, the petitioner had approached the fifth respondent and requested them to allot the seat. But, the fifth respondent had refused, stating that the petitioner did not approach them, within the stipulated time. The petitioner was very much available in the fifth respondent college, from 24.09.2013 to 30.09.2013, except on 29.09.2013. But, he was not given a seat. In such circumstances, the Writ Petition, in W.P.[MD].No.16509 of 2014, had been filed. 8. The case of the petitioner, in W.P.[MD].No.16470 of 2013, is that she had passed the Higher Secondary examination conducted in March 2013 and secured 1080 marks and made her application on 22.08.2013, with the Application No.3027, to the sixth respondent. She had preferred the seventh respondent college, as her first choice. On 23.09.2013, results were published and the petitioner had got 551st rank in the merit list. When the petitioner had approached the seventh respondent college and sought admission, she was directed to come after 26.09.2013, as the process was going on. The seventh respondent had acted with a mala fide intention and denied admission to the petitioner. Hence, a complaint had been made to the fifth respondent, who in turn had sent a communication before the seventh respondent, on 24.09.2013, to offer their remarks. On 30.09.2013, the petitioner had received a letter, dated 24.09.2013, from the seventh respondent college, intimating her to appear for Counselling, at the college, on 26.09.2013.
Hence, a complaint had been made to the fifth respondent, who in turn had sent a communication before the seventh respondent, on 24.09.2013, to offer their remarks. On 30.09.2013, the petitioner had received a letter, dated 24.09.2013, from the seventh respondent college, intimating her to appear for Counselling, at the college, on 26.09.2013. The post office seal, affixed on the cover, would show that it was posted only, on 29.09.2013. Thus, it is crystal clear that the seventh respondent had acted with a mala fide intention. In the above circumstances, the Writ Petition, in W.P. [MD].No.16470 of 2013, had been filed. 9. The learned Single Judge, by his Common Order, dated 05.06.2014, while holding that the petitioners were not entitled for admission in M.B.B.S., Course, came to the conclusion that the petitioners were entitled to a sum of Rs.3,00,000/-, each towards compensation, payable by the Dean, Velammal Medical College Hospital, and Research Institute, Madurai. Aggrieved over the compensation awarded by the learned Single Judge, the college had come up with W.A. [MD].Nos.921 and 923 of 2014. Challenging the non-admission in the M.B.B.S., Course, W.A. [MD].Nos.794 and 898 of 2014 had been filed by the petitioners/students. 10. Mr. M. Ajmal Khan, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner/student, in W.A[MD].No.898 of 2014, had vehemently contended that the merit list has to be placed in the Notice Board and only the meritorious students had to be admitted. The very posting of the letter, dated 24.09.2013, on 29.09.2013, calling upon the petitioner to appear for counselling, on 26.09.2013, on the face of it, would make it manifestly clear that the college had acted with a mala fide intention. The petitioner was, in fact, available in the college, on 25.09.2013. The college had given admission to the students, who had secured lesser marks than that of the petitioner herein. There was no transparency in the admission at all. In support of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel had relied on the Judgment in Asha Vs. P.T.B.D. Sharma University of Health Sciences and others, reported in 2012 7 SCC 389 and Parmender Kumar and others Vs. State of Haryana and others, reported in 2012 (1) SCC 177 . 11. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner/student, in W.A.[MD].No.794 of 2014, had adopted the arguments advanced by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner/student, in W.A[MD].No.898 of 2014.
State of Haryana and others, reported in 2012 (1) SCC 177 . 11. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner/student, in W.A.[MD].No.794 of 2014, had adopted the arguments advanced by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner/student, in W.A[MD].No.898 of 2014. 12. Mr. R. Muthukumarasamy, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the college had submitted that the admission to the M.B.B.S., course had been made through three streams viz., All India Quota, State Quota and Management Quota. He had further submitted that because of the three stream admissions, the role of the colleges to admit in the Management Quota would always come little later. Paragraph No.11 of the Prospectus, for the MBBS course, 2013-2014 Session, issued by the Tamil Nadu Private Professional Colleges Association-Health Sciences, deals with the method of admission. According to the said method, preferences will be given to the first choice opted by the candidates. Before 30.09.2013, the college had to fill up all the seats. The petitioners had reported on 23rd or 24th September 2013 and they were asked to report, on 26.09.2013. 13. The learned Senior Counsel had further contended that apart from the said oral communication, a written communication had also been sent, on 24.09.2013. However, by mistake, it was posted, on 29.09.2013. The petitioners did not report to the college, on 26.09.2013. Since oral intimation was given to the petitioners to report, on 26.09.2013, the call letter, dated 24.09.2013, had no consequences at all. The said fact amply proves by the communication addressed, by the petitioners, dated 24.09.2013. The letter, dated 27.09.2013, addressed by the petitioners to the Committee did not refer anything about the presence of the petitioners in the college, on 26.09.2013. Even in the affidavits filed in support of the Writ Petitions, it was not stated as to whether the petitioners were present in the college, on 26.09.2013. The college had waited, till 26.09.2013 and replied to the Committee, stating that they had not denied admission to any of the students and the vacancies were filled up, according to the merit list, as published. Further, the college had also stated that false and untenable allegations were made against the college. The petitioners were unable to prove that they were present in the college, on 26.09.2013.
Further, the college had also stated that false and untenable allegations were made against the college. The petitioners were unable to prove that they were present in the college, on 26.09.2013. The denial of admission had not been proved, and thus, the burden would lie on the petitioners to prove the same. As 30th September 2013 being the cut off date, the Court cannot extend the date of admission, under any circumstances. In the absence of any concrete proof, this Court cannot lay its hands to rescue the petitioners, and thus, the order of the learned Single Judge, awarding compensation to the petitioners are liable to be set aside. In support of his contentions, the learned Senior Counsel had relied on the following decisions:- i. Dr. M. Vennil Vs. Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission, reported in 2006 WLR 574 ii. Chandigarh Administration Vs. Jasmine Kaur 14. The learned counsels appearing on behalf of the Medical Council of India and the Registrar, M.G.R. Medical University, had reiterated the contentions raised in the counter affidavits filed by them. 15. We have carefully considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the parties concerned and meticulously perused the materials placed before this Court. 16. In the cases on hand, it is an admitted fact that the merit list had been published, on 23.09.2013, wherein the names of the petitioners herein had found place at Serial Nos.551 and 731, respectively. However, on a perusal of the facts and circumstances of the case, as narrated above, would indicate that the college had claimed that they had communicated the students well in advance, in this regard, whereas the students had claimed that they had received the communications, belatedly. Thus, the questions, whether the petitioners had appeared before the college at the crucial date, as required by the college and whether the college had sent communication well in time, are all disputed questions of facts, which cannot be gone into in a Writ Petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and this Court cannot conduct a roving enquiry to give a definite finding in favour of the petitioners/students. It is for the petitioners/students to establish their rights before the competent Civil Court, by adducing proper evidences. 17. In the Judgment, relied on by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner/student, in W.A[MD].No.898 of 2014, in Asha Vs.
It is for the petitioners/students to establish their rights before the competent Civil Court, by adducing proper evidences. 17. In the Judgment, relied on by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner/student, in W.A[MD].No.898 of 2014, in Asha Vs. PT.B.D. Sharma University of Health Sciences and others, reported in 2012 7 SCC 389 , it has been held as follows:- "23. Adherence to the schedule is the obligation of the authorities and the students both. The prescribed schedule is to be maintained stricto sensu by all the stakeholders because if one party adheres to the schedule and others do not or there is some kind of lack of communication or omission to make proper announcements and maintain proper records for such counselling, disastrous results can follow, of which the present case is an apt example. 24. The Court cannot ignore the fact that these admissions relate to professional courses and the entire life of a student depends upon his admission to a particular course. Every candidate of higher merit would always aspire admission to the course which is more promising. Undoubtedly, any candidate would prefer course of MBBS over BDS given the high competitiveness in the present times, where on a fraction of a mark, admission to the course could vary. Higher the competition, greater is the duty on the part of the authorities concerned to act with utmost caution to ensure transparency and fairness. It is one of their primary obligations to see that a candidate of higher merit is not denied seat to the appropriate course and college, as per his preference. We are not oblivious of the fact that the process of admissions is a cumbersome task for the authorities but that per se cannot be a ground for compromising merit. The authorities concerned are expected to perform certain functions, which must be performed in a fair and proper manner i.e. strictly in consonance with the relevant rules and regulations. 25. Strict adherence to the time schedule has again been a matter of controversy before the courts. The courts have consistently taken the view that the schedule is sacrosanct like the rule of merit and all the stakeholders including the authorities concerned should adhere to it and should in no circumstances permit its violation. This, in our opinion, gives rise to dual problem. Firstly, it jeopardises the interest and future of the students.
The courts have consistently taken the view that the schedule is sacrosanct like the rule of merit and all the stakeholders including the authorities concerned should adhere to it and should in no circumstances permit its violation. This, in our opinion, gives rise to dual problem. Firstly, it jeopardises the interest and future of the students. Secondly, which is more serious, is that such action would be ex facie in violation of the orders of the court, and therefore, would invite wrath of the courts under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. In this regard, we may appropriately refer to the judgments of this Court in Priya Gupta, State of Bihar v. Sanjay Kumar Sinha, Medical Council of India v. Madhu Singh, GSF Medical and Paramedical Assn. v. Assn. of Self Financing Technical Institutes and Christian Medical College v. State of Punjab. 26. The judgments of this Court constitute the law of the land in terms of Article 141 of the Constitution and the regulations framed by the Medical Council of India are statutorily having the force of law and are binding on all the parties concerned. Various aspects of the admission process as of now are covered either by the respective notifications issued by the State Governments, prospectus issued by the colleges and, in any case, by the regulations framed by the Medical Council of India. There is no reason why every act of the authorities be not done as per the procedure prescribed under the Rules and why due records thereof be not maintained. This proposition of law or this issue is no more res integra and has been firmly stated by this Court in its various judgments which may usefully be referred at this stage. (Ref.: State of M.P. v. Gopal D. Tirthani, State of Punjab v. Dayanand Medical College & Hospital, Bharati Vidyapeeth v. State of Maharashtra, Chowdhury Navin Hemabhai v. State of Gujarat and Harish Verma v. Ajay Srivastava.) 29. However, the question that immediately follows is whether any mid-term admission can be granted after 30th September of the academic year concerned, that being the last date for admissions. The respondents before us have argued with some vehemence that it will amount to a mid-term admission which is impermissible, will result in indiscipline and will cause prejudice to other candidates.
However, the question that immediately follows is whether any mid-term admission can be granted after 30th September of the academic year concerned, that being the last date for admissions. The respondents before us have argued with some vehemence that it will amount to a mid-term admission which is impermissible, will result in indiscipline and will cause prejudice to other candidates. Reliance has been placed upon the judgments of this Court in Medical Council of India v. Madhu Singh, Neelu Arora v. Union of India, Aman Deep Jaswal v. State of Punjab, Medical Council of India v. Naina Verma and Mridul Dhar v. Union of India. 30. There is no doubt that 30th September is the cut-off date. The authorities cannot grant admission beyond the cut-off date which is specifically postulated. But where no fault is attributable to a candidate and she is denied admission for arbitrary reasons, should the cutoff date be permitted to operate as a bar to admission to such students particularly when it would result in complete ruining of the professional career of a meritorious candidate, is the question we have to answer. 31. Having recorded that the appellant is not at fault and she pursued her rights and remedies as expeditiously as possible, we are of the considered view that the cut-off date cannot be used as a technical instrument or tool to deny admission to meritorious students. The rule of merit stands completely defeated in the facts of the present case. The appellant was a candidate placed higher in the merit list. It cannot be disputed that candidates having merit much lower to her have already been given admission in the MBBS course. The appellant had attained 832 marks while the students who had attained 821, 792, 752, 740 and 731 marks have already been given admission in the ESM category in the MBBS course. It is not only unfortunate but apparently unfair that the appellant be denied admission. 32.
The appellant had attained 832 marks while the students who had attained 821, 792, 752, 740 and 731 marks have already been given admission in the ESM category in the MBBS course. It is not only unfortunate but apparently unfair that the appellant be denied admission. 32. Though there can be the rarest of rare cases or exceptional circumstances where the courts may have to mould the relief and make exception to the cut-off date of 30th September, but in those cases, the Court must first return a finding that no fault is attributable to the candidate, the candidate has pursued her rights and legal remedies expeditiously without any delay and that there is fault on the part of the authorities and apparent breach of some rules, regulations and principles in the process of selection and grant of admission. Where denial of admission violates the right to equality and equal treatment of the candidate, it would be completely unjust and unfair to deny such exceptional relief to the candidate. (Refer Arti Sapru v. State of J&K, Chhavi Mehrotra v. DG, Health Services and Arvind Kumar Kankane v. State of U.P.). 38.2. Question (b): 30th September is undoubtedly the last date by which the admitted students should report to their respective colleges without fail. In the normal course, the admissions must close by holding of second counselling by 15th September of the relevant academic year (in terms of the decision of this Court in Priya Gupta). Thereafter, only in very rare and exceptional cases of unequivocal discrimination or arbitrariness or pressing emergency, admission may be permissible but such power may preferably be exercised by the courts. Further, it will be in the rarest of rare cases and where the ends of justice would be subverted or the process of law would stand frustrated that the courts would exercise their extraordinary jurisdiction of admitting candidates to the courses after the deadline of 30th September of the current academic year. This, however, can only be done if the conditions stated by this Court in Priya Gupta and this judgment are found to be unexceptionally satisfied and the reasons therefor are recorded by the court of competent jurisdiction." 18. In Parmender Kumar and others Vs. State of Haryana and others, reported in 2012 (1) SCC 177 , the Supreme Court has held as follows:- "32.
In Parmender Kumar and others Vs. State of Haryana and others, reported in 2012 (1) SCC 177 , the Supreme Court has held as follows:- "32. We, accordingly, have no hesitation in allowing the appeals and setting aside the Judgment and Order of the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court. However, we appear to be facing the same problem, as was faced by this Court in Vinay Rampal's case. The counselling process in these appeals was to be conducted, on 06.04.2011 and the academic session was to commence, on 10.05.2011. In other words, the appellants have already lost about six months of the courses in question. As was observed in Vinay Rampal's case, the sands of time had run out which is inevitable in judicial process. Following the same reasoning, as was adopted in the aforesaid case, we direct that the appellants shall be admitted in the postgraduate or diploma courses, for which they have been selected for the new academic year, without any further test or selection." 19. In the Judgment, relied on by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the college, in Priya Gupta vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Others, reported in 2012(7) SCC 433 , the Supreme Court had considered a similar issue as to whether the college can be directed to accommodate the students in the next academic year. The Supreme Court, at Paragraph No.45, had answered as follows:- “45. The maxim boni judicis est causas litium dirimere places an obligation upon the Court to ensure that it resolves the causes of litigation in the country. Thus, the need of the hour is that binding dicta be prescribed and statutory regulations be enforced, so that all concerned are mandatorily required to implement the time schedule in its true spirit and substance. It is difficult and not even advisable to keep some windows open to meet a particular situation of exception, as it may pose impediments to the smooth implementation of laws and defeat the very object of the scheme. These schedules have been prescribed upon serious consideration by all concerned. They are to be applied stricto sensu and cannot be moulded to suit the convenience of some economic or other interest of any institution, especially, in a manner that is bound to result in compromise of the abovestated principles.” (emphasis supplied) 20.
These schedules have been prescribed upon serious consideration by all concerned. They are to be applied stricto sensu and cannot be moulded to suit the convenience of some economic or other interest of any institution, especially, in a manner that is bound to result in compromise of the abovestated principles.” (emphasis supplied) 20. Again, the Supreme Court, in a decision, reported in (2012) 10 SCC 149 , FAIZA CHAUDHARY V. STATE OF J. & K. has held that a medical seat has life only in the year it falls, that too, only till the cut off fixed by the Supreme Court i.e., 30th September in the respective year. The Apex Court has held, in clear and categorical terms, that carry-forward principle is unknown to the professional courses like medicine, engineering and dentist, etc., The relevant Paragraph Nos. 14, 15 and 16 are as follows: “14. A medical seat has life only in the year it falls, that too only till the cut-off date fixed by this Court i.e., 30th September in the respective year. Carry forward principle is unknown to the professional courses like medical, engineering, dental etc. No rule or regulation has been brought to our knowledge conferring power on the Board to carry forward a vacant seat to a succeeding year. If the Board or the Court indulges in such an exercise, in the absence of any rule or regulation, that will be at the expense of other meritorious candidates waiting for admission in the succeeding years. 15. The Medical Council of India Act provides that admission can be made by the medical colleges only within the sanctioned capacity for which permission under Section 10A/recognition under Section 11(2) has been granted. This Court in State of Punjab and Others v. Renuka Singla and Others (1994) 1 SCC 175 , held that the High Court or the Supreme Court cannot be generous or liberal in issuing such directions which in substance amount to directing authorities concerned to violate their own statutory rules and regulations, in respect of admissions of students.
This Court in State of Punjab and Others v. Renuka Singla and Others (1994) 1 SCC 175 , held that the High Court or the Supreme Court cannot be generous or liberal in issuing such directions which in substance amount to directing authorities concerned to violate their own statutory rules and regulations, in respect of admissions of students. In Medical Council of India v. State of Karnataka (1988) 6 SCC 131, this Court held that the number of students admitted cannot be over and above that fixed by the Medical Council as per the Regulations and that seats in the medical colleges cannot be increased indiscriminately without regard to proper infrastructure as per the regulations of the Medical Council. In Medical Council of India v. Madhu Singh and Others (2002) 7 SCC 258 , this Court held that there cannot be telescoping of unfilled seats of one year with permitted seats of the subsequent year. Recently, this Court in Satyaprata Sahoo and Others v. State of Orissa and Others JT 2012 (8) SCC 203 : 2012(@) SCC (L&S) 570, has reiterated that it would not be possible to increase seats at the expense of candidates waiting for admission in the succeeding years. 16. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant referred to few judgments of this Court stating that this Court had previously given certain directions to accommodate candidates in the succeeding years, but that was done in our view only in extraordinary circumstances and issued in view of the mandate contained in Article 141 of the Constitution which cannot be treated as a precedent for this Court or the High Courts to follow. We, therefore, hold that a seat which fell vacant in a particular year cannot be carried forward or created in a succeeding year, in the absence of any rule or regulation to that effect.” 21. Applying the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Priya Gupta's and FAIZA CHAUDHARY's case, to the facts of the present case, if we analyze the facts involved in the case on hand, we find no cause or reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge, insofar as it relates to the view that the petitioners/students are not entitled for admission in the M.B.B.S., Course.
Thus, we have no hesitation to hold that the Writ Appeals, in W.A. [MD].Nos.794 and 898 of 2014, filed by the petitioners/students are liable to be dismissed. 22. Now, coming to the Writ Appeals, in W.A.[MD].Nos.921 and 923 of 2014, filed by the college, challenging the Common Order of the learned Single Judge, dated 05.06.2014, insofar as it relates to compensation awarded by the learned Single Judge. It is the case of the petitioners/students that they had reported to the college in time. But, this fact is stoutly denied by the college. In such circumstances, when it is a disputed question of fact, which cannot be gone into in a Writ Petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, we are of the considered view that the learned Single Judge ought not to have awarded the compensation. In this context, we may usefully refer to the Judgment of the Supreme Court in 2005(12) SCC 725 , Orissa Agro Industries Corpn. Ltd. v. Bharati Industries, wherein at Paragraph No.7 as follows: “7.A bare perusal of the High Court's judgment shows that there was clear non-application of mind. On one hand the High Court observed that the disputed questions cannot be gone into a writ petition. It was also noticed that the essence of the dispute was breach of contract. After coming to the above conclusions, the High Court should have dismissed the writ petition. Surprisingly, the High Court proceeded to examine the case solely on the writ petitioner's assertion and on a very curious reasoning that though the appellant-Corporation claimed that the value of articles lifted was nearly Rupees 14.90 lakhs no details were specifically given. From the counter-affidavit filed before the High Court, it is crystal clear that relevant details disputing claim of the writ petitioner were given. Value of articles lifted by the writ petitioner is a disputed factual question. Where a complicated question of fact is involved and the matter requires thorough proof on factual aspects, the High Court should not entertain the writ petition. Whether or not the High Court should exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution would largely depend upon the nature of dispute and if the dispute cannot be resolved without going into the factual controversy, the High Court should not entertain the writ petition. As noted above, the writ petition was primarily founded on allegation of breach of contract.
Whether or not the High Court should exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution would largely depend upon the nature of dispute and if the dispute cannot be resolved without going into the factual controversy, the High Court should not entertain the writ petition. As noted above, the writ petition was primarily founded on allegation of breach of contract. Question whether the action of the opposite party in the writ petition amounted to breach of contractual obligation ultimately depends on facts and would require material evidence to be scrutinized and in such a case writ jurisdiction should not be exercised. (See: State of Bihar v. Jain Plastic and Chemicals Ltd.,[2002] 1 SCC 216). 23. Applying the legal pronouncement of the Supreme Court, cited supra, to the case on hand, we are of the considered view that the petitioners/students are not entitled for compensation of Rs. 3,00,000/- each, as awarded by the learned Single Judge. Thus, we have no hesitation to hold that the order of the learned Single Judge, dated 05.06.2014, made in W.P.[MD].Nos.16039 and 16470 of 2013, is liable to be set aside. 24. In the result, the Writ Appeals, in W.A.[MD].Nos.794 and 898 of 2014, filed by the petitioners/students, are dismissed. The Writ Appeals, in W.A.[MD].Nos. 921 and 923 of 2014, filed by the college are allowed, setting aside the order of the learned Single Judge, dated 05.06.2014, made in W.P.[MD].Nos.16039 and 16470 of 2013, insofar as awarding of compensation to the petitioners/students. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.