JUDGMENT Hon’ble Dinesh Maheshwari, J.—Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material placed on record. 2. By way of this writ petition, the petitioner, holding the office of Chairperson of Nagar Palika Parishad, Bilari, District Moradabad, has questioned the notice-cum-order dated 12.11.2014 (Annexure -1) whereby the State Government, while informing him of charges in relation to eight different allegations and calling upon him to show-cause as to why he be not removed from office, has debarred him from exercising administrative and financial powers until he is exonerated of the charges. 3. In challenge to the notice-cum-order so issued by the State Government, the petitioner has taken a ground in the writ petition that the action impugned is an outcome of extraneous considerations inasmuch as the concerned Member of Legislative Assembly (arrayed as respondent No. 4) has been nursing a grudge against him for the reason that he challenged the nomination of five persons as members of Nagar Palika Parishad, Bilari by way of a writ petition bearing No. 64500 of 2013 wherein this Court passed an interim order on 4.12.2013 staying the operation of impugned order pertaining to the nominations in question. According to the petitioner, the Member of Legislative Assembly concerned being antagonized, has got initiated the inquiry against him on baseless charges. The petitioner has further submitted that all the charges levelled against him remain baseless and incorrect and he is being subjected to unnecessary harassment. 4. Apart from the foregoing, during the course of submissions, the learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 48 of the Uttar Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1916 (‘the Act’) and submitted that for a valid order withdrawing the financial and administrative powers of the Chairperson of a Municipality, it is incumbent for the State Government to record that the allegations do not appear to be groundless but no such satisfaction has been recorded in the order impugned and the same deserves to be set aside on this ground alone. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further referred to a larger Bench decision of this Court in Hafiz Ataullah Ansari v. State of U.P. and others, 2010 LawSuit(All) 2383, to submit that the show-cause notice should not only indicate the materials on which the reason of belief or objective satisfaction is based but the evidence, by which the charges are to be proved, should also be mentioned. The learned counsel for the petitioner has particularly referred to paragraph 84 of this decision. It is submitted that no material having been supplied in support of the charges, the impugned notice-cum-order remains baseless and deserves to be set aside. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also referred to the report made by the District Magistrate on 11.10.2014 and submitted that thereunder, the recommendations had only been of adopting the proceedings under Section 81 of the Act and acting upon such a report, the Government was not justified in taking up the proceedings under Section 48 of the Act. 5. It may be observed that in this petition, having regard to the circumstances, we have granted time to the learned Standing Counsel appearing for respondents Nos. 1 to 3 to complete his instructions and then have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel. 6. The learned Standing Counsel who has duly supported the order impugned and has referred to the decisions in Girish Chandra Srivastava v. State of U.P., 2007 LawSuit(All) 571 and Sardar Javed Khan v. State of U.P. and others, 2011 LawSuit(All) 2414. 7. We may observe in the first place that after having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel and having examined the record with reference to the law applicable, we have found it entirely unnecessary to enter into the personal allegations against the Member of Legislative Assembly concerned, who has been arrayed as respondent No. 4; and have thus not issued any notice to the respondent No. 4. So far as the allegations against the respondent No. 4 are concerned, even if the petitioner has taken up a litigation against the nomination of members and an interim order has been passed at his instance, these facts, by themselves, cannot be taken as sufficient to conclude that the Member of Legislative Assembly would be nursing a grudge against the petitioner. Moreover, it cannot be assumed that the Government has not been justified in adopting the proceedings under Section 48 of the Act, 1916 after taking an inquiry report from the District Magistrate concerned, which was made after due opportunity of explanation to the petitioner. Yet further, looking to their nature, the charges as levelled cannot, at this stage, be dubbed as altogether fanciful or baseless. In the totality of circumstances, there appears no reason to enter into the allegations as made by the petitioner against the Member of Legislative Assembly concerned at least at this stage. Such allegations are left at that only. 8. Coming to the question of merits of charges, when the petitioner has been served with the notice containing the charges and has been afforded an opportunity to show-cause, it appears appropriate not to dilate upon their merit lest there be the likelihood of prejudice to either of the parties. Suffice it to observe for the present purpose that the charges against the petitioner are of his failure in performance of duties; not removing unauthorized possession despite orders of the authority concerned; and also relate to financial irregularities. 9. Charge No. 4 is to the effect that the petitioner got certain road works executed without calling for quotations or inviting tenders. The learned counsel for the petitioner read over charge No. 4 and then attempted to argue that in this regard, the report of District Magistrate had been rather in favour of the petitioner. We have examined the report of the District Magistrate on this charge at point No. 9 (pp. 74-75) and are unable to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner. The learned District Magistrate has observed about want of adherence to the requirements of the orders of Finance Department; and the allegations had been that four different road works were got executed without even calling for quotations. We would reiterate that there are no comments on the merits of the charges in this order but prima facie all the charges cannot be said to be totally baseless or fanciful. 10. We would reiterate that there are no comments on the merits of the charges in this order but prima facie all the charges cannot be said to be totally baseless or fanciful. 10. Coming to the question of the requirements of proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 48, we may take note of the said proviso which reads as under : “Provided that where the State Government has reason to believe that the allegations do not appear to be groundless and the President is prima facie guilty on any of the grounds of this sub-section resulting in the issuance of the show-cause notice and proceedings under this sub-section he shall, from the date of issuance of the show-cause notice containing charges, cease to exercise, perform and discharge the financial and administrative powers, functions and duties of the President until his exonerated of the charges mentioned in the show-cause notice issued to him under this sub-section and finalization of the proceedings under sub-section(2-A) and the said powers, functions and duties of the President during the period of such ceasing, shall be exercised, performed and discharged by the District Magistrate or an officer nominated by him not below the rank of Deputy Collector.” 11. A comprehensive reading of the impugned notice-cum-order dated 10.11.2014 makes it clear that the requisite satisfaction of the Government, that it has reason to believe that the allegations do not appear to be groundless and the petitioner is prima facie guilty of the charges referable to failure to perform duties and of misconduct in the discharge of duties, is writ large on the face of record. The impugned order records thus right at beginning: ^^Jh lkgw lquhy lgk;] v/;{k] uxj ikfydk ifj"kn] fcykjh] tuin eqjknkckn ds fo:) izkIr f'kdk;rksa dh tkWp ftykf/kdkjh] eqjknkckn ds ek/;e ls djk;h x;hA tkWpksijkUr ftykfèkdjh] eqjknkcknd i= la[;k&709@4@ ,y0ch0lh0@2014] fnukWd 4&3&2014 }kjk izkIr tkWp vk[;k ¼Nk;k izfr layXu½ esa fl) ik;s x;s vkjksiksa ds lUnHkZ esa Jh lgk; dks viuk i{k j[kus dk volj iznku fd;k x;kA Jh lgk; }kjk 'kklu dk izsf"kr Li"Vhdkj.k fnukWd 5&9&2014 esa mfYyf[kr rF;ksa dk ftykf/kdjh] eqjknkckn }kjk izfr&ijh{k.k djk;k x;kA rn~dze esa ftykf/kdkjh] eqjknkckn ds i= fnukWd 11&10&2014 ¼Nk;k izfr layXu½ }kjk izkIr vk[;k ds ijh{k.kksaijkUr laKku esa vk;s lR;kfir rF;ksa ls fofnr gS fd v/;{k uxj ikfydk ifj"kn] fcykjh }kjk vius drZO;ksa ds ikyu esa lrr pwd ,oa vius vf/kdkjksa dk vfrdze.k djrs gq, in dk nq:i;ksx fd;k x;k gSA^^ 12. Moreover, after narrating eight different charges, the petitioner has been called upon to show-cause while stating as under: ^^Jh lkgw lquhy lgk;] uxj ikfydk ifj"kn] fcykjh] tuin eqjknkckn ij yxk;s x;s vkjksiksa ds lUnHkZ esa ftykf/kdkjh] eqjknkckn dh tkWp vk[;k] v/;{k ds Li"Vhdj.k ij ftykf/kdkjh] eqjknkckn dh tkWp vk[;k ,oa lqlaxr vfHkys[kksa ij lE;d fopkjksijkUr vkjksiksa ds fl) ik;s tkus ds n`f"Vxr ek0 jkT;iky egksn; m0iz0 uxj ikfydk vf/kfu;e 1916 dh èkkjk&48¼2½¼d½¼[k½ ds ijUrqd& vi, vii, ix, xi, xii anda xvii ds vUrxZr Jh lgk;d dks ftykf/kdkjh] eqjknkckn ds ek/;e ls ;g Li"V djus ,oa dkj.k crkus ds funsZ'k nsrs gSa fd mDr vkjksiksa ds vk/kkj ij lrr pwd] vf/kdkjksa dk vfrdze.k rFkk nkf;Roksa ds fuoZgu esa mnklhurk ds dkj.k mudksa v/;{k uxj ikfydk ifj"kn] fctkjh ds in ls gVk fn;s tkus dh vkKk D;ksa u ns nh tk;sA ^^ 13. In view of the above-quoted recitals, the contention that the order impugned suffers from want of recording of requisite satisfaction is required to be, and is hereby, rejected. We may observe that such a requirement of objective satisfaction of the Government is not a matter of form; and fulfillment of such a requirement is not to be seen with reference to the words, expressions and phrases used in the order. The matter is required to be examined at its substance; and when the order in question, on its comprehensive reading and the construction, makes out that the Government has indeed proceeded on an objective satisfaction that the allegation did not appear to be groundless, the order so passed calls for no interference. The matter is required to be examined at its substance; and when the order in question, on its comprehensive reading and the construction, makes out that the Government has indeed proceeded on an objective satisfaction that the allegation did not appear to be groundless, the order so passed calls for no interference. In the present case, the objective satisfaction of the State Government that the facts as found made out that the petitioner had failed to perform his duties and had also been engaged in or assisted any person in encroaching upon the property of Municipality and had misconducted in discharge of his duties clearly finds mentioned in the order impugned. 14. The other submission of the petitioner that the requisite material has not been supplied to him also does not appear to be a well founded one. The record makes out that the petitioner was put to explanation on seventeen different allegations and then, the matter was duly inquired into by the District Magistrate, Moradabad who made a detailed report dated 11.10.2014. The said report containing detailed discussion on different charges and the relevant material has been enclosed with the impugned notice-cum-order dated 12.11.2014, and in our view, has to be read as the requisite supporting material. 15. The learned counsel for the petitioner has strongly relied upon paragraph 84 of the decision in Hafiz Ataullah Ansari case (supra). In the said paragraph, the Full Bench of this Court has summed up its opinion on the requirements of the law to be complied with before a valid order for cessation of financial and administrative powers could be made in the following terms: “In our opinion, the cessation of financial and administrative power can take place only if the power under the proviso to Section 48(2) of the Municipalities Act is rightly exercised. It is rightly exercised only if at least the following conditions are satisfied in the notice/order: (i) There should be objective satisfaction of the Stage Government that: The allegations do not appear to be groundless; and The president is prima facie guilty of the ground that have to be indicated under Section 48(2) of the Municipalities Act. It is rightly exercised only if at least the following conditions are satisfied in the notice/order: (i) There should be objective satisfaction of the Stage Government that: The allegations do not appear to be groundless; and The president is prima facie guilty of the ground that have to be indicated under Section 48(2) of the Municipalities Act. (ii) The show-cause notice should contain the charges; (iii) The show-cause notice should not only indicates the material on which the reason to believe or objective satisfaction is based, but the evidence by which charges are to be proved should also mentioned. However, in most of the cases they might be the same and there would not be any point in repeating them.” 16. In our view, all the requirements aforesaid are clearly satisfied in the present case. The objective satisfaction of the State Government that the allegations do not appear to be groundless and the petitioner is considered prima facie guilty of the grounds indeed forms the basic foundation of the order dated 12.11.2014. This notice-cum-order also contains eight charges levelled against the petitioner. The material on which such satisfaction of the Government is based is duly indicated in the impugned order as also in the enclosed report of the District Magistrate concerned. 17. The last point urged on behalf of the petitioner, in our view, rather operates against him. The District Magistrate in his report dated 11.10.2014 has, while reaching to the conclusion against the petitioner, has recommended adopting of the proceedings under Section 81 of the Act, we may take note of the provisions of Section 81 as under: “81. Surcharge.—(1) The President, and every member, officer and servant of the Municipality shall be liable to surcharge for the loss, waste and misapplication of any money or property of the Municipality, its such, loss, waste or misapplication is a direct consequence of his neglect or misconduct while acting as such President, member, officer or servant: Provided that such liability shall cease to exist after the expiry of ten years from the occurrence of such loss, waste or misapplication or after the expiry of five years from the date on which such President, member, officer or servant ceases to hold his office, whichever is later. (2) The amount of surcharge so imposed shall be recoverable as if it were an arrear of land revenue and the Collector on being satisfied that the sum is due shall proceed to recover it as such an arrear. (3) The procedure of surcharge and the manner of the recovery of the amount involved in loss, waste or misapplication shall be such as may be prescribed. (4) Where no surcharge proceedings are taken the Municipality, with the previous sanction of, or on being directed by, the Prescribed Authority, may institute a suit for compensation against such person.” 18. A bare look at the provisions of Section 81 ibid. makes it clear that the President, every member, officer and servant of the Municipality is liable to surcharge for the loss, waste or misapplication of any money or property of the Municipality, if such a loss, waste or misapplication is a direct consequence of his negligence or misconduct while acting in the given capacity. Thus, recovery of surcharge per Section 81 of the Act could be made when it is finally found that there had been a loss, waste or misapplication of money or property of the Municipality owing to the neglect or misconduct of the petitioner while acting as a Chairperson of the concerned Municipality. Though, we may observe that the suggestion so made by the District Magistrate may be considered questionable at the given stage because a final finding on the neglect or misconduct of the petitioner is yet to be reached but this much is clear that such recommendations are of the graver nature and of serious consequences. Although, as at present, the matter is of the proceedings under Section 48 of the Act but then, as a consequence of the findings in such proceedings, if they be against the petitioner, and any loss, waste or misapplication is found to be a direct result of his neglect or misconduct, proceedings under Section 81 of the Act could always be adopted. However, for the present purpose, suffice it to say that such recommendations of the District Magistrate, do not enure to the benefit of the petitioner and for such recommendations, it cannot be said that the Government is not entitled to take up the proceedings under Section 48 of the Act. 19. For what has been discussed hereinabove, the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner fail and are rejected. 19. For what has been discussed hereinabove, the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner fail and are rejected. However, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it does appear appropriate to observe and direct that the concerned Secretary should take up and conclude the inquiry with a reasoned and speaking order with strict adherence to the requirements of law expeditiously, preferably within a period of 60 days from the date of filing of the certified copy of this order. 20. It is also made clear that we have not dealt with the merits of the case either way and the observations herein are relevant only to the extent of examining the validity of the impugned notice-cum-order dated 12.11.2014 and not beyond. In other words, the final decision in the proceedings shall be taken strictly in accordance with law and on the merits of the case, irrespective of any observation made herein. 21. The writ petition stands dismissed but with the observations and requirements foregoing. ——————