Judgment Sanjay Karol, J. The sole question, which arises for consideration, in the present appeal, is as to whether cognizance of the complaint taken by the Special Court, Kangra at Dharamshala, initiated under the provisions of Section 3(x) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), can be stated to be illegal or not. 2. It is not in dispute that complainant Jagdish Chand filed a complaint in the Court of Special Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala. The same was registered, accused were summoned and they challenged the maintainability of the complaint directly before the Special Judge. 3. Without adverting to the contents of the complaint, which prima facie justify initiation of action, I am of the considered view that the issue involved is no longer res integra. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners, refers to and relies upon the decision of the apex Court in Gangula Ashok and another v. State of A.P., (2000) 2 SCC 504 , in support of his contention that unless and until there is committal of the case by the Magistrate to the Court of Sessions, cognizance could not have been taken by the Sessions Judge. 5. Significantly, ratio of law laid down in the said decision was considered by the apex Court in Rattiram and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2012) 4 SCC 516 , wherein it was held that: “65. We may state without any fear of contradiction that if the failure of justice is not bestowed its due signification in a case of the present nature, every procedural lapse or interdict would be given a privileged place on the pulpit. It would, with unnecessary interpretative dynamism, have the effect potentiality to cause a dent in the criminal justice delivery system and eventually, justice would become illusory like a mirage. It is to be borne in mind that the Legislature deliberately obliterated certain rights conferred on the accused at the committal stage under the new Code. The intendment of the Legislature in the plainest sense is that every stage is not to be treated as vital and it is to be interpreted to sub-serve the substantive objects of the criminal trial. 66. The intendment of the Legislature in the plainest sense is that every stage is not to be treated as vital and it is to be interpreted to sub-serve the substantive objects of the criminal trial. 66. Judged from these spectrums and analysed on the aforesaid premises, we come to the irresistible conclusion that the objection relating to non-compliance of Section 193 of the Code, which eventually has resulted in directly entertaining and taking cognizance by the Special Judge under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, does not vitiate the trial and on the said ground alone, the conviction cannot be set aside or there cannot be a direction of retrial and, therefore, the decision rendered in State of M.P. v. Bhooraji, (2001) 7 SCC 679 , lays down the correct law inasmuch as there is no failure of justice or no prejudice is caused to the accused. 67. The decisions rendered in Moly v. State of Kerala, (2004) 4 SCC 584, and Vidyadharan v. State of Kerala, (2004) 1 SCC 215 , have not noted the decision in Bhooraji (supra), a binding precedent, and hence they are per incuriam and further, the law laid down therein, whereby the conviction is set aside or matter is remanded after setting aside the conviction for fresh trial, does not expound the correct proposition of law and, accordingly, they are hereby, to that extent, overruled.” (Emphasis supplied) 6. No prejudice is stated to have been caused to the present petitioner. Thus, the impugned order dated 12.3.2013, passed by Special Judge (Sessions Judge), Kangra at Dharamshala, in Pvt. Complaint No.3/2010, titled as Jagdish Chand v. Raghubir Singh and others, deciding maintainability of the complaint before him, cannot be said to be illegal, in any manner. Hence, the present petition, devoid of merit, is dismissed. Petition stands disposed of, so also pending application(s), if any.