JUDGMENT Hon’ble Pankaj Mithal, J.—Heard Sri P.K. Jain, Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Rahul Sahai, learned counsel for the defendant revisionist (tenant) and Sri Swapnil Kumar, learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent (landlady). 2. Learned counsel for both the parties agree for final disposal of the revision at the out set with reference to the documents annexed with the revision and accompanying the stay application. 3. The landlady Smt. Premwati filed SCC Suit No. 6 of 2007 for eviction of the tenant from the shop in dispute situate in Mohalla Narain Nagar, Etah. The suit has been decreed by the impugned judgment and order dated 9.10. 2014 passed by the Small Causes Court. 4. It may be pertinent to note that the defence of the tenant was ordered to be struck of earlier and the said order was affirmed in revision vide judgment and order dated 20.12.2013 passed by the High Court. 5. The Court below in decreeing the suit has returned findings that the rent of the shop is Rs. 1,400/-per month, the tenant has defaulted in payment of rent and that the deposits made by the tenant under Section 30 (1) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 are not valid. 6. In assailing the impugned judgment and order of the Court below Sri P.K. Jain has submitted : (i) The landlady has herself not appeared in the witness box and as such failed to prove the plaint case; (ii) The evidence of even Ram Babu about the rate of rent is sketchy and does not prove that the rent was ever enhanced to Rs. 1,400/- per month; (iii) The Court below has failed to consider as to whether the tenant is entitle to benefit of Section 20 (4) of the Act; and (iv) The deposits made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act are valid deposits and merely for the reason that they were not held to be valid for the purpose of order XV Rule 5 CPC the same can not be ignored for the purposes of Section 20 (4) of the Act. 7. On the other hand, Sri Swapnil Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the landlady states that there is no illegality in not producing the landlady as witness. 7. On the other hand, Sri Swapnil Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the landlady states that there is no illegality in not producing the landlady as witness. She is an old lady of feeble health unable to attend Court and that his son who had personal knowledge of the matters had appeared and proved the rate of rent. The finding on rate of rent is based upon the evidence and in the absence of any contra evidence there is no perversity in the said finding. Moreover, the said finding is a finding of fact which is not liable to be disturbed under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act, 1887. The deposits, if any, made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act are only till the date of notice and any deposit made by the tenant after the service of notice of demand would not be a valid deposit so as to enure to his benefit for the purpose of Section 20 (4) of the Act. 8. The suit of the plaintiff is for arrears of rent and eviction under the provisions of Small Causes Court Act, 1887. It is a small causes suit which is of a summary nature wherein by virtue of Order L Rule 1 (a) (iii) CPC it is not necessary to settle issues but in view of Order XX Rule 4 CPC the Court is obliged to state the concise statement of the case, the points of determination and the decision thereof with reasons in its judgment. However, to succeed in any suit much less in a suit of summary nature before Small Causes Court, the plaintiff has to prove his plaint case even if there is no defence or the defence of the opponent had been struck of. 9. It is admitted that the defence of the defendant was ordered to be struck of and that the plaintiff herself has not entered in the witness box to state her case on oath and to prove it instead her son Ram Babu alone was examined and cross examined as a witness. She has not even filed any affidavit or herself examination in chief on affidavit so as to offer her for cross-examination. 10. She has not even filed any affidavit or herself examination in chief on affidavit so as to offer her for cross-examination. 10. The Privy Council in Sardar Gurbaksh Singh v. Gurdial Singh and another, AIR 1927 PC 230 , held that a presumption would arise that the case set up by the party is not correct, if he fails to appear as witness to state his case on oath and to offer himself for cross examination. 11. The Allahabad High Court in Arjun Singh v. Virendra Nath and another, AIR 1971 All 29 , held that if party abstain from entering in to a witness box, it would give rise to an adverse inference against him. 12. The above principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Vidhyadhar v. Manik Rao and another, (1999) 3 SCC 573 . The Court reiterate the well recognized legal principle that where a party to the suit does not appear in the witness box and states his own case on oath and does not offer himself to be cross examined by the other side, a presumption would arise that the case set up by him is not correct.The aforesaid view has the approval of the Supreme Court in Man Kaur dead by LRs v. Hartar Singh Sangha, (2010) 10 SCC 512 and in Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani v. Indusind Bank Limited and others, AIR 2005 SC 439 . 13. In case the landlady due to her ill health was not in a position to attend Court to give evidence, she could have easily taken recourse to the provisions of Order XXVI CPC as applicable to the State of U.P. However, no effort was made to get her examined by a commission. 14. In view of the above, as the plaintiff has failed to state her case on oath and has not offered herself for cross examination by the defendant, the presumption in law is that the case as set up by her in the plaint is not correct. 15. Let me now examine as to whether the plaintiff could have proved her case by the evidence of her son. 16. Section 120 of the Evidence Act, 1872 provides for the deposition of the husband and wife as witness. It reads as under : 120. Parties to civil suit, and their wives or husbands. 15. Let me now examine as to whether the plaintiff could have proved her case by the evidence of her son. 16. Section 120 of the Evidence Act, 1872 provides for the deposition of the husband and wife as witness. It reads as under : 120. Parties to civil suit, and their wives or husbands. Husband or wife of person under criminal trial.— “In all civil proceedings the parties to the suit, and the husband or wife of any party to the suit, shall be competent witnesses. In criminal proceedings against any person, the husband or wife of such person, respectively, shall be a competent witness.” The above provision provides that the husband or the wife are competent witnesses qua each other. In other words in all civil proceedings a husband can depose for a wife and the wife for the husband. 17. The son of the landlady is not a person covered under the aforesaid provision and as such is not a competent to depose on her behalf. 18. In view of Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani (Supra) the son of the plaintiff could have deposed on her behalf had he been holding her power of attorney. 19. The son of the plaintiff is not her power of attorney holder. Therefore, he could not have legally appeared and deposed on her behalf. 20. In view of the above, any evidence adduced by the son of the plaintiff in support of the plaint case is not sufficient to prove the case as stated in the plaint. 21. Sri Swapnil Kumar, learned counsel has laid emphasis upon the decision of the Man Kaur (Supra) and has submitted that it crystallizes the position as to who should give evidence in a case. 22. The aforesaid decision is on the point as to the person entitle to give evidence regarding matter involving personal knowledge. The Court has summarized the legal position in that regard and has laid down that a power of attorney holder who has signed the plaint and instituted the suit can depose with regard to the transactions within his personal knowledge and may be examined as a witness to prove those facts, acts and transaction but he can not depose and given evidence in place of the principal for the acts done by the principal or the transactions or dealings of the principal which are within the personal knowledge of the principal. The aforesaid decision is not an authority which may absolve the landlady to state her case on oath so as to prove it. 23. This apart, the Court below is not justified in decreeing the suit simply for the reason that the defence of the evidence was struck of and therefore whatever has been said in the plaint is true. It was a sacred duty and obligation of the Court in a suit for arrears of rent and eviction to first of all examine as to whether the tenancy had been validly determined, what is the rate of rent, whether the tenant had committed default in its payment entitling his eviction and whether he can be relieved of the decree of eviction in accordance with Section 20(4) of the Rent Act, if applicable. 24. The Court below has failed to consider the benefit, if any, available to the tenant under Section 20 (4) of the Rent Act. 25. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I am of the view that the Court below materially erred in exercise of its jurisdiction and committed a manifest error of law in decreeing the suit without the plaint allegations being proved by the plaintiff on oath. 26. In view of the above conclusion, I need not dwell upon other points which have been raised by learned counsel for the parties. 27. Accordingly, the judgment and order dated 29.10.2014 passed in the above suit is set aside and the suit stands dismissed. The revision is allowed. ——————