JUDGMENT Sudhir Kumar Saxena, J. 1. This petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed against the summoning order dated 12.12.2008 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Barabanki in Complaint Case No. 9813 of 2008, under Sections 323, 504, 506, 392 I.P.C., Police Station Kotwali City, Barabanki as well as revisional order dated 12.04.2012 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, court No. 2, Barabanki in Criminal Revision No. 76 of 2009 upholding the summoning order. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned counsel for the respondents. 2. Briefly stated facts are that an application was moved by Dr. Rajan Yadav under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., alleging therein that he was a doctor and member of Indian Medical Association, Barabanki having Clinic at Ghosiyana Mohalla, Station Road, Barabanki. On 15.09.2008, he had purchased a house from Rajkumar Watson which was in occupation of Smt. Maya Mouris and her daughter Deepa Mouris as tenant. They had promised to vacate the house but now they are not willing to vacate the same. It is further alleged that Deepa Mouris had illicit relations with V.P. Upadhyaya, Sub Inspector, Police outpost, Banki and taking the advantage of said relations, they have threatened complainant to implicate him in some false case if he insisted for vacation of the house. On 23.09.2008 at about 01: 45 p.m. while he was going to his house, nearby Railway School, Constable Pramod Kumar, who is posted in Police outpost Banki, asked him to accompany and took him to V.P. Upadhyaya, Sub Inspector. Pramod Kumar took out Rs. 2000/- from his pocket and detained in said Police outpost. There V.P. Uapadhyaya, Sub Inspector used filthy abuses and threatened Rajan Yadav to implicate in NDPS Act if he asked the ladies to vacate the house. He was released after payment of Rs. 1000/- to Sub Inspector who asked him to pay Rs. 9000/- more. Rajan Yadav requested Rashid Miyan to help him who gave Rs. 6000/- to Sub Inspector V.P. Uapdhyaya. Remaining amount of Rs. 3000/- was paid by him after taking from one Sonu. Thus, Rs. 10,000/- was given to Sub Inspector V. P. Upadhyaya. In this regard, a request was also made to S.P. to get the matter investigated. 3. 9000/- more. Rajan Yadav requested Rashid Miyan to help him who gave Rs. 6000/- to Sub Inspector V.P. Uapdhyaya. Remaining amount of Rs. 3000/- was paid by him after taking from one Sonu. Thus, Rs. 10,000/- was given to Sub Inspector V. P. Upadhyaya. In this regard, a request was also made to S.P. to get the matter investigated. 3. It appears that Magistrate treated the application moved by Rajan Yadav under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as complaint wherein he gave his statement under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and reiterated the allegations made in the complaint. Shakeel Alam, Rashid Ali and Ram Gopal have supported the complainant in their statements recorded under Section 202 Cr.P.C. Learned Magistrate vide order dated 12.12.2008 summoned Maya Mouris, Deepa Mouris, V.P. Upadhyaya, Sub Inspector and Pramod Kumar, Constable, under Sections 323,504, 506, 342, 392 I.P.C. 4. Revision filed by present petitioners against summoning order (Criminal Revision No. 138 of 2009) was dismissed by Additional Sessions Judge, court No. 2, Barabanki on 12.04.2012. These very orders have been challenged in this petition. 5. It is submitted by learned counsel for petitioners that in fact Deepa Mouris had lodged an F.I.R. on 01.10.2008 alleging that Dr. Rajan Yadav misbehaved with her, thereupon Police Constable Pramod took him to Police outpost where Police allowed Dr. Rajan Yadav to go without any action as requested by her mother Maya Mouris. Case was registered as Case Crime No. 1266 of 2008, under Sections 500, 504, 507, 354, 379, 420, 467, 468, 471 I.P.C. In counter-blast, impugned complaint has been filed to harass petitioners. Petitioner No. 1, Maya Mouris (mother) is aged about 70 years and she is suffering from Arthritis while daughter Deepa Mouris (petitioner No. 2) is an unmarried girl of 25 years. It is further submitted that summoning order has been passed without application of mind, although, there was no evidence to summon them. 6. Counter affidavit has been filed by Dr. Rajan Yadav denying the above allegations of harassment. It was stated therein that courts below have passed the orders in accordance with law. Petitioners are well connected with political leaders. F.I.R. was lodged against petitioners by the wife of complainant which was registered as Crime No. 1725 of 2009, under Sections 392, 323, 506 I.P.C. stating that on 24.04.2009, petitioners alongwith two other persons allegedly beat up Dr. Rajan Yadav and his wife Smt. Bela Rajan. 7. Petitioners are well connected with political leaders. F.I.R. was lodged against petitioners by the wife of complainant which was registered as Crime No. 1725 of 2009, under Sections 392, 323, 506 I.P.C. stating that on 24.04.2009, petitioners alongwith two other persons allegedly beat up Dr. Rajan Yadav and his wife Smt. Bela Rajan. 7. In rejoinder affidavit, allegations made in petition are reiterated. 8. It appears that a Suit was filed by Dr. Rajan Yadav against Maya Mouris and Deepa Mouris for cancellation of sale-deed in respect of house in dispute alleging that on 08.08.2013 on the gun point, threatening to kill his son, sale-deed was got executed by him under coercion. 9. An application is also said to have been moved before CJM, Barabanki stating therein that Dr. Rajan Yadav is withdrawing the complaint. This application was signed by Deepa Mouris as well as Dr. Rajan Yadav on 09.08.2013. 10. From the above discussion, it is apparent that petitioners were tenant of the house which was purchased by Dr. Rajan Yadav who had been asking them to vacate the house. 11. On 08.08.2013, the house was sold by Dr. Rajan Yadav in favour of present petitioners but Suit for cancellation of sale-deed was filed on the ground that owing to fear of his son's death, the sale-deed was got executed. Allegation has also been made that one of the petitioner has illicit relations with Sub Inspector of Police outpost Banki as a result whereof number of F.I.Rs. have been lodged against Dr. Rajan Yadav. 12. Perusal of statements under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. shows that witnesses have supported the allegations made in the complaint as such, prima facie, case to summon the accused persons is made out. At this stage, chances of conviction or acquittal of the accused persons cannot be seen by learned Magistrate. 13. Learned Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge have found that case for summoning the accused persons was made out. Under Section 482 Cr.P.C., summoning order can be quashed only when it is found that no offence is made out from the material on record or prosecution is malicious. 14. In this case, complaint has been made against tenants (petitioners) and the Police personnel who have been summoned as well. Admittedly, number of F.I.Rs. have been lodged against Dr. Rajan Yadav. Case under Section 354 I.P.C. has been registered against Dr. 14. In this case, complaint has been made against tenants (petitioners) and the Police personnel who have been summoned as well. Admittedly, number of F.I.Rs. have been lodged against Dr. Rajan Yadav. Case under Section 354 I.P.C. has been registered against Dr. Rajan Yadav at the behest of Deepa Mouris, one of the present petitioners. In the F.I.R., it is mentioned that Dr. Rajan Yadav was taken to Police outpost, Banki where police set him free on the persuasion made by Maya Mouris (petitioner No. 1). In these circumstances, it cannot be said that there was no material to summon the present petitioners. 15. Consequently, I do not find any error in the orders passed by learned Magistrate or the Sessions Judge. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2009 (1) JIC 245 (SC)) M/s. Eicher Tractor Ltd. & Others Vs. Harihar Singh and Another. Relevant para 5 and 7 are reproduced hereinbelow: Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a case of this nature is an exception and not the rule. The section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal, possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in the course of administration of justice on the principle quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the Court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers, court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto. The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335). A note of caution was, however, added that the power should be exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of the rare cases. The illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as follows: (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102). (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7)Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fides and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 17. In the aforesaid case, Hon'ble Apex Court has quoted the case of State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal, (1992 (Supp 1) SCC 335), wherein it is said that 'where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fides and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.' 18. Another case on which learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon is reported in (ACC, 1998, page 20), M/s. Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another Vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and others, wherein it is said that: summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. it is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused. 19. On the facts, Hon'ble Apex Court found that "there was nothing on record to show that what is the role of the appellants in the manufacture of beverage which is said to be adulterated." 20. It has been discussed above that independent witnesses under Section 202 Cr.P.C. have supported the version of complaint which also finds support from the F.I.R. lodged by present petitioners against Dr. Rajan Yadav. Consequently, it cannot be said that allegations are absurd and no offence is made out. 21. In the complaint as well as statements under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. it is said that on 24.09.2008, a complaint was made to SP by Dr. Rajan Yadav but no action was taken, then, an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was filed which was treated as complaint. F.I.R. was lodged by present petitioners on 01.10.2008, thus, it cannot be said that present complaint was a counterblast as complainant had immediately informed S.P. on 23.09.2008 but no F.I.R. was registered. 22. In view of the above discussion, I do not find any ground to exercise the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 23. Consequently, petition is devoid of merits and is dismissed. 24. Looking to the allegations made in the complaint and the fact that both the petitioners are women and Maya Mouris (petitioner No. 1) is aged about 70 years, I permit them to appear before learned Magistrate within one month from today and apply for bail which shall be considered and decided in the light of Section 437 Cr.P.C. Subject to above, petition is dismissed.