JUDGMENT : A.B. CHAUDHARI, J. 1. Learned Adv. Mr. Jibhkate for the petitioner, assailing the impugned Order dated 5th July, 2002, passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bhandara, in IDA Case No. 38 of 1999, argued that the very basis for claiming the wages u/s 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was non-existent, inasmuch as the original workman, whose legal heirs wife and children had filed IDA application u/s 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, had expired prior to the date of passing of the Award in the matter of regularization of his services. The husband of the applicant Smt. Vimal had died on 6th July, 1996, while the Award was passed on 26th March, 1998 in Complaint [ULPN] Nos. 1561 to 1568 all of 1991. He, therefore, contended that such an Award was a nullity in law and the Award, which was nullity in law, could not be enforced u/s 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act for demanding wages under the said Award. Mr. Jibhkate then contended that there is no distant relationship of employer-workman in the light of the above facts and that is another reason why the application was liable to be dismissed. He then submitted that a specific stand was taken in the Written Statement that the Succession Certificate from the competent court was sine qua non for claiming such relief and admittedly no such Certificate was produced on record. 2. Lastly, learned Adv. Mr. Jibhkate also argued that in the proceedings u/s 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, which are in the nature of execution proceedings, there is no provision to award interest on the amount due. He then submitted that 50% amount has already been paid to the respondent-widow. 3. Per contra, learned Adv. Mr. Quazi for the respondent sole supported the impugned order. 4. I have gone through the impugned order that was passed u/s 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 5. It is not in dispute that the Industrial Court had made an Award in the year 1998 in the matter of regularization of services of the employees in Class-IV cadre or below the said cadre, and the said Award was the subject mater of challenge in the Writ Petitions, since similar Writ Petitions were decided by Mr. Justice F.I. Rebello of this Court by the Judgment in case of Municipal Council and another Vs. Mrs. Justice F.I. Rebello of this Court by the Judgment in case of Municipal Council and another Vs. Mrs. Jaiwantabai Meshram and others, (1998) 3 MhLJ 765 . 6. In this case, the Award, in question, was passed in the year 1998, i.e., after the death of husband of the applicant Smt. Vimal. But then it is not in dispute, nor any material has been shown by the Municipal Council, Bhandara, the petitioner herein, that said Smt. Vimal was not the legal heir of deceased Sadaram therefore, she was not entitled to the benefits due to said Mr. Sadaram Kodape. The principles of abatement of the proceedings or the argument about nullity of the Judgment, in my view, do not apply in the present case, since the Award was already passed without any objection about the death of Sadaram Kodape in the first place, and secondly the claims under the wages or benefits to be received by the widow Smt. Vimal were the deceased workman's service benefits. Undoubtedly, the widow Smt. Vimal, the respondent herein, was entitled to the benefits due to her husband and said benefits due to the deceased workman under law cannot be taken away by setting up a plea of abatement of the proceedings or nullity of the Award. The decisions cited before me by learned Adv. Mr. Jibhkate to substantiate his argument do not relate to service or labour law justice and, therefore, are not applicable. 7. The maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona has been pressed into service by the petitioner. However, the Apex Court in paras 12 and 13 of its Judgment in the case of Rameshwar Manjhi (Deceased) through his son Lakhiram Manjhi Vs. Managemenmt of Sangramgarh Colliery and others, AIR 1994 SC 1176 stated thus:- 12. The maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona though part of English Common Law has been subjected to criticism even in England. It has been dubbed as unjust maxim, obscure in its origin, inaccurate in its expression and uncertain in its application. It has often caused grave injustice. This Court in a different context, in considering the survival of a claim for rendition of accounts, after the death of the party against whom the claim was made in Girja Nandini Devi v. Bijendra Narain Choudhury observed as under: The maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona-a personal action dies with the person has a limited application. This Court in a different context, in considering the survival of a claim for rendition of accounts, after the death of the party against whom the claim was made in Girja Nandini Devi v. Bijendra Narain Choudhury observed as under: The maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona-a personal action dies with the person has a limited application. It operates in a limited class of action ex delicto such as actions for damages for defamation, assault or other personal injuries not causing the death of the party, and in other actions where after the death of the party the relief granted could not be enjoyed or granting it would be nugatory. An action for account is not an action for damages ex delicto, and does not fall within the enumerated classes. Nor is it such that the relief claimed being personal could not be enjoyed after death, or granting it would be nugatory. 13. It is thus obvious that the applicability of the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona depends upon the relief claimed and the facts of each case. By and large the industrial disputes u/s 2-A of the Act relate to the termination of services of the concerned workman. In the event of the death of the workman during pendency of the proceedings, the relief of reinstatement, obviously, cannot be granted. But the final determination of the issues involved in the reference may be relevant for regulating the conditions of service of the other workmen in the industry. Primary object of the Act is to bring industrial peace. The Tribunals and Labour Courts under the Act are the instruments for achieving the same objective. It is, therefore, in conformity with the scheme of the Act that the proceedings in such cases should continue at the instance of the legal heirs/representatives of the deceased workman. Even otherwise there may be a claim for back wages or for monetary relief in any other form. The death of the workman during pendency of the proceedings cannot deprive the heirs or the legal representatives of their right to continue the proceedings and claim the benefits as successors to the deceased workman. In the light of the above dicta, the plea about abatement must be rejected. 8. The death of the workman during pendency of the proceedings cannot deprive the heirs or the legal representatives of their right to continue the proceedings and claim the benefits as successors to the deceased workman. In the light of the above dicta, the plea about abatement must be rejected. 8. In view of the peculiar fact that the respondent-applicant Smt. Vimal is the widow of Sadaram Kodape, which is an undisputed fact, the question of obtaining a Succession Certificate does not arise. If the petitioner Municipal Council wanted to dispute widow Smt. Vimal s entitlement to receive the benefits as a legal heir, the same could have been pointed out to the Trial Judge and the Trial Judge, in turn, could have passed an appropriate order. The objection raised by Mr. Jibhkate will have to be rejected. The submission about the issue of regularization under the Award has already been dealt with by Hon'ble Mr. Justice F.I. Rebello and, therefore, there is no need for me to dwell on that aspect. 9. There is an order of award of interest at the rate of twelve per cent per annum from the date of application, i.e., 7th October, 1999. The proceedings u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act are in the nature of execution proceedings only and there is no provision therein to award interest on the amount found due. Hence Labour Court does not have the jurisdiction to award interest on the amount found due. In my opinion, grant of interest at the rate of twelve per cent per annum would be penalizing the Municipal Council. 10. This Court having noticed that there is no power in the Labour Court acting u/s 33C(2) of Industrial Disputes Act, finds that it is necessary to make some observations in the present matter. The application u/s 33C(2) was filed on 7th October, 1999 and the decision was made on 5th July, 2002. Section 33C(2) reads thus:- 33C. Recovery of Money Due from an Employer.- (1)..... The application u/s 33C(2) was filed on 7th October, 1999 and the decision was made on 5th July, 2002. Section 33C(2) reads thus:- 33C. Recovery of Money Due from an Employer.- (1)..... (2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government within a period not exceeding three months. It is seen that the outer limit for decision is three months. But in this case the decision came late by more than two years due to transfer of Presiding Officer or for want of notification conferring power. Thus, the applicant has lost the interest on the due amount. But as found above, there is no power to award interest, as the proceedings have been held to be in the nature of execution proceedings. It is a matter of common experience that these summary proceedings of execution are not decided within three months. Hence this Court finds that the Labour Court acting u/s 33C(2) of Industrial Disputes Act should be empowered to award interest. Hence I make the following order:- [a] Writ Petition No. 2724 of 2002 is partly allowed. [b] The award of Rs. 1,43,166-00 [rupee one lakh forty-three thousand one hundred and sixty six only] towards the arrears of wages from 1st July, 1988 to 30th June, 1996 is confirmed and the petitioner-Municipal Council is directed to make payment of the said amount within a period of four months from today to respondent Smt. Vimal Sadaram Kodape and report compliance. [c] The award of interest at the rate of twelve per cent per annum made by the Labour Court in exercise of power u/s 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is set aside for want of jurisdiction. [d] If the balance amount of fifty per cent is not paid within a period of four months from today, the petitioner-Municipal Council shall pay interest at the rate of seven per cent per annum thereon till the date of actual payment. [d] If the balance amount of fifty per cent is not paid within a period of four months from today, the petitioner-Municipal Council shall pay interest at the rate of seven per cent per annum thereon till the date of actual payment. [e] A copy of this order with emphasis on its last para be sent to the Law & Justice Department, Khan Market, New Delhi. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.