JUDGMENT U.B. Saha, J.:- The instant appeal is preferred by the Tripura State Electricity Corporation Ltd. challenging the judgment and decree dated 01.10.2008 passed by the learned Principal Civil Judge (District Judge), South Tripura, Udaipur in case No. TS (Fatal) 120/2004 whereby and whereunder the learned Principal Civil Judge has awarded a sum of Rs. 1,60,000/- in favour of the claimant respondents along with interest @ 6% p.a. to be reckoned from the date of presentation of claim petition, i.e. from 28.07.2004 which should be paid within three months from the date of the judgment and decree and in case the same could not be paid within the stipulated period, then it would carry penal interest @ 9% p.a. Heard Mr. DC Nath, learned counsel for the appellant as well as Mr. S. Lodh, learned counsel for the claimant-respondents. 2. The short question that arises in this appeal is that the claimant-respondent filed a petition for claiming compensation against the wrongful action under the provisions of Fatal Accident Act, 1855 (for short, "Act of 1855") instead of filing a suit providing a notice under Section 80 of the CPC. The other ground taken is that the learned Principal Civil Judge had no jurisdiction to pass the judgment and decree impugned without deposit of ad valorem court fee by the respondents as action against the civil wrong can be compensated only in a suit and not in a petition. Another ground is also taken that the Principal Civil Judge had no jurisdiction to decide the suit relating to payment of money by way of compensation as the jurisdiction of setting aside is based upon the Civil Judge, Sr. Division or Civil Judge, Jr. Division. 3. Learned counsel for the parties, in their usual fairness submits that the question that arises for decision in the instant appeal has already been answered by a Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court in Maya Rani Ghosh and Anr. Vs. State of Tripura and Ors., 2007 (1) GLT 669 wherein the Division Bench held that seeking compensation under the Indian Fatal Accident Act is to be raised in a suit not by a petition and the ad valorem court fee has also to be paid on the suit value and the same has to be filed before the Court as the original jurisdiction lies with the civil Judge, Jr. Division or Civil Judge, Sr. Division or Civil Judge, Sr. Division and the Division Bench also saved the suit registered by the Principal Civil Judge (District Judge) on the basis of the claim petition filed under the Act of 1855 and the suit which has already been decided prior to the decision of the Division Bench and admittedly the instant appeal is preferred against the claim petition on the basis of which the suit was registered before the Principal Judge (District Judge) and also had been decided prior to January, 31st, 2007, i.e. the decision of the Division Bench in the aforesaid Maya Rani Ghosh and Anr. (supra) and according to them, in view of the above position, the instant appeal has no merit. Hence the same can be dismissed. 4. This Court has gone through the decision of the Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court, Agartala Bench in Maya Rani Ghosh and Anr.(supra) wherein the Division Bench held as under:- 65. Our decision that it is only by means of suits that compensation, under the Act of 1855, can be claimed may have the effect of upsetting the orders, which have become final and have been acted upon by the parties concerned. We are clear in our mind that though incorrect, the system, having been followed for a long time, shall be discontinued forthwith; but the orders, which have already become final, shall not be rendered ineffective. We derive the strength for the direction, which we so intent to give, from the maxim 'communis error facit jus'. The principle underlying the maxim is that "the law so favours the public good, that it will in some cases permit a common error to pass for right". This maxim was applied by the Apex Court in Raman Nadar Viswanathan Nadar and Ors. vs. Snehappoo Rasalamma and Ors., reported in AIR 1970 SC 1759 . In Raman Nadar Viswanathan Nadar (supra), a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, having noticed that under Hindu Law, a bequest to an unborn person or person, not in existence, had been held to be void. Although there was no authority, in Hindu Law, to justify the doctrine that a Hindu cannot make a gift or bequest for the benefit of an unborn person, yet this doctrine was engrafted, on Hindu Law, by the decision of the Judicial Committee in the famous Tagore's case (1872) Ind App Supp 47 (PC). Although there was no authority, in Hindu Law, to justify the doctrine that a Hindu cannot make a gift or bequest for the benefit of an unborn person, yet this doctrine was engrafted, on Hindu Law, by the decision of the Judicial Committee in the famous Tagore's case (1872) Ind App Supp 47 (PC). The Supreme Court, in Raman Nadar Viswanathan Nadar (supra) clearly held that the decision, in Tagore's case, was based on wrong reading of the relevant verse in Dayabhaga, but since the decision stood a great length of time and on the basis of that decision, rights had been regulated, arrangement as to property had been made, entitlement to properties have passed, the Supreme Court, relying upon the maxim 'communis error facit jus', did not disturb the actions, which had already been taken on the basis of the wrong decision in Tagore's case. The application of this maxim is also traceable In the speech of Lord Blackburn in his speech in Charies Dalton v. Henry P. 812 as follows: I quite agree with what is said by the late Chief Justice Cockburn,((1877) 3 QBD 85 at p. 105), that where the evidence proved an adverse enjoyment as of right for twenty years, or little more, and nothing else, 'no one had the faintest belief that any grant had ever existed, and the presumption was known to be a mere fiction'. He thinks that thus to shorten the period of prescription without the authority of the Legislature was a great judicial usurpation. Perhaps it was. The same thing may be said of all legal fictions, and was often said (sith, I think, more reason) of recoveries. But I take it that when a long series of cases have settled the law, it would produce intolerable confusion if it were to be reversed because the mode in which, it was introduced was not approved of: even where it was originally a blunder and inconvenient, communis error facit jus. 66. Thus, taking a cue from the decision in Tagore's case (supra), we make it clear that relying upon what we have held in this case, the final orders, which might have, in the meanwhile, been passed and have attained finality, shall remain undisturbed and the actions, taken on the basis of such orders, shall also remain intact. 66. Thus, taking a cue from the decision in Tagore's case (supra), we make it clear that relying upon what we have held in this case, the final orders, which might have, in the meanwhile, been passed and have attained finality, shall remain undisturbed and the actions, taken on the basis of such orders, shall also remain intact. The practice, hitherto adhered to by the Courts of the District Judge, in the State of Tripura, shall, however, be stopped forthwith and shall not henceforth be permitted to continue. 67. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, these appeals succeed. The impugned appellate orders are hereby set aside and the appeals are remanded to the learned first appellate Court for decision on the question as to whether the amounts of compensation, awarded in favour of the claimants-appellants, call for interference in law and if so, necessary order(s) may be passed in this regard. In view of the above position, the instant appeal is fully covered by the decision of the Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court, Agartala Bench and accordingly the appeal fails. Interim order, if any, passed earlier shall stand vacated. Prepare the decree accordingly. Send down the LCR.