DISTRICT CANE SERVICE AUTHORITY v. NARESH PAL SINGH
2014-12-11
D.Y.CHANDRACHUD, P.K.S.BAGHEL
body2014
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT By the Court.—This special appeal is against a judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 30 July 2014 allowing a writ petition filed by the first respondent. 2. The facts lie in a narrow compass. The father of the first respondent was engaged as a seasonal employee in the office of the Co-operative Cane Development Union Ltd. (Cane Development Union), Daurala, District Meerut, the second appellant. As a seasonal employee, he had worked from 28 December 1964 until his death on 15 May 1997. Upon the death of the seasonal employee, the first respondent applied for employment. On 28 September 1998, the first respondent was engaged as a seasonal clerk on a temporary basis. The first respondent had moved a representation for seeking appointment on a permanent basis under the dying in harness category. Being aggrieved by his appointment as a seasonal clerk, eventually, he filed a writ petition (Writ-A No. 26836 of 2016) seeking a mandamus to the Deputy Cane Commissioner, the third respondent to issue appropriate directions for his appointment on the post of clerk on a permanent basis. 3. The Cane Development Union is a Co-operative Society, registered under the U.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965. In 1974, the Uttar Pradesh Recruitment of Dependants of Government Servants Dying in Harness Rules, 1974 (Rules) were made in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. There is no dispute about the position in law that these Rules have no application to the Cane Development Union, particularly since employees of the Cane Development Union are not Government servants within the meaning of Rule 2 (a). The basis of the claim of the first respondent for the grant of permanency under the dying in harness category was that on 21 December 1973, prior to the enforcement of the Rules made under the proviso to Article 309, the State Government had issued a circular clarifying that, upon the death of a Government servant, one member of his family would be eligible for the grant of compassionate appointment subject to fulfillment of required educational qualifications. This circular was adopted by the Cane Development Union in an order dated 28 July 1979 of the Cane Commissioner who is also an ex officio President of the State Cane Services Authority and the Registrar of the Cane Development Union.
This circular was adopted by the Cane Development Union in an order dated 28 July 1979 of the Cane Commissioner who is also an ex officio President of the State Cane Services Authority and the Registrar of the Cane Development Union. Hence, the submission of the first respondent was that since the circular of the State Government had been adopted by the Cane Development Union, the first respondent was entitled to an appointment as a clerk in a permanent capacity inspite of the fact that his father was a seasonal clerk. This submission was accepted by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment and order. The learned Single Judge relied upon a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Ajay Kumar Sharma v. State Government of U.P., 2000 (1) ESC 291 (All), in support of the proposition that an appointment under the dying in harness rules cannot be on a temporary or ad hoc basis as it would frustrate the purpose of the rules, namely to save the family which has lost its wage earner from distress. In the view of the learned Single Judge, once the circular of the State Government had been accepted as a matter of policy and the appellants had engaged the first respondent as a seasonal clerk, his appointment could not have been, in any other than a permanent capacity. The judgement of the learned Single Judge has been called into question. 4. The submission which has been urged on behalf of the appellants is that under the U.P. Cane Co-operative Service Regulations 1975 (Regulations) which have been framed under Section 122 of the Act, the entire seasonal staff is divided into two categories, Category-A and Category-B, based on the efficient discharge of duties. The staff placed in Category-A shall be automatically re-employed in the next season unless the strength of the seasonal staff has been reduced in any particular year to such an extent that it may not be possible to employ all the seasonal employees. Under the Regulations, the service of a seasonal employee may be terminated by the recruiting or appointing authority at any time with a notice of one week or salary in lieu thereof.
Under the Regulations, the service of a seasonal employee may be terminated by the recruiting or appointing authority at any time with a notice of one week or salary in lieu thereof. These provisions were relied upon to submit that when an employee was engaged as a member of the seasonal staff and died in that capacity, a member of his family, who is granted compassionate appointment, cannot claim a higher right by seeking appointment on a permanent basis. Insofar as the judgement in Ajay Kumar Sharma (supra) is concerned, it was submitted that the principle is that an ad hoc or temporary appointment on a compassionate basis cannot be granted to an eligible person where the employee, who has died in harness, was himself or herself a permanent employee. But, where the person, upon whose death the compassionate appointment has been sought, was not a permanent employee, there is no known principle of service law under which compassionate appointment has to be granted on a permanent basis. 5. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the first respondent submitted that once the decision of the State Government, as reflected in the circular dated 21 December 1973, was adopted by the Cane Development Union on 28 July 1979 envisaging the grant of compassionate appointment, it is not open to the appellants to create two categories, the first consisting of those who would be granted compassionate appointment on a permanent basis and the other consisting of those who would be granted compassionate appointment on a seasonal basis. In this case, it was submitted that the first respondent was appointed in a pay-scale. Hence, his representation was for the grant of permanency to which, the learned Single Judge has correctly held, the first respondent was entitled. 6. The rival submissions now fall for consideration. 7. At the outset, it would be necessary to emphasize the rationale for the grant of compassionate appointment. The object and purpose of the grant of compassionate appointment is that where the wage earner in a family dies while in service, or as it is said, in harness, the financial distress and hardship being faced by the family upon the death of its wage earner should be alleviated by the grant of compassionate appointment.
The object and purpose of the grant of compassionate appointment is that where the wage earner in a family dies while in service, or as it is said, in harness, the financial distress and hardship being faced by the family upon the death of its wage earner should be alleviated by the grant of compassionate appointment. Compassionate appointment is understood to be an exception to the general rule and principle of equality of opportunity in matters of public employment since a person who seeks compassionate appointment as an heir of a deceased employee is not required to seek appointment in the normal channel involving competition with rival applicants. The exception is carved out because of the sudden impact due to the death of the employee, on the members of the immediate family. In other words, the whole basis and purpose of the grant of compassionate appointment is to alleviate the distress suffered by the members of the bereaved family of a deceased employee in terms of the financial impact which is suffered by the loss of the wage earner. 8. Having due regard to this principle, it has been laid down by the Supreme Court, though in the context of the U.P. Dying in Harness Rules of 1974, that the provision for compassionate appointment under the rules would not extend to an heir of a daily wage earner. This decision of the Supreme Court was in General Manager, Uttaranchal Jal Sansthan v. Laxmi Devi and others, (2009) 7 SCC 205 . A similar view was taken by a judgment of a Full Bench of this Court in Pawan Kumar Yadav v. State of U.P. and others, 2010(8) ADJ 664 (FB). Both these decisions, we must, of course note, relate to the interpretation of the provisions of the U.P. Dying in Harness Rules, 1974. Strictly speaking, those rules are not applicable to the Cane Development Union. But equally, the principle which underlies the rules is relevant to the issue which falls for determination in this special appeal. The principle is what we have adverted to earlier. 9. The father of the first respondent was admittedly a seasonal employee, who had continued over a long period of time. The Regulations require in Regulation 21 the classification of the entire seasonal staff into categories A and B on the basis of their work and worth during the season.
The principle is what we have adverted to earlier. 9. The father of the first respondent was admittedly a seasonal employee, who had continued over a long period of time. The Regulations require in Regulation 21 the classification of the entire seasonal staff into categories A and B on the basis of their work and worth during the season. Category A consists of those persons who have discharged their duties with unquestionable integrity and efficiency during the crushing season. Category B comprises of the rest of the seasonal employees. Regulation 26 stipulates that the staff placed in category A shall be automatically re-employed in the next season unless the strength of the seasonal staff has been reduced in any particular year to such an extent that it may not be possible to re-employ all such staff. Regulation 34 provides that the service of a seasonal employee may be terminated by the recruiting or appointing authority at any time with a notice of one week or salary in lieu thereof. The very nature of the engagement of a seasonal employee is, thus, distinct from employment against a permanent post or on a permanent basis. The father of the first respondent, had he continued until the date of his attaining the age of superannuation, would in the normal course have continued as a seasonal employee. The request of the first respondent for the grant of compassionate appointment was acceded to and he was appointed on a purely temporary basis in 1998 in which capacity he continued until date. The first respondent, appointed on a compassionate appointment, could not have claimed a higher right to the grant of permanency since his father (on whose death compassionate appointment was claimed) was only a seasonal workman. The grant of compassionate appointment is in place of the employee who dies in harness. The status of the first respondent, upon the grant of compassionate appointment, could not have been on a higher footing. The mere adoption, by the Cane Development Union, of the circular of the State Government dated 21 December 1973 would not materially alter the position. The circular governs cases of Government employees who die while in service. Any adoption of a circular must necessarily be mutatis mutandis and having due regard to the nature of employment in the Cane Development Union.
The circular governs cases of Government employees who die while in service. Any adoption of a circular must necessarily be mutatis mutandis and having due regard to the nature of employment in the Cane Development Union. The industry, by its very nature, is a seasonal industry where the work is dependent on the crushing operations during the crushing season. Having regard to this factual background, the first respondent had no vested entitlement to claim the grant of permanency in his capacity as a person who is appointed on a compassionate basis. We hasten to clarify that this principle which we have been called upon to decide applies to a situation where the employee on whose death compassionate appointment is claimed was not a permanent employee. 10. For this reason, we are of the view that the learned Single Judge was in error in the view which was taken. Though the learned Single Judge has directed the appellants to consider the claim of the first respondent for the post of a clerk in a substantive capacity, it is clear from the reasons contained in the judgement that the learned Single Judge has held the first respondent to be entitled to a substantive post. For the reasons which we have indicated, we hold that the learned Single Judge was in error in coming to that conclusion. There was, therefore, no merit in the challenge of the first respondent to the order of the President of the Co-operative Cane Development Union declining to grant permanency to the first respondent. 11. The special appeal shall, accordingly, stand allowed and the impugned judgement and order of the learned Single Judge is set aside. 12. The special appeal is, accordingly, disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. ——————