JUDGMENT Hon’ble Manoj Kumar Gupta, J.—The head constables and constables are the lowest in the hierarchy of non gazetted officers of the Police Force. They play a vital role in maintaining law and order, preventing and detecting crime and in helping Courts of law punish the guilty. This bunch of petitions is by such officers of the Police Force, aggrieved by Government Order dated 7.6.2014 imposing ban on their posting in districts adjoining their home district. The consequential transfer orders are also under challenge. As common questions of law and fact are involved in these cases, same are being decided by this common judgment. 2. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners contended that the Government Order dated 7.6.2014 is wholly illegal and arbitrary, inasmuch as it does not contain any reason for cancellation of the previous Government Order dated 20.3.2012, whereby, relaxation was granted in posting of constables and head constables in districts bordering their home district, by amending Government Order dated 11.6.1986. It was further contended that the Government Order in question is a result of political vendetta, as the Government feels that its defeat in the Lok Sabha election is on account of non-extension of co-operation by the petitioners. In other words, the impugned Government Order has been issued to teach lesson to the petitioners. It was further submitted that the transfer policy is contained in the Police Regulations, which has statutory force and the Government Order in question being not referable to any of the provisions contained under Paragraph 520-526 thereof, is thus, contrary to the statutory provisions. The impugned transfer orders have not been issued on administrative grounds or in exigencies of service, thus, cannot be sustained in law. The personal hardship of the petitioners has not been considered. In various cases, transfer orders have been passed in mid session, entailing great hardship to the petitioners and members of their family. It was further urged that in any case, the impugned Government Order can only be applied prospectively and there is no mandate for transferring the incumbents posted in bordering districts forthwith. In some of the writ petitions, particularly in Writ Petition No. 39723 of 2014, Sri B.C. Rai Advocate, appearing on behalf of the petitioners contended that the petitioners, therein, are members of Armed Police, who are not concerned with day-to-day maintenance of law and order in the State. In some of the writ petitions, particularly in Writ Petition No. 39723 of 2014, Sri B.C. Rai Advocate, appearing on behalf of the petitioners contended that the petitioners, therein, are members of Armed Police, who are not concerned with day-to-day maintenance of law and order in the State. Consequently, they cannot be brought within the purview of the impugned Government Order. It is further contended that the Government Order in question is not referable to Section 46 of the U.P. Police Act, 1861, which confers power in the State to make rules and thus, the impugned Government Order is wholly contrary to the provisions of Section 46. The impugned transfers have been made with the approval of the Regional Police Establishment Boards, the constitution of which is contrary to the directions contained in the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Prakash Singh v. Union of India, 2006 (8) SCC 1 and thus, the transfers made on its recommendation, are wholly illegal. 3. On the other hand, learned standing counsel placing reliance on the letter dated 28.5.2014 written by Director General of Police to the Principal Secretary, Home, U.P. Government, Lucknow contended that past experience had shown that constables and head constables posted in districts bordering their home district were found missing from their place of posting during nights. They go to their home, being nearby their place of posting. They were thus not available in emergency, adversely affecting law and order. It was further found that on account of their posting in bordering districts, they were interfering in trivial matters, being connected with one party or the other. This impacts their impartiality and the image of the Police Force. Consequently, the Government, in order to improve law and order situation in the State and efficiency of the police force, issued the impugned Government Order dated 7.6.2014. The allegation of political vendetta in issuing the impugned Government Order is specifically denied. It was contended that the decision has been taken in public interest. It was further submitted that the police force is quite different and distinguishable from other State services. This is borne out from the fact that there is a separate entry relating to ‘police’ being Entry No. 2 in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. It was contended that the decision has been taken in public interest. It was further submitted that the police force is quite different and distinguishable from other State services. This is borne out from the fact that there is a separate entry relating to ‘police’ being Entry No. 2 in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. The police force is regulated by the Police Act, 1861, the Rules framed thereunder, the Police Regulations and the executive instructions in the nature of Government Orders. It is contended that the impugned Government Order only supplements the existing provisions under the Police Regulations and is, in no manner, contrary to it. It was further submitted that the constitution of Police Establishment Board, without Director General of Police as its Chairman, has been found to be valid and legal by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Vinod Kumar and another v. State of U.P. and others, 2010 (7) ADJ 315 and the Division Bench in the case of State of U.P. and others v. C.P. Ravindra Singh and others, 2011 (2) ADJ 177 . It was further submitted that under Section 2 of the Police Act, the entire police establishment is deemed to be one Police Force, as such, the members of the Armed Police Force cannot be treated differently, as compared to those working under Civil Police, as contended by the petitioners posted in the Armed Police. Validity of Regional Police Establishment Boards : 4. The first question, therefore, for consideration is whether the constitution of Police Establishment Boards vide Government Order dated 8.4.2010 of which the Director General of Police is not the Chairman, is contrary to the dictum of the Apex Court in the case of Prakash Singh (supra). For the said purpose, the background in which the Apex Court directed for constitution of the Police Establishment Board in the case of Prakash Singh (supra), is to be noticed. The Apex Court issued various directions to the Central Government, State Governments and Union Territories to establish Police Establishment Boards with the object of insulating the police from political pressures and other extraneous considerations in the matter of their transfers, postings, promotions and other service related matters. Directions contained in this regard, in paragraph 31 of the judgment, relating to establishment to Police Establishment Board are as under : “Police Establishment Board (5). Directions contained in this regard, in paragraph 31 of the judgment, relating to establishment to Police Establishment Board are as under : “Police Establishment Board (5). There shall be a Police Establishment Board in each State which shall decide all transfers, postings, promotions and other service related matters of officers of and below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police. The Establishment Board shall be a departmental body comprising the Director General of Police and four other senior officers of the Department. The State Government may interfere with the decision of the Board in exceptional cases only after recording its reasons for doing so. The Board shall also be authorized to make appropriate recommendations to the State Government regarding the postings and transfers of officers of and above the rank of Superintendent of Police, and the Government is expected to give due weight to these recommendations and shall normally accept it. It shall also function as a forum of appeal for disposing of representations from officers of the rank of Superintendent of Police and above regarding their promotions/transfers/disciplinary proceedings or their being subjected to illegal or irregular orders and generally reviewing the functioning of the police in the State.” (Emphasis Supplied) 5. In order to implement the directions given in the case of Prakash Singh (supra), the State Government issued Government Order dated 12.3.2008 for constitution of four different Police Establishment Boards for regulating the transfers and postings and others service matters of different ranks of the police force. The Police Establishment Board for Sub Inspectors and officials below such rank comprises of the Inspector General of Police (Establishment) as its Chairman instead of Director General of Police, as provided under the judgment of the Apex Court. The constitution of the Police Establishment Board as provided under Government Order dated 12.3.2008 became subject-matter of consideration by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Vinod Kumar (supra). The Full Bench, after noticing the conflict between the Division Bench Judgments of this Court, held as under : “19. It is true that there may be no strict compliance in terms of the directions issued by the Supreme Court in Prakash Singh (supra) insofar as one of the Boards is concerned. The Government has attempted to contend that the notification has to be read with the exercise of power under Section 2 of the Police Act. It is true that there may be no strict compliance in terms of the directions issued by the Supreme Court in Prakash Singh (supra) insofar as one of the Boards is concerned. The Government has attempted to contend that the notification has to be read with the exercise of power under Section 2 of the Police Act. There is a power in the State Government under Section 2 to have issued notification constituting the Boards. The section does not provide for the publication or laying of the Rules or Regulations made thereunder before the Legislature. In other words, the power conferred on the Government, as a delegate, to make Rules is not subject to any control by the Legislature. Rules as held by the judgment of the Supreme Court can be made under Section 2 of the Police Act. The Government, in the absence of legislation, in exercise of its power under Article 309 of the Constitution should have made rules governing the conditions of service. In the instant case, there is legislation governing transfers, but there is no provision for constitution of Boards. The Boards have been constituted by the State in exercise of its executive powers. It is now well-settled that in an area, where rule or existing law is silent in the matter of conditions of service, administrative instructions can be issued to fill in the void or gap, which the State has done. However, we have held that the notification for reasons given cannot be held to be an exercise of power under Section 2 of the Police Act. 20. In our opinion, therefore, considering the fact that the Rule 26 of the Rules, 2008 makes applicable the rules pertaining to the Government servants, i.e. persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State, and as Regulation 520 deals with the transfers of the police personnel, who are also a part of the public services of the State, therefore, insofar as the police are concerned, the Regulation pertaining to transfer would continue to apply to them. Therefore, though one of the Boards constituted is not strictly in terms of the directions issued by the Supreme Court in Prakash Singh (supra), nonetheless considering the exercise that has to be done and the provisions for transfer, as contained in the Police Regulations, there has been sufficient compliance. 21. Therefore, though one of the Boards constituted is not strictly in terms of the directions issued by the Supreme Court in Prakash Singh (supra), nonetheless considering the exercise that has to be done and the provisions for transfer, as contained in the Police Regulations, there has been sufficient compliance. 21. In these circumstances, we are clearly of the opinion that, though we have found that the notification constituting the Board is not traceable to Section 2 of the Police Act, the same at the highest, amounts to an irregularity and not illegality and would not vitiate the transfers, if they have been done in terms of the Regulations and after the approval of the Board. (Emphasis Supplied) 6. Later came another judgment by Division Bench of this Court in the case of State of U.P. and others v. C.P. Ravindra Singh and others, 2011 (2) ADJ 177 , wherein, similar plea was raised regarding invalidity in the constitution of the Police Establishment Board. However, the argument was repelled by holding as under : “According to us, pluralistic view in the place and instead of singular view is one of the devices to maintain transparency. It avoids possibilities of motivated action, biasness or influence in the cases of transfer. To that extent, there is no conflict between Prakash Singh (supra) and the steps taken by the State. The only issue is whether the State has strictly complied with or sufficiently complied with the direction of the Supreme Court in Prakash Singh (supra). According to the Full Bench of this High Court in Vinod Kumar (supra), direction has been sufficiently complied with. Learned Chief Standing Counsel has given an explanation by saying that the position of the State of Uttar Pradesh as regards its vastness and population may not be similar with various other States. Therefore, if the Board is constituted strictly in compliance with the direction of the Supreme Court then the State will not get full time engagement of such officers to maintain the law and order situation of the State. To that, it is desirable that the State should explain such position before the Supreme Court. It is expected that by now it has been done by the State. To that, it is desirable that the State should explain such position before the Supreme Court. It is expected that by now it has been done by the State. But so far as the existing position is concerned, this Division Bench will be governed by both, Prakash Singh (supra) and Vinod Kumar (supra) and a conjoint reading of both the judgements speaks that a mode or mechanism of plurality has been adopted by the State, in spite of the existing law. Therefore, this Court does not find any reason to negate the orders of transfer, as were impugned in the writ petition.” (Emphasis Supplied) 7. However, Sri Vijai Guatam, learned counsel appearing in some of the writ petitions tried to distinguish the aforesaid judgments by contending that the Full Bench in the case of Vinod Kumar (supra) and the Division Bench in the case of Ravindra Singh (supra) were considering the constitution of the Police Establishment Board under Government Order dated 12.3.2008, while the Regional Police Establishment Boards on whose recommendations, impugned transfers have been made, are constituted under Government Order dated 8.4.2010. It is submitted that the constitution of Regional Police Establishment Boards, in none of which, the Director General of Police is the Chairman, is contrary to the directives given by the Apex Court in the case of Prakash Singh (supra) and thus, the impugned transfers effected on basis of such recommendations, are not legally valid. 8. On the other hand, learned standing counsel contended that the Government Order dated 8.4.2010 was issued as a single Police Establishment Board constituted under the Government Order dated 12.3.2008 for police officials upto the rank of Sub Inspector, was creating administrative difficulties on account of large number of such officials in the police force of the State. It is submitted that care has been taken to ensure independence of the Regional Police Establishment Board, as per the objective laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Prakash Singh (supra). 9. The preface to the Government Order dated 8.4.2010 mentions that Police Establishment Board constituted under Government Order dated 12.3.2008 and 27.11.2008 for police officials upto the rank of Inspector resulted in administrative and practical problems in view of large number of police officials of such rank in the police force of the State. 9. The preface to the Government Order dated 8.4.2010 mentions that Police Establishment Board constituted under Government Order dated 12.3.2008 and 27.11.2008 for police officials upto the rank of Inspector resulted in administrative and practical problems in view of large number of police officials of such rank in the police force of the State. Consequently, for regulating the transfers and postings of police officials upto the rank of Inspector within the region, Regional Police Establishment Boards have been constituted as under : “(a) Regional Inspector General of Police/Regional Deputy Inspector General of Police as its Chairman, apart from two senior most officers.” 10. Thus, for effecting transfers at the regional level, Police Establishment Boards at regional level were established with highest police officer at the regional level viz. Inspector General of Police/Regional Deputy Inspector General of Police as its Chairman. The other two senior most officers of the region are its members. The Full Bench in the case of Vinod Kumar (supra) and Division Bench in the case of Ravindra Singh (supra) have held that constitution of Police Establishment Board without Director General of Police as its chairman, can at best be an irregularity and not illegality, till its independence is ensured and the mechanism of plurality is maintained. It was concluded that constitution of Police Establishment Board for police officers below the rank of Inspectors, without Director General of Police as its Chairman, is substantially in keeping with the spirit of the directions issued by the Apex Court in the case of Prakash Singh (supra) and recommendations made by such Board, cannot vitiate the transfers. Applying these principles, I find that Regional Police Establishment Boards constituted under Government Order dated 8.4.2010 for effecting transfer at the regional level fulfills both the criteria. These are headed by the highest police officials of the region and at the same time, retains the character of pluralism, being a multi member body. Thus, transfers and postings of members of the Police Force within the region remains under the control of an independent body comprising of highest police officials of the region, thereby achieving the principal object of insulating transfers and postings from political interference. Consequently, the transfers made on its recommendations cannot be held to be illegal as to warrant interference by this Court. Whether Government Order dated 7.6.2014 is illegal and arbitrary : 11. Consequently, the transfers made on its recommendations cannot be held to be illegal as to warrant interference by this Court. Whether Government Order dated 7.6.2014 is illegal and arbitrary : 11. This takes the Court to the next question as to whether the impugned Government Order dated 7.6.2014 is illegal, irrational, arbitrary for non-disclosure of reasons for issuance thereof or is contrary to the Act, the Rules and the Police Regulations. 12. According to the State respondents, the impugned Government Order has been issued with the object of strengthening the law and order situation in the State. It has been issued in larger public interest. It is contended that question as to how law and order can be improved in the State, is in the exclusive domain of the executive and the administrative power of the State. The policy decision of the State, taken in this regard, cannot be subjected to judicial review. The impugned Government Order is neither illegal nor arbitrary nor contrary to the provisions of the Act, Rules or the Police Regulations. 13. The power of the Executive Government to frame policies to run day-to-day administration and to maintain law and order, cannot be doubted. Nay, it is the duty of the State to regulate its policies for common good of its people. Normally, Courts do not interfere in the framing of policies and their implementation but can it be said that policies framed by the State Government are beyond judicial review, if not, what is the scope of interference by Courts of law. There are line of decisions on the subject, some of which requires to be noted in brief, to test the argument made by the parties. 14. The Apex Court in the case of Brij Mohan Lal v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 502 , was judging the challenge laid to the decisions of the Government to discontinue Fast Track Courts. After analysing several decisions on the subject, their Lordships of the Supreme Court summarised the test for judicial review of policy decisions as under : “100. Certain tests, whether this Court should or not interfere in the policy decisions of the State, as stated in other judgments, can be summed up as: (I) If the policy fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness, it would be unconstitutional. Certain tests, whether this Court should or not interfere in the policy decisions of the State, as stated in other judgments, can be summed up as: (I) If the policy fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness, it would be unconstitutional. (II) The change in policy must be made fairly and should not give the impression that it was so done arbitrarily on any ulterior intention. (III) The policy can be faulted on grounds of mala fides, unreasonableness, arbitrariness or unfairness, etc. (IV) If the policy is found to be against any statute or the Constitution or runs counter to the philosophy behind these provisions. (V) It is dehors the provisions of the Act or legislations. (VI) If the delegate has acted beyond its power of delegation.” 15. It was ultimately concluded by holding that no hard and fast rule can be laid down in absolute terms and it all depends on facts and circumstances of each case. Somewhat similar view was taken by the Apex Court in the case of Delhi Development Authority and another v. Joint Action Committee, Allottee of SFS Flats and others, (2008) 2 SCC 672 , by laying down as under : “65. Broadly, a policy decision is subject to judicial review on the following grounds: (a) if it is unconstitutional; (b) if it is dehors the provisions of the Act and the regulations; (c) if the delegatee has acted beyond its power of delegation; (d) if the executive policy is contrary to the statutory or a larger policy.” 16. Applying these broad principles, I proceed to test the argument of the petitioners laying challenge to the Government Order in question. 17. For appreciating the issue, certain statutory provisions may be noted. Section 2 of the Police Act, 1861 provides for the constitution of the police force in the State and it reads as under : “2. Constitution of the force : The entire police-establishment under a [State Government] shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be one police-force and shall be formally enrolled; and shall consist of such number of officers and men, and shall be constituted in such manner, as shall from time to time be ordered by the State Government. Constitution of the force : The entire police-establishment under a [State Government] shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be one police-force and shall be formally enrolled; and shall consist of such number of officers and men, and shall be constituted in such manner, as shall from time to time be ordered by the State Government. [Subject to the provisions of this Act, the pay and all other conditions of service of members of the subordinate ranks of any police-force shall be such as may be determined by the [State Government]].” 18. Section 46 of the Police Act, 1861 confers power in the State to make rules consistent with the Act. The State Government, in exercise of such power, had framed U.P. Police Constables and Head Constables Service Rules, 2008 and Rule 26 thereof provides as under : “26. Regulation of other matters.—In regard to the matters not specifically covered by these rules or special orders persons appointed to the service shall be governed by the rules, regulations and orders applicable generally to Government Servants serving in connection with the affairs of the State.” 19. Paragraphs 520 to 525 of the Police Regulations framed under the Act lay down broad principles regarding transfer of the officials of the Police Force. Paragraph 520, which is relevant for the present controversy, is reproduced below : “520. Transfer of Gazetted Officers are made by the Governor in Council. The Inspector General may transfer Police Officers not above the rank of inspector throughout the province. The Deputy Inspector General of Police of the range may transfer inspectors, sub-inspectors, head constables and constables, within his range; provided that the postings and transfers of inspectors and reserve sub-inspectors in hill stations will be decided by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Headquarters. Transfers which result in officers being stationed far from their homes should be avoided as much as possible. Officers above the rank of constable should ordinarily not be allowed to serve in districts in which they reside or have landed property. In the case of constables the numbers must be restricted as far as possible. Sub-inspectors and head constables should not be allowed to stay in a particular district for more than six years and ten years respectively and in a particular police station not more than three years and five years respectively. In the case of constables the numbers must be restricted as far as possible. Sub-inspectors and head constables should not be allowed to stay in a particular district for more than six years and ten years respectively and in a particular police station not more than three years and five years respectively. In the Tarai area (including the Tarai and Bhabar Estates) the period of sub-inspectors, head constables and constables should not exceed five years.” 20. It is contended by the petitioners that paragraph 520 of the Police Regulations does not place any restriction in the posting of constables and head constables in districts bordering their home district. Thus, the impugned Government Order is contrary to paragraph 520 of the Police Regulations. It is further contended that there is no rational for placing such restriction, that too by means of executive fiat in the shape of a Government order, when there is no such restriction under the Act, the Rules or the Police Regulations. 21. The Government Order dated 11.7.1986 was issued in supersession of earlier Government Order dated 27.6.1983. Clause (1) thereof places restriction on postings of Inspectors and Sub Inspectors in their home districts or districts bordering their home district. Clause (5) of the said Government Order places similar restrictions qua the constables and head constables. By Government Order dated 20.3.2012, restriction regarding posting of constables and head constables in districts bordering their home districts was done away with, as a result thereof, the petitioners herein came to be posted in various districts bordering their home district. Now, by impugned Government Order dated 7.6.2014, relaxation granted in this regard, has been withdrawn. In other words, the restriction placed in the posting of the constables and head constables vide paragraph 5 of the Government Order dated 11.7.1986 in districts bordering their home districts now stands revived. 22. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State respondents, it is stated that the impugned Government Order has been issued on the basis of the recommendations made by the Director General of Police, Uttar Pradesh vide its letter dated 28.5.2014. A copy of the said letter has been brought on record as Annexure CA-3 to the counter-affidavit filed in the writ petition No. 34228 of 2014 Manish Kumar Dixit and others v. State of U.P. and others. A copy of the said letter has been brought on record as Annexure CA-3 to the counter-affidavit filed in the writ petition No. 34228 of 2014 Manish Kumar Dixit and others v. State of U.P. and others. The letter dated 28.5.2014 by Director General of Police, U.P. Lucknow is addressed to Principal Secretary, Home, U.P. Administration Lucknow. The subject-matter of the letter is transfers and postings of constables and head constables in the State. It has been observed that after issuance of Government Order dated 20.3.2012, there is no restriction on posting of constables and head constables in districts bordering their home district. It has been noted that the past experience and information received so far reveals that posting of constables and head constables in districts bordering their home district is resulting in serious practical difficulties. The constables and head constables leave their places of posting during night, as they go to their home in the adjoining district, and are thus not available in case of emergency. This is adversely impacting the law and order in the State. It has been further noted that because of their posting in districts bordering their home district, the members of the police force generally have their relations in the same district, impacting their impartiality. They are found interfering in trivial matters, adversely affecting the image of the police department. It was concluded that the present policy of transfer and posting is thus having adverse effect on maintenance of the law and order in the State and curbing the activities of the criminals. It was suggested that the relaxation granted by Government Order dated 20.3.2012 be reviewed. The State Government accepted the recommendations made by the Director General of Police vide its letter dated 28.5.2014 by issuing Government Order dated 7.6.2014, re-imposing ban on postings of constables and head constables in districts bordering their home district. Thus, clause (5) of the Government Order dated 11.6.1986 stands revived and now, constables and head constables cannot be posted in their home districts, in districts adjoining their home districts and in districts where they hold immovable properties. 23. Indisputably, the Director General of Police is the head of the police force in the State. The recommendations contained in his letter dated 28.5.2014 discloses valid reasons for making suggestion to the State Government to withdraw the relaxation granted by Government Order dated 20.3.2012. 23. Indisputably, the Director General of Police is the head of the police force in the State. The recommendations contained in his letter dated 28.5.2014 discloses valid reasons for making suggestion to the State Government to withdraw the relaxation granted by Government Order dated 20.3.2012. The State Government, while issuing the impugned Government Order dated 7.6.2014, had rightly acted on the recommendations made by the Director General of Police. The action of the State Government taken in this regard, cannot be said to be illegal or arbitrary or devoid of reasons. Rather, the Court is of the opinion that the State Government was fully justified in acting on such recommendations, as maintenance of law and order should be its prime concern. No laxity, in this regard, has to be given. Consequently, the contention of the petitioners that the impugned Government Order has been issued for no justifiable reason or that it is a result of illegal and arbitrary exercise of power, cannot be accepted. Whether State competent to issue impugned Government Order : 24. Undoubtedly, ‘Police’ is a State subject as it appears at Item No. 2 of list II of Seventh Schedule, which reads as ‘Police (including railway and village police) subject to provisions of Entry 2-A of List 1’. Thus, it is abundantly clear that State Government is competent to legislate and amend the existing provisions regulating service conditions of the Police Force. Under Article 162 of the Constitution, the executive power of the State extends to matters with regard to which it has power to legislate. Thus, the State is also competent to issue executive orders. In the instant case, the State having chosen to exercise its executive power under Article 162 by issuing the impugned Government Order, had committed no illegality. The judgment cited by Sri B.C. Rai in the case of Jasveer Singh v. State of U.P., 2008 (2) ADJ 484, is distinguishable. There, the action of State in transferring police constables of more than 10 years service to Armed Police was held contrary to paragraph 525 of Police Regulations and was thus struck down. The power of State to issue executive orders under Article 162 of the Constitution was not at all under consideration, and would thus be of no help to the petitioners herein. Whether impugned Government Order is contrary to Statutory Provisions particularly paragraph 520 of Police Regulations : 25. The power of State to issue executive orders under Article 162 of the Constitution was not at all under consideration, and would thus be of no help to the petitioners herein. Whether impugned Government Order is contrary to Statutory Provisions particularly paragraph 520 of Police Regulations : 25. Now, I proceed to examine the other limb of the argument of the petitioners as to whether the Government could have provided for such restriction by issuing impugned Government Order, though there is no such embargo under the Act, the Rules and the Police Regulations. 26. Paragraph 520 of the Police Regulations places restriction on posting of police officers above the rank of constables in their home district and districts in which they own immovable property. In case of constables, their number is to be restricted as far as possible. The aforesaid restriction was placed for obvious reason. A member of Police Force, being custodian of law and order, are ordained with several such powers, which have the potentiality of impinging upon the freedom and liberty of the citizens. Such powers are ordinarily not possessed by other Government servants. In order to prevent misuse of such power, restrictions, as mentioned above, were placed by the Police Regulations, which are an exercise in subordinate legislation. 27. It may be noted that Police Act, 1861 and the regulations framed thereunder, are pre-independence legislations. With the country attaining freedom, having its own Constitution and with the development of infrastructure in the country including better transport facilities, it become easier to commute between adjoining districts within short time. As per the respondents, the experience in the recent past showed that with the withdrawal of restriction of posting of head constables and constables in district bordering their home district, they were often found missing during night, as they go to their home. In order to do away with this malady which was having adverse impact on law and order situation in the State, it was felt necessary to place certain additional restrictions, in the nature of ban on posting of constables and head constables in districts bordering their home district. 28. This additional restriction initially placed by Government Order dated 11.6.1986 and revived by the impugned Government Order does not, in any manner, run contrary to the restrictions placed by Police Regulations, particularly paragraph 520 thereof. 28. This additional restriction initially placed by Government Order dated 11.6.1986 and revived by the impugned Government Order does not, in any manner, run contrary to the restrictions placed by Police Regulations, particularly paragraph 520 thereof. It only supplements the provisions under the existing legislation, which is permissible in law (Vide Joint Action Committee of Air Lines Pilots’ Association of India v. D.G. of Civil Aviation, (2011) 5 SCC 435 ; Union of India v. Rakesh Kumar, (2001) 4 SCC 309 ; District Registrar v. M.B. Kayakutty, (1979) 2 SCC 150 ). Thus, neither the exercise of power in issuing the impugned Government Order, nor the manner or the reason for which it has been exercised, can be said to be illegal, to justify interference by this Court. Whether impugned Government Order has been issued on extraneous considerations : 29. As regards the contention of the petitioners that the impugned Government Order has been issued as the State feels that it lost the general Lok Sabha elections held in the year 2014 because of non co-operation by the members of the police force and is thus, a result of political vendetta, the same cannot be accepted, as there is no material on record to support such plea. The imputation of motive in issuance of the impugned Government Order has been categorically denied by the State. The State had succeeded in defending its position in issuing the impugned Government Order by placing reliance on the recommendations made by the Director General of Police vide its letter dated 28.5.2014. There is no challenge in any of the writ petition to the facts stated in the said letter. Thus, it cannot be said that the impugned Government Order has its genesis in any extraneous consideration. Effect of non-consideration of Government Order dated 25.3.1995, while issuing impugned Government Order : 30. It is next contended that restriction on posting of police officials in districts bordering their home district placed by Government Order dated 11.6.1986, was partially withdrawn by Government Order dated 25.3.1995. A copy thereof has been filed as Annexure-4 to Writ Petition No. 34228 of 2014. It relaxes restriction on posting of constables and head constables in districts bordering their home district by providing that the same will remain confined to police stations of the bordering areas and shall not apply to all police stations. A copy thereof has been filed as Annexure-4 to Writ Petition No. 34228 of 2014. It relaxes restriction on posting of constables and head constables in districts bordering their home district by providing that the same will remain confined to police stations of the bordering areas and shall not apply to all police stations. It is submitted that vide letter of Director General of Police dated 27.5.2009 and 3.10.2009, directions were issued to strictly enforce the Government Order dated 25.3.1996. It is contended that while issuing impugned Government Order dated 7.6.2014, the Government Order dated 25.3.1995 has been ignored. This reflects non application of mind by the Government. 31. There is a serious challenge by the State to the authenticity of the Government Order dated 25.3.1995. It is contended that similar plea was subject-matter of consideration before this Court in the case of Jagannath Prasad Gaur (supra) and it was repelled by observing as under: “14. It is seen that the Government Order dated 11th July, 1986 was issued regarding appointments and transfers of Constables, Head Constables, Sub-Inspectors and Inspectors of Police. Paragraph-5 of the said Government Order provides that Head Constables and Constables shall not be posted in their home district or in districts nadjoining their home district. The Government Order dated 25th March, 1995, on which reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the petitioners, amends paragraph-5 of the Government Order dated 11th July, 1986 to the extent that the Constables and the Head Constables shall not be posted in their home district or in police stations adjoining their home district. The genuineness of the said Government Order dated 25th March, 1995 was doubted in the subsequent Government Order dated 28th October, 2009 and so an inquiry was set up. It was also noticed that a proposal for not posting the Head Constables/Constables in police stations adjoining the home district was submitted in 1992 but the State Government did not accept this proposal and this decision was intimated to the Inspector General of Police, Allahabad on 27th June, 1992. The Government Order dated 28th October, 2009 thereafter mentions that the Government Order dated 11th July, 1986 shall continue to operate. The Government Order dated 28th October, 2009 thereafter mentions that the Government Order dated 11th July, 1986 shall continue to operate. In such circumstances, when a decision had been taken for implementation of the Government Order dated 11th July, 1986 without the amendment said to have been made by the Government Order dated 25th March, 1995, it cannot be said that the decision taken by the Police Establishment Board for transfer of the Constables/Head Constables on the basis of the Government Order dated 11th July, 1986 is bad in law. This apart, no factual foundation has been laid in the writ petition as to whether the petitioners were posted in police stations adjoining the home districts or not. Thus, for this reason also, the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted.” (Emphasis supplied) 32. In view of what has been held in the case of Jagannath Prasad Gaur (supra), I am of the opinion that no reliance can be placed on the alleged Government Order dated 25.3.1995. Further, the Government itself vide letter dated 28.10.2009, apart from expressing doubt about authenticity of Government Order dated 25.3.1995, clarified that the restriction placed by Government Order dated 11.7.1986, shall apply without any exception. For the aforesaid reasons, it was not necessary for the Government to refer to the Government Order dated 25.3.1995, while issuing the impugned Government Order dated 7.6.2014. Whether members of the Armed Police should be kept exempt from the bar imposed by impugned Government Order : 33. The question which remains to be answered is whether Government was justified in applying the restrictions placed by the impugned Government Orders to the members of the Armed Police, who are not concerned with day-to-day maintenance of law and order. It is to be noted that under Section 2 of the Police Act, 1861, the entire police force is deemed to be one police force. To the same effect is paragraph 396 of the Police Regulations. The members of Armed Police Force can be sent to other branches of the police force and vice-versa as provided under paragraph 525 of the Police Regulations. The Armed Police is meant for dealing with serious law and order situation requiring a higher level of armed expertise. To the same effect is paragraph 396 of the Police Regulations. The members of Armed Police Force can be sent to other branches of the police force and vice-versa as provided under paragraph 525 of the Police Regulations. The Armed Police is meant for dealing with serious law and order situation requiring a higher level of armed expertise. Paragraph 65 of the Police Regulations delineate the duty of the members of the Armed Police Force as protection of treasuries, tahsils and lock-ups, for the escort of treasure, prisoners and Government property, for service on magazine and quarter guards, for the suppression and prevention of disorder and crimes of violence, and for the pursuit and apprehension of dangerous criminals. Apart from normal duties as described above, they are employed during public events like processions and religious ceremonies (Paragraph 69 of the Police Regulations) and civil unrest (Paragraph 68 of the Police Regulations). Under Paragraph 71 of the Police Regulations, Armed Police can be pressed to service where civil police is unable to cope with a situation. This is in view of their specialized training in use of arms. Thus, Armed Police is integral part of the police force and provides it with muscle power to tackle special situation. The members of the Armed Police, thus, have to perform important role in case of emergencies. The conclusions which impelled the Government to bring about the impugned Government Order, as discussed in previous paragraphs of this judgment, applies with much greater force to members of the Armed Police Force and they cannot claim any immunity from the ban imposed thereby. Whether transfers made on basis of impugned Government Order would amount to applying the Government Order retrospectively : 34. It is to be noted that impugned Government Order was issued by way of a corrective step in the existing policy, which past experience demonstrated, was seriously flawed. Thus, it was to be implemented forthwith to achieve the object viz. strengthen the law and order situation in the State. It brook of no delay. Transferring the petitioners, who come within the ambit of the impugned Government Order, does not mean that it is being applied retrospectively. Merely because the petitioners have not completed a fixed duration at a particular place, as provided under certain Circulars/executive instructions, will not render the impugned transfers invalid. It brook of no delay. Transferring the petitioners, who come within the ambit of the impugned Government Order, does not mean that it is being applied retrospectively. Merely because the petitioners have not completed a fixed duration at a particular place, as provided under certain Circulars/executive instructions, will not render the impugned transfers invalid. It cannot be gainsaid that members of the police force hold transferable post and they do not have any indefeasible right to be posted at a particular place for any particular duration. Provisions, in this regard, whether contained in executive instructions or Circulars, are only by way of broad guidelines, but departure therefrom will not confer any right in favour of the incumbents to get the same enforced through a Court of law. If situation warrants, transfer can be made even if the period prescribed for posting at a particular place has not been completed, nor can such transfer amount to applying the impugned Government Order retrospectively. In this regard, reference may be made to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Mrs. Shilpi Bose and others v. State of Bihar and others, 1991 Supp (2) SCC 659, wherein, it is held as under : “In our opinion, the Courts should not interfere with a transfer Order which are made in public interest and for administrative reasons unless the transfer Orders are made in violation of any mandatory statutory Rule or on the ground of mala fide. A Government servant holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at one place or the other, he is liable to be transferred from one place to the other. Transfer Orders issued by the competent authority do not violate any of his legal rights. Even if a transfer Order is passed in violation of executive instructions or Orders, the Courts ordinarily should not interfere with the Order instead affected party should approach the higher authorities in the Department. If the Courts continue to interfere with day-to-day transfer Orders issued by the Government and its subordinate authorities, there will be complete chaos in the Administration which would not be conducive to public interest. The High Court over looked these aspects in interfering with the transfer Orders.” 35. If the Courts continue to interfere with day-to-day transfer Orders issued by the Government and its subordinate authorities, there will be complete chaos in the Administration which would not be conducive to public interest. The High Court over looked these aspects in interfering with the transfer Orders.” 35. The Apex Court in the case of Major General, J.K. Bansal v. Union of India, (2005) 7 SCC 227 , has cautioned the Courts in interfering with transfer orders in case of members of the Armed Force. It has been held that the scope for judicial review is far more limited and narrow as compared to the civilian employees. A member of police force though not a member of Armed Force, but can also not be equated with other Government servants, as he holds a special position in the law enforcement machinery of the State. The authorities charged with duty to maintain law and order, have to be given much greater elbow space to frame polices and take decisions regarding transfers and postings of members of the police force. In State of Haryana v. Kashmir Singh, (2010) 13 SCC 306 , the Apex Court in reference to transfer of police officers observed as under : “12. Transfer ordinarily is an incidence of service, and the Courts should be very reluctant to interfere in transfer orders as long as they are not clearly illegal. In particular, we are of the opinion that transfer and postings of policemen must be left in the discretion of the concerned State authorities which are in the best position to assess the necessities of the administrative requirements of the situation. The concerned administrative authorities may be of the opinion that more policemen are required in any particular district and/or another range than in another, depending upon their assessment of the law and order situation and/or other considerations. These are purely administrative matters, and it is well-settled that Courts must not ordinarily interfere in administrative matters and should maintain judicial restraint vide Tata Cellular v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 11 . 14. In our opinion, the High Court has taken a totally impractical view of the matter. These are purely administrative matters, and it is well-settled that Courts must not ordinarily interfere in administrative matters and should maintain judicial restraint vide Tata Cellular v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 11 . 14. In our opinion, the High Court has taken a totally impractical view of the matter. If the view of the High Court is to prevail, great difficulties will be created for the State administration since it will not be able to transfer/deploy its police force from one place where there may be relative peace to another district or region/range in the State where there may be disturbed law and order situation and hence requirement of more police. Courts should not, in our opinion, interfere with purely administrative matters except where absolutely necessary on account of violation of any fundamental or other legal right of the citizen. After all, the State administration cannot function with its hands tied by judiciary behind its back. As Justice Holmes of the US Supreme Court pointed out, there must be some free-play of the joints provided to the executive authorities.” 36. Thus, challenge laid on these grounds also fails. Whether impugned Government Order is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution : 37. It is contended that restrictions placed by impugned Government Order are discriminatory, as such restrictions have not been made applicable to Sub Inspectors, Inspectors, Deputy Superintendent of Police and Superintendent of Police. 38. It is noticeable that Inspectors and Sub Inspectors are non gazetted officers of the police force like constables and head constables, while officers above Inspectors are gazetted officers governed by different set of service rules. In the counter-affidavit, the specific case is that Deputy Superintendent of Police and Additional Superintendent of Police are governed by the Uttar Pradesh Service Rules, 1942 made under Section 241 and Section 275 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and their appointments are made through Public Service Commission. The transfer and posting of I.P.S. officers are governed by different Rules. Group A officer viz. Superintendent of Police and Additional Superintendent of Police are not to be posted in their home range, whereas Group B officers are not to be posted in their home districts. The service condition of I.P.S. category, P.P.S. category and non-gazetted category are different to each other, thus, no claim for parity can be made under Article 14 of the Constitution. 39. The service condition of I.P.S. category, P.P.S. category and non-gazetted category are different to each other, thus, no claim for parity can be made under Article 14 of the Constitution. 39. It is now well-settled that equals should be treated alike, while unequals should not be treated alike. While Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid classification. A three Judges Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Unikat Sankunni Menon v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1968 SC 81 , while repelling the claim of higher pay to the members of Rajasthan Secretariat Services in comparison to their counterparts in Rajasthan Administrative Services held as under : “6. The methods of recruitment, qualifications, etc., of the two Services are not identical. In their ordinary time-scale, the two Services do not carry the same grades. Even the posts, for which recruitment in the two Services is made, are, to a major extent, different. The members of the R.S.S. are meant to be employed in the Secretariat only, while members of the R.A.S. are mostly meant for posts which are outside the Secretariat though some posts in the Secretariat can be filled by members of the R.A.S. In such a case, where appointment is made to the posts of Deputy Secretaries of Government servants belonging to two different and separate Services, there can arise no question of a claim that all of them, when working as Deputy Secretaries, must receive identical salaries, or must necessarily both be given special pay. It is entirely wrong to think that every one, appointed to the same post, is entitled to claim that he must be paid identical emoluments as any other person appointed to the same post, disregarding the method of recruitment, or the source from which the Officer is drawn for appointment to that post. No such equality is required either by Art. 14 or Art. 16 of the Constitution.” 40. No such equality is required either by Art. 14 or Art. 16 of the Constitution.” 40. In a more recent judgement in case of Nagaland Senior Government Employees Welfare Association v. State of Nagaland and others, (2010) 7 SCC 643 , the Apex Court turned down challenge to constitutional validity of the Nagaland Recruitment from Public Employees (Second Amendment) Act, 2009, in so far as it provided for retirement from public service on completion of 35 years of service or on attaining 60 years, which ever was earlier, by holding that it is not violative of Article 14 qua similar provisions in other States, where the employees are to be superannuated only on attaining the age of 60 years. It was held as under : “57. Merely because some employees had to retire from public employment on completion of 35 years of service although they have not completed 55 years of age does not lead to any conclusion that the impugned enactment is arbitrary, irrational, unfair and unconstitutional. The fact that the provision such as the impugned provision that allows the retirement from public employment at the age of 35 years’ service is not to be found in other States is of no relevance. As a matter of fact, retirement policy concerning public employment differs from State to State. Kerala retires employees from the public employment at the age of 55 years. In any case there is nothing wrong if the legislation provides for retirement of the Government employees based on maximum length of service or on attaining a particular age, wherever is earlier, if the prescribed length of service or age is not irrational.” 41. Thus, the petitioners cannot set up plea of discrimination qua the gazetted officers of the police force. 42. So far as other non-gazetted officers of the police force are concerned, i.e. Inspectors and Sub Inspectors, similar restrictions on their posting in bordering districts is in place, vide paragraph 1 of the Government Order dated 11.7.1986. In case of constables and head constables, such restriction was relaxed by Government Order dated 20.3.2012, but it was never relaxed in case of Inspectors and Sub Inspectors. They were never permitted to be posted in districts bordering their home district. Thus, plea of discrimination and violation of Article 14 is also not tenable. Individual Hardship : 43. In case of constables and head constables, such restriction was relaxed by Government Order dated 20.3.2012, but it was never relaxed in case of Inspectors and Sub Inspectors. They were never permitted to be posted in districts bordering their home district. Thus, plea of discrimination and violation of Article 14 is also not tenable. Individual Hardship : 43. As regards individual hardship to the petitioners and members of their families, it is now well-settled that remedy for the same is to represent to the authorities. However, that cannot be a ground for the writ-Court to interfere. Accordingly, in cases of hardship to the incumbent or members of his family, it shall be open to him to make representation to the Regional Police Establishment Board, on whose recommendations, transfer has been made. In the event, any such representation is made, the Board shall examine the same with all sympathy, as it is also its duty to mitigate the hardship of the members of the police force, which is necessary to strike a balance between public duty and personal interest. Such exercise shall be carried out within one month from the date representation is made. In case of demonstrated undue hardship, it shall be open to the Board to amend/modify the transfer order or pass such order which, it deems appropriate. 44. Subject to above liberty, writ petitions stand dismissed. ——————