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2014 DIGILAW 3736 (ALL)

Tata Teleservices Limited v. Anurag Mobiles

2014-12-12

ANIL KUMAR

body2014
JUDGMENT Anil Kumar,J.: - Heard Shri Jaspreet Singh, learned counsel for the revisionist, Shri Satendra Nath Rai, learned counsel for the respondent and perused the record. 2. As per admitted facts of the present case, an agreements dated 07.03.2008 and 16.05.2008 entered between the parties for providing Fixed and Mobile telephone services to it's subscribers in it's Licensed Service Area. As per terms of the agreement, if there is any dispute and differences arises between the parties, the same shall be referred to Arbitrator as per provision of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), the relevant clause i.e. Clause No.27.2 is quoted herein below : - "The arbitration shall be governed by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 and the same shall be conducted at the headquarters of the TTSL circle or such other place/s as may be decided by the arbitrator. The arbitrator shall have summary powers and he shall not be bound to give any reasons." 3. As, the dispute and difference had arisen between the parties arising out of the agrement, so, the matter is referred to the Sole Arbitrator, namely, Shri S. P. Agrawal. After conducting the arbitration proceedings as per Act, 1996. Thereafter, an arbitration award dated 06.08.2009 has been passed, the relevant portion quoted herein below : - "The Claim petition is disposed off in the manner that services of the respondent as Channel Partner were legally terminated by the claimant and it is entitled to stop the services of the respondent as Channel Partner. And further within 30 days from the date of this award the respondent will provide compete, relevant and requisite details and documents concerning his claim to the claimant, falling which, it shall be open to the claimant to fully and finally settle the respondent's account as per its records. Costs on parties." 4. Aggrieved by the said award, opposite party/M/S Anurag Mobiles has filed a petition under Section 34 of the Act before the Court of District Judge, Lucknow on 17.12.2009. Costs on parties." 4. Aggrieved by the said award, opposite party/M/S Anurag Mobiles has filed a petition under Section 34 of the Act before the Court of District Judge, Lucknow on 17.12.2009. As the petition has been filed beyond the period of limitation as provided under sub-Section (3) of Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 which reads as under : - "An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under Section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral Tribunal : Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter." 5. So, an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been filed with a prayer that delay may be condone in filing the application under Section 34 of the Act on the ground that deponent was seriously ill, so he was not able to file the application within time and also not aware of limitation, as such, the delay in filing the same be condoned and be heard on merit. 6. On 08.12.2011, M/S Anurag Mobiles moved another application for condonation of delay under Section 34 (3) Arbitration and Conciliation Act read with Section 14 of Limitation Act along with an affidavit and plea which has been taken in the affidavit for condonation of delay that Mr. Anurag Yadav/proprietor of M/S Anurag Mobiles has moved a representation before the opposite party/Tata Teleservices Ltd. as per direction of Sole Arbitrator on 27.08.2009 that the relevant document may be given to him but no heed has been paid by the revisionist, as such, the period between 27.08.2009 to till November, 2009 spent during the said correspondence should not be counted for the purpose of limitation for filing application under Section 34 of the Act and delay may be condoned. 7. 7. By order dated 22.08.2012, the Court below/District Judge, Lucknow condoned the delay, relevant portion quoted as under : - "It is correct to say that the defendant is not court of Law and, at the first blus, it appears that, if another proceedings is not being prosecuted in the court of law, the party adopting such another proceeding is not entitled to benefit of Section-14 o the Limitation Act. But as in the present case in hand, another proceeding the plaintiff has adopted by filing representation before the defendant pursuant to the direction of learned Arbitrator, hence, to my mind, the Principle embodied in section 14 of the Limitation Act may be made squarely application to the present case. In view of the discussion, made above, the application for condonation of delay moved under section-34 (3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 read with Section 14 of Limitation Act deserves to be allowed, but on payment of costs. Application B-18 under Section under section-34 (3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 read with Section 14 of Limitation Act is allowed and delay in filing the objection-petition under Section Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is hereby condoned". 8. Aggrieved by the said order, the present revision has been filed by Tata Teleservcies Ltd. 9. Shri Jaspreet Singh, learned counsel for the revisionist while challenging the impugned order submits that in the present case, objection has been filed by M/S Anurag Mobiles to the award dated 6.8.2009 given by learned Sole Arbitrator beyond the period of limitation as provided under sub-Section (3) of Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, so, there is no justification or reason whatsoever to condoned the delay by giving benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act because Section 14 of the Limitation Act will not apply in the present case and the correspondence has been taken place between the parties as the said correspondence does not come within the ambit and scope of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In support of his argument, he has placed reliance on the following judgments : - (1) Union of India vs. Popular Construction Company 2001 (8) SCC page 470 (2) The Commissioner of Sales Tax U.P. Lucknow vs. M/S Parson Tools and Plants Kanpur 1975 (30) (4) SCC page 22 (3) Consolidated Engineering Enterprises vs. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department and others 2008 (7) SCC page 169 (4) ITI Ltd. vs. Siemens Public Communications Network Ltd. 2002 (5) SCC page 510 (5) M/s Hotel Pradeep vs. Airports Authority of India and another 2011 (29) LCD page 2165 10. Accordingly, Shri Jaspreet Singh, learned counsel for the revisionist submits that the impugned order dated 22.08.2012 passed by District Judge, Lucknow in Misc. Case No.311/2009 (M/S Anurag Mobiles vs. Tata Teleservices Ltd.) thereby condoning the delay in filing the petition under Section 34 (3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is contrary to law and liable to be set aside. 11. Shri Satendra Nath Rai, learned counsel for the respondent while defending the impugned order submits that in view of the direction given by the learned Sole Arbitrator in award dated 06.08.2009 and the correspondence between M/s Anurag Mobiles and Tata Teleservices Ltd. to get certain documents, but not available to him, as such, delay in filing an objection-petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has been rightly condoned by the Court below taking int consideration the said facts of the case as well as law as laid down by Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Coal India Limited and another vs. Ujjal Transport Agency and others (2011) 1 SCC 117 . Hence, the present revision lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed. 12. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the records. 13. As per undisputed facts of the present case, after a dispute had arisen between the parties arising out of the agreement entered between them known as "Channel Partner Agreement" and as per Clause 27.2, the matter was referred to Sole Arbitrator, namely, Shri S. P. Agrawal, who passed the award dated 06.08.2009, challenged by M/S Anurag Mobiles under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 by filing a petition before the Court of District Judge, Lucknow on 17.12.2009 along with an application for condonation of delay. Accordingly, the first question to be considered is whether the action on the part of the court below thereby condoning the delay is correct exercise or not? 14. If a person is aggrieved by an award given by Arbitrator, he is right to challenge the same by way of filing an objection under Section 34 of the Act within a statutory period of limitation provided therein. In this regard, Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Popular Construction Company, 2001 (8) SCC 470 , held as under: - "There is no dispute that the 1996 Act is a 'Special law' and that Section 34 provides for a period of limitation different from the prescribed under the Limitation Act. The question then is - is such exclusion expressed in Section 34 of the 1996 Act? The relevant extract of Section 34 reads : 34 " Application for setting aside arbitral award - (1) xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx (2)XXX XXX XXX XXX XXXX XXX (3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral Award or, if a request had been made under Section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal : Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter." Had the proviso to Section 34 merely provided for a period within which the Court could exercise its discretion, that would not have been sufficient to exclude Section 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act because "mere provision of a period of limitation in howsoever peremptory or imperative language is not sufficient to displace the applicability of Section 5".' That was precisely why in construing Section 116-A of the Representation of People Act, 1951, the Constitution Bench in Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel 2, rejected the argument that Section 5 of the Limitation Act had been excluded : " 27. It was then said that S.116-A of the Act provided an exhaustive and exclusive code of limitation for the purpose of appeals against orders of tribunals and reliance is placed on the proviso to sub-s.(3) of that section, which reads : "Every appeal under this Chapter shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of the order of the Tribunal under Section 98 or Section 99. Provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period." The contention is that sub-s.(3) of S. 116-Aof the Act not only provides a period of limitation for such an appeal, but also the circumstances under which the delay can be excused, indicating thereby that the general provisions of the Limitation Act are excluded. There are two answers to this argument. Firstly, S. 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act speaks of express exclusion but there is no express exclusion of sub-s. (3) of S.116-A of the Act; Secondly, the proviso from which an implied exclusion is sought to be drawn does not lead to any such necessary implication". This decision recognises that it is not essential for the special or local law to, in terms, exclude the provisions of the Limitation Act. It is sufficient if on a consideration of the language of its provisions relating to limitation, the intention to exclude can be necessarily implied. As has been said in Hukum Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra (1947) 2 SCC 133. "If on an examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act"3. Thus, where the legislature prescribed a special limitation for the purpose of the appeal and the period of limitation of 60 days was to be computed after taking the aid of Sections 4, 5 and 12 of the Limitation Act, the specific inclusion of these sections meant that to that extent only the provisions of the Limitation Act stood extended and the applicability of the other provisions, by necessary implication stood excluded in Patel Naranbhai Marghabhai v. Dhulabhai Galbabhai, (1992) 4 SCC 264 . As for as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are 'but not thereafter' used in the proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the Court could entertain an application to set aside the Award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase 'but not thereafter' wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such a result. Apart from the language, 'express exclusion' may follow from the scheme and object of the special or local law. "Even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the Court to examine whether and to what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation". Here the history and scheme of the 1996 Act support the conclusion that the time limit prescribed under Section 34 to challenge an Award is absolute and unextendable by Court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Arbitration and Conciliation Bill, 1995 which preceded the 1996 Act stated as one of its main objectives the need "to minimise the supervisory role of courts in the arbitral process".6 This objective has found expression in Section 5 of the Act which prescribes the extent of judicial intervention in no uncertain terms : "5. Extent of judicial intervention. - Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in matter governed by this Part, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part." The 'Part' referred to in Section 5 is Part I of the 1996 Act which deals with domestic arbitrations. Section 34 is contained in Part I and is therefore subject to the sweep of the prohibition contained in Section 5 of the 1996 Act. Furthermore, section 34(1) itself provides that recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award "in accordance with" sub Section 2 and sub Section 3. Furthermore, section 34(1) itself provides that recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award "in accordance with" sub Section 2 and sub Section 3. Sub Section 2 relates to grounds for setting aside an award and is not relevant for our purposes. But an application filed beyond the period mentioned in Section 34, sub section (3) would not be an application "in accordance with" that sub section. Consequently by virtue of Section 34 (1), recourse to the court against an arbitral award cannot be made beyond the period prescribed. The importance of the period fixed under Section 34 is emphasised by the provisions of Section 36 which provide that "where the time for making an application to set aside the arbitral award under Section 34 has expired.......the award shall be enforced and the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in the same manner as if it were a decree of a court". This is a significant departure from the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Under the 1940 Act, after the time to set aside the award expired, the court was required to "proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award and upon (he judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow". Now the consequence of the time expiring under Section 34 of the 1996 Act is that the award becomes immediately enforceable without any further act of the Court. If there were any residual doubt on the interpretaion of the language used in Section 34, the scheme of the 1996 Act would resolve the issue in favour of curtailment of the Court's powers by the exclusion of the operation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The appellant then sought to rely on a decision of this Court in Civil Appeal No. 1953 of 2000 - - Union of India v. M/s Hanuman Prasad & Brothers1, (2000) AIR SCW 3934 (2) to which one of us (Ruma Pal, J.) was a party. It is contended that the decision is an authority for the proposition that Section 5 of the limitation Act applied to objections to an award under the 1996 Act. It is true that in the body of that judgment, there is a reference to the 1996 Act. It is contended that the decision is an authority for the proposition that Section 5 of the limitation Act applied to objections to an award under the 1996 Act. It is true that in the body of that judgment, there is a reference to the 1996 Act. But that is an apparent error as the reasoning clearly indicates that the provisions of section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and not section 34 of the 1996 Act were under consideration. In order to clarify the position, we have scrutinized the original record of Civil Appeal No. 1953 of 2000 decided on 6th March 2000. We have found that that was indeed a case which dealt with an Award passed and challenged under the Arbitration Act, 1940. No question was raised with regard to the applicability of the Limitation Act to the 1940 Act. The only issue was whether the High Court should have refused to condone the delay of 2 months and 22 days in filing the objection to the Award. This Court found that sufficient cause had been shown to condone the delay and accordingly set aside the decision of the High Court. This decision is as such irrelevant." 15. Further, sofaras the matter in regard to the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation for setting aside the arbitration award under Section 34 of the Act is concerned, the said matter has come up for consideration before Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Consolidation Engineering Enterprises Vs. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department and others, 2008 (7) SCC 169 , after considering the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act as well as Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act and Section 34 of the Act,1996 held as under: - "The question posed for consideration before the Court is whether the provision of Section 14 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to an application submitted under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 for setting aside the award made by the arbitrator. In order to resolve the controversy it would be advantageous to refer to certain provisions of the Limitation Act and Section 34 of the Act of 1996. In order to resolve the controversy it would be advantageous to refer to certain provisions of the Limitation Act and Section 34 of the Act of 1996. Section 14 and relevant part of 29(2) of the Limitation Act, necessary for the purpose of deciding the issue, read as under: "14.Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first or of a appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (2)In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (3)Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 2 of Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission granted by the court under rule 1 of that Order, where such permission is granted on the ground that the first suit must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the court or other cause of a like nature. Explanation : For the purpose of this section,-- (a)in excluding the time during which a former civil proceeding was pending, the day on which that proceeding was instituted and the day on which it ended shall both be counted. (b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding. (C) misjoining of parties or of cause of action shall be deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction. (b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding. (C) misjoining of parties or of cause of action shall be deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction. 29 (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provision of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. However, Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 reads as under: 34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.- (1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). However, Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 reads as under: 34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.- (1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). (2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if- (a) the party making the application furnishes proof that- (i) a party was under some incapacity; or (ii)the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or (iii)the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or (iv)the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration: Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or (v)the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Part from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Part; or (b)the Court finds that (i)the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force, or (ii)the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India. Explanation: Without prejudice to the generality of sub-clause (ii) of clause (b), it is hereby declared, for the avoidance of any doubt, that an award is in conflict with the public policy of India if the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in violation of section 75 of section 81. Explanation: Without prejudice to the generality of sub-clause (ii) of clause (b), it is hereby declared, for the avoidance of any doubt, that an award is in conflict with the public policy of India if the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in violation of section 75 of section 81. (3)An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter. (4)On receipt of an application under sub-section (1), the Court may, where it is appropriate and it is so requested by a party, adjourn the proceedings for a period of time determined by it in order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the opinion of arbitral tribunal will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award. A bare reading of sub-section (3) of Section 34 read with the proviso makes it abundantly clear that the application for setting aside the award on the grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 34 will have to be made within three months. The period can further be extended, on sufficient cause being shown, by another period of 30 days but not thereafter. It means that as far as application for setting aside the award is concerned, the period of limitation prescribed is three months which can be extended by another period of 30 days, on sufficient cause being shown to the satisfaction of the Court. It means that as far as application for setting aside the award is concerned, the period of limitation prescribed is three months which can be extended by another period of 30 days, on sufficient cause being shown to the satisfaction of the Court. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, inter alia provides that where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period of limitation prescribed by the schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period was the period prescribed by the schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. When any special statute prescribes certain period of limitation as well as provision for extension upto specified time limit, on sufficient cause being shown, then the period of limitation prescribed under the special law shall prevail and to that extent the provisions of the Limitation Act shall stand excluded. As the intention of the legislature in enacting sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act is that the application for setting aside the award should be made within three months and the period can be further extended on sufficient cause being shown by another period of 30 days but not thereafter, this Court is of the opinion that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not be applicable because the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act stands excluded because of the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. However, merely because it is held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to an application filed under Section 34 of the Act for setting aside an award, one need not conclude that provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act would also not be applicable to an application submitted under Section 34 of the Act of 1996. Section 14 of the Limitation Act deals with exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in a court without jurisdiction. Section 14 of the Limitation Act deals with exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in a court without jurisdiction. On analysis of the said Section, it becomes evident that the following conditions must be satisfied before Section 14 can be pressed into service: (1)Both the prior and subsequent proceedings are civil proceedings prosecuted by the same party; (2)The prior proceeding had been prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith; (3)The failure of the prior proceeding was due to defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature; (4)The earlier proceeding and the latter proceeding must relate to the same matter in issue and; (5) Both the proceedings are in a court. The policy of the Section is to afford protection to a litigant against the bar of limitation when he institutes a proceeding which by reason of some technical defect cannot be decided on merits and is dismissed. While considering the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, proper approach will have to be adopted and the provisions will have to be interpreted so as to advance the cause of justice rather than abort the proceedings. It will be well to bear in mind that an element of mistake is inherent in the invocation of Section 14. In fact, the section is intended to provide relief against the bar of limitation in cases of mistaken remedy or selection of a wrong forum. On reading Section 14 of the Act it becomes clear that the legislature has enacted the said section to exempt a certain period covered by a bona fide litigious activity. Upon the words used in the section, it is not possible to sustain the interpretation that the principle underlying the said section, namely, that the bar of limitation should not affect a person honestly doing his best to get his case tried on merits but failing because the court is unable to give him such a trial, would not be applicable to an application filed under Section 34 of the Act of 1996. The principle is clearly applicable not only to a case in which a litigant brings his application in the court, that is, a court having no jurisdiction to entertain it but also where he brings the suit or the application in the wrong court in consequence of bona fide mistake or law or defect of procedure. The principle is clearly applicable not only to a case in which a litigant brings his application in the court, that is, a court having no jurisdiction to entertain it but also where he brings the suit or the application in the wrong court in consequence of bona fide mistake or law or defect of procedure. Having regard to the intention of the legislature this Court is of the firm opinion that the equity underlying Section 14 should be applied to its fullest extent and time taken diligently pursuing a remedy, in a wrong court, should be excluded." 16. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Coal India Limited and another vs. Ujjal Transport Agency and others (2011) 1 SCC 117 while taking into consideration the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act in regard to the filing of objection Section 34 of the Act held as under: - "Section 34 (3) of the Act provides that an application for setting aside an award may not be made after three months from the date of receipt of the arbitral award. The proviso thereto enables the court, if satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause, to entertain the application within a further period of thirty days but not thereafter. This Court in M/s. Consolidated Engineering Enterprises Vs. The Principal Secretary (Irrigation Department) & Ors., (2008) 7 SCC 169 held that neither Section 34(3) nor any other provision of the Act excludes the application of Section 14 of Limitation Act, 1963 and the provisions of Section 14 of Limitation Act would apply to applications under Section 34 of the Act. This court held that even where there is jurisdiction for applying Section 14 of Limitation Act, the period of limitation will continue to be three months (subject to extension under the proviso to subsection (3) of Section 34 of the Act) but in computing the limitation period of three months for the application under Section 34(1) of the Act, the time during which the applicant was prosecuting the matter bonafide and with due diligence before the wrong court will have to be excluded. In this case the Award was passed on 6.2.2009. The petition under Section 34 before the District Court was filed on 19.10.2009. The appeal before the wrong forum was filed on 6.5.2009 and withdrawn on 30.10.2009. In this case the Award was passed on 6.2.2009. The petition under Section 34 before the District Court was filed on 19.10.2009. The appeal before the wrong forum was filed on 6.5.2009 and withdrawn on 30.10.2009. If the appellants are able to demonstrate that they were bona fide and with due diligence pursuing the remedy before a court without jurisdiction, they will be entitled for exclusion of time from 6.5.2009 to 30.10.2009 (or till 19.10.2009 when they filed the application before the proper forum). If the said period is excluded, it will be seen that the application was filed within three months which is the period of limitation, even without the benefit of extension under the proviso to Section 34(3) of the Act. The question that therefore would arise for consideration is whether the appellants were bona fide and diligently pursuing the remedy before a wrong forum. The first respondent contended that different causes were shown and different explanations were given by the appellants in the application for condonation of delay filed by the appellant before the District Court on 3.11.2009, the subsequent application under Section 34(3) of the Act read with Section 14 of Limitation Act filed on 8.1.2010 and the application dated 29.10.2009 for withdrawal of the appeal filed before the High Court. But a careful examination of these applications shows that there is, in fact, no 4 inconsistency. The first appellant is a Corporation and it has to act through its Board of Directors and not at the level of individual officers. It is true that the appellants have stated that they became aware that the appeal was not maintainable before the High Court when they came to know about the execution proceedings. But thereafter, there was some uncertainty as to whether the application under Section 34 of the Act had to be filed in the District Court only after the withdrawal of ''appeal' under Section 34 of the Act before the High Court, or whether the withdrawal and filing of fresh application under Section 34 of the Act should be simultaneous, or whether to avoid delay, the application under Section 34 of the Act should be filed in the District Court immediately even before the application for withdrawal could be moved before the High Court. In fact the appellants demonstrated their diligence and bona fides by filing the application under Section 34 of the Act on 19.10.2009 itself immediately on reopening of court, without waiting for a formal order of withdrawal of the ''appeal' under Section 34 before the wrong forum. Therefore, it cannot be said that filing of the application under Section 34 of the Act on 19.10.2009 was belated. Further if the period spent before wrong forum is excluded, the application is filed within three months and there is no question of explaining any delay." 17. Thus, the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act can be given if a person is pursuing a remedy before the wrong court. However, in the instant matter, as per admitted facts, M/S Anurag Mobiles moved an application along with an affidavit under Section 14 of the Limitation Act on the ground that as per direction given by Sole Arbitrator, representation has been made to get certain documents from Tata Teleservices Ltd. and in this regard, assurance has been given, but no heed has been paid by the revisionist. So the period between 27.08.2009 to till November, 200 which has been spent by the respondents in regard to correspondence made between them and revisionist, delay may be condoned by giving the benefit of Section 14 of Limitation Act. As the said correspondence does not in any manner come within the ambit and scope of the Court as per Section 14 of the Limitation Act and Tata Teleservices Ltd. is not a court of law, so the said benefit cannot be given to M/s Anurag Mobiles/respondent. 18. Further, the court below/District Judge, Lucknow while passing the impugned order has held that It is correct to say that the defendant is not court of Law and, at the first blus, it appears that, if another proceedings is not being prosecuted in the court of law, the party adopting such another proceeding is not entitled to benefit of Section-14 o the Limitation Act. But as in the present case in hand, another proceeding the plaintiff has adopted by filing representation before the defendant pursuant to the direction of learned Arbitrator, hence, to my mind, the Principle embodied in section 14 of the Limitation Act may be made squarely application to the present case. But as in the present case in hand, another proceeding the plaintiff has adopted by filing representation before the defendant pursuant to the direction of learned Arbitrator, hence, to my mind, the Principle embodied in section 14 of the Limitation Act may be made squarely application to the present case. The said action on the part of the court below thereby condoning the delay in filing the objection against the award given by the Arbitrator is contrary to settle proposition of law as laid down by Hon'ble the Apex Court as stated herein above which governs the filed, so liable to be set aside. 19. For the foregoing reasons, the revision is allowed and the impugned order dated 22.08.2012 passed by District Judge, Lucknow in Misc. Case No.311/2009 (M/S Anurag Mobiles vs. Tata Teleservices Ltd.) is set aside.