JUDGMENT Mahendra Dayal,J. 1. By means of this writ petition, the petitioners have prayed for quashing of the orders dated 5.9.2013 and 11.12.2013, passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No.10, Lucknow, in Rent Appeal No. 33/2012, whereby two applications for issue of survey commission have been rejected. 2. The subject matter of the dispute is House No.86/249, Mohalla Maqboolganj, Kurmi Tola, Ram Gopal Vidyant Road, Lucknow. The opposite party no.2 filed an application for release under Section 21(1) (a) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act No.13 of 1972 claiming himself to be the owner and land-lord of the said house on the basis of a Will executed by Mohan Lal Kalwar in favour of Om Prakash Jaiswal. The application of release was filed on the ground of bonafide need. During the pendency of the release application the petitioners on 4.7.2011 moved an application for survey commission which was rejected by the Prescribed Authority by the order dated 14.7.2011. Thereafter the application for release was allowed. 3. Feeling aggrieved by the release order, the petitioners filed appeal under Section 22 of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 which is presently pending in the court of Additional District Judge, Court No.10, Lucknow. As the Prescribed Authority had refused to issue survey commission, the petitioners again applied before appellate court for local inspection vide application dated 31.5.2013 and the petitioners prayed that the court may also inspect the premises in dispute, so that the controversy between the parties may be adjudicated. The said application was rejected by the learned appellate court vide order dated 5.9.2013 on the ground that there was no need for local inspection of the property. However, the learned appellate court observed that if at the time of argument it was felt necessary to inspect the property,l the court shall himself inspect the property after informing the parties. 4. It appears that after the rejection of the earlier application for local inspection, the petitioners moved another application for local inspection, which was again rejected by the order dated 11.12.2013 and this time the learned appellate court also imposed cost of Rs. 1000/- upon the petitioners observing that the application has been moved to prolong the disposal of the appeal. 5. 1000/- upon the petitioners observing that the application has been moved to prolong the disposal of the appeal. 5. Shri S.K. Mehrotra, learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that under Section 34 and Rule 22 framed under the Act No.13 of 1972 there is specific provision for local inspection of the property in dispute but both the courts below rejected the prayer of the petitioners while local inspection was necessary for deciding the controversy between the parties. The purpose of local inspection is only to bring on record the real facts and not to create a fresh evidence. But both the courts below on erroneous assumption, have rejected the prayer of petitioners for issue of commission of local inspection. 6. The learned counsel for contesting opposite parties has submitted that the learned appellate court while rejecting the application for issue of commission for local inspection vide order dated 5.9.2013 has clearly observed that if after hearing the arguments, it was felt necessary to inspect the property in dispute, the same shall be done by the court itself after informing the parties. Thus it is still open for the court to either issue a commission for local inspection or inspect the property himself if at the time of final disposal of the appeal it was at all felt necessary to inspect the premises. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioners only to linger on the final disposal of the appeal which is pending since 2012. 7. It has also been submitted on behalf of the petitioners that a near relative of opposite party no.2, namely, Km. Shanti Jaiswal had instituted a suit for declaration and permanent injunction claiming the same property in dispute alleged to have been allotted to her in a family settlement with which opposite party no.2 had no concern. In this suit the petitioners admittedly were not parties. The said suit was contested by the opposite party no.2 and he claimed himself to be the owner of the property on the basis of unregistered Will. However, the said suit was decreed in favour of Km. Shanti Jaiswal but on an appeal filed by opposite party no.2. the suit was dismissed. It was held by the appellate court that the family settlement alleged by Km. Shanti Jaiswal was imaginary. However, the said suit was decreed in favour of Km. Shanti Jaiswal but on an appeal filed by opposite party no.2. the suit was dismissed. It was held by the appellate court that the family settlement alleged by Km. Shanti Jaiswal was imaginary. With regard to the Will of opposite party no.2, it was held that the said Will was forged and fictitious. Thus neither Km.Shanti Jaiswal nor the opposite party no.2 were held to be the owners of the property in question. Km. Shanti Jaiswal filed a Second Appeal No. 407 of 2006 and in the said second appeal a collusive compromise was filed by which Km. Shanti Jaiswal admitted the claim of opposite party no.2 and the said second appeal was disposed of in terms of compromise. Since the petitioners were not parties to those proceedings, hence they do not admit the opposite party no.2 as landlord. The said compromise is not binding upon the petitioners. 8. The aforesaid facts placed on behalf of the petitioners before this Court have no relevance at this point of time because in this writ petition a limited question is involved and i.e. with regard to issue of commission. Rest of the arguments raised on behalf of the petitioners are yet to be considered by the appellate court before whom the rent appeal is pending. 9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having gone through the impugned orders, I do not find any illegality and infirmity in the said order, however, the writ petition is disposed of with the direction that if after hearing the arguments of the parties in appeal the appellate court finds it necessary to inspect the property in dispute either by himself or by issuing a commission, it will be open for the appellate court to do so. 10. Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of.