Judgment : Aggrieved by the Award dated 01.11.2007 in O.P No.1002 of 2001 passed by the Chairman, I Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Nizamabad (for short “the Tribunal”) the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation/1st respondent in the O.P preferred M.A.C.M.A No.197 of 2009 questioning the quantum of compensation and the claimant preferred M.A.C.M.A No.1675 of 2009 on the ground of inadequacy of compensation. 2) The factual matrix of the case is thus: a) The claimant—Smt. Palepu Mamatha is the wife of deceased Palepu Gangadhar, R/o. Shetpally Village of Morthad Mandal, Nizamabad District and respondent No.2 is mother of the deceased. The case of the claimant is that on 05.05.2001 at about 15:30 hours, when the deceased was proceeding in a Jeep bearing No.ABV 7114 as driver from Armoor to Shetpally, suddenly a bus bearing No.AP 10 Z 8237 came in high speed from opposite side and dashed against the Jeep. In the resultant accident, the deceased and others who were travelling in the Jeep sustained multiple and grievous injuries and the deceased and three others died on the spot. It is averred that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the APSRTC bus driver. It is averred that due to sudden demise of husband of the claimant, she lost her sole breadwinner. On these pleas, the claimant filed O.P.No.1002 of 2001 against APSRTC/1st respondent claiming Rs.5,00,000/- as compensation under different heads. b) Regarding 2nd respondent, it is averred that the father of the deceased died when he was in the womb of his mother/ 2nd respondent and after giving birth to the child, the 2nd respondent threw away the child in thorny bushes when he was aged 1 ½ years and she went away with one Manne Vittal and living in Oddiat Village for the past 22 years and she never visited the deceased till his death. It is further averred that 2nd respondent was not at all depending upon the income of deceased and she is not entitled for any compensation but she being the mother, formally added as party to this O.P. c) The First respondent/APSRTC filed counter and opposed the claim, inter alia contending that the accident was occurred only due to the fault of driver of the jeep i.e, deceased but not the driver of the bus. It urged that claimant should be put to strict proof of petition averments. It urged that claimant should be put to strict proof of petition averments. R.1 further contended that at the time of the accident, the deceased was carrying more passengers than permissible under the MV Act and Rules and the bus was going slowly on its left side of the road and the deceased who was proceeding on wrong side of the road was unable to control the jeep and dashed against the bus. R.1 further contended that the deceased was not holding any valid driving licence and as such the Insurer of the Jeep was not made as party to this O.P. R.1 contended that this O.P is bad for non-joinder of necessary party i.e, Insurer of the Jeep. d) Respondent No.2 filed counter and denied the petition averments and urged to put the petitioner in strict proof of the same. R.2 contended that she is the real mother of the deceased and she filed separate O.P.No.1086 of 2001 against R.1 and the petitioner. She denied that she has thrown away her deceased son and submitted that she remarried after the death of father of deceased. R.2 further contended that petitioner got remarried after the death of deceased and as such the petitioner is not entitled to claim any compensation. e) During trial, PW.1 was examined and Exs.A1 to A4 were marked on behalf of the claimant. RWs.1 to 4 were examined and Exs.B.1 to B.3 were marked on behalf of respondents. f) A perusal of the award shows that considering the oral evidence of RW.2 – eye witness and also the documentary evidence Ex.A1-F.I.R and Ex.A2-charge sheet, the Tribunal held that the bus driver was responsible for the accident. In this regard, Tribunal did not believe the evidence of RW.4 – bus conductor. g) Then coming to the quantum of compensation, the Tribunal having observed that the deceased was aged 23 years and a driver, fixed his monthly income at Rs.3,000/- and assessed the compensation under different heads as follows: Loss of dependency Rs.4,08,000/- Funeral expenses Rs. 5,000/- Loss of consortium Rs. 15,000/- Total Rs.4,28,000/- Thus, the Tribunal granted total compensation of Rs.4,28,000/- with proportionate costs and interest @ 7.5% p.a against 1st respondent. h) So far as issue No.2 is concerned, the O.P.No.1086/01 filed by R.2 was dismissed on 14.07.2005 giving liberty to contest and adduce evidence in the O.P.No.1002 of 2001. 5,000/- Loss of consortium Rs. 15,000/- Total Rs.4,28,000/- Thus, the Tribunal granted total compensation of Rs.4,28,000/- with proportionate costs and interest @ 7.5% p.a against 1st respondent. h) So far as issue No.2 is concerned, the O.P.No.1086/01 filed by R.2 was dismissed on 14.07.2005 giving liberty to contest and adduce evidence in the O.P.No.1002 of 2001. The Tribunal held that claimant and 2nd respondent being the legal heirs of the deceased, they are entitled to claim the compensation amount equally. Hence, the appeals by respective parties. 3) Heard arguments of Smt. B.G. Uma Devi, learned standing counsel for APSRTC/appellant in MACMA No.197 of 2009, Sri M. Rajamalla Reddy, learned counsel for claimant/appellant in MACMA No.1675 of 2009 and Sri N. Sreedhar Reddy, learned counsel for R.2 in both the appeals. 4a) Learned standing counsel for APSRTC / appellant in MACMA No. 197 of 2009 firstly argued that the Tribunal erred in holding that the bus driver was responsible for the accident. Learned counsel submitted that the evidence of the bus conductor (RW.4) coupled with Ex.B.3 – judgment in C.C.No.102 of 2002 on the file of Judicial Magistrate of First Class at Armoor would clearly show that bus driver drove the bus at slow speed to his left side and on the other hand, the deceased drove the Jeep at high speed and lost control and dashed the bus and therefore, the Tribunal ought to have dismissed the claim in limini by fixing the liability on the deceased. b) Secondly, questioning the quantum of compensation, learned counsel argued that the Tribunal erred in fixing the monthly income of the deceased at Rs.3,000/- without there being any cogent evidence in this regard. Learned counsel submitted, thereby the compensation was unduly escalated. c) Thirdly, learned counsel submitted that the claim petition is not maintainable in view of the fact that the claimant remarried after the death of the deceased and hence she is no more a legal representative of the deceased. Learned counsel thus prayed to allow its appeal and dismiss the appeal of claimant. 5a) Per contra, learned counsel for claimant/appellant in M.A.C.M.A No.1675 of 2009 firstly argued that the accident was occurred purely due to the rash and negligent driving of the bus driver and hence the Tribunal has rightly fixed liability on him. Learned counsel thus prayed to allow its appeal and dismiss the appeal of claimant. 5a) Per contra, learned counsel for claimant/appellant in M.A.C.M.A No.1675 of 2009 firstly argued that the accident was occurred purely due to the rash and negligent driving of the bus driver and hence the Tribunal has rightly fixed liability on him. He submitted that the claimant could establish the fault of bus driver through RW.2 – an independent eye witness-cum-victim in the accident. In view of it, the judgment of the criminal court exonerating the bus driver from the liability cannot be considered. He further submitted that RW.4 – bus conductor is only an interested witness to see that his department is exempted from paying compensation. Therefore, the oral and documentary evidence adduced by APSRTC cannot undo the independent evidence of RW.2. b) Secondly regarding quantum of compensation, learned counsel argued that the Tribunal granted meager compensation and it failed to award compensation under certain heads. For instance, he submitted, the Tribunal did not grant compensation for loss of estate. Learned counsel further submitted that the claimant is entitled to Rs.1,00,000/- as compensation for loss of consortium as per the latest judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in Rajesh and others vs. Rajbir Singh and others (2013 ACJ 1403). Regarding compensation for loss of dependency, he argued that the Tribunal ought to have accepted the monthly income of the deceased as Rs.5,900/- in view of the evidence of RW.3 coupled with Ex.B.2. He further submitted that the Tribunal ought to have accepted ‘18’ as multiplier instead of ‘17’ following the decision reported in Smt. Sarla Verma and others vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and another ( 2009 ACJ 1298 = (2009) 6 SCC 121 ). c) Thirdly, he argued that the 2nd respondent is not entitled to any compensation as she remarried immediately after the death of father of the deceased and forlorned him. Hence compensation awarded to her may be withdrawn and granted to the claimant. He thus prayed to allow the appeal filed by claimant and dismiss the appeal filed by APSRTC. 6) Learned counsel for R.2 argued that the remarriage of the mother will not deprive her social status as the legal representative of the deceased and hence she was rightly granted compensation by the Tribunal and in case compensation is enhanced in the appeal, she may be allotted her due share. 6) Learned counsel for R.2 argued that the remarriage of the mother will not deprive her social status as the legal representative of the deceased and hence she was rightly granted compensation by the Tribunal and in case compensation is enhanced in the appeal, she may be allotted her due share. 7) In the light of above rival arguments, now the points for determination in these appeals are: 1. Whether the accident was occurred due to the fault of driver of APSRTC bus bearing No. AP 10 Z 8237 or due to the fault of driver of Jeep bearing No. ABV 7114? 2. Whether the claimant and 2nd respondent are the legal representatives of the deceased and hence entitled to compensation? 3. Whether the compensation granted by the Tribunal is just and reasonable and needs enhancement? 8) POINT No.1: The accident, involvement of the APSRTC bus and jeep and death of the deceased are all admitted facts. The point is whether the bus driver or the deceased as the driver of the Jeep or both were at fault. It may be noted that the Tribunal opined that the bus driver was responsible for the accident. To prove guilt of bus driver, the claimant and 2nd respondent examined RW.2 – eye witness-cum-victim of the accident. Whereas APSRTC examined its conductor as RW.4 and produced Ex.B.3 – judgment to show that bus driver was not responsible for the accident. Hence the aforesaid evidence needs scrutiny. 9) Admittedly the accident was occurred on 05.05.2001 near Dargah in Chepur Village in between Armoor and Shetpally. F.I.R was registered within short time after the accident on the complaint lodged by one Gajjela Narsaiah who was a passenger in the Jeep. His version in Ex.A.1 – F.I.R is that about 16 passengers were travelling in the Jeep and when the Jeep reached the Dargah, at that time the RTC bus came in the opposite direction from Godavarikhani side being driven by its driver at high speed and in a rash and negligent manner and hit the Jeep and thereby four persons including the Jeep driver died on the spot and others including RW.2 suffered injuries. He averred that the bus driver was responsible for the accident. This is the earliest version regarding the manner of occurrence of accident. He averred that the bus driver was responsible for the accident. This is the earliest version regarding the manner of occurrence of accident. The complainant was not examined but one of the passengers in the Jeep i.e, RW.2 was examined by the claimant and R.2. RW.2 deposed in similar lines to Ex.A.1 and stated that when the Jeep reached outskirts of Chepur Village on N.H-16 road, the offending bus came from opposite direction driven by its driver at high speed and in a rash and negligent manner and dashed their Jeep and thereby the driver and four inmates died on the spot whereas himself and some others received injuries. He categorically avouched that the accident was occurred due to the fault of bus driver. In the cross-examination except suggesting that accident was occurred due to the fault of Jeep driver which he emphatically denied, nothing useful was extracted to conclude that the bus driver was not at fault and Jeep driver himself was at fault. It should be noted that RW.2 is an independent witness and in Ex.A.2- charge sheet he was cited as LW.4 i.e, injured-cum-eye witness. 10) Against the above evidence, RTC examined its conductor as RW.4. He deposed that on seeing the Jeep, the bus driver slowed down the bus and proceeding on the left side of the road but the Jeep driver who was carrying 20 persons went on wrong side of the road and at high speed and unable to control the Jeep dashed the bus and thereby the accident was occurred. He stated that the bus driver was not at fault. He stated that at the time of accident, he was sitting in his seat. He denied the suggestion that he did not see the manner of occurrence of the accident. He also denied the suggestion that bus driver was at fault and not the Jeep driver. He produced Ex.B.3 – copy of judgment in C.C.No.102 of 2002 on the file of Judicial Magistrate of First Class at Armoor to show that in the resultant criminal case, the bus driver was acquitted. So far as the judgment in a criminal case is concerned, law is clear that the same cannot have a binding force in a civil case and the fault of the concerned driver has to be decided basing on the evidence produced before the Tribunal. So far as the judgment in a criminal case is concerned, law is clear that the same cannot have a binding force in a civil case and the fault of the concerned driver has to be decided basing on the evidence produced before the Tribunal. Here we have the evidence of RW.2 on one hand and RW.4 on the other. As already discussed supra, RW.2 is an independent witness and a victim in the accident. He is not interested towards any of the drivers and therefore, if the Jeep driver was at fault, there was no need for him to hide the said fact and attribute the fault to bus driver. On the other hand, RW.4 belongs to RTC department and thus an interested witness. No doubt he was examined on the plea that bus driver was not in the service of RTC but on his own admission he was sitting in the conductor’s seat and claimed to have witnessed the accident. Hence due to the distance between his seat and front windshield, his observing the manner of occurrence of accident is also a doubtful one. So in any view of the matter, the evidence of RW.2 is reliable than RW.4. Therefore, unhesitatingly it can be held that the bus driver was responsible for the accident. Thus, the Tribunal was right in holding so. 11) POINT No.2: Admittedly the claimant and 2nd respondent are the wife and mother of the deceased – Palepu Gangadhar and they are his legal representatives. However the respective rival contentions are that according to 2nd respondent, claimant after the death of deceased married one Bojanna of Pippera Village and she is no more the L.R of the deceased, whereas the contention of claimant is that 2nd respondent after the death of her husband threw away her son i.e, deceased when he was aged about 1 ½ year and married one Manne Vittal of Oddiat Village in Morthad Mandal, Nizamabad District and gave birth to three children and she has been living with them and hence she is no more the L.R of the deceased. a) So far as the claimant is concerned, the Tribunal held that except the allegation, 2nd respondent failed to prove that the claimant remarried one Bojanna of Pippera Village. a) So far as the claimant is concerned, the Tribunal held that except the allegation, 2nd respondent failed to prove that the claimant remarried one Bojanna of Pippera Village. The Tribunal also perused the decision reported in National Insurance Company Limited vs. Eda Anjanamma and others ( 2004 (1) ALD 117 )cited by R.2 and held that the said decision has no application. b) So far as the mother is concerned, the Tribunal considering Sections 8 and 14 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 observed that the right inherited by her in the estate of her deceased son became absolute and her remarriage is not a bar for her to succeed as heir to her son. Thus, the Tribunal held that both claimant and 2nd respondent are entitled to compensation and granted the compensation in equal shares to them. 12) Now in the appeal again their right is in dispute. Hence their eligibility to claim compensation needs scrutiny. 13) In this regard, the first legal point is whether remarriage of a wife subsequent to the death of her husband in an accident disentitles her to claim compensation. The above question came up for consideration in EdaAnjanamma’s case (3 Supra). In that case one E. Venkata Ramana died in a tractor accident. His wife, father and mother filed claim petition. The Insurance Company inter alia contended that wife is not entitled to claim compensation as she got remarried during pendency of the claim petition. The facts proved that 1st claimant was widow for about three years after the death of deceased and then remarried. Learned single judge of this Court placing reliance on the decision of a Division Bench of Orissa High Court reported in State of Orissa vs. Smt. Archana Nayak and others (1987 ACJ 772)held thus: “20. The facts proved that 1st claimant was widow for about three years after the death of deceased and then remarried. Learned single judge of this Court placing reliance on the decision of a Division Bench of Orissa High Court reported in State of Orissa vs. Smt. Archana Nayak and others (1987 ACJ 772)held thus: “20. After analyzing the above legal position it is made out that a widow of the deceased who died in the motor accident is entitled for compensation for loss of dependency, loss of consortium and the other items of compensation till she ceases to be the legal representative of her late husband on her remarriage, therefore, she cannot be denied compensation completely and it has to be reduced on the basis of the period during which she remained as the widow of the deceased.” It may be noted that the Division Bench of Orissa High Court on which reliance was placed by the learned judge of this Court, decided that the widow of the deceased will be entitled to compensation only for the period she remained as his widow on the observation that under Section 110-A of the M.V. Act claim application has to be made by all or any of the “legal representatives” and the expression “legal representative” has not been defined in the M.V. Act but it has been defined under Section 2(11) of the C.P.C to mean a person who in law represents the estate of the deceased person and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased. Orissa High Court further observed that with the remarriage, the wife ceases to be the legal representative of her first husband though by virtue of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, the property of her husband vested in her cannot be divested i.e, once a widow succeeds to the property of her husband and acquires an absolute right over the same, she would not be divested of that absolute right on her remarriage but she would certainly cease to be a legal representative of the first husband on her remarriage. Under Section 22 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 she also ceases to be dependent and thus if a widow remarries after the death of her husband her dependency ends. Under Section 22 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 she also ceases to be dependent and thus if a widow remarries after the death of her husband her dependency ends. 14) So in the view of Orissa High court, though a remarriage will not divest the right of a Hindu woman in the estate of her husband by virtue of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956, still for the purpose of claiming compensation due to death of her husband in an accident, she cease to be his legal representative as soon as she remarries and therefore, she will be entitled to compensation till she remained his widow only. 15) It must be noted that the right to claim compensation arises out of a tortuous liability i.e, accident. Such a right to claim compensation against a tortfeaser accrues to the wife of a deceased on the date of death of her husband and not on the date of her subsequent remarriage. This right which accrued on her will not be divested due to subsequent remarriage. If remarriage of a widow is not a taboo or an offence and on the other hand, it is considered as a symbol of progress by the social reformers, reinforcing it will lead the society to regression than progression. Hence in my view, remarriage of the wife after the death of a husband cannot be considered as a clog to claim compensation. In a similar case reported in New India Assurance Company through it’s Branch Manager vs. Mona Girish @ Giridhari Chandak and others ( 2011 ACJ 662 ),High Court of Bombay (Nagpur Bench) observed thus: “Here, one has to bear in mind that claim arises out of tort. As soon as the tort is committed, the person against whom such tort is committed becomes entitled to compensation. Therefore, if on the date the tort was committed, the claimant was entitled to a certain compensation, any subsequent act cannot deprive him or her of the said entitlement. As soon as the cause of action arises, the person in whose favour it so arises can prosecute the same. The provision in the form of Section 166 of the Act is a social Legislation. The same, therefore, must be interpreted to further the objective of the said section. The law does not prohibit a widow from remarrying. As soon as the cause of action arises, the person in whose favour it so arises can prosecute the same. The provision in the form of Section 166 of the Act is a social Legislation. The same, therefore, must be interpreted to further the objective of the said section. The law does not prohibit a widow from remarrying. Claimant No. 1 was only 25 years of age when her husband died. To my mind, it would be too much of Insurance Company to expect that, if the claimant wants to have compensation, she should not remarry and suffer miseries. In fact, a legislation was required to be brought to overcome the evil of prohibition of remarriage of a widow. If these aspects of the matter are considered, remarriage cannot be an impediment in claiming the compensation nor can it be a ground to reduce the compensation to which the widow is otherwise entitled.” Madras High Court also expressed the same view in the case of National Insurance Company Limited rep. by its Branch Manager, Kottai Station Road, Trichy vs. Nelphona and others (2013) 1 ACC 503)and observed thus: “Under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, it is provided that any of the legal representatives can file the claim petition. Widow even after remarriage continues to be the legal representative of her husband as there is no provision under the Hindu Succession Act or any other law which lays down that after remarriage she does not continue to be the legal representative. The right of succession accrues immediately on the death of husband and in the absence of any provision she cannot be divested from the property vested in her due to remarriage.” 16) Law cannot be static but dynamic mirroring the needs of society. Restricting a wife to claim compensation only for the period she remained as widow is nothing but fettering her growth. In view of this and the latest law being in favour of a wife conferring on her full rights to claim compensation even after her remarrying subsequent to the death of her husband, the view expressed by the High Court of Orissa and reflected in the decision of the Single Judge of this Court cannot be followed. For this reason, it is held, even if the claimant remarries after the death of her husband she will not lose her right to claim compensation. For this reason, it is held, even if the claimant remarries after the death of her husband she will not lose her right to claim compensation. Even otherwise, the record shows that except making allegation, the R.2 failed to prove that the claimant remarried one Bojanna after the death of her husband. Hence she can be still considered as the wife of deceased. Therefore, either way the claimant is entitled to compensation. 17) Second respondent is concerned, she admitted that after the death of her husband, she remarried one Manne Vittal, Oddiat Village and begot three children and however she denied that she threw away the deceased in thorny buses while he was a kid. She further denied that she was not depending on him. It may be noted that under Section 8 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 a mother along with other Class I heirs, inherits the estate of her deceased son and this right is an absolute one under Section 14 of the said Act and the said right will not be divested due to her remarriage. Hon’ble Supreme Court considered this aspect in a decision reported in Smt.KasturiDevi vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others ( AIR 1976 SC 2595 ) and observed thus: “We are, however, unable to agree with the view taken by the Deputy Director of Consolidation which appears to be contrary to the written text of the Hindu Law. Mulla in his 'Hindu Law', 14th Edn, while describing the incidents of a mother regarding inheritance under Clause (iii) observed at p. 116 as follows: (iii) Unchastity and remarriage---Unchastity of a mother is no bar to her succeeding as heir to her son, nor docs remarriage constitute any such bar. 4. A large number of authorities have been cited in support of this view. We find ourselves entirely in agreement with this view. Our attention has not been invited to any text of the Hindu Law under which a mother could be divested of her interest in the property either on the ground of unchastity or re-marriage.” 18) So on the same analogy, it can be said that R.2 is also entitled to compensation. This point is decided accordingly. 19) POINT No.3: This point is concerned, the submission on behalf of claimant is that the Tribunal granted only Rs.15,000/- for loss of consortium and she deserves more as per Rajesh’s case (1 Supra). This point is decided accordingly. 19) POINT No.3: This point is concerned, the submission on behalf of claimant is that the Tribunal granted only Rs.15,000/- for loss of consortium and she deserves more as per Rajesh’s case (1 Supra). Considering the fact that claimant lost her husband in the prime of her youth, compensation for loss of consortium is enhanced to Rs.25,000/- relying on Rajesh’s case (1 Supra). 20) Nextly, it is contended that the Tribunal erred in fixing the monthly income of the deceased as Rs.3,000/-. However on perusal of the Paras 21 and 22 of the award, I hold that the Tribunal rightly fixed the earnings of the deceased as Rs.3,000/- p.m and there is no need to review the same. Then multiplier is concerned, the contention of claimant is that ‘18’ instead of ‘17’ ought to have been taken as multiplier following the decision in SarlaVerma’s case (2 Supra), in view of the fact that the deceased was aged 23 years. There is some force in the said contention. The age of the deceased is consistently mentioned as 23 years in Ex.A.2- charge sheet and Ex.A.3- postmortem report in SarlaVerma’s case (2 Supra), Hon’ble Apex Court fixed multiplier ‘18’ for the deceased in the age group of 21 to 25 years Hence compensation for loss of dependency has to reassessed basing on the said multiplier. Accordingly, the annual income of the deceased i.e, Rs.36,000/- is multiplied with ‘18’ which comes to Rs.6,48,000/-. From this 1/3rd is deducted towards his personal expenditure and balance amount of Rs.4,32,000/- is awarded as compensation. Further a sum of Rs.5,000/- is awarded towards loss of estate as the same was not granted by the Tribunal. Thus the total compensation payable is stated as follows: Loss of dependency Rs.4,32,000/- Loss of estate Rs. 5,000/- Loss of consortium Rs. 25,000/- Funeral expenses Rs. 5,000/- Total Rs.4,67,000/- So the compensation is enhanced by Rs.39,000/- (Rs.4,67,000/- minus Rs.4,28,000/-) 21) Considering the fact that claimant is the wife and a lonely lady, she is held entitled to Rs.3,17,000/- and R.2 being mother and having children to look after held entitled to Rs.1,50,000/-. 5,000/- Loss of consortium Rs. 25,000/- Funeral expenses Rs. 5,000/- Total Rs.4,67,000/- So the compensation is enhanced by Rs.39,000/- (Rs.4,67,000/- minus Rs.4,28,000/-) 21) Considering the fact that claimant is the wife and a lonely lady, she is held entitled to Rs.3,17,000/- and R.2 being mother and having children to look after held entitled to Rs.1,50,000/-. 22) In view of the discussion in points 1 to 3 supra, the two appeals are disposed of accordingly and ordered as follows: i) M.A.C.M.A. No.197 of 2009 is dismissed and ii) M.A.C.M.A.No.1675 of 2009 is allowed and compensation is enhanced by Rs.39,000/- with proportionate costs and simple interest at 7.5% p.a from the date of O.P till the date of realisation. iii) Respondent No.1/APSRTC is directed to deposit the compensation amount within one month from the date of this judgment, failing which execution can be taken out against it. iv) On such deposit or realisation, claimant in the O.P is entitled to Rs.3,17,000/- with proportionate costs and simple interest to her share. She is permitted to withdraw Rs.1,00,000/- to meet her immediate needs. Her balance amount shall be kept in F.D in State Bank of India, Kanteshwar Branch, Nizamabad for a period of three years. v) Respondent No.2 in the O.P is entitled to Rs.1,50,000/-. She is permitted to withdraw Rs.1,00,000/- to meet her immediate needs. Her balance amount shall be kept in F.D in State Bank of India, Kanteshwar Branch, Nizamabad for a period of three years. vi) No order as to costs in the appeals. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications if any pending in these appeals, shall stand closed.