JUDGMENT Mahendra Dayal,J. The petitioners being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 31.03.1981 passed by the Judge Small Causes Court, Lucknow in S.C.C. Suit No.2895 of 1974 and judgment and decree dated 15.04.1983 passed by the Additional District Judge, Lucknow in Civil Revision No.201 of 1982, have filed this writ petition. 2. The opposite party no.1 Shri Munnilal Bhagwati Prasad Dharamshala Trust filed a suit being S.C.C. Suit No.2895 of 1974 in the Court of Judge Small Causes Court, Lucknow for ejectment, recovery of arrears of rent and mesne profits on the ground of default committed by the petitioners. It was alleged that the original petitioner namely Ram Deo Tripathi was a tenant @ Rs.46/- per month, which was enhanced to Rs.62.10 paisa per month after coming into force of U.P.Act No.13 of 1972. The Trust had purchased the property in the year 1960 and thereafter the petitioner-tenant had sent only Rs.902.20 paisa by money order and thereafter deposited a sum of Rs.1,978/- in the Court of Munsif North, Lucknow but thereafter nether any rent was deposited by the petitioner-tenant nor the same was paid to the opposite party no.1 landlord. The suit was contested mainly on the ground that the notice was not served before filing of the suit and it was also pleaded that the original-tenant was the firm namely M/s. Laxmi Rasayanshala in which the petitioners are the partners. It was further alleged that the tenancy was for the manufacturing purposes. It was pleaded that the suit in respect of a part of the tenanted premises was not maintainable. Learned Judge, Small Causes Court framed points for determination and after hearing came to the conclusion that the petitioner namely Ram Deo Tripathi alone was tenant of the premises in question and there was no defect of non-joinder of necessary parties. The learned trial court further found that the tenant was duly served with the notice and he has committed default in payment of rent. He was therefore liable to be ejected. 3. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Judge, Small Causes Court, the petitioner filed a revision before the District Judge, which was heard and dismissed by the 7th Additional District Judge, Lucknow by the judgment and decree dated 15.04.1983. 4. I have heard Shri Qamar Ahmad appearing on behalf of the petitioner and learned counsel for the opposite parties. 5. 4. I have heard Shri Qamar Ahmad appearing on behalf of the petitioner and learned counsel for the opposite parties. 5. It has been argued on behalf of the petitioners that it was the firm namely Laxmi Rasayanshala which took on rent the shop in question in the year 1953. At that time, the Trust was not in existence. The Trust was created sometimes after 1960 and before 1965. The landlord opposite party served a first notice on 02.04.1974 and thereafter issued a second notice on 09.10.1974. However, when the case was filed, the first notice dated 02.04.1974 was made basis of the suit. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that when a second notice was issued by the landlord to the tenant, the first notice automatically stood waived. Thus, the suit filed on the basis of the first notice was not maintainable and both the courts below have committed illegality in passing the impugned judgments. The petitioners had also denied the tenancy on the ground that the tenancy was in the name of the firm. It has also been submitted on behalf of the petitioners that initially the learned trial court had framed only six issues but subsequently additional issues were framed without the knowledge of the petitioners. The petitioners have also by means of amendment in the writ petition have challenged the Constitution of the Small Causes Court and have argued that Section 21(2) CPC inserted by the C.P.C. Amendment Act, 1976 is arbitrary as it gives unguided and absolute power to a Court and as such is violative of Section 6 of the Code and parts III & IV of the Constitution of India. If a suit is tried by a Court which has no pecuniary jurisdiction, the same would be without jurisdiction and void ab initio. The petitioners have prayed for issue of a writ declaring the proviso attached to the Order VI Rule 17 CPC, ultra-vires and void. 6. If a suit is tried by a Court which has no pecuniary jurisdiction, the same would be without jurisdiction and void ab initio. The petitioners have prayed for issue of a writ declaring the proviso attached to the Order VI Rule 17 CPC, ultra-vires and void. 6. In a suit for arrears of rent and ejectment after determination of lease, the basic requirement is that the Court should see that the notice issued by the landlord to the tenant by which the tenancy was terminated, was a valid notice or not because unless the tenancy of a tenant is not terminated by issuing a valid notice, the landlord cannot maintain a suit for ejectment on the ground of arrears of rent or on any other ground provided under Section 20 of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972. In this case, the contention of the petitioners is that when the landlord issued a second notice, the first notice stood automatically waived under the provisions of Transfer of Property Act. From the perusal of record, I find that first notice was issued by the landlord on 02.04.1974 and thereafter a second notice was issued on 08.10.1974. However, from the perusal of both the notices, it cannot be said that by issuing a second notice, the first notice was waived. By the second notice, the landlord only informed the tenant that in case he pays the arrears of rent, he may be considered for continuation of the tenancy otherwise the landlord would proceed in accordance with notice dated 02.04.1974. Thus, by issuing the second notice, the landlord neither terminated the tenancy of tenant nor demanded any arrears of rent from him. The landlord gave only a chance to the tenant to save his tenancy by paying the arrears of rent in time otherwise it was specifically provided in the second notice that the suit would follow. In these circumstances, the illustration appended to Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act has no application which provides that when a second notice is issued, the first notice stands waived. Thus, there is no merit in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that by issuance of second notice by the landlord, the first notice was waived. 7. It has next been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the tenancy was for manufacturing purposes and, therefore, the notice of six months was required. Thus, there is no merit in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that by issuance of second notice by the landlord, the first notice was waived. 7. It has next been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the tenancy was for manufacturing purposes and, therefore, the notice of six months was required. The tenancy could not be terminated by giving only a month's notice. Thus, the notice itself was invalid and no decree for ejectment or recovery of arrears of rent could have been passed on the basis of such invalid notice. In this regard, a perusal of the record indicates that Shri Laxmi Narain Pathak had taken the disputed shop on rent from the previous owner namely Shri Basant Singh Sarin. This fact has been stated by the defendant-petitioner himself during his cross-examination. He further stated that he was the partner of a firm namely Laxmi Rasayanshala which was established by Shri Laxmi Narain Pathak who has been running a dispensary in the shop in dispute. Thus, at the time of sale of the property in the year 1960 the original-defendant Shri Ram Deo Tripathi was tenant in respect of two shops and prior to it, Shri Laxmi Narain Pathak was tenant who was running a dispensary. Thus, the tenancy was not for manufacturing purposes. The original-tenant Shri Ram Deo Tripathi and his predecessor have been paying the rent of the disputed shop on month to month basis and thus the tenancy was a monthly tenancy and not yearly tenancy. In these circumstances, the tenancy could be terminated by giving 30 days notice only and not six months notice as argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners. There is no evidence on record that the shop in question was taken on lease for manufacturing purposes. There is also no document on record to show that M/s. Laxmi Rasayanshala was the tenant. There is also no evidence in support of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the earlier owner had admitted the firm as tenant. Even from the perusal of the sale-deed, the copy of which is on record, it appears that the original-defendant Shri Ram Deo Tripathi was a tenant. Not only this, the original-defendant-tenant Shri Ram Deo Tripathi had moved an application for depositing rent in Court and in this application he mentioned himself as tenant. Even from the perusal of the sale-deed, the copy of which is on record, it appears that the original-defendant Shri Ram Deo Tripathi was a tenant. Not only this, the original-defendant-tenant Shri Ram Deo Tripathi had moved an application for depositing rent in Court and in this application he mentioned himself as tenant. Thus, from the evidence and material on record, there is nothing to indicate that the firm was a tenant at any point of time. The finding of fact recorded by both the courts below in this regard is based on appreciation of evidence which does not call for any interference. 8. The rate of rent has also been disputed by the petitioner-tenant. It has been contended that the rate of rent was only Rs.46/- per month. The learned trial Judge has recorded a finding that the rate of rent was Rs.62.10 paisa per month. This finding has been recorded on the basis of fact that when the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 came into force, 25% of the rent was enhanced and if the amount of water tax is added to it, the total rate of rent comes to Rs.62.10 per month. Learned revisional Court has upheld this finding recorded by the trial court. Thus, with regard to the rate of rent, there is a concurrent finding of both the courts below that the rate of rent was Rs.62.10 per month and there is no illegality in this finding. 9. It has also been vehemently argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the decree passed by both the court below is nullity being without jurisdiction. It has been submitted that by the notification No.526 dated 25.10.1972 issued by the Hon'ble High Court, all the civil Judges and Munsifs were conferred jurisdiction of Small Causes Court where such Courts were not established. However, they were empowered to try the suit only upto the valuation of Rs.5,000/-. However, in case of Munsif the valuation was only Rs.1,000/-. It has been argued that since the Court of Judge, Small Causes Court was functioning in District Lucknow, the Civil Judge was not empowered to exercise the jurisdiction of Judge, Small Causes Court and as such the judgment and decree passed by the trial court is a nullity. However, in case of Munsif the valuation was only Rs.1,000/-. It has been argued that since the Court of Judge, Small Causes Court was functioning in District Lucknow, the Civil Judge was not empowered to exercise the jurisdiction of Judge, Small Causes Court and as such the judgment and decree passed by the trial court is a nullity. He submits that if a Court lacks inherent jurisdiction to pass any decree, the decree passed by such Court would be a nullity. In this regard, the submission of on behalf of the opposite parties is that from the perusal of the notification dated 25.10.1972, it is clear that the Court of Civil Judge had also jurisdiction to try S.C.C. Suit upto the valuation of Rs.5,000/- but such power was to be exercised by the Civil Judge where there was no regular court of Small Causes. In such a situation, it cannot be said that the Court of Civil Judge had no inherent jurisdiction because he had jurisdiction to try a suit of Small Causes nature where there was no Small Causes Court. Thus, the decree passed by the Court of Civil Judge as Court of Judge Small Causes is not a nullity. This point has been dealt with in detailed by the learned revisional court and it has been found that the decree passed by the Court of Civil Judge acting as Judge Small Causes Court is not a nullity. 10. So far as the question of the Constitutional validity of C.P.C. Amendment Act is concerned, this Hon'ble Court while entertaining the writ of rent control nature cannot go into the question of Constitutional validity of any provision. 11. In view of the discussions made hereinabove, I am of the view that the judgment and decree passed by both the courts below have been rightly passed and the learned revisional court has already modified the decree with regard to payment and has also recorded a finding that the petitioners were liable to be evicted on the ground that they have not paid the arrears of rent in accordance with Order 15 Rule 5 CPC and their defence has rightly been struck down. Thus, the writ petition is devoid of merits and is liable to be dismissed. 12. The writ petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to cost. Thus, the writ petition is devoid of merits and is liable to be dismissed. 12. The writ petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to cost. However, in the circumstances of the case, it is provided that the petitioners shall vacate the premises in dispute within a period of three months from the date of this judgment failing which the landlord opposite parties would be free to execute the decree by due process of law.