Judgment 1. The petitioners have come up with the above writ petitions, challenging the two conditions imposed by the Government of India for the grant of In Principle Approval of the competent authority to amend the CMTS license, upon the merger of two companies. 2. Heard Mr. P.S. Raman, learned senior counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Haja Mohideen Gisthi, learned Central Government Standing Counsel for the respondent. 3. Aircel Limited, which is the petitioner in the first writ petition is the holding company and Aircel Cellular Limited, which is the petitioner in the second writ petition is its wholly owned subsidiary. The holding company, namely Aircel Limited, is engaged in the business of providing telecommunication services in terms of CMTS license granted on 22.5.1998 for an area known as "Rest of Tamil Nadu Service Area" (RoTN license) excluding the Chennai Metro Service Area. The subsidiary, namely Aircel Cellular Limited, is engaged in the business of providing telecommunication services in terms of a Cellular Mobile Telephone Service (CMTS) license granted on 30.11.1994 for the Chennai Metro Service Area. The licenses were granted to the petitioners in terms of the proviso to Section 4 of the Indian Telegraph Act. 4. On 15.9.2005, the Government of India issued a circular for the merger of Chennai Metro Service Area and Rest of Tamil Nadu Service Area, on the ground that such bifurcation of the State of Tamil Nadu into two service areas, namely Chennai Metro and Tamil Nadu Telecom Circle, was contrary to public interest. The circular, therefore, called upon the licensees who were having licenses in both service areas, to apply for the issue of license for the merged service area, without payment of any additional entry fee. The circular indicated that the effective date for the merged license shall be the same as that of the existing license. But, if the effective dates of existing licenses were not the same, the circular stipulated that the effective date of the license, later in point of time, shall be the effective date for the merged license. 6. The petitioners herein did not apply for the merger of the licenses in response to the above circular. However, when a Notice Inviting Application (NIA) was issued on 25.02.2010, for the auction of 3G and BWA Spectrum, certain conditions were incorporated. 6. The petitioners herein did not apply for the merger of the licenses in response to the above circular. However, when a Notice Inviting Application (NIA) was issued on 25.02.2010, for the auction of 3G and BWA Spectrum, certain conditions were incorporated. One of the conditions was that if the successful bidder had different licenses for the Chennai Metro Service Area and Rest of Tamil Nadu Service Area, they should submit an undertaking to merge their license as per the circular dated 15.9.2005. Therefore, there was no option left open for the licensees. Hence, the petitioners furnished undertakings on 18.3.2010. 7. In pursuance of the said undertakings, the Boards of Directors of both companies passed resolutions to amalgamate both companies. Thereafter, both the petitioners submitted a Scheme of Amalgamation on 05.8.2010 before the Company Court, under Sections 391 to 394 of the Companies Act, 1956. The Scheme of Amalgamation contained a stipulation that if requisite approvals were not received, the Scheme itself would stand revoked. 8. The petitioners herein also filed an application on 10.8.2010 with the respondent seeking formal approval for the transfer of the license of the subsidiary company to the holding company and to make necessary amendments. 9. On 01.10.2010, this Court sanctioned the Scheme of Amalgamation with effect from the effective date as defined in the Scheme. The Directors of the Companies were also directed to file certified copies of the order of amalgamation within 30 days with the Registrar of Companies. 10. Upon receipt of a certified copy of the order of the Company Court, the petitioners sent a letter dated 13.10.2010, to the respondent, seeking approval. The order of the High Court sanctioning the Scheme of Amalgamation was also filed with the Registrar of Companies. The petitioners also made necessary application to the Reserve Bank of India on 12.11.2010 for taking over the External Commercial Borrowings of the subsidiary company. 11. But, unfortunately, as ill-luck would have it, the Registrar of Companies deleted the name of the subsidiary company (petitioner in the second writ petition) from its records on or about 29.10.2010, on the basis of the order of amalgamation, overlooking the fact that the amalgamation was subject to the transfer of license. 12. Therefore, the petitioners filed Company Application Nos.408 and 409 of 2011 in C.P.No.216 of 2010 for appropriate directions. 12. Therefore, the petitioners filed Company Application Nos.408 and 409 of 2011 in C.P.No.216 of 2010 for appropriate directions. In the said application, the Registrar of Companies took a stand that they could not wait till the approval of the respondent for transfer of license. However, this Court disposed of both the applications, directing the reinstatement of the subsidiary company in the records of the Registrar of Companies and granting liberty to the petitioners to approach this Court against the respondent for appropriate directions, as no direction could be granted to the respondent in a company petition. 13. Thereafter, the petitioners sent several representations from the year 2010 up to 2013, seeking transfer of license. But, these representations did not evoke any response. Therefore, the petitioners filed a petition in Petition No.462 of 2012 on the file of the Telecom Disputes Settlement Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT) on 17.7.2012, seeking appropriate directions. But, thereafter, the respondent issued a show cause notice dated 12.10.2012 to the subsidiary, alleging violation of the License Agreement. In view of the said show cause notice, the Tribunal passed an interim order on 31.10.2012, directing the respondent to adjudicate on the show cause notice. However, the Tribunal also recorded certain findings in favour of the petitioners. One of the directions given by the Tribunal was that if the respondent chooses to drop further proceedings, it should pass an order on the petitioners application for transfer of license. 14. In accordance with the said order, the subsidiary filed its response to the show cause notice on 07.11.2012 and also participated in a personal hearing held on 27.12.2012. 15. But, the respondent passed an order on 26.4.2013 slapping a penalty of Rs.10.00 Crores upon the petitioner, on the premise that the subsidiary had assigned its right without the consent of the respondent. Left with no alternative and acting in good faith, the petitioner deposited Rs.10.00 Crores without prejudice to their rights and contentions. 16. Pursuant to the said deposit, TDSAT issued an order dated 02.7.2013, directing the respondent to process the transfer application and take a final decision and communicate the same within two weeks. In pursuance of the said order, the respondent issued a communication dated 03.10.2013, conveying the In Principle Approval of the competent authority to amend the CMTS license for Rest of Tamil Nadu Service Area, so as to include the Chennai Metro Service Area also. In pursuance of the said order, the respondent issued a communication dated 03.10.2013, conveying the In Principle Approval of the competent authority to amend the CMTS license for Rest of Tamil Nadu Service Area, so as to include the Chennai Metro Service Area also. But, while doing so, the respondent imposed certain conditions. The conditions imposed by the respondent are as follows: "(a) Consequent to amendment of the licence No.842-92/97-VAS dated 22.05.1998 (effective date 24-04-1998) for Tamilnadu (excluding Chennai) service area to include Chennai, all the spectrum allocation and numbering resources shall stand transferred to M/s. Aircel Limited under licence No.842-92/97-VAS dated 22.05.1998 (effective date 24-04-1998). The extension of spectrum held in present Chennai service area and its terms and conditions will be subject to decision of the Government on the opinion of Ld. AG, which is being sought. (b) The Chennai Licence No.842-21/93-TM dated 30.11.1994 (effective date 29-11-1994) will be cancelled simultaneously and all the liabilities under this licence including any payment due arising at a later date shall stand transferred to licence No.842-92/97-VAS dated 22.05.1998 (effective date 24-04-1998). (c) The above will be subject to M/s. Aircel Limited clearing all the dues in respect of both the licences No.842-21/93-TM dated 30.11.1994 (effective date 29-11-1994) and 842-92/97-VAS dated 22.05.1998 (effective date 24-04-1998). (d) The above will be further subject to clearance of the demands to be issued by WPC/WPF wing of this department relating to: (i) Payment of One Time Spectrum charges for the spectrum held for the erstwhile two service areas by the Licensees/Companies. (ii) Payment for the spectrum holding of the erstwhile Chennai service area license for the extended period from 29.11.2014 to 29.11.2018 which shall be as per decision of the Government. (e) M/s. Aircel Limited shall furnish an unconditional and unequivocal undertaking in prescribed format enclosed with this letter to pay the all demands which will be issued with respect to extension of spectrum for Chennai service Area from 2014 to 2018. (f) The Spectrum Usage Charges (SUC), in terms of the rates applicable at present, shall be payable by M/s. Aircel Limited at the rates of the slab corresponding to 9.8 MHz from the date of transfer of license." 17. Aggrieved by some of the conditions, the petitioner sent representations on 25.10.2013 and 31.10.2013. The petitioners also had meetings with the respondent, but they did not produce any result. 18. Aggrieved by some of the conditions, the petitioner sent representations on 25.10.2013 and 31.10.2013. The petitioners also had meetings with the respondent, but they did not produce any result. 18. Therefore, the petitioners gave a letter dated 18.12.2013 agreeing to execute an undertaking in terms of conditions (d)(i) and (ii) of the order dated 03.10.2013, without prejudice to their rights. But, by a communication dated 23.01.2014, the respondent rejected the offer made by the petitioner to execute an undertaking. Therefore, left with no alternative, the petitioners have come up with the above writ petitions. 19. The objection of the petitioners is not to all the conditions laid down in the order dated 03.10.2013. I have extracted six conditions which form part of the communication dated 03.10.2013. The petitioner has no difficulty with condition (a). Insofar as condition (b) is concerned, the respondent has indicated the effective date as 24.4.1998. The only objection that the petitioners have to this is that the correct effective date should be 31.12.1998 and not 24.4.1998. After the conclusion of the arguments, Mr. Haja Mohideen Gisthi, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent filed a print out of the e-mail received by him from the Under Secretary to the Government on 20.9.2014, clarifying that the correct effective date is 31.12.1998. Therefore, the problem with regard to condition (b) also stands resolved now. 20. Insofar as conditions (e) and (f) are concerned, the same appear to be common to all providers of telecommunication services. Therefore, the petitioners have no objection even to conditions (e) and (f), subject to their right to work out their remedies in accordance with law. 21. The primary objection of the petitioners is to the conditions (c) and (d)(i). As per condition (c), the petitioners are obliged to clear all the dues in respect of both the licenses dated 30.11.1994 and 22.5.1998. As per condition (d)(i), the petitioners are obliged to make payment of one time spectrum charges for the spectrum held for erstwhile two service areas by the licensees. 22. The objection of the petitioners to these two conditions is that the petitioners as well as several others have already filed writ petitions in W.P.Nos.585 to 588 of 2012 and 2165 to 2167 of 2013 and that by interim orders passed on 22.6.2012 and 28.01.2013, this Court has granted interim protection. 22. The objection of the petitioners to these two conditions is that the petitioners as well as several others have already filed writ petitions in W.P.Nos.585 to 588 of 2012 and 2165 to 2167 of 2013 and that by interim orders passed on 22.6.2012 and 28.01.2013, this Court has granted interim protection. Therefore, the petitioners contend that the respondent cannot impose a condition for the transfer of the licenses, that would actually annul the effect of the interim orders granted by this Court. 23. The respondent has filed counter affidavits. The primary contentions of the respondent are (a) that the writ petitions are not maintainable in view of the availability of alternative remedy before TDSAT, and (b) that the charges in respect of which an undertaking is demanded under the impugned orders, are leviable in terms of the orders of the Supreme Court. 24. Therefore, two questions arise for consideration, namely (i) as to whether the writ petitions are maintainable, and (ii) as to whether the demand for an undertaking in terms of the format enclosed to the impugned orders, is justified. Alternative remedy: 25. It is true that under Section 14 of TRAI Act, the Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal is specially constituted to adjudicate any dispute between the licensor and a licensee and a dispute between two or more service providers. Therefore, there can be no doubt that the petitioners have an alternative remedy to approach the TDSAT. 26. But, the dispute between the licensor and the licensee in this case, is with respect to something which this Court is already seized of in a batch of writ petitions. Therefore, it is not possible to direct the petitioners to approach the Appellate Tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal may not be in a position to pass order that will conflict directly with the interim orders of protection granted by this Court in the batch of writ petitions, namely W.P.Nos.585 to 588 of 2012 and 2165 to 2167 of 2013. 27. Mr. Therefore, it is not possible to direct the petitioners to approach the Appellate Tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal may not be in a position to pass order that will conflict directly with the interim orders of protection granted by this Court in the batch of writ petitions, namely W.P.Nos.585 to 588 of 2012 and 2165 to 2167 of 2013. 27. Mr. Haja Mohideen Gisthi, learned Central Government Standing Counsel relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Tata Teleservices (Maharashtra) Ltd. [ (2007) 7 SCC 517 ], Sri Siddeshwara Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Ikbal [ (2013) 10 SCC 83 ] and Commissioner of Income Tax v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal [ (2014) 1 SCC 603 ], in support of his contention that the availability of alternative remedy before the specially constituted Tribunal is a bar to the maintainability of the writ petitions. 28. The decision of the Supreme Court in Tata Teleservices (Maharashtra) Ltd. is not exactly on the question of bar of jurisdiction on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy before the Tribunal. As a matter of fact, the said decision arose out of an appeal filed under Section 18 of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997, against an order passed by TDSAT under Section 14 of the Act. But, in the said decision, the Supreme Court took a survey of the Scheme of the Act. It was pointed out in the said decision that the Act was enacted with a view to provide for the establishment of TDSAT to regulate the telecommunication service, adjudicate disputes, dispose of appeals and to protect the interest of service providers and consumers of the telecom sector, to promote and ensure orderly growth of the telecom sector and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. After noting the Scheme of Sections 14, 14-A, 14-B and 14-C, as well as Section 15, the Supreme Court pointed out in paragraph 15 of the said decision that all disputes between the licensee and licensor, between two or more service providers which takes in the Government and includes a licensee and between a service provider and a group of consumers are within the purview of the Tribunal. The Court noted that there is also an ouster of the jurisdiction of the civil Court. The Court noted that there is also an ouster of the jurisdiction of the civil Court. The Court pointed out that the Act is a self-contained Code intended to deal with all disputes arising out of telecommunication services. It is in the light of the Scheme of the Act so analysed by the Supreme Court that the Court came to the conclusion that TDSAT has jurisdiction even to entertain a counter claim. Therefore, it is clear that the decision in Tata Teleservices did not deal with the question of maintainability. 29. In Sri Siddeshwara Co-operative Bank Ltd., the Supreme Court was concerned with Rule 9 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 and the availability of alternative remedy under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, as against an action initiated under Section 13(4). But, the Supreme Court pointed out even in the said case that an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. 30. In Chabbil Dass Agarwal, which arose under the Income Tax Act, the Supreme Court cautioned that where a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievance, a writ petition should not be entertained. 31. But, as I have pointed out earlier, the petitioners in these writ petitions could not have gone before the TDSAT, challenging the conditions incorporated in the impugned orders, on the basis of interim orders obtained in a batch of writ petitions against the levy of one time spectrum charges. Those writ petitions, namely W.P.Nos.585 to 588 of 2012 and 2165 to 2167 of 2013, are still pending on the file of this Court with interim protective orders in favour of the petitioners. Therefore, even if the petitioners are directed to go before the Tribunal, the TDSAT cannot do anything to vacate the interim orders passed in those writ petitions. Therefore, the plea that an alternative remedy is available to the petitioners, cannot be accepted in the peculiar situation in which the parties are placed. Hence, I reject the first contention of the respondent. Justification for the levy: 32. The main contention of the petitioners is that when they are protected by interim orders passed in a batch of writ petitions, the respondent cannot impose a condition for the transfer of licenses, that will set at naught, the effect of the interim orders. Hence, I reject the first contention of the respondent. Justification for the levy: 32. The main contention of the petitioners is that when they are protected by interim orders passed in a batch of writ petitions, the respondent cannot impose a condition for the transfer of licenses, that will set at naught, the effect of the interim orders. But, the stand of the respondents is that the levy of these charges is on the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court and that therefore, the petitioners cannot raise any objection. 33. In the decision of the Supreme Court in Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India [W.P.(Civil) No.423 of 2010 dated 02.02.2012] relied upon by the respondent, the Supreme Court was concerned with the following questions: "(i) Whether the Government has the right to alienate, transfer or distribute natural resources/national assets otherwise than by following a fair and transparent method consistent with the fundamentals of the equality clause enshrined in the Constitution? (ii) Whether the recommendations made by the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) on 28.8.2007 for grant of Unified Access Service Licence (for short 'UAS Licence') with 2G spectrum in 800, 900 and 1800 MHz at the price fixed in 2001, which were approved by the Department of Telecommunications (DoT), were contrary to the decision taken by the Council of Ministers on 31.10.2003? (iii) Whether the exercise undertaken by the DoT from September 2007 to March 2008 for grant of UAS Licences to the private respondents in terms of the recommendations made by TRAI is vitiated due to arbitrariness and malafides and is contrary to public interest? (iv) Whether the policy of first-come-first-served followed by the DoT for grant of licences is ultra vires the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution and whether the said policy was arbitrarily changed by the Minister of Communications and Information Technology (hereinafter referred to as 'the Minister of C&IT'), without consulting TRAI, with a view to favour some of the applicants? (v) Whether the licences granted to ineligible applicants and those who failed to fulfil the terms and conditions of the licence are liable to be quashed?" 34. Eventually, the Supreme Court allowed the writ petitions with certain directions. (v) Whether the licences granted to ineligible applicants and those who failed to fulfil the terms and conditions of the licence are liable to be quashed?" 34. Eventually, the Supreme Court allowed the writ petitions with certain directions. The operative portion of the order of the Supreme Court reads as follows: "In the result, the writ petitions are allowed in the following terms: (i) The licences granted to the private respondents on or after 10.1.2008 pursuant to two press releases issued on 10.1.2008 and subsequent allocation of spectrum to the licensees are declared illegal and are quashed. (ii) The above direction shall become operative after four months. (iii) Keeping in view the decision taken by the Central Government in 2011, TRAI shall make fresh recommendations for grant of licence and allocation of spectrum in 2G band in 22 Service Areas by auction, as was done for allocation of spectrum in 3G band. (iv) The Central Government shall consider the recommendations of TRAI and take appropriate decision within next one month and fresh licences be granted by auction. (v) Respondent Nos.2, 3 and 9 who were benefited at the cost of Public Exchequer by a wholly arbitrary and unconstitutional action taken by the DoT for grant of UAS Licences and allocation of spectrum in 2G band and who off-loaded their stakes for many thousand crores in the name of fresh infusion of equity or transfer of equity shall pay cost of Rs.5 crores each. Respondent Nos. 4, 6, 7 and 10 shall pay cost of Rs.50 lakhs each because they too had been benefited by the wholly arbitrary and unconstitutional exercise undertaken by the DoT for grant of UAS Licences and allocation of spectrum in 2G band. We have not imposed cost on the respondents who had submitted their applications in 2004 and 2006 and whose applications were kept pending till 2007. (vi) Within four months, 50% of the cost shall be deposited with the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee for being used for providing legal aid to poor and indigent litigants. The remaining 50% cost shall be deposited in the funds created for Resettlement and Welfare Schemes of the Ministry of Defence. (vi) Within four months, 50% of the cost shall be deposited with the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee for being used for providing legal aid to poor and indigent litigants. The remaining 50% cost shall be deposited in the funds created for Resettlement and Welfare Schemes of the Ministry of Defence. (vii) However, it is made clear that the observation made in this judgment shall not, in any manner, affect the pending investigation by the CBI, Directorate of Enforcement and others agencies or cause prejudice to those who are facing prosecution in the cases registered by the CBI or who may face prosecution on the basis of chargesheet(s) which may be filed by the CBI in future and the Special Judge, CBI shall decide the matter uninfluenced by this judgment. We also make it clear that this judgment shall not prejudice any person in the action which may be taken by other investigating agencies under Income Tax Act, 1961, Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and other similar statutes." 35. Therefore, the main grievance of the petitioners is that the Supreme Court was concerned primarily with what happened post 10.01.2008. But, the petitioners were granted licenses on 30.11.1994 and 22.5.1998 respectively, with the former for the Chennai Metro Service Area and the latter for the Rest of Tamil Nadu Service Area. It is on this basis that the petitioners have filed a batch of writ petitions challenging the levy of charges in respect of which impugned conditions have been incorporated. This Court is also seized of the same. 36. In such circumstances, it is the contention of the petitioners that the condition imposed upon them to execute an undertaking that they would pay the charges which already formed the subject matter of challenge before this Court, would in fact make those challenges become infructuous. According to the petitioners, the respondent cannot overreach the orders of this Court by demanding payment of the charges, the collection of which is stayed by this Court. 37. But, I do not think that the above contention is sustainable. The scope of the interim orders passed by this Court in those writ petitions, is only to injunct the respondents from taking any coercive steps for recovery. Taking coercive steps for recovery stands on a different footing from the imposition of a condition for renewal or transfer of a license. The scope of the interim orders passed by this Court in those writ petitions, is only to injunct the respondents from taking any coercive steps for recovery. Taking coercive steps for recovery stands on a different footing from the imposition of a condition for renewal or transfer of a license. A careful look at the interim orders passed by this Court would steer clear any doubt that one may have in this regard. 38. In M.P.Nos.1 and 1 of 2012, in W.P.Nos.585 and 587 of 2012, the interim order passed by the Court on 22.6.2012 was to the following effect: "No coercive steps shall be taken by the respondents to recover the license fee payable by the petitioner in respect of the non telecom activities of the petitioner until further orders." The main prayer in those writ petitions was for a declaration that the first proviso to Section 4 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, insofar as it confers a power upon the department to claim a revenue share in respect of non telecom activities was ultra vires the Constitution and for a declaration that the department can charge only the license fee/AGR from the revenue earned from the licensed activities. The interim prayer made in those writ petitions was for an interim injunction restraining the department from demanding and/or recovering any fee from the revenue unrelated to licensed activities. 39. Therefore, it is clear that what was injuncted by this Court by its order dated 22.6.2012 was only the initiation of coercive steps for recovery of any share of the revenue earned in respect of the non telecom activities. 40. Similarly, the interim reliefs sought in M.P.Nos.3, 3 and 3 of 2013 in W.P.Nos.2165 to 2167 of 2013 were for an injunction restraining the department from proceeding in furtherance of the order dated 28.12.2012 issued by the Assistant Wireless Adviser of the Ministry of Communications and a demand notice issued on 08.01.2013 by the very same officer. This Court granted an interim injunction on 28.01.2013, following a similar order of injunction granted by the Bombay High Court. 41. The order dated 28.12.2012 that became the subject matter of these three writ petitions, was the order by which a one time spectrum charges for the GSM Spectrum held in 1800/900 MHz band by the incumbent telecom service providers was levied. 41. The order dated 28.12.2012 that became the subject matter of these three writ petitions, was the order by which a one time spectrum charges for the GSM Spectrum held in 1800/900 MHz band by the incumbent telecom service providers was levied. Therefore, the injunction that was sought by the petitioners and granted by this Court was only to prevent the respondents from proceeding in furtherance of those orders. 42. The demand now made by condition (d)(i) of the impugned order is for payment of one time spectrum charges held for the erstwhile two service areas. This demand, according to the petitioners, has the effect of setting at naught the injunction granted in W.P.Nos.2165 to 2167 of 2013. Therefore, the petitioners contend that what cannot be done by the respondent directly is sought to be done indirectly by the impugned order. 43. But, as I have pointed out in paragraph 37 above, what is prohibited by the interim orders of this Court, is only the recovery in pursuance of the demand impugned in those batch of writ petitions. Those interim orders cannot be construed to mean that the respondents should refrain from claiming the same, even when the question of transfer or renewal comes up. 44. In S.M. Amarchand Sowcar v. Tamil Nau Electricity Board [(1999) 2 Law Weekly 47], a question arose as to whether the electricity service connection could be disconnected for non payment of dues which have already become time barred. This Court held that the recovery of arrears was completely different from the continued supply of electricity. The Court pointed out that even if the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board is barred from initiating an action for recovery of arrears, on account of the law of limitation, there was nothing that would prevent the Electricity Board from disconnecting supply. I think the same analogy would apply to the cases of this nature. 45. In Vishnuvardhan Paper Mills Ltd. v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board [W.P.(MD)No.12507 of 2011 dated 23.11.2011], a question arose as to whether the Electricity Board can demand from one company, the arrears of electricity consumption charges due from three of its sister concerns. Two contentions were advanced on behalf of the petitioner. 45. In Vishnuvardhan Paper Mills Ltd. v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board [W.P.(MD)No.12507 of 2011 dated 23.11.2011], a question arose as to whether the Electricity Board can demand from one company, the arrears of electricity consumption charges due from three of its sister concerns. Two contentions were advanced on behalf of the petitioner. They were (i) that the dues of the sister concerns cannot be sought to be recovered from a private limited company, which has an independent legal existence of its own; and (ii) that in any case, the demand made by the Electricity Board even against those three sister concerns was under orders of stay passed in a batch of three writ petitions filed by those sister concerns themselves. 46. The second contention raised in Vishnuvardhan Paper Mills Ltd. was almost identical to the contention raised in these writ petitions. The said contention was that when the consumer companies had challenged the demand notices served on them by the Electricity Board and had also obtained stay of recovery, it was not open to the Electricity Board to demand from a sister concern, the very same arrears as a condition precedent for the grant of electricity service connection. The petitioner in Vishnuvardhan Paper Mills Ltd. contended that what the Electricity Board could not do directly (namely recovery of arrears of consumption charges), could not be achieved indirectly by demanding the payment of the very same charges for the grant of electricity service connection to a sister concern. The said writ petition was dismissed by me, on the basis of a decision of the Supreme Court in Amit Products (India) Ltd. v. Chief Engineer [ (2005) 7 SCC 393 ]. While doing so, I pointed out that there was a distinction between the stay of recovery of arrears from the consumers and the imposition of a pre-condition for the payment of arrears for the grant of a fresh connection or the grant of an additional load. 47. I think the same logic would hold good even in respect of the situation on hand. It is true that the respondent cannot recover from the petitioners, the one time spectrum charges as levied by them, in view of the interim orders of protection granted in favour of the petitioners. 47. I think the same logic would hold good even in respect of the situation on hand. It is true that the respondent cannot recover from the petitioners, the one time spectrum charges as levied by them, in view of the interim orders of protection granted in favour of the petitioners. But, it does not mean that even while considering the applications for the grant of fresh licenses or the application for the grant of transfer of licenses, the respondent is obliged to ignore their earlier claim completely. At the most the petitioners can claim that in the event of succeeding in the other writ petitions, the payment made by virtue of the orders impugned in these writ petitions should be refunded or at least adjusted towards future charges. 48. In view of the above, both the writ petitions are disposed of, to the following effect: (i) the petitioners shall, within two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, comply with the conditions as imposed in the order of the respondent dated 03.10.2013, without prejudice to their rights and contentions in the writ petitions already pending on the file of this Court; (ii) insofar as condition (b) in the impugned order dated 03.10.2013 is concerned, the effective date shall be read as 31.12.1998; (iii) in the event of the petitioners succeeding in the writ petitions W.P.Nos.585 & 587 of 2012 and 2615 to 2617 of 2013, the undertaking will automatically lapse; (iv) the compliance by the petitioners of conditions (e) and (f) will not preclude the petitioners from taking recourse to legal remedies available under law; and (v) all observations herein may not be taken to be a seal of approval of the demand. No costs. Consequently, M.P.Nos.2 of 2014 in both the writ petitions are closed.