JUDGMENT HEMANT GUPTA, J.(Oral) This order shall dispose of aforementioned two writ petitions i.e. CWP No.20720 of 2008 wherein challenge is to an order dated 26.03.2008 passed by the Joint Development Commissioner exercising the powers of the Commissioner in a petition filed under Section 11 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (for short ‘the Act’) and CWP No.18694 of 2008 wherein the orders passed against the petitioners in proceedings under Section 7 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 are subject matter of challenge. Since both the writ petitions relate to the same land, the same are being taken up for final hearing together today itself with the consent of the parties. The consolidation in the village was undertaken in the year 1959. As per the petitioners, the land in question measuring 199 kanals 11 marlas is in the ownership of Mustarka Malkaanand, thus, is a Bachatland owned and possessed by all the rightholders of the village. Having said so, it is further averred that to meet out the requirements of common purposes of the village, prorata cut was imposed upon the proprietors of the village including the petitioners’ ancestors. By such cut, 622 kanals 7 marlas of land was recorded in the name of Jumla Mustarka Malkaan; 385 kanals 8 marlas was utilized for common purposes and land measuring 230 kanals 8 marlas was left as excess land. In reply, it was, inter alia, asserted that the Gram Panchayat has been leasing the land in question from time to time since the year 1961, the same having been reserved for common purposes during consolidation. It was in the year 1999, the petitioners filed a petition under Section 42 and 43A of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (for short ‘the 1948 Act’) claiming shares in the Khewat owned by Jumla Mustarka Malkaan for the reason that the land is Bachatland and vest with the proprietors. Such application was allowed by the Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, on 02.08.2000. It was, inter alia, observed as under: “5. The proprietors who are willing to get the Bachat land partitioned shall be allotted Kuraas and those who do not want to get the Bachat land partitioned should be allotted a joint Kurrah but their names & their shares in such land shall be defined in the order. 6. It was, inter alia, observed as under: “5. The proprietors who are willing to get the Bachat land partitioned shall be allotted Kuraas and those who do not want to get the Bachat land partitioned should be allotted a joint Kurrah but their names & their shares in such land shall be defined in the order. 6. Before partitioning the Bachat land the latest position of such land on the spot should be got checked and if any part of Bachat land has been utilized after consolidation for common needs or connivance of the village then such land should be excluded from partition. If any proprietors has built a house an such Bachat land and the possession is within his share then such built up area should be preferably allotted to such proprietors in order to mitigate the chances of litigation on such account.” Such order was challenged by the Gram Panchayat in CWP No.13708 of 2000. Such writ petition was dismissed by speaking order on 22.03.2001. The arguments raised on behalf of the Panchayat that the order passed by the Director is wholly without jurisdiction as the Director, Consolidation could not have gone into a question of ownership and that the petition was filed after a gross delay, was negated. The Court held to the following effect: “It is not disputed that even in the latest revenue entry, the village proprietary body has been recorded as the owner of the land in dispute. Nothing has been placed on the record of the this Court which may even, prima facie, indicate that the finding of the Director with regard to the ownership of the land having remained in the name of the proprietary body was wrong in fact, the question of title was never raised before the Director. This being the factual position, we find no infirmity in the view taken by the authority that the land had continued to remain in the ownership of the proprietary body. Mr. Jasbir Singh contends that the petition should have been dismissed on the ground of delay. In other words, the rightful owners of the property should have been denied possession of the land only because they had not objected to the Panchayat managing the affairs of the property for a certain duration of time. We find no ground to accept this contention. In other words, the rightful owners of the property should have been denied possession of the land only because they had not objected to the Panchayat managing the affairs of the property for a certain duration of time. We find no ground to accept this contention. Firstly, the competent authority has considered the matter and taken a possible view. Secondly, there is no equity or justice n favour of the petitioner. Admittedly, the land belongs to the respondents and other land owners of the village. The petitioner had somehow managed to remain in possession. It has only derived underserved benefit. It has not lost anything with the passage of time nor has any right accrued to the petitioner. In such a situation, the petitioner cannot take the benefit of its own wrong of having remained in wrongful possession nor can the benefit be denied to the respondents who were illegally deprived of the right to enjoy their property.” Special Leave Petition against the said order was filed, which was dismissed without any speaking order on 09.07.2001. On the other hand, petition filed by the Panchayat under Section 11 of the Act was decided on 26.09.2005 inter alia holding that the land in dispute is Mustarka Malkaanand is shown to be in possession of lessees. The Panchayat is leasing land in dispute to various persons vide documents Ex.P2 to Ex.P9 and utilizing the income from such lease for the common purposes. It was found that the present petitioners have failed to produce any document that they are continuously in possession since 26.01.1950 and that how much is the share of the present petitioners. The management and control vest with the Panchayat though the land in dispute is MustarkaMalkaan. The Panchayat after dividing the land can give it on chakota. The Gram Panchayat aggrieved against the said order filed an appeal before the Joint Development Commissioner, exercising the power of the Commissioner. Such appeal has been allowed on 26.03.2008, wherein the following finding has been recorded: “After going through the arguments and the record, it is clear that Gram Panchayat has been utilizing this land for common purposes of the village. No doubt the ownership as per Jamabandi for the year 19992000 indicates the land to be in the name of Mushtarka Malkan but it is clear that it was managed by Gram Panchayat, Khatriwala. No doubt the ownership as per Jamabandi for the year 19992000 indicates the land to be in the name of Mushtarka Malkan but it is clear that it was managed by Gram Panchayat, Khatriwala. Copies of the auction registers and the income so derived was used for the village common purposes. It is also clear by various judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India and the Hon’ble High Court that Director (Consolidation) has no jurisdiction to go into the question of title under the Consolidation Act for shamilat deh and village common lands. The matter pertaining to shamilat land/shamilat deh can be decided only under the Punjab Village Common Land (Regulation) Act, 1961. This matter was decided earlier by the Consolidation Authorities and the Collector has merely based his decision on the Order passed by Additional Director (Consolidation) dated 2.8.2000. It is also clear that out of 74 proprietors of the village only 4/5 have filed this petition. The latest amendment in the East Punjab Holdings (consolidation & Prevention of Fragmentation) Act 1948 and the instructions issued by the Government have clearly provided that no order or judgment passed by any court or Officer or any other Authority shall be implemented if it is, in way, contrary to Section 42A of the Consolidation Act. Hence it is very clear that the lower court has passed a patently wrong order and has allowed repartition of this land to the socalled village proprietary body. Nowhere has it come on record to indicate that a prorata cut was imposed on the respondents at the time of consolidation. The respondents had not agitated on the issue of title for the last more than 45 years. Hence the case is hopelessly time bared and the Collector has wrongly decided it in favour of the respondents. The appeal filed by Gram Panchayat, Khatriwala is accepted and the lower court dated 26.9.2005 is set aside.” Such order passed in exercise of powers under Section 11 of the Act and the orders passed under Section 7 of the Act are subject matter of challenge in the present writ petitions. The learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the conclusion drawn by the Full Bench in CWP No.2318 of 2002 titled as “Parkash Singh and others Vs. The learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the conclusion drawn by the Full Bench in CWP No.2318 of 2002 titled as “Parkash Singh and others Vs. Joint Development Commissioner, Punjab and others” decided on 18.11.2013 to contend that the order passed by the Director Consolidation shall be deemed to be merged by the order of this Court, therefore, on the basis of doctrine of merger, the Gram Panchayat is prohibited to file a petition under Section 11 of the Act. On the other hand, Mr. Kanwaljit Singh, learned Senior Counsel representing Gram Panchayat, has argued that in terms of the Full Bench judgment, the land vests with Panchayat, therefore, the orders passed by the authorities under the Act are without jurisdiction and such order cannot be given cloak of jurisdiction only by the fact that the writ petition against the said order has been dismissed. It is also argued that no reference was made to any of the provisions of the Act as to why the land would not vest in Panchayat in terms of Section 2(g) of the Act. The question; as to whether the Director Consolidation can examine the question of title over the land relating to Shamilat Dehor not and whether such orders affirmed in writ petition would bar the Gram Panchayat to dispute the orders passed in proceedings under Section 42 of the 1948 has also been examined by Full Bench of this Court in Parkash Singh’s case (supra). In the said judgment, it has been held that the Director, Consolidation is a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction not competent to decide a question of title, therefore, any finding recorded on a question of title would not operate as resjudicata. It has been further held that if any writ petition has been filed and has been decided considering the provisions of the Act, the order passed in a writ petition or in any appeal, the order would be binding on Panchayat in terms of the doctrine of rule of merger. The Full Bench has, inter alia, returned the following findings: “A perusal of these judgment and due consideration of the principles of resjudicata leads to a singular conclusion that for an order passed, in former proceedings, to operate as resjudicata in latter proceedings, it should have been passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction. The Full Bench has, inter alia, returned the following findings: “A perusal of these judgment and due consideration of the principles of resjudicata leads to a singular conclusion that for an order passed, in former proceedings, to operate as resjudicata in latter proceedings, it should have been passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction. The Director Consolidation, as held, hereinbefore, is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction not competent to decide a question of title and, therefore, any finding recorded in an order passed by Consolidation authorities or by the Director Consolidation under Section 42 of the Consolidation Act on a question of title, even if writ petitions and special leave petitions have been dismissed, would not operate as resjudicata, on a question of title, raised before the jurisdictional forum.” Later while examining the question; what is the effect of dismissal of the writ petition, the Court held to the following effect: “The doctrines of resjudicata and merger are doctrines of public policy coined to confer finality to legal proceedings and cannot be invoked to confer legitimacy on orders that are limited in their jurisdictional ambit to prohibit the jurisdictional forum deciding a question of title. If, however, the writ petitions or the special leave petitions are dismissed after examining the merits or after considering the provisions of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, etc. or after holding that the Director Consolidation had jurisdiction to decide the dispute, the order passed by the Director Consolidation shall be deemed to have merged in orders passed by the High Court or the Supreme Court, thereby prohibiting the Collector or the appropriate forum, from considering or deciding an application on a question of title. We, therefore, have no hesitation in holding that the doctrine of merger would only apply where the writ petitions and the special leave petitions have been dismissed by assigning reasons for dismissal of the writ petition and the special leave petition.” While answering second and third questions, the Bench concluded as under: “(1) The State or its delegate, exercising power under Section 42 and authorities under the Consolidation Act are tribunals of limited jurisdiction. (2) Consolidation authorities have no power to decide disputed questions of title in respect of lands, or any right, title or interest therein. (2) Consolidation authorities have no power to decide disputed questions of title in respect of lands, or any right, title or interest therein. (3) The State or its delegate, may in the exercise of power under Section 42 of the Consolidation Act order correction of errors, in accordance with law; (4) While exercising powers under Section 42 of the Consolidation Act, if it is held that the land, in dispute, vests or does not vest in a Gram Panchayat such an order would be construed to be an opinion recorded by a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction and an order so passed would not operate as resjudicta to be binding upon parties or the Collector, exercising power under Section 11 of the 1961 Act, or the jurisdictional forum, constituted for deciding a question of title. (5) If a writ petition or special leave petition filed to challenge an order passed under Section 42 of the Consolidation Act is dismissed without assigning any reason, by use of the words “dismissed”, “no merits, dismissed” or such like similar expressions, the order passed under Section 42 of the Consolidation Act shall not merge in the order passed by the High Court or the Hon’ble Supreme Court, so as to operate as resjudicata or prohibit the Gram Panchayat from approaching the jurisdictional forum, or. (6) If an order passed under Section 42 of the Consolidation Act has not been challenged in a writ petition or before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, such order shall be ignored, by the Collector exercising power under Section 11 of the 1961 Act, as Section 13B clearly postulates that notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law or any agreement, instruments, custom or usage or any decree or order of any court or other authority, the provisions of the 1961 Act shall prevail. (7) If, however, the order passed by the Director Consolidation has been affirmed, by the High Court or in a special leave petition or an appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court on merits, the order passed by the Director Consolidation shall be deemed to have merged in orders passed under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution of India and would, therefore, on the basis of the doctrine of rule estoppel, merger and the order of precedence among courts, prohibit the Gram Panchayat from filing a petition under Section 11 of the 1961 Act, the Collector from entertaining such a petition, or where the land is “Jumla Mushtarka Malkan” the Civil Court.” A perusal of the order passed by Division Bench of this Court in a writ petition filed by the Panchayat shows that no right of Panchayat with reference to Section 2(g) of the 1961 Act was raised or decided. The Court was examining only the legality of the order passed by the Director in exercise of powers conferred under Section 42 of the 1948 Act. In terms of the Full Bench judgment, the Director has no jurisdiction to entertain such a petition under Section 42 of the Act. Since the earlier order of the High Court is only examining the legality and validity of the jurisdiction of the Director Consolidation under the Act, the same would be restricted to that extent alone as there is no discussion with reference to the provisions of Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961. This Court in the earlier order cannot be deemed to have examined whether the land is not Shamilatdehvesting in Panchayat in terms of Section 2 (g) of the Act. Therefore, on the strength of the order passed by the Director (Consolidation) in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 42 of the 1948 Act, the petitioners cannot resist the claim of the Panchayat to manage the land reserved for common purposes during consolidation. In view of the Full Bench judgment in Parkash Singh’s case (supra), it is the Collector under the Act, who alone can examine; whether the land vest with shamilat or not, even if it is a Bachatland. The Additional Director (Consolidation) exercising the powers of the State Government does not have any jurisdiction to order partition of the socalled Bachatland amongst the proprietors. The Additional Director (Consolidation) exercising the powers of the State Government does not have any jurisdiction to order partition of the socalled Bachatland amongst the proprietors. In view of the above, we do not find any merit in both the writ petitions. The same are accordingly dismissed.