Judgment : 1. This second appeal arises out of the concurrent judgment passed by the courts below. The first defendant is the appellant before this Court. The plaintiff/ respondent herein has filed the suit in O.S. No. 4376 of 1997 for the relief of declaration and possession. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall be referred to as per their litigative status in the suit. 2. According to the plaintiff, he and the first defendant are brothers and are sons of deceased Ekambaram. The second defendant was inducted as a tenant in the suit property by the first defendant. It is the case of the plaintiff that his father, during his life time, has purchased the property bearing Door No.27, Sundarapuram Third Street, Pulianthope High Road, Chennai – 600 012 way back in the year 1943 by means of a registered sale deed. Similarly, the plaintiff's father was assigned a land in R.S. No. 1735/29, bearing Door No.26, which is the suit property, by the Government in the year 1939. By virtue of such ownership, the father of the plaintiff settled the entire property in Door No.27 and 1/3rd share in Door No.26 in favour of the plaintiff and remaining two shares were given to first defendant and another son Elumalai, who is not a party to the suit. Pursuant to such settlement, the plaintiff was in physical possession and enjoyment of the same by paying taxes and charges to the authorities concerned. While so, during the year 1978, the first defendant attempted to trespass into the suit property on the strength of a document purportedly signed by his father Ekambaram on 01.04.1978, marked as Ex.B1. In those circumstances, the plaintiff filed O.S. No. 360 of 1978 for bare injunction in which an order of status quo was granted. According to the plaintiff, he was appointed in Indian Overseas Bank and the order of appointment dated 02.01.1979 was served on him in the suit property. Further, for the notice sent by him, the first defendant sent a reply addressed to the plaintiff in the suit property. In other words, the plaintiff is in possession of the suit property bearing Door No.26 as well as the property bearing Door No.27. According to the plaintiff, he is living in the suit property along with his mother and the property bearing Door No.27 was let out for rent to tenants. In other words, the plaintiff is in possession of the suit property bearing Door No.26 as well as the property bearing Door No.27. According to the plaintiff, he is living in the suit property along with his mother and the property bearing Door No.27 was let out for rent to tenants. While so, the plaintiff was transferred from Thiyagadurgam to Villivakkam, Chennai, however, the plaintiff left his mother, wife and children to reside in the suit property while he was in employment to the transferred place. According to the plaintiff, in the year 1985, he built a new house at Thirunindravur and in the invitation for the house warming ceremony, his address was mentioned as Door No.26. From 16.05.1989, the plaintiff shifted his place of residence to Thirunindravur and kept the suit property under lock and key. In those circumstances, the first defendant requested the plaintiff to permit him to reside in the suit property. Having regard to the proximity of relationship between the plaintiff and first defendant, being brothers, the plaintiff permitted the first defendant to reisde in the suit property as a permissive occupant to commence a surgical polishing business for one year. Thereafter, the first defendant shifted his place of business to another location. While doing so, without any right, he has leased out the suit property to the second defendant. As the activities of the defendants has become prejudicial and detriment to the plaintiff to assert his right over the suit property, he has filed the suit. 3. The suit was resisted by the first defendant by filing a written statement. According to the first defendant, the plaintiff is not in possession of the suit property from the year 1974, as alleged. On the other hand, the first defendant was in possession and enjoyment of the suit property from the year 1978 and perfected his title by adverse possession. The plaintiff was never in possession of the suit property. The alleged intrusion or attempt to trespass in to the suit property during the year 1978 is incorrect. In fact, the first defendant intended to challenge the validity of the settlement deed dated 14.03.1974 executed by his father in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the suit property in Door No.26 as well as the property bearing Door No.27. The alleged intrusion or attempt to trespass in to the suit property during the year 1978 is incorrect. In fact, the first defendant intended to challenge the validity of the settlement deed dated 14.03.1974 executed by his father in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the suit property in Door No.26 as well as the property bearing Door No.27. On coming to know about such an action proposed by the first defendant, the plaintiff approached the first defendant for an amicable settlement whereby the first defendant offered to give 1/3rd share in the suit property in lieu of the first defendant giving up his entire right in the property in Door No.27. On such representation, the first defendant executed a release deed on 30.01.1978 in favour of the plaintiff giving up his 1/3rd right, title and interest in the suit property. From that date, the first defendant is in possession and enjoyment of the suit property. At no point of time, the suit property was under lock and key of the plaintiff. The first defendant was in possession of the suit property from the year 1978. Further, from the year 1978, the plaintiff and the first defendant were not in talking terms, while so, the allegation that this defendant requested the plaintiff to permit him to occupy the suit property as a permissive occupant does not arise. The first defendant was not carrying on surgical polishing business from the year 1991 as alleged in the plaint. From the year 1978, the first defendant had let out the suit property to various tenants and he is collecting rent from them. The plaintiff issued notice dated 21.11.1996 for which this defendant issued a reply notice on 29.11.1996 denying the contentions contained therein. The first defendant, notwithstanding the execution of settlement deed, has perfected his title by adverse possession and therefore also, the suit filed by the plaintiff after long lapse of time is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches. 4. Before the trial court, the plaintiff/respondent herein marked Exs. A1 to A10, examined himself as PW1. On behalf of the first defendant, Exs. B1 to B9 were marked besides Ex.C1, the plaint in OS No. 360 of 1978 was marked. Apart from examining himself as DW1, three other witnesses as PW2 to 4 were examined on the side of the first defendant. A1 to A10, examined himself as PW1. On behalf of the first defendant, Exs. B1 to B9 were marked besides Ex.C1, the plaint in OS No. 360 of 1978 was marked. Apart from examining himself as DW1, three other witnesses as PW2 to 4 were examined on the side of the first defendant. The trial court, on appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, concluded that Ex.B1, partition letter executed by the deceased Ekambaram was not registered and it could not be relied on. By holding so, the trial court decreed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent herein. Aggrieved by the decree and judgment of the trial court, the first defendant preferred A.S. No. 591 of 2005 before the first appellate Court which concurred with the findings of the trial court that Ex.B1, partition letter cannot be relied on to accept the defence putforth by the first defendant. The first appellate Court further held that Ex.B1 is not a registered one, the date was not typed and it was written as 30th January in pencil and only the year 1978'was typed. Even if Ex.B1 is accepted, there must be corresponding relinquishment of right of the first defendant in favour of the plaintiff with regard to Door No.27 but there is no evidence forthcoming in this regard. Further, the value of the suit property as on the date of execution of Ex.B1 must be more than Rs.100/-, which so, non-registration of Ex.B1 cannot be treated as an admissible document besides being contrary to the Indian Registration Act. Therefore, the first appellate Court concluded that Ex.B1 will not confer or convey any title to the property in favour of any one. As regards adverse possession pleaded by the first defendant, the first appellate Court held that when a person claims right over a property, he is estopped from simultaneously claiming title by adverse possession. Consequently, the first appellate Court dismissed the first appeal. 5. I heard the counsel for both sides. The following questions of law arise for consideration in this appeal i) Whether the Judgments of the courts below are liable to be set aside as perverse on the ground of ignoring vital admission made by PW1 about first defendant's possession as early as 1978? ii) Whether the respondent/plaintiff is entitled to maintain the suit when his own admission as PW1 falsify plea of permissive occupation? ii) Whether the respondent/plaintiff is entitled to maintain the suit when his own admission as PW1 falsify plea of permissive occupation? iii) Whether the courts below are legally justified in ignoring family arrangement, Ex.B1, wherein the suit property was allotted to appellant herein? 6. All the three questions of law relate to the validity and genuineness of Ex.B1 filed on behalf of the first defendant/appellant. However, for the sake of convenience, the first and second questions of law are dealt with simultaneously while the third question of law will be decided thereafter. 7. It is seen from the records that Ekambaram, the father of plaintiff and first defendant, has purchased Door No.27, Sundarapuram Third Street, Pulianthope, Chennai by a registered sale deed dated 20.08.1943. Similarly, the property bearing Door No.26, which is the subject matter of the suit, was assigned in favour of Ekambaram by the Government. The said Ekambaram, out of love and affection towards the plaintiff, being his son, executed a registered settlement deed dated 14.03.1974, Ex.A1. By this sale deed, Ex.A1, the said Ekambaram settled the entire property bearing Door No.27 and 1/3rd share in Door No.26, being the suit property in favour of plaintiff/respondent herein. The other two shares were settled in favour of the first defendant and another son Elumalai. This settlement deed was not subjected to challenge by the first defendant or the other son Elumalai in a manner known to law. However, in the written statement, the first defendant contended that when he had taken steps to challenge the validity of the settlement deed, Ex.A1, the plaintiff/respondent herein approached him with an offer to give up his 1/3rd share in Door No.26 in respect of suit property and that he will give up his entire right in respect of property bearing Door No.27. According to the first defendant, he agreed for such an offer with the result a release deed dated 30.01.1978 came to be executed. A perusal of the release deed dated 30.01.1978 would indicate that it was an unregistered document. It was witnessed by one Ekambaram and Elumalai without indicating their address. It was simply signed as Ekambaram and Elumalai in the witness column. As rightly pointed out by the first appellate Court, in the so-called release deed dated 30.01.1978, the date and month i.e., “30th January” was written in pencil and only the year 1978' was typed. It was witnessed by one Ekambaram and Elumalai without indicating their address. It was simply signed as Ekambaram and Elumalai in the witness column. As rightly pointed out by the first appellate Court, in the so-called release deed dated 30.01.1978, the date and month i.e., “30th January” was written in pencil and only the year 1978' was typed. The release deed dated 30.01.1978 was only signed by the first defendant/ appellant – Govindan. Therefore, based on the release deed dated 30.01.1978 also, no right will confer on the first defendant/appellant. 8. The first defendant/appellant has admitted that the property was subjected to amicable partition even during the life time of his father Ekambaram, however, Ex.A1 was not cancelled or superseded in a manner known to law. If it is so, as rightly pointed out by the first appellate Court, there should be a document to show the nature of cancellation or re-structuring of share between the plaintiff and first defendant in respect of the suit property in Door No.26 and the property in Door No.27, but there was no such document produced before the court below. 9. In the evidence, DW2 – Elumalai has stated that the first defendant has paid Rs.1,500/- as consideration for his share in Door No.27. As rightly pointed out by the first appellate Court, if the property value conveyed under any document is more than Rs.100/-, such document must be registered as per the Indian Registration Act. Since Ex.B1 was not registered, it cannot be relied on to show the conferment or conveyance of any right in favour of the first defendant. 10. The first appellate Court has categorically stated that Ex.B1 is an unregistered document. The original records have been produced. I have verified the same. Ex.B1 is nothing but a partition letter, that has been allegedly executed by the father in favor of his three sons namely, the plaintiff, the first defendant and yet another brother. Further, the alleged release deed though produced, is not marked and the same is also not a registered document. At any rate, that cannot be considered by this Court at this point of time. Further, the alleged release deed though produced, is not marked and the same is also not a registered document. At any rate, that cannot be considered by this Court at this point of time. Insofar as Ex.B1 is concerned, it is a partition letter allegedly executed by the father bequeathing the property in respect of three persons and also he reserved his right of enjoying the property during his life time and also a portion is given to his wife. Further, he also executed a registered settlement deed even in the year 1974. Therefore, the trial Court is right in coming to the conclusion that in respect of any property whether relates to relinquishment of right or transfer of right, unless, it is a registered document, that cannot be accepted. Even otherwise, Ex.B1 cannot be accepted in view of the further documents that have not been executed pursuant to Ex.B1 and that the first defendant is not in possession and enjoyment of the property. Further, all these things have been proved by the plaintiff. Therefore, the courts below have correctly held that the defendant cannot claim title over the property and I do not find any reason to interfere with the same. 11. The first and second substantial questions of law are to the effect that the Court below ignored the admission made by PW1 regarding permissive occupation. In this context, if the deposition of PW1/Plaintiff is read, it is clearly stated that the plaintiff filed the suit only after he came to know that the first defendant had unauthorisedly sublet the suit property to the second defendant and collecting rent. In his deposition, PW1 has categorically stated that he permitted the first defendant to occupy the suit property to commence a business, however, on coming to know that the suit property was unauthorisedly let out to tenants, he caused a legal notice cancelling the permission granted to the first defendant and thereafter filed the suit immediately. Even though this was denied by the first defendant, he asserted his right on the basis of Ex.B1. As mentioned above, Ex.B1 is inadmissible in evidence and it cannot be relied on to confer title on the first defendant. Even though this was denied by the first defendant, he asserted his right on the basis of Ex.B1. As mentioned above, Ex.B1 is inadmissible in evidence and it cannot be relied on to confer title on the first defendant. Therefore, I am of the view that the first and second substantial questions of law have to be answered against the first defendant/appellant herein and in favour of the plaintiff/respondent herein especially when the courts below have elaborately discussed the evidence, both oral and documentary made available on record to come to a clear and categorical finding against the claim made by the first defendant. Therefore, it cannot be said that the courts below ignored vital admission or evidence made available on record. 12. As regards third substantial questions of law, it was already discussed and decided above holding that Ex.B1 is inadmissible in evidence and it is hit by the mandatory provisions contained in the Indian Registration Act. Therefore, I hold that the third substantial question of law is also to be answered against the first defendant/appellant. 13. In the result, the second appeal is dismissed confirming the decree and judgment passed by the courts below. Resultantly, the suit in O.S. No. 4376 of 1997 filed by the plaintiff/respondent herein is decreed as prayed for by the plaintiff. No costs. Consequently, MP No. 1 of 2010 is closed.