ORDER In this batch of Writ Petitions the action of the respondents in not granting special remission to the convicts, (in Sessions Case No.112 of 1997 on the file of the IV Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad undergoing sentence in Cherlapalli Central Prison, Ranga Reddy District), pursuant to G.O.Ms. No.283 Home (Prisons. C) Department dated 30.10.2010 is questioned as being illegal, arbitrary and in violation of principles of natural justice. A consequential direction is sought to the respondents to give them the benefit of G.O.Ms. No.283 dated 30.10.2010, and to release the convicts forthwith. The convicts in these Writ Petitions are Accused Nos.2 to 5 and 9 in S.C.No.112/97. They were convicted for killing Sri M.A. Qadeer, (the then Deputy Secretary of the A.P. State Wakf Board), by the IV Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad on 24.01.2003, for offences under Sections 302, 404, 301 and 120-B I.P.C, and were sentenced to life imprisonment. The appeals preferred thereagainst were dismissed by this Court in Criminal Appeal No.141 of 2003 and batch dated 17.10.2003. All the convicts are undergoing life sentence in Cherlapalli Central Prison, Hyderabad. They have undergone actual sentence of 7 years, and a total sentence of 10 years including remission, as on 31.12.2010. It is the petitioners case that all the convicts, in this batch of Writ Petitions, are entitled to be released from prison in terms of para 3 of G.O.Ms. No.283 dated 30.10.2010; and para 4(iv) of the said G.O. has no application as the deceased was neither a “public servant” under Section 21 IPC nor was he “on duty” when he was murdered. In the counter-affidavit, filed on behalf of the 3rd respondent, it is stated that para 4(iv) of G.O.Ms. No.283 dated 30.10.2010 disentitles prisoners, convicted of the murder of a public servant on duty, from being granted remission; the convicts, in these Writ Petitions, were involved in the murder of the Deputy Secretary of the A.P. State Wakf Board; under Rule 11 of the Andhra Pradesh Fundamental Rules, a Government servant is on duty all around the clock, 24 hours a day; and the case of these life convicts was not favourably considered for release, in view the prohibition in clause (iv) of para 4 of G.O.Ms. No.283 Home (Pri.C) Department dt.30.10.2010. Oral submissions were made, and written arguments submitted, by Smt. Pushpinder Kaur, Learned Counsel for the petitioners. No.283 Home (Pri.C) Department dt.30.10.2010. Oral submissions were made, and written arguments submitted, by Smt. Pushpinder Kaur, Learned Counsel for the petitioners. Learned Government Pleader for Home appeared on behalf of the respondents. The contentions urged by Counsel on either side can be conveniently examined under different heads. I. ARTICLE 161 – ITS SCOPE: Smt. Pushpinder Kaur, Learned Counsel for the petitioners, would submit that the action of the respondents in not granting special remission, to the subject convicts undergoing life sentence, in terms of G.O.Ms. No.283 Home (Prison. C) Department dated 30.10.2010, is irrational and arbitrary; and, consequently, the respondents should be directed to release these five convicts granting them special remission in terms thereof. It is necessary therefore to examine, at the outset, the scope of Article 161 of the Constitution of India whereunder power is conferred on the Governor to grant pardon/remission. The power to grant pardon under Article 161 is very wide and does not contain any limitation as to the time at which and the occasion on which and the circumstances in which the said powers can be exercised. (Epuru Sudhakar v. Govt. of A.P., (2006) 8 SCC 161 ); Satpal v. State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 170 ).However all public power, including constitutional power, should not be exercised arbitrarily or mala fide and, ordinarily, guidelines for a fair and equal exercise guarantees a valid play of power. (Maru Ram v Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 107 ); Epuru Sudhakar (supra). If the Government has framed any rule, or made a scheme, for early release of convicts then those rules or schemes will have to be treated as guidelines for the exercise of power under Article 161 of the Constitution. (State of Haryana v. Balwan (1999) 7 SCC 355 ). The State Government issued G.O.Ms. No.283 Home (Prisons. C) Department dated 30.10.2010 prescribing guidelines for grant of special remission to life convicts on the occasion of Republic Day, 2011. Para 3 of the said G.O. classifies prisoners in the State, who have been convicted by Civil Courts of criminal jurisdiction, into different categories for grant of remission. Under para 3(d) are those convicted prisoners who have been sentenced to imprisonment for life, including those governed by Section 433-A CrPC, and who have undergone an actual sentence of 7 years, and a total sentence of 10 years including remission as on 31.12.2010. Under para 3(d) are those convicted prisoners who have been sentenced to imprisonment for life, including those governed by Section 433-A CrPC, and who have undergone an actual sentence of 7 years, and a total sentence of 10 years including remission as on 31.12.2010. It is not in dispute that all the convicts, in this batch of Writ Petitions, fall under Para 3(d) category of G.O.Ms. No.283 dated 30.10.2010. Under Para 4 of G.O.Ms. No.283 dated 30.10.2010 remission of sentence, in terms of para.3 of the said G.O, has been made inapplicable to certain categories of prisoners. Para 4 (iv) disentitles prisoners, who have been convicted of murder of a public servant on duty, from being granted remission of their sentence. Remission is a boon and a concession to which no one has any vested right. As to what classes of persons or category of offenders should be granted remission is a matter of policy, particularly when it is also a constituent power conferred upon the constitutional functionary and Head of the State Government. A larger area of latitude is to be conceded in favour of such authority to decide upon the frame and limits of its exercise under Article 161 itself. (Sanaboina Satyanarayana v. Govt. of A.P. (2003) 10 SCC 78 ). When an authority is called upon to exercise its powers, it must do so consistently with the government decisions/instructions prevalent at that time. If, according to the government policy/instructions in force at the relevant time, the life convict has already undergone sentence for the period prescribed in the policy decision/instructions, then the only right which he can be said to have acquired is to have his case put up, before the authorities concerned, for considering exercise of power under Article 161 of the Constitution. Ordinarily, the authority should exercise its powers consistently with the government decisions/instructions prevalent at that time. (Balwan (supra).The grant of remission as well as the conditions form a compendious single common pattern or scheme of concession impregnated with a policy designed in public interest and the safety and interests of society. There is no scope for judicial modification or modulation so as to extend the concession beyond the object of the order made on considerations of State policy. The scheme of remission cannot be modified or extended to the category of prisoners which it specifically excludes. (Govt. There is no scope for judicial modification or modulation so as to extend the concession beyond the object of the order made on considerations of State policy. The scheme of remission cannot be modified or extended to the category of prisoners which it specifically excludes. (Govt. of A.P. v. M.T. Khan (2004) 1 SCC 616 ); Sanaboina Satyanarayana (supra). II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AN ORDER GRANTING/REFUTING TO GRANT REMISSION: Smt. Pushpinder Kaur, Learned Counsel for the petitioners, would submit that the offences committed, by the convicts in these Writ Petitions, cannot be said to be offences committed against a “public servant” so as to disentitle them from seeking remission in terms of G.O.Ms. No.283 dated 30.10.2010; the decision of the State Government to grant remission must be in accordance with Section 432 read with Section 433A CrPC; the subject convicts are not covered by the sweep of clause (iv) of para 4 of G.O.Ms. No.283 dated 30.10.2010; and they are entitled to have their cases considered by the State Government for being granted remission. The entitlement of the convicts, to be granted the relief sought for in these Writ Petitions, would require this court to examine the scope of judicial review of the decision of the competent authority in refusing to grant remission. A constitutional order, built on the founding faith of the rule of law, may posit wide powers in high functionaries and validly exclude judge-power from eating these forbidden fruits. Article 161 designedly and benignantly vests in the highest Executive the humane and vast jurisdiction to remit, reprieve, respite, commute and pardon criminals on whom judicial sentences may have been imposed. Historically, it is a sovereign power; politically, it is a residuary power; humanistically, it is in aid of intangible justice where imponderable factors operate for the well-being of the community, beyond the blinkered court process. (G. Krishta Goud & J. Bhoomaiah v. State of A.P. (1976) 1 SCC 157 ). The power under Article 161 of the Constitution is of the widest amplitude and envisages myriad kinds and categories of cases with facts and situations varying from case to case. The exercise of power depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case, and the necessity or justification for the exercise of that power has to be judged from case to case. The exercise of power depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case, and the necessity or justification for the exercise of that power has to be judged from case to case. Every aspect of the exercise of the power under Article 161 does not fall in the judicial domain. In certain cases, a particular aspect may not be justiciable. However, even in such cases there has to exist requisite material on the basis of which the power is exercised under Article 161 of the Constitution. (Epuru Sudhakar (supra). Exercise of power under Article 161 cannot be questioned on the ground of adequacy or inadequacy of the reasons which weighed with the authority in the passing the order. (Hukum Singh v. State of Punjab and Haryana (AIR 1975 Punjab & Haryana 148 (FB). The order of the President/Governor cannot be subjected to judicial review on its merits. However, the function of determining whether the act of a constitutional or statutory functionary falls within the constitutional or legislative conferment of power, or is vitiated by self-denial on an erroneous appreciation of the full amplitude of the power, is a matter for the Court. (Epuru Sudhakar (supra); Kehar Singh v Union of India (1989) 1 SCC 204 ).The Courts, except in the rarest of rare cases, cannot be called upon to adjudicate on the desirability or wisdom of such decisions. (Sanaboina Satyanarayana (supra). The exercise or non-exercise of the pardon power by the Governor is not immune from judicial review. Limited judicial review is available in certain cases. (Epuru Sudhakar (supra). The Court, therefore, would be justified in interfering with an order passed by the Governor, in the exercise of his power under Article 161 of the Constitution, if he is found to have exercised the power himself without being advised by the Government or if the Governor transgresses his jurisdiction in its exercise. The order of the Governor can be impugned on the following grounds: (a) the order has been passed without application of mind; (b) the order is malafide; (c) the order has been passed on extraneous or wholly irrelevant considerations; (d) relevant materials have been kept out of consideration; and (e) the order suffers from arbitrariness. The order of the Governor can be impugned on the following grounds: (a) the order has been passed without application of mind; (b) the order is malafide; (c) the order has been passed on extraneous or wholly irrelevant considerations; (d) relevant materials have been kept out of consideration; and (e) the order suffers from arbitrariness. (Epuru Sudhakar (supra); Satpal (supra).An order passed under Article 161 of the Constitution of India is justiciable on any of the following grounds: (1) the authority, which is purported to have exercised the power, had no jurisdiction to exercise the same; (2) the impugned order goes beyond the extent of the power conferred by the provisions of law under which it is purported to be exercised; and (3) the order has been obtained by fraud or was passed on extraneous considerations not germane to the exercise of the power conferred or, in other words, the order is a result of mala fide exercise of power. (Hukum Singh (supra).If the power under Article 161 is exercised arbitrarily, malafide or in absolute disregard of the finer canons of constitutionalism, the by-product order cannot get the approval of law and, in such cases, the judicial hand must be stretched to it. (Swaran Singh v. State of U.P. (1998) 4 SCC 75 ). While taking into consideration the societal needs, and the dictates of the large scale gruesome events happening all over, if a conscious decision has been taken by the policy-maker to keep out a class of anti-socials from availing the benefit of the remission, Courts cannot, by stretching the language, confer an undeserved benefit upon the class of convicts who have been designedly kept out of the scheme for according the benefit of remission. (Sanaboina Satyanarayana (supra). Bearing these principles in mind, let us now examine whether the convicts, in this batch of Writ Petitions, have satisfied the conditions stipulated in G.O.Ms. No.283 dated 30.10.2010, for it is only if they have are they entitled to have their cases reconsidered for grant of remission. III. (Sanaboina Satyanarayana (supra). Bearing these principles in mind, let us now examine whether the convicts, in this batch of Writ Petitions, have satisfied the conditions stipulated in G.O.Ms. No.283 dated 30.10.2010, for it is only if they have are they entitled to have their cases reconsidered for grant of remission. III. SECTION 66(1) OF THE WAKF ACT, 1954, AND SEC.101 OF THE WAKF ACT, Smt. Pushpinder Kaur, Learned Counsel for the petitioners, would rely on State of Maharashtra v. Laljit Rajshi Shah ( AIR 2000 S.C. 937 ) to submit that, merely because the members and officers of the Wakf Board are “deemed to be public servants” under Section 101 of the Wakf Act, 1995, they would not, automatically, fall within the ambit of Section 21 IPC; it is only in relation to the offences set out in Wakf Act are the officers referred to therein, including the deceased - a Deputy Secretary of the Wakf Board, recognised as “public servants”; such a person would not answer the description of a “public servant” under Section 21 IPC; the expression “public servant” has been used in Section 21 IPC for certain purposes; the legal fiction created by the Wakf Act cannot be stretched beyond the purpose for which the Act has been made; it would not take within its sweep the expression “public servant”, for the purpose of Section 21 IPC, as both the Statutes are not in pari materia; the Wakf Act is a separate legislation containing various offences and remedies; and the expression “public servant”, used in the Wakf Act, must be confined only to the offences contained and set out in the said Act, and cannot be stretched for the purposes of Section 21 IPC. In the counter-affidavit, filed on behalf of the 3rd respondent, it is stated that, by his letter dated 09.12.2010, the Chief Executive Officer, A.P. State Wakf Board had informed the 1st respondent that the deceased Sri M.A. Qadeer (Ex. Deputy Secretary of the A.P. State Wakf Board, Hyderabad) fell under the category of “public servant” under Section 66 of Wakf Act, 1954 corresponding to Section 101 of the Wakf Act, 1995. Deputy Secretary of the A.P. State Wakf Board, Hyderabad) fell under the category of “public servant” under Section 66 of Wakf Act, 1954 corresponding to Section 101 of the Wakf Act, 1995. Under Section 66(1) of the Waqf Act, 1954 (similar to Section 101(1) of the Wakf Act 1995), the Wakf Commissioner, Survey Commissioner, members of the Board, every auditor, every officer and servant of the Board and every other person duly appointed to discharge any duties imposed on him by the Act or any rule or order made thereunder, shall be deemed to be “public servants” within the meaning of Section 21 IPC. Like the aforesaid provisions of the Wakf Act, Section 161 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 also stipulated that the Registrar of Cooperative Societies, among others, shall be deemed to be a “public servant” within the meaning of Section 21 IPC. Like the aforesaid provisions of the Wakf Act, Section 161 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 also stipulated that the Registrar of Cooperative Societies, among others, shall be deemed to be a “public servant” within the meaning of Section 21 IPC. While considering the effect of Section 161 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, in interpreting the provisions of Section 21 IPC, the Supreme Court, in Laljit Rajshi Shah (supra), observed that the legislature, no doubt in Section 161, had referred to the provisions of Section 21 IPC, but such reference would not make the officers concerned 'public servants' within the ambit of Section 21 IPC; the State Legislature had the powers to amend Section 21 IPC, the same being referable to a legislation under Entry 1 of List III of the Seventh Schedule, subject to Article 254(2) of the Constitution as, otherwise, inclusion of the persons who are 'public servants' under Section 161 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act would be repugnant to the definition of 'public servant' under Section 21 IPC; that not having been done, it was difficult to accept the contention that, by reference to Section 21 IPC in the deeming definition in Section 161 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, the persons concerned could be prosecuted for offences under the IPC; the Indian Penal Code and the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act are not Statutes in pari materia; the Co-operative Societies Act is a self-contained Statute with its own provisions and has created specific offences quite different from the offences in the Indian Penal Code; both Statutes have different objects and have created offences with separate ingredients; this being the position, even though the Legislature had incorporated the provisions of Section 21 IPC into the Co-operative Societies Act in order to define a 'public servant', those 'public servants' cannot be prosecuted for having committed offences under the IPC; a specific category of officers, while exercising powers under specific sections, have, by legal fiction, become a 'public servant' only for the purposes of the Co-operative Societies Act; that, by itself, does not make those persons 'public servants' under the IPC, so as to be prosecuted for having committed offences under the Penal Code; and when a person is "deemed” to be something, the only meaning possible is that, whereas he is not in reality that something, the Act of legislature requires him to be treated as such for the purposes of the said Act and not otherwise. The contention of the respondents that the deceased, who is deemed to be a “public servant” under Section 66(1) of the Wakf Act, 1954 or Section 101 of the Wakf Act, 1995, is a “public servant” within the meaning of Section 21 IPC necessitates rejection in view of the law declared by the Supreme Court, in Laljit Rajshi Shah (supra), interpreting Section 161 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, a provision similar to the aforesaid provisions of the Wakf Act. Smt. Pushpinder Kaur, Learned Counsel for the petitioners, would submit that the deceased, in S.C.No.112 of 1997, was an employee of the Wakf Board, and not in the service of the Government; he was neither in the pay of the Government nor was he remunerated by fees or commission, for the performance of any public duty, by the Government; and, as such, was not a “public servant” under Section 21(12)(a) IPC. Till the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1958 (Act No. II of 1958) was put on the statute book, Section 21 IPC consisted only of eleven clauses. Clause 12 was introduced by the aforementioned Act and read : 'Every officer in the service or pay of a local authority or of a Corporation engaged in any trade or industry which is established by a Central, Provincial or State Act or of a Government Company as defined in S. 617 of the Companies Act, 1956'. The avowed object of the amendment was, inter alia, to bring within the scope of the Indian Penal Code, employees of statutory trading corporations, by giving an extended definition to the expression "public servant" in Section 21 of the Code. The obvious intention of the legislature was to spread the net wider. (In Re. H.V. Jagdesh AIR 1966 AP 35 (FB). Clause 12, introduced by Act II of 1958, was re-enacted later as Clause 12(b). The last part in the unamended Clause (9): 'every officer in the service or pay of the Government or remunerated by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty' was severed from the 9th clause, and incorporated as independent Clause (12) (a). The original Clause (12) was deleted and was re-enacted as Clause (12) (b) with minor modifications. (R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay ( AIR 1984 SC 684 ). The original Clause (12) was deleted and was re-enacted as Clause (12) (b) with minor modifications. (R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay ( AIR 1984 SC 684 ). Was the deceased, a Deputy Secretary of the A.P. State Wakf Board, a “public servant” under Section 21 IPC for, if he was not, para 4 (iv) would not disentitle the convicts from seeking remission, in terms of para 3 of G.O.Ms. No.283 dated 30.10.2010, provided, of course, that the deceased was murdered while he was on duty. Under Section 21 IPC, the words “public servant” denote a person falling under any of the descriptions thereunder. Under Clause (12)(a) of Section 21, every person in the service or pay of the Government or remunerated by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty by the Government is a “public servant”. Clause (12)(a) of Sec.21 IPC would be attracted only if the person is (i) in the service of the Government; or (ii) in the pay of the Government; and (iii) is remunerated by fees or commission, for the performance of any public duty, by the Government. (R.S. Nayak (supra). Section 48(3)[c] of the Wakf Act, 1954 (Similar to Section 77(4)[c] of the Wakf Act, 1995) stipulates that the Wakf Fund shall be applied for the payment of salary and allowances to the officers’ and staff of the Board. The deceased was a Deputy Secretary in the A.P. State Wakf Board. A Deputy Secretary of the A.P. State Wakf Board is neither in the service or pay of the Government nor is he remunerated by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty by the Government. He would, therefore, not be a “public servant” in terms of Section 21(12)(a) IPC. On the scope of Clause (12) (b) of Section 21 IPC, Smt. Pushpinder Kaur, Learned Counsel for the petitioners, would submit that the Indian Penal Code was amended by Amending Act 40 of 1964; the original clauses (9) and (12) were deleted, and re-enacted as Clause (12)(b) with minor modifications; and the Deputy Secretary of the Wakf Board does not fall in any of the categories Section 21 IPC. Section 21(12)(b) IPC stipulates that every person, in the service or pay of a local authority, a corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act or a Government Company as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956, is a “public servant”. In Akhtar Alam v. State of Bihar (1969) 1 SCC 142 ), the question which arose for consideration was whether the appellant therein was a public servant within the meaning of the twelfth clause in Section 21, Indian Penal Code, as it stood after the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1958 (Act 2 of 1958). Under Explanation 4 to Section 21(12) IPC the expression “corporation engaged in any trade or industry” included a banking, insurance or financial corporation, a river valley corporation and a corporation for supplying power, light or water to the public. The Supreme Court held that the appellant, who was in the service of the State Electricity Board, fell within the language of Explanation 4; and was a “public servant” under Section 21 IPC. Clause (12) of Section 21 IPC, as it stood after the Criminal Law (Amendment Act) 1958, was amended and renumbered as Clause (12)(b) after deleting the words “engaged in any trade or industry” and Explanation 4 therefrom. The object of the amendment is to widen the net further and bring every person in the service or pay of a corporation, established by or under a Central, provincial or State Act, within the ambit of the definition of a “public servant” under Section 21 IPC. Unlike the pre-amended Clause (12) which confined the ambit of Section 21 IPC only to persons in the service and pay of a corporation engaged in any trade or industry, now persons in the service and pay of all corporations established by or under a Central or State Act are also brought within the ambit of Clause (12)(b) of Section 21 IPC. In Republic of India v. Khagendranath Jha (1982 Crl. L.J. 961) the Orissa High Court held that the State Bank of India was established by the State Bank of India Act, 1955; and, by virtue of Section 21(12)(b) of the Indian Penal Code, a person in the service of State Bank of India was a “public servant”. In Republic of India v. Khagendranath Jha (1982 Crl. L.J. 961) the Orissa High Court held that the State Bank of India was established by the State Bank of India Act, 1955; and, by virtue of Section 21(12)(b) of the Indian Penal Code, a person in the service of State Bank of India was a “public servant”. In State through CBI v. O.P. Dogra ( AIR 1986 SC 312 ), the Supreme Court held that employees of the Life Insurance Corporation of India came within the definition of the term ‘public servant’ under Section 21 IPC. In Rajendra Vithalrao Suryavanshi v. State of Maharashtra (1991 Crl.L.J. 2068), the Bombay High Court held that United India Insurance Company Limited is one of the companies acquired by the General Insurance Corporation of India; this Corporation came to be formed as a result of statutory legislation, namely, General Insurance Business (Nationalisation) Act, 1972; Rule 1(3) of the Rules framed under the Act makes the Rules applicable to every person appointed to any post under the General Insurance Corporation of India or its subsidiary Company; and, therefore, an employee of a subsidiary company becomes a public servant under clause 12(b) of Section 21 IPC. In Ashoka Marketing Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank (1990) 4 SCC 406 ), and Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Mitra (1995) 2 SCC 768 ), the Supreme Court held that, keeping in view the provisions of the Banks Nationalisation Act, a nationalised bank is a corporation established by a Central Act; it is owned and controlled by the Central Government; and the employees of Corporations, which are owned and controlled by the Central Government and are established by a Central Act, are “public servants”. A. IS THE WAKF BOARD A CORPORATION ESTABLISHED BY OR UNDER A CENTRAL ACT? The Wakf Act, 1995 (Act 43 of 1995) (hereinafter called the “1995 Act”) came into force on 01.01.1996. The deceased was murdered on 09.11.1992. It is the earlier Wakf Act, 1954 (Act 29 of 1954) (hereinafter called the ‘1954 Act’), which was in force at the relevant time. Both the “1954 Act” and the “1995 Act” are Acts of Parliament, and are Central Acts as referred to under Section 21(12)(b) IPC. The deceased was murdered on 09.11.1992. It is the earlier Wakf Act, 1954 (Act 29 of 1954) (hereinafter called the ‘1954 Act’), which was in force at the relevant time. Both the “1954 Act” and the “1995 Act” are Acts of Parliament, and are Central Acts as referred to under Section 21(12)(b) IPC. Under Section 9(1) of the 1954 Act (similar to Section 13(1) of the 1995 Act), with effect from such date as the State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette appoint in this behalf, there shall be established a Board of Wakfs under such name as may be specified in the notification. Under Section 15(1) of the 1954 Act, (similar to Section 32 (1) of the 1995 Act), subject to the rules that may be made under the Act, the general superintendence of all wakfs in a State in relation to all matters, except those which are expressly required by the Act to be dealt with by the Wakf Commissioner, shall vest in the Board established for the State, and it shall be the duty of the Board to exercise its powers under the Act to ensure that the wakfs, under its superintendence, are properly maintained, controlled and administered and the income thereof is duly applied to the objects and the purposes for which such wakfs were created or intended. Section 21-B(1) of the 1954 Act, (similar to Section 24 of the 1995 Act), empowers the Board to have the assistance of such number of officers and other employees as may be necessary for the efficient performance of his or its functions under the Act. Section 9(2) of the 1954 Act, and Section 13(3)(3) of the 1995 Act, stipulate that the Board shall be a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal with power to acquire and hold property and to transfer any such property subject to such conditions and restrictions as may be prescribed and shall by the said name sue and be sued. Black’s Law Dictionary Sixth Edition defines a “body corporate” to mean a public or private corporation. A body Corporate is a corporation. It is called a body corporate, because the persons are made into a body politic and are of capacity to take, grant, etc., by a particular name. An incorporated company is a body corporate. (P. Ramanatha Aiyer: The Law Lexicon 2nd Edition). A body Corporate is a corporation. It is called a body corporate, because the persons are made into a body politic and are of capacity to take, grant, etc., by a particular name. An incorporated company is a body corporate. (P. Ramanatha Aiyer: The Law Lexicon 2nd Edition). The Board of Wakfs is a body corporate. Though it is subject to the control of the State Government, it is a statutory corporation and is vested with statutory powers, functions and duties. (Syed Yousuf Yar Khan v. Syed Mohd. Yar Khan ( AIR 1967 SC 1318 ). The deceased was an officer of the A.P. State Wakf Board in the cadre of a Deputy Secretary. An “officer” is one to whom is delegated, by the supreme authority, some portion of its regulating and coercive powers or who is appointed to represent the State in its relations to individual subjects. The word “officer” means some person employed to exercise to some extent, and in certain circumstances, a delegated function of the Government. He is either himself armed with some authority or representative character or his duties are immediately auxiliary to those of someone who is so armed. The word officium principally implies a duty and, in the next place, the charge of such duty. It is a rule that where one man hath to do with another’s affairs against his will, and without his leave, that it is an office, and he who is in it is an officer.’ (Akhtar Alam (supra); Beg.v. Ramaji Rao Jivhaji (12 Bom FCR 1). In order to determine whether a person is an officer of the Corporation within the meaning of Section 21 IPC, the true test is: (1) whether he is in the service or pay of the corporation, and (2) whether he is himself either armed with some authority or representative character by the corporation or whether his duties are immediately auxiliary to those of some one who is armed with such authority or representative character. A person, performing duties immediately auxiliary to those of the Head of the office, is an officer.(Akhtar Alam (supra). The deceased, a Deputy Secretary, was assisting the Special Officer of the Wakf Boad who was an I.A.S. Officer discharging statutory functions under the Wakf Act. A person, performing duties immediately auxiliary to those of the Head of the office, is an officer.(Akhtar Alam (supra). The deceased, a Deputy Secretary, was assisting the Special Officer of the Wakf Boad who was an I.A.S. Officer discharging statutory functions under the Wakf Act. The deceased was paid his salary from the Wakf fund, as stipulated in Section 48(3)[c] of the 1954 Act (similar to Section 77(4)[c] of the 1995 Act). He was an officer in the pay of the Wakf Board, a corporation established by and under a Central Act i.e. the Wakf Act, and is a “public servant” under Section 21(12)(b) IPC. Smt. Pushpinder Kaur, Learned Counsel for the petitioners, would submit that the deceased was not actually on duty when he was killed; and the expression “on duty” should be read and understood as a person actually performing his duty as a public servant. She would rely on Thakkidi Ram Reddy v. Govt. of A.P. (Judgment in WP No.22823 of 2009, dated 28.01.2010), and Sri M. Pullaiah v. The Government of A.P. (Judgment in W.P. No.24583 of 2009 dated 21.01.2010), in this regard. In Thakkidi Ram Reddy (supra), a Division bench of this Court observed: “…..The other contention raised by Sri C. Padmanabha Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners was that the deceased-Sarpanch was not actually on duty when he was done to death. In other words, it was his contention that the expression employed in this Section “on duty” should be read and understood as a public servant, who was actually performing the duty. It is his further contention that at the time of his death, since the deceased-Sarpanch was not performing any public duty, the same shall not be treated as killing up of a public servant “on duty”. In this context, since we have already expressed our view as regards the first part of the expression “public servant” as contained in G.O.Ms.No.338, Home (Prisons-C) Department, dated 24.7.2009, and eventually held that a Sarpanch or a Upa-Sarpanch cannot be held to be a public servant, virtually the examination of the second part regarding whether the deceased-Sarpanch was actually ‘on duty’ or not, is rather superfluous. Therefore, we are not expressing any view on that aspect…….” (emphasis supplied) As the question whether the deceased was actually “on duty” was not decided in Thakkidi Ram Reddy (supra), reliance placed thereupon is misplaced. Therefore, we are not expressing any view on that aspect…….” (emphasis supplied) As the question whether the deceased was actually “on duty” was not decided in Thakkidi Ram Reddy (supra), reliance placed thereupon is misplaced. In order to answer the question whether the deceased was murdered, by the convicts in this batch of Writ Petitions, while “on duty”, it is necessary to refer to the facts noted in the judgment of the IV Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad in S.C.No.112 of 1997 dated 24.01.2003. The said judgment records that the deceased Sri M.A. Quadeer was a Deputy Secretary of the A.P. State Wakf Board looking after the establishment section, and was handling cases relating to disputed properties; the Special Officer Sri Shaik Saad Hussain, IAS (LW.1) was the Head of the Wakf Board, and was the deceased’s superior; A1 was working as the orderly/watchman of the Special Officer (LW.1) at his building under demolition at Chintal Basti, Khairatabad; A2 was working as the Personal Assistant to the Special Officer (LW.1); A5 was the Official Driver of the Special Officer (LW.1); A1 had introduced A4 and A6 to the Special Officer (LW.1) soliciting their appointment in the Wakf Board; A2 managed to obtain the endorsement of the Special Officer (LW.1) for his higher grade appointment in the Wakf Board, and for the appointment of his brother-in-law Sk. Mohd. Khasim in the services of the Wakf Board; A5 had obtained the endorsement of the Special Officer (LW.1) for appointment of his cousin Mohd. Abdul Salam in the Wakf Board; the deceased had objected to the aforesaid retention and appointments, and had got them rejected by the Special Officer (LW.1); taking advantage of the disputes over wakf properties, including Razzak Manzil, A1, A2 and A5 had threatened the deceased asking him to either resign or meet his death; on 25.10.1992, A1, A2 and A5 hired Mohd. Nayeem, a rowdy, to kill the deceased; the deceased left his office at 6.00 P.M. on 09.11.1992; A1 telephoned the residence of the deceased at 7.10 P.M. and 7.50 P.M.; the deceased’s nephew answered the phone as the deceased had not yet returned home; A1 introduced himself as Sri Shaik Saad Hussain, and asked Sri M.A. Faheem (nephew of the deceased) to send the deceased to the building at Chintal Basti; when the deceased came home at about 8.15 P.M, Sri M.A. Faheem informed him of the telephone calls; the deceased telephoned the house of the Special Officer (LW.1) to ascertain the purpose of the calls; as the phone of the Special Officer (LW.1) was dead, the deceased left his house and proceeded, to the under demolition building, in an auto; 10 minutes thereafter, A1 telephoned the house of the deceased, and was informed by Sri M.A. Faheem that the deceased had already left his house; A1, A2 and A5 then hurried back, and were waiting for the deceased at the under demolition building; at about 9.15 P.M. the deceased reached the said premises; A1, who was waiting outside, took him inside the gate through its small side door stating that their boss was inside; and, thereafter, the deceased was strangulated to death with a nylon rope. It is evident that the deceased went to the building at Chintalbasti in the belief that the Special Officer (LW.1), below whom he was working, had called him there. The visit of the deceased, to the subject building late at night, was therefore in the discharge of his official duties; and the deceased must be held to have been murdered while on duty. The question which arose for consideration before this Court, in, M. Pullaiah (supra) was whether or not the deceased therein, who was working as an LDC in ESI hospital, fell within the definition of a “public servant on duty”? It is in this context that this Court held that the deceased could not be termed as a public servant, within the meaning of Section 21 IPC, as, even according to the charge sheet, there were disputes between the wife and husband; the husband i.e., the convict used to demand additional dowry; the alleged incident took place at about 11.30 A.M. on 03.08.1999 when the deceased was at home; and the deceased was not a public servant on duty. Unlike in M. Pullaiah (supra) the deceased, in the present case, was under the belief that he was summoned by his superior, the Special Officer of the Wakf Board, when he went to the dilapidated building late at night. As the visit of the deceased to the building, where he was murdered, was in the belief that he was discharging his duties as the Deputy Secretary of the A.P. State Wakf Board, reliance placed on the judgment in M. Pullaiah (supra) is misplaced. VI. CONCLUSION: As the deceased Sri M.A. Qudeer was murdered while on duty, albeit on the night of 09.11.1992, para 4(iv) of the G.O.Ms. No.283 dated 30.10.2010 is attracted and all the convicts herein are persons convicted of the murder of a “public servant on duty”. They are not entitled, therefore, for being granted special remission of sentence in terms of para 3 of the said G.O, and the respondents cannot be faulted in not giving them the said benefit. All the Writ Petitions fail and are, accordingly, dismissed. The miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall also stand dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.