CAV ORDER Heard Ms. Fauzia Shakil, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. N. A. Shamsi, learned Assistant Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the Union of India. 2. In the present writ application, the petitioner is aggrieved by an order dated 06.07.2010 passed by the Group Commandant, Central Industrial Security Force (hereinafter referred to as the CISF) Group Headquarters, Patna whereby he has been dismissed from service, taking recourse to Rule 39(ii) of the Central Industrial Security Force Rules, 2001, dispensing with the requirement of a departmental enquiry, on the satisfaction that such enquiry was not reasonably practicable. 3. The petitioner was a Constable in CISF and, at the relevant point of time, was deployed in “A” Coy of CISF Unit, Indian Oil Corporation, Barauni under administrative control of CISF Group Headquarters, Patna. On the alleged date of occurrence, i.e., 05.07.2010 he was detailed in the “B” shift duty from 1300 hours to 2100 hours at CISF Unit, Barauni for gate checking. Allegedly he did not turn up for his duties and remained absent without any intimation and prior permission of the competent authority and also remained absent from the Unit barrack. A GD (General Diary) entry to this effect was made at CISF control room of Indian Oil Corporation, Barauni by shift in-charge on 05.07.2010. From the impugned order it appears that the police out post, FCI, Barauni intimated the CISF control room Indian Oil Corporation, Barauni telephonically that on 05.07.2010, at about 1115 hours, the petitioner was found indulging in an act of molestation with an intention to commit rape upon a minor girl aged nearly 12 years. The petitioner is said to have been caught by local people, who in turn handed him over to the police and he was, accordingly, taken into custody. On the basis of a written complaint to the police by the father of the victim, the first information report being Barauni PS case No. 227/2010 was instituted for the offence punishable under sections 376/511 of the IPC against the petitioner. 4. On the basis of a written complaint to the police by the father of the victim, the first information report being Barauni PS case No. 227/2010 was instituted for the offence punishable under sections 376/511 of the IPC against the petitioner. 4. The disciplinary authority, taking into account all these facts, as noted above, coupled with the fact that the petitioner had been punished on 13 times during his service career with minor penalties, recorded the satisfaction, for the reasons enumerated in the order that in the circumstances, any attempt to hold a departmental enquiry by serving a charge sheet and following the departmental proceeding in the manner, as prescribed under Rules 36, 37 and 38 of the CISF Rules, 2001, was reasonably impracticable, and, accordingly, by an order issued on the very next day of the date of occurrence, passed the order of dismissal dated 06.07.2010, taking recourse to Rule 39(ii) of the CISF Rules, 2001. 5. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the said order before the Deputy Inspector General, CISF, Eastern Zone Headquarters, Patna which was dismissed by an order dated 09.09.2010 (annexure-3). The petitioner, thereafter, preferred a revision application before the Inspector General of CISF which has also been dismissed by an order dated 30.10.2010. This is the circumstance in which the petitioner has challenged these orders dated 06.07.2010, 09.09.2010 and 31.12.2010 in the present writ application. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the order of the disciplinary authority dated 06.07.2010, dismissing the petitioner from service without holding any enquiry, mainly on the ground that satisfaction recorded by the Disciplinary Authority that it was not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry in the manner provided under the Rules is not based on sound reasoning and, in view of the nature of allegation and other attending circumstances, a departmental enquiry could not have been held. Relying upon a Supreme Court judgement reported in (1991) 1 SCC 362 (Jaswant Singh vs. State of Punjab & Ors.) she submits that the decision to dispense with the departmental enquiry cannot be rested solely on the ipse dixit of the concerned authority and when such satisfaction is questioned in court of law, it is imperative and incumbent upon the disciplinary authority to demonstrate that satisfaction of the disciplinary authority is based on certain objective facts and is not the outcome of the whim or caprice of the concerned authority. She has submitted, referring to the impugned order, that Rule 39(ii) of the CISF Rules, 2001, which is akin to second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, that the grounds for dispensing with the disciplinary proceeding before dismissing the petitioner from service is extraneous in nature and impugned action of the authorities needs interference by this court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 7. Mr. N. A. Shamsi, learned Assistant Solicitor General, appearing on behalf of the Union of India, on the other hand, has opposed the prayer and has contended that a swift departmental action against the petitioner, in view of the nature of allegation made against him and in view of the circumstances existing, became must for the disciplinary authority. He further contends that the nature of allegation and the circumstances were such that a departmental enquiry, as envisaged under Rules 36 to 38 of the CISF Rules, 2001, was not found reasonably practicable. He submits, accordingly, that the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority would require no interference in the facts and circumstances of the case. 8. Before I consider the rival submissions made on behalf of the parties, as noted above, I must take note of a fact urged on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner was subsequently acquitted under criminal case by an order dated 30.05.2013 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Begusarai in Sessions Trial No. 122/ 2011. In this background, it has been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the order of dismissal from service without holding any enquiry should be held to be illegal. Rule 39(ii) of the CISF Rules, 2001 reads thus:- “39. In this background, it has been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the order of dismissal from service without holding any enquiry should be held to be illegal. Rule 39(ii) of the CISF Rules, 2001 reads thus:- “39. Special Procedure in certain cases.- Notwithstanding anything contained in rules 36 to 38- (i) where any penalty is imposed on an enrolled member of the Force on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or (ii) where the disciplinary authority is satisfied for reasons to be recorded by it in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry in the manner provided in these rules; or (iii) where the President is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State, it is not expedient to hold any enquiry in the manner provided in these rules, the disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of the case and make such orders thereon as it deems fit: Provided that the enrolled member of the Force may be given an opportunity of making representation against the penalty proposed to be imposed before any order is made in cause under clause (i).” 9. From a bare reading of Section 39(ii) of the Rules, it would appear that departmental enquiry, as contemplated under the Rules, can be dispensed with if the disciplinary authority is satisfied that no enquiry is reasonably practicable before imposing a penalty including penalty of dismissal from service. In this background, this court is only required to test as to whether the reasons recorded by the disciplinary authority for dispensing with the disciplinary proceeding in the impugned order dated 06.07.2010 can be said to be germane or not. The circumstances in which the order of dismissal was passed have been taken note of above. The reasons assigned in the impugned order dated 06.07.2010 are as follows:- “AND WHEREAS, this is serious misconduct and criminal offence on the part of Constable Md. Salam that has generated communal sentiments among two religious communities. AND WHEREAS:- (a) It has tarnished the image of the Force in the public eye. An enquiry will attract a lot of public attention, media coverage and adverse comments. Individual actions like this one are totally contradictory to the image of the Force. Salam that has generated communal sentiments among two religious communities. AND WHEREAS:- (a) It has tarnished the image of the Force in the public eye. An enquiry will attract a lot of public attention, media coverage and adverse comments. Individual actions like this one are totally contradictory to the image of the Force. (b) Calling up evidences like stray passers by Aam Janta (General Public) whose even identity is not known, would be next to impossible. (c) The individual was nabbed by public while forcibly molesting a minor girl thereby his malafide intention has been amply established. (d) Swift departmental action against such criminal acts, which go against the basic ethics of a civilized society and of a disciplined Force, shall help in maintaining the discipline and conduct of the members of the Force. AND WHEREAS, due to above reasons, I am satisfied under the circumstances any attempt to hold departmental enquiry by serving a charge sheet and following due procedures in the manner as prescribed in the Rule-36, 37 and 38 of CISF Rules, 2001 is practicably impossible. AND WHEREAS, on consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and also the fact that he has been awarded punishments on 13 different occasions in the past various misconducts, I am of the view that the penalty of Dismissal from Service be imposed upon CISF No. 914492450 Constable Md. Salam.” 10. From the reasons assigned, it appears that the petitioner was nabbed by the police while he was found molesting the victim minor girl. With this allegation and other circumstances, assigned in the impugned order, as quoted above, it cannot be said that the decision of the disciplinary authority is based on no cogent material. 11. Ms. Shakil, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has placed heavy reliance upon the Supreme Court judgement in the case of Jaswant Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab & Ors. (supra). In my opinion, however, this judgement would not come in the aid to the petitioner’s case because the disciplinary authority, as would appear from the impugned order, took a decision to dismiss the petitioner dispensing with the requirement of departmental enquiry not only keeping in view the seriousness of misconduct alleged against the petitioner but also the delicate situation which the force was made to face because of the petitioner’s conduct. 12. 12. This is to be noted that in the facts and circumstances of that case the disciplinary authority came to a conclusion that calling evidence like stray passers by whose even identity was not known, would be next to impossible. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed strong reliance upon a Supreme Court judgement reported in (1985) 4 SCC 252 (Satyavir Singh & Ors. V. Union of India & Ors.) and has contended that it was in fact, in the given circumstances, was possible and practicable to hold an enquiry. She has placed reliance upon paragraphs 60 and 62 of the said judgement which read thus:- “60. The disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with the disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives merely in order to avoid the holding of an enquiry or because the department’s case against the civil servant is weak and must fair.” “62. It will also not be reasonably practicable to afford to the civil servant an opportunity of a hearing or further hearing, as the case may be, when at the commencement of the inquiry or pending it, the civil servant absents and cannot be served or will not participate in the inquiry. In such cases, the matter must proceed ex parte and on the materials before the disciplinary authority.” 14. She also referred to paragraphs 68, 104, 106 and 108 of the said judgement and has submitted that the court is required to consider the circumstances which, according to the disciplinary authority, made him come to the conclusion that it was not reasonably practicable to hold the enquiry. 15. To consider this submission made on behalf of the petitioner, it would be appropriate to refer to paragraph 108 of the Apex Court judgment in the case of Satyavir Singh vs. Union of India (supra) which deals with clause (b) to second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. Paragraph 108 of the said judgement reads thus:- “108. In examining the relevancy of the reasons given for dispensing with the inquiry, the court will consider the circumstances which, according to the disciplinary authority, made it come to the conclusion that it was not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry. Paragraph 108 of the said judgement reads thus:- “108. In examining the relevancy of the reasons given for dispensing with the inquiry, the court will consider the circumstances which, according to the disciplinary authority, made it come to the conclusion that it was not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry. If the court finds that the reasons are irrelevant, the order dispensing with the inquiry and the order of penalty following upon it would be void and the court will strike them down. In considering the relevancy of the reasons given by the disciplinary authority, the court will not, however, sit in judgement over the reasons like a court of first appeal in order to decide whether or not the reasons are germane to clause (b) of the second proviso or an analogous service rule. The court must put itself in the place of the disciplinary authority and consider what in the then prevailing situation a reasonable man acting in a reasonable manner would have done. It will judge the matter in the light of the then prevailing situation and not as if the disciplinary authority was deciding the question whether the inquiry should be dispensed with or not in the cool detached atmosphere of a court room, removed in time from the situation in question. Where two views are possible, the court will decline to interfere.” 16. While sitting in judicial review over the reasons recorded by the disciplinary authority for dispensing with the departmental enquiry, the Apex Court has held that court will not sit in judgement over the reasons like a court of first appeal in order to decide whether or not the reasons are germane to clause (b) of the second proviso or an analogous service rule. The Apex Court held that while exercising the power of judicial review the court will judge the matter in the light of the then prevailing situation and not as if the disciplinary authority was deciding the question whether the enquiry should be dispensed with or not in the cool detached atmosphere of a court room, removed in time from the situation in question. Where two views are possible, the court will decline to interfere. 17. Reference may also be made in this regard to a Supreme Court judgement reported in (2009) 9 SCC 24 (Southern Railway Officers Association & anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors.). 18. Where two views are possible, the court will decline to interfere. 17. Reference may also be made in this regard to a Supreme Court judgement reported in (2009) 9 SCC 24 (Southern Railway Officers Association & anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors.). 18. In the case of Southern Railway Officers Association & anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors. (supra), action of dismissal from service dispensing with the departmental enquiry was taken as the employees had attempted to cause bodily harm to a senior officer of the railway, they had created an ugly scene and alleged to have abused, threatened and assaulted a railway officer who was proceeding to his native place on retirement. In such circumstance, the authorities, dispensing with the formality of holding departmental proceeding, recorded satisfaction that the delinquent employee with his associates threatened, intimidated and terrorized all the officers. The atmosphere of violence, indiscipline and insubordination was prevailing and in such circumstance, it was not reasonably practicable to hold enquiry. The Apex Court interfered with the findings of the High Court setting aside the orders of dismissal recording as follows in paragraph 35 which reads thus:- “35. So far as the finding of the High Court that the orders of dismissal suffer from want of material is concerned, the orders of the disciplinary authority themselves disclose existence of sufficient materials. Before the statutory authorities, the incident was not denied. Lodging of the first report was also not denied. The fact that one of the delinquent officials was arrested on the same day was not denied. Arrest of others after the period of two weeks also stood admitted. Display of handwritten poster both at the workshop and at the railway station had also not been denied.” 19. Regard being had to the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Southern Railway Officers Association & anr. v. Union of India & Ors. (supra) and in view of the plea in the present writ application it cannot be said that the grounds stated in the order of dismissal were wholly non existent. Further no malafide has been alleged against the disciplinary authority. The reasons for dispensing with the disciplinary proceeding, in the facts and circumstances of the case cannot be said to be irrelevant. 20. Further no malafide has been alleged against the disciplinary authority. The reasons for dispensing with the disciplinary proceeding, in the facts and circumstances of the case cannot be said to be irrelevant. 20. As regards the submission made on behalf of the petitioner, that the petitioner was subsequently acquitted in the criminal case and, therefore, also the order of dismissal from service requires to be interfered with by this court, paragraph 37 of the judgement in the case of Southern Railway Officers Association & anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors. (supra) is relevant which reads thus:- “37. Acquittal in a criminal case by itself cannot be a ground for interfering with an order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. The High Court did not say that the said fact had not been taken into consideration. The revisional authority did so. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the order of dismissal can be passed even if the delinquent official had been acquitted of the criminal charge.” 21. This writ application is, accordingly, dismissed. Before I part with, I must record my appreciation for the perseverance, tenacity and at the same time fairness with which learned counsel for the petitioner has assisted this court.